The Mueller Docs U.S. v. Roger Stone U.S. v. Michael Cohen U.S. v. Paul Manafort U.S. v. Russian intelligence officers U.S. v. Konstantin Kilimnik U.S. v. Richard Gates U.S. v. Paul Manafort and Richard Gates U.S. v. Alex van der Zwaan U.S. v. Internet Research Agency U.S. v. Richard Pinedo U.S. v. Michael Flynn U.S. v. George Papadopoulos

The Mueller Docs

The complete court filings from the Special Counsel investigating Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election


U.S. v. Roger Stone

Indictment of Roger Stone

The Grand Jury for the District of Columbia charges:

Introduction

1. By in or around May 2016, the Democratic National Committee (“DNC”) and the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (“DCCC”) became aware that their computer systems had been compromised by unauthorized intrusions and hired a security company (“Company 1”) to identify the extent of the intrusions.

2. On or about June 14, 2016, the DNC—through Company 1—publicly announced that it had been hacked by Russian government actors.

3. From in or around July 2016 through in or around November 2016, an organization (“Organization 1”), which had previously posted documents stolen by others from U.S. persons, entities, and the U.S. government, released tens of thousands of documents stolen from the DNC and the personal email account of the chairman of the U.S. presidential campaign of Hillary Clinton (“Clinton Campaign”).

a. On or about July 22, 2016, Organization 1 released documents stolen from the DNC.

b. Between on or about October 7, 2016 and on or about November 7, 2016, Organization 1 released approximately 33 tranches of documents that had been stolen from the personal email account of the Clinton Campaign chairman, totaling over 50,000 stolen documents.

4. ROGER JASON STONE, JR. was a political consultant who worked for decades in U.S. politics and on U.S. political campaigns. STONE was an official on the U.S. presidential campaign of Donald J. Trump (“Trump Campaign”) until in or around August 2015, and maintained regular contact with and publicly supported the Trump Campaign through the 2016 election.

5. During the summer of 2016, STONE spoke to senior Trump Campaign officials about Organization 1 and information it might have had that would be damaging to the Clinton Campaign. STONE was contacted by senior Trump Campaign officials to inquire about future releases by Organization 1.

6. By in or around early August 2016, STONE was claiming both publicly and privately to have communicated with Organization 1. By in or around mid-August 2016, Organization 1 made a public statement denying direct communication with STONE. Thereafter, STONE said that his communication with Organization 1 had occurred through a person STONE described as a “mutual friend,” “go-between,” and “intermediary.” STONE also continued to communicate with members of the Trump Campaign about Organization 1 and its intended future releases.

7. After the 2016 U.S. presidential election, the U.S. House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (“HPSCI”), the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (“SSCI”), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) opened or announced their respective investigations into Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, which included investigating STONE’s claims of contact with Organization 1.

8. In response, STONE took steps to obstruct these investigations. Among other steps to obstruct the investigations, STONE:

a. Made multiple false statements to HPSCI about his interactions regarding Organization 1, and falsely denied possessing records that contained evidence of these interactions; and

b. Attempted to persuade a witness to provide false testimony to and withhold pertinent information from the investigations.

Other Relevant Individuals

9. Person 1 was a political commentator who worked with an online media publication during the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign. Person 1 spoke regularly with STONE throughout the campaign, including about the release of stolen documents by Organization 1.

10. Person 2 was a radio host who had known STONE for more than a decade. In testimony before HPSCI on or about September 26, 2017, STONE described Person 2 (without naming him) as an “intermediary,” “go-between,” and “mutual friend” to the head of Organization 1. In a follow-up letter to HPSCI dated October 13, 2017, STONE identified Person 2 by name and claimed Person 2 was the “gentleman who confirmed for Mr. Stone” that the head of Organization 1 had “‘[e]mails related to Hillary Clinton which are pending publication.’”

Background

STONE’s Communications About Organization 1 During the Campaign

11. By in or around June and July 2016, STONE informed senior Trump Campaign officials that he had information indicating Organization 1 had documents whose release would be damaging to the Clinton Campaign. The head of Organization 1 was located at all relevant times at the Ecuadorian Embassy in London, United Kingdom.

12. After the July 22, 2016 release of stolen DNC emails by Organization 1, a senior Trump Campaign official was directed to contact STONE about any additional releases and what other damaging information Organization 1 had regarding the Clinton Campaign. STONE thereafter told the Trump Campaign about potential future releases of damaging material by Organization 1.

13. STONE also corresponded with associates about contacting Organization 1 in order to obtain additional emails damaging to the Clinton Campaign.

a. On or about July 25, 2016, STONE sent an email to Person 1 with the subject line, “Get to [the head of Organization 1].” The body of the message read, “Get to [the head of Organization 1] [a]t Ecuadorian Embassy in London and get the pending [Organization 1] emails . . . they deal with Foundation, allegedly.” On or about the same day, Person 1 forwarded STONE’s email to an associate who lived in the United Kingdom and was a supporter of the Trump Campaign.

b. On or about July 31, 2016, STONE emailed Person 1 with the subject line, “Call me MON.” The body of the email read in part that Person 1’s associate in the United Kingdom “should see [the head of Organization 1].”

c. On or about August 2, 2016, Person 1 emailed STONE. Person 1 wrote that he was currently in Europe and planned to return in or around mid-August. Person 1 stated in part, “Word is friend in embassy plans 2 more dumps. One shortly after I’m back. 2nd in Oct. Impact planned to be very damaging.” The phrase “friend in embassy” referred to the head of Organization 1. Person 1 added in the same email, “Time to let more than [the Clinton Campaign chairman] to be exposed as in bed w enemy if they are not ready to drop HRC. That appears to be the game hackers are now about. Would not hurt to start suggesting HRC old, memory bad, has stroke – neither he nor she well. I expect that much of next dump focus, setting stage for Foundation debacle.”

14. Starting in early August 2016, after receiving the August 2, 2016 email from Person 1, STONE made repeated statements about information he claimed to have learned from the head of Organization 1.

a. On or about August 8, 2016, STONE attended a public event at which he stated, “I actually have communicated with [the head of Organization 1]. I believe the next tranche of his documents pertain to the Clinton Foundation, but there’s no telling what the October surprise may be.”

b. On or about August 12, 2016, STONE stated during an interview that he was “in communication with [the head of Organization 1]” but was “not at liberty to discuss what I have.”

c. On or about August 16, 2016, STONE stated during an interview that “it became known on this program that I have had some back-channel communication with [Organization 1] and [the head of Organization 1].” In a second interview on or about the same day, STONE stated that he “communicated with [the head of Organization 1]” and that they had a “mutual acquaintance who is a fine gentleman.”

d. On or about August 18, 2016, STONE stated during a television interview that he had communicated with the head of Organization 1 through an “intermediary, somebody who is a mutual friend.”

e. On or about August 23, 2016, Person 2 asked STONE during a radio interview, “You’ve been in touch indirectly with [the head of Organization 1]. . . . Can you give us any kind of insight? Is there an October surprise happening?” STONE responded, “Well, first of all, I don’t want to intimate in any way that I control or have influence with [the head of Organization 1] because I do not. . . . We have a mutual friend, somebody we both trust and therefore I am a recipient of pretty good information.”

15. Beginning on or about August 19, 2016, STONE exchanged written communications, including by text message and email, with Person 2 about Organization 1 and what the head of Organization 1 planned to do.

a. On or about August 19, 2016, Person 2 sent a text message to STONE that read in part, “I’m going to have [the head of Organization 1] on my show next Thursday.” On or about August 21, 2016, Person 2 sent another text message to STONE, writing in part, “I have [the head of Organization 1] on Thursday so I’m completely tied up on that day.”

b. On or about August 25, 2016, the head of Organization 1 was a guest on Person 2’s radio show for the first time. On or about August 26, 2016, Person 2 sent a text message to STONE that stated, “[the head of Organization 1] talk[ed] about you last night.” STONE asked what the head of Organization 1 said, to which Person 2 responded, “He didn’t say anything bad we were talking about how the Press is trying to make it look like you and he are in cahoots.”

c. On or about August 27, 2016, Person 2 sent text messages to STONE that said, “We are working on a [head of Organization 1] radio show,” and that he (Person 2) was “in charge” of the project. In a text message sent later that day, Person 2 added, “[The head of Organization 1] has kryptonite on Hillary.”

d. On or about September 18, 2016, STONE sent a text message to Person 2 that said, “I am e-mailing u a request to pass on to [the head of Organization 1].” Person 2 responded “Ok,” and added in a later text message, “[j]ust remember do not name me as your connection to [the head of Organization 1] you had one before that you referred to.”

i. On or about the same day, September 18, 2016, STONE emailed Person 2 an article with allegations against then-candidate Clinton related to her service as Secretary of State. STONE stated, “Please ask [the head of Organization 1] for any State or HRC e-mail from August 10 to August 30—particularly on August 20, 2011 that mention [the subject of the article] or confirm this narrative.”

ii. On or about September 19, 2016, STONE texted Person 2 again, writing, “Pass my message . . . to [the head of Organization 1].” Person 2 responded, “I did.” On or about September 20, 2016, Person 2 forwarded the request to a friend who was an attorney with the ability to contact the head of Organization 1. Person 2 blindcopied STONE on the forwarded email.

e. On or about September 30, 2016, Person 2 sent STONE via text message a photograph of Person 2 standing outside the Ecuadorian Embassy in London where the head of Organization 1 was located.

f. On or about October 1, 2016, which was a Saturday, Person 2 sent STONE text messages that stated, “big news Wednesday . . . now pretend u don’t know me . . . Hillary’s campaign will die this week.” In the days preceding these messages, the press had reported that the head of Organization 1 planned to make a public announcement on or about Tuesday, October 4, 2016, which was reported to be the ten-year anniversary of the founding of Organization 1.

g. On or about October 2, 2016, STONE emailed Person 2, with the subject line “WTF?,” a link to an article reporting that Organization 1 was canceling its “highly anticipated Tuesday announcement due to security concerns.” Person 2 responded to STONE, “head fake.”

h. On or about the same day, October 2, 2016, STONE texted Person 2 and asked, “Did [the head of Organization 1] back off.” On or about October 3, 2016, Person 2 initially responded, “I can’t tal[k] about it.” After further exchanges with STONE, Person 2 said, “I think it[’]s on for tomorrow.” Person 2 added later that day, “Off the Record Hillary and her people are doing a full-court press they [sic] keep [the head of Organization 1] from making the next dump . . . That’s all I can tell you on this line . . . Please leave my name out of it.”

16. In or around October 2016, STONE made statements about Organization 1’s future releases, including statements similar to those that Person 2 made to him. For example:

a. On or about October 3, 2016, STONE wrote to a supporter involved with the Trump Campaign, “Spoke to my friend in London last night. The payload is still coming.”

b. Also on or about October 3, 2016, STONE received an email from a reporter who had connections to a high-ranking Trump Campaign official that asked, “[the head of Organization 1] – what’s he got? Hope it’s good.” STONE responded in part, “It is. I’d tell [the high-ranking Trump Campaign official] but he doesn’t call me back.”

c. On or about October 4, 2016, the head of Organization 1 held a press conference but did not release any new materials pertaining to the Clinton Campaign. Shortly afterwards, STONE received an email from the high-ranking Trump Campaign official asking about the status of future releases by Organization 1. STONE answered that the head of Organization 1 had a “[s]erious security concern” but that Organization 1 would release “a load every week going forward.”

d. Later that day, on or about October 4, 2016, the supporter involved with the Trump Campaign asked STONE via text message if he had “hear[d] anymore from London.” STONE replied, “Yes - want to talk on a secure line - got Whatsapp?” STONE subsequently told the supporter that more material would be released and that it would be damaging to the Clinton Campaign.

17. On or about October 7, 2016, Organization 1 released the first set of emails stolen from the Clinton Campaign chairman. Shortly after Organization 1’s release, an associate of the highranking Trump Campaign official sent a text message to STONE that read “well done.” In subsequent conversations with senior Trump Campaign officials, STONE claimed credit for having correctly predicted the October 7, 2016 release.

The Investigations

18. In or around 2017, government officials publicly disclosed investigations into Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election and possible links to individuals associated with the campaigns.

a. On or about January 13, 2017, the chairman and vice chairman of SSCI announced the committee would conduct an inquiry that would investigate, among other things, any intelligence regarding links between Russia and individuals associated with political campaigns, as well as Russian cyber activity and other “active measures” directed against the United States in connection with the 2016 election.

b. On or about January 25, 2017, the chairman and ranking member of HPSCI announced that HPSCI had been conducting an inquiry similar to SSCI’s.

c. On or about March 20, 2017, the then-director of the FBI testified at a HPSCI hearing and publicly disclosed that the FBI was investigating Russian interference in the 2016 election and possible links and coordination between the Trump Campaign and the Russian government.

d. By in or around August 2017, news reports stated that a federal grand jury had opened an investigation into matters relating to Russian government efforts to interfere in the 2016 election, including possible links and coordination between the Trump Campaign and the Russian government.

STONE’s False Testimony to HPSCI

19. In or around May 2017, HPSCI sent a letter requesting that STONE voluntarily appear before the committee and produce:

Any documents, records, electronically stored information including e-mail, communication, recordings, data and tangible things (including, but not limited to, graphs, charts, photographs, images and other documents) regardless of form, other than those widely available (e.g., newspaper articles) that reasonably could lead to the discovery of any facts within the investigation’s publiclyannounced parameters. On or about May 22, 2017, STONE caused a letter to be submitted to HPSCI stating that “Mr. Stone has no documents, records, or electronically stored information, regardless of form, other than those widely available that reasonably could lead to the discovery of any facts within the investigation’s publicly-announced parameters.”

20. On or about September 26, 2017, STONE testified before HPSCI in Washington, D.C. as part of the committee’s ongoing investigation. In his opening statement, STONE stated, “These hearings are largely based on a yet unproven allegation that the Russian state is responsible for the hacking of the DNC and [the Clinton Campaign chairman] and the transfer of that information to [Organization 1].” STONE further stated that “[m]embers of this Committee” had made certain “assertions against me which must be rebutted here today,” which included “[t]he charge that I knew in advance about, and predicted, the hacking of Clinton campaign chairman[’s] email, [and] that I had advanced knowledge of the source or actual content of the [Organization 1] disclosures regarding Hillary Clinton.”

21. In the course of his HPSCI testimony, STONE made deliberately false and misleading statements to the committee concerning, among other things, his possession of documents pertinent to HPSCI’s investigation; the source for his early August 2016 statements about Organization 1; requests he made for information from the head of Organization 1; his communications with his identified intermediary; and his communications with the Trump Campaign about Organization 1.

STONE’s False and Misleading Testimony About His Possession of Documents Pertinent to HPSCI’s Investigation

22. During his HPSCI testimony, STONE was asked, “So you have no emails to anyone concerning the allegations of hacked documents . . . or any discussions you have had with third parties about [the head of Organization 1]? You have no emails, no texts, no documents whatsoever, any kind of that nature?” STONE falsely and misleadingly answered, “That is correct. Not to my knowledge.”

23. In truth and in fact, STONE had sent and received numerous emails and text messages during the 2016 campaign in which he discussed Organization 1, its head, and its possession of hacked emails. At the time of his false testimony, STONE was still in possession of many of these emails and text messages, including:

a. The email from STONE to Person 1 on or about July 25, 2016 that read in part, “Get to [the head of Organization 1] [a]t Ecuadorian Embassy in London and get the pending [Organization 1] emails . . . they deal with Foundation, allegedly.”;

b. The email from STONE to Person 1 on or about July 31, 2016 that said an associate of Person 1 “should see [the head of Organization 1].”;

c. The email from Person 1 to STONE on or about August 2, 2016 that stated in part, “Word is friend in embassy plans 2 more dumps. One shortly after I’m back. 2nd in Oct. Impact planned to be very damaging.”;

d. Dozens of text messages and emails, beginning on or about August 19, 2016 and continuing through the election, between STONE and Person 2 in which they discussed Organization 1 and the head of Organization 1;

e. The email from STONE on or about October 3, 2016 to the supporter involved with the Trump Campaign, which read in part, “Spoke to my friend in London last night. The payload is still coming.”; and

f. The emails on or about October 4, 2016 between STONE and the high-ranking member of the Trump Campaign, including STONE’s statement that Organization 1 would release “a load every week going forward.”

24. By falsely claiming that he had no emails or text messages in his possession that referred to the head of Organization 1, STONE avoided providing a basis for HPSCI to subpoena records in his possession that could have shown that other aspects of his testimony were false and misleading.

STONE’s False and Misleading Testimony About His Early August 2016 Statements

25. During his HPSCI testimony on or about September 26, 2017, STONE was asked to explain his statements in early August 2016 about being in contact with the head of Organization 1. STONE was specifically asked about his statement on or about August 8, 2016 that “I’ve actually communicated with [the head of Organization 1],” as well as his statement on or about August 12, 2016 that he was “in communication with [the head of Organization 1]” but was “not at liberty to discuss what I have.”

26. STONE responded that his public references to having a means of contacting Organization 1 referred exclusively to his contact with a journalist, who STONE described as a “go-between, as an intermediary, as a mutual friend” of the head of Organization 1. STONE stated that he asked this individual, his intermediary, “to confirm what [the head of Organization 1] ha[d] tweeted, himself, on July 21st, that he ha[d] the Clinton emails and that he [would] publish them.” STONE further stated that the intermediary “was someone I knew had interviewed [the head of Organization 1]. And I merely wanted confirmation of what he had tweeted on the 21st.” STONE declined to tell HPSCI the name of this “intermediary” but provided a description in his testimony that was consistent with Person 2.

27. On or about October 13, 2017, STONE caused a letter to be submitted to HPSCI that identified Person 2 by name as the “gentleman who confirmed for Mr. Stone” that the head of Organization 1 had “‘[e]mails related to Hillary Clinton which are pending publication.’”

28. STONE’s explanation of his August 2016 statements about communicating with the head of Organization 1 was false and misleading. In truth and in fact, the first time Person 2 interviewed the head of Organization 1 was on or about August 25, 2016, after STONE made his August 8 and August 12, 2016 public statements. Similarly, at the time STONE made his August 2016 statements, STONE had directed Person 1—not Person 2—to contact the head of Organization 1. And Person 1—not Person 2—had told STONE in advance of STONE’s August 8 and August 12, 2016 public statements that “[w]ord is friend in embassy plans 2 more dumps,” including one in October. At no time did STONE identify Person 1 to HPSCI as another individual STONE contacted to serve as a “go-between,” “intermediary,” or other source of information from Organization 1. STONE also never disclosed his exchanges with Person 1 when answering HPSCI’s questioning about STONE’s August 8 and August 12, 2016 statements.

STONE’s False and Misleading Testimony About Requests He Made for Information from the Head of Organization 1

29. During his HPSCI testimony, STONE was asked, “[W]hat was the extent of the communication with [the intermediary]?” STONE replied, “I asked him to confirm . . . that the tweet of [the head of Organization 1] of the 21st was accurate, that they did in fact have . . . Hillary Clinton emails and that they would release them.” STONE was then asked, “Did you ask [the intermediary] to communicate anything else to [the head of Organization 1]?” STONE falsely and misleadingly responded, “I did not.” STONE was then asked, “Did you ask [the intermediary] to do anything on your own behalf?” STONE falsely and misleadingly responded, “I did not.”

30. In truth and in fact, STONE directed both Person 1 and Person 2 to pass on requests to the head of Organization 1 for documents that STONE believed would be damaging to the Clinton Campaign. For example:

a. As described above, on or about July 25, 2016, STONE sent Person 1 an email that read, “Get to [the head of Organization 1] [a]t Ecuadorian Embassy in London and get the pending [Organization 1] emails . . . they deal with Foundation, allegedly.”

b. On or about September 18, 2016, STONE sent a text message to Person 2 that said, “I am e-mailing u a request to pass on to [the head of Organization 1],” and then emailed Person 2 an article with allegations against then-candidate Clinton related to her service as Secretary of State. STONE added, “Please ask [the head of Organization 1] for any State or HRC e-mail from August 10 to August 30— particularly on August 20, 2011 that mention [the subject of the article] or confirm this narrative.”

c. On or about September 19, 2016, STONE texted Person 2 again, writing “Pass my message . . . to [the head of Organization 1].” Person 2 responded, “I did,” and the next day Person 2, on an email blind-copied to STONE, forwarded the request to an attorney who had the ability to contact the head of Organization 1.

STONE’s False and Misleading Testimony About Communications with His Identified Intermediary

31. During his HPSCI testimony, STONE was asked repeatedly about his communications with the person he identified as his intermediary. STONE falsely and misleadingly stated that he had never communicated with his intermediary in writing in any way. During one exchange, STONE falsely and misleadingly claimed only to have spoken with the intermediary telephonically:

Q: [H]ow did you communicate with the intermediary?

A: Over the phone.

Q: And did you have any other means of communicating with the intermediary?

A: No.

Q: No text messages, no – none of the list, right?

A: No.

Later during his testimony, STONE again falsely denied ever communicating with his intermediary in writing:

Q: So you never communicated with your intermediary in writing in any way?

A: No.

Q: Never emailed him or texted him?

A: He’s not an email guy.

Q: So all your conversations with him were in person or over the phone.

A: Correct.

32. In truth and in fact, as described above, STONE and Person 2 (who STONE identified to HPSCI as his intermediary) engaged in frequent written communication by email and text message. STONE also engaged in frequent written communication by email and text message with Person 1, who also provided STONE with information regarding Organization 1.

33. Written communications between STONE and Person 1 and between STONE and Person 2 continued through STONE’s HPSCI testimony. Indeed, on or about September 26, 2017—the day that STONE testified before HPSCI and denied having ever sent or received emails or text messages from Person 2—STONE and Person 2 exchanged over thirty text messages.

34. Certain electronic messages between STONE and Person 1 and between STONE and Person 2 would have been material to HPSCI. For example:

a. In or around July 2016, STONE emailed Person 1 to “get to” the head of Organization 1 and obtain the pending emails.

b. In or around September 2016, STONE sent messages directing Person 2 to pass a request to the head of Organization 1.

c. On or about January 6, 2017, Person 2 sent STONE an email that had the subject line “Back channel bs.” In the email, Person 2 wrote, “Well I have put together timelines[] and you [] said you have a back-channel way back a month before I had [the head of Organization 1] on my show . . . I have never had a conversation with [the head of Organization 1] other than my radio show . . . I have pieced it all together . . . so you may as well tell the truth that you had no back-channel or there’s the guy you were talking about early August.”

STONE’s False and Misleading Testimony About Communications with the Trump Campaign

35. During his HPSCI testimony, STONE was asked, “did you discuss your conversations with the intermediary with anyone involved in the Trump campaign?” STONE falsely and misleadingly answered, “I did not.” In truth and in fact, and as described above, STONE spoke to multiple individuals involved in the Trump Campaign about what he claimed to have learned from his intermediary to Organization 1, including the following:

a. On multiple occasions, STONE told senior Trump Campaign officials about materials possessed by Organization 1 and the timing of future releases.

b. On or about October 3, 2016, STONE wrote to a supporter involved with the Trump Campaign, “Spoke to my friend in London last night. The payload is still coming.”

c. On or about October 4, 2016, STONE told a high-ranking Trump Campaign official that the head of Organization 1 had a “[s]erious security concern” but would release “a load every week going forward.”

Attempts to Prevent Person 2 from Contradicting STONE’s False Statements to HPSCI

36. On or about October 19, 2017, STONE sent Person 2 an excerpt of his letter to HPSCI that identified Person 2 as his “intermediary” to Organization 1. STONE urged Person 2, if asked by HPSCI, to falsely confirm what STONE had previously testified to, including that it was Person 2 who provided STONE with the basis for STONE’s early August 2016 statements about contact with Organization 1. Person 2 repeatedly told STONE that his testimony was false and told him to correct his testimony to HPSCI. STONE did not do so. STONE then engaged in a prolonged effort to prevent Person 2 from contradicting STONE’s false statements to HPSCI.

37. In or around November 2017, Person 2 received a request from HPSCI to testify voluntarily before the committee. After being contacted by HPSCI, Person 2 spoke and texted repeatedly with STONE. In these discussions, STONE sought to have Person 2 testify falsely either that Person 2 was the identified intermediary or that Person 2 could not remember what he had told STONE. Alternatively, STONE sought to have Person 2 invoke his Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination. For example:

a. On or about November 19, 2017, in a text message to STONE, Person 2 said that his lawyer wanted to see him (Person 2). STONE responded, “‘Stonewall it. Plead the fifth. Anything to save the plan’ . . . Richard Nixon.” On or about November 20, 2017, Person 2 informed HPSCI that he declined HPSCI’s request for a voluntary interview.

b. On or about November 21, 2017, Person 2 texted STONE, “I was told that the house committee lawyer told my lawyer that I will be getting a subpoena.” STONE responded, “That was the point at which your lawyers should have told them you would assert your 5th Amendment rights if compelled to appear.”

c. On or about November 28, 2017, Person 2 received a subpoena compelling his testimony before HPSCI. Person 2 informed STONE of the subpoena.

d. On or about November 30, 2017, STONE asked Person 1 to write publicly about Person 2. Person 1 responded, “Are you sure you want to make something out of this now? Why not wait to see what [Person 2] does. You may be defending yourself too much—raising new questions that will fuel new inquiries. This may be a time to say less, not more.” STONE responded by telling Person 1 that Person 2 “will take the 5th—but let’s hold a day.”

e. On multiple occasions, including on or about December 1, 2017, STONE told Person 2 that Person 2 should do a “Frank Pentangeli” before HPSCI in order to avoid contradicting STONE’s testimony. Frank Pentangeli is a character in the film The Godfather: Part II, which both STONE and Person 2 had discussed, who testifies before a congressional committee and in that testimony claims not to know critical information that he does in fact know.

f. On or about December 1, 2017, STONE texted Person 2, “And if you turned over anything to the FBI you’re a fool.” Later that day, Person 2 texted STONE, “You need to amend your testimony before I testify on the 15th.” STONE responded, “If you testify you’re a fool. Because of tromp I could never get away with a certain [sic] my Fifth Amendment rights but you can. I guarantee you you are the one who gets indicted for perjury if you’re stupid enough to testify.”

38. On or about December 12, 2017, Person 2 informed HPSCI that he intended to assert his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination if required to appear by subpoena. Person 2 invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege in part to avoid providing evidence that would show STONE’s previous testimony to Congress was false.

39. Following Person 2’s invocation of his Fifth Amendment privilege not to testify before HPSCI, STONE and Person 2 continued to have discussions about the various investigations into Russian interference in the 2016 election and what information Person 2 would provide to investigators. During these conversations, STONE repeatedly made statements intended to prevent Person 2 from cooperating with the investigations. For example:

a. On or about December 24, 2017, Person 2 texted STONE, “I met [the head of Organization 1] for f[i]rst time this yea[r] sept 7 . . . docs prove that. . . . You should be honest w fbi . . . there was no back channel . . . be honest.” STONE replied approximately two minutes later, “I’m not talking to the FBI and if your smart you won’t either.”

b. On or about April 9, 2018, STONE wrote in an email to Person 2, “You are a rat. A stoolie. You backstab your friends-run your mouth my lawyers are dying Rip you to shreds.” STONE also said he would “take that dog away from you,” referring to Person 2’s dog. On or about the same day, STONE wrote to Person 2, “I am so ready. Let’s get it on. Prepare to die [expletive].”

c. On or about May 21, 2018, Person 2 wrote in an email to STONE, “You should have just been honest with the house Intel committee . . . you’ve opened yourself up to perjury charges like an idiot.” STONE responded, “You are so full of [expletive]. You got nothing. Keep running your mouth and I’ll file a bar complaint against your friend [the attorney who had the ability to contact the head of Organization 1].”

COUNT ONE
(Obstruction of Proceeding)

40. Paragraphs 1 through 39 of this Indictment are re-alleged and incorporated by reference as if fully set forth herein.

41. From in or around May 2017 through at least December 2017, within the District of Columbia and elsewhere, the defendant ROGER JASON STONE, JR., corruptly influenced, obstructed, impeded, and endeavored to influence, obstruct, and impede the due and proper exercise of the power of inquiry under which any inquiry and investigation is being had by either House, and any committee of either House and any joint committee of the Congress, to wit: STONE testified falsely and misleadingly at a HPSCI hearing in or around September 2017; STONE failed to turn over and lied about the existence of responsive records to HPSCI’s requests about documents; STONE submitted and caused to be submitted a letter to HPSCI falsely and misleadingly describing communications with Person 2; and STONE attempted to have Person 2 testify falsely before HPSCI or prevent him from testifying.

All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1505 and 2.

COUNTS TWO THROUGH SIX
(False Statements)

42. Paragraphs 1 through 39 of this Indictment are re-alleged and incorporated by reference as if fully set forth herein.

43. On or about September 26, 2017, within the District of Columbia and elsewhere, in a matter within the jurisdiction of the legislative branch of the Government of the United States, the defendant ROGER JASON STONE, JR., knowingly and willfully made and caused to be made materially false, fictitious, and fraudulent statements and representations, to wit:

Count 2
False Statement

STONE testified falsely that he did not have emails with third parties about the head of Organization 1, and that he did not have any documents, emails, or text messages that refer to the head of Organization 1.

Count 3
False Statement

STONE testified falsely that his August 2016 references to being in contact with the head of Organization 1 were references to communications with a single “go-between,” “mutual friend,” and “intermediary,” who STONE identified as Person 2.

Count 4
False Statement

STONE testified falsely that he did not ask the person he referred to as his “go-between,” “mutual friend,” and “intermediary,” to communicate anything to the head of Organization 1 and did not ask the intermediary to do anything on STONE’s behalf.

Count 5
False Statement

STONE testified falsely that he and the person he referred to as his “go-between,” “mutual friend,” and “intermediary” did not communicate via text message or email about Organization 1.

Count 6
False Statement

STONE testified falsely that he had never discussed his conversations with the person he referred to as his “go-between,” “mutual friend,” and “intermediary” with anyone involved in the Trump Campaign.

All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1001(a)(2) and 2.

COUNT SEVEN
(Witness Tampering)

44. Paragraphs 1 through 39 of this Indictment are re-alleged and incorporated by reference as if fully set forth herein.

45. Between in or around September 2017 and present, within the District of Columbia and elsewhere, the defendant ROGER JASON STONE, JR., knowingly and intentionally corruptly persuaded and attempted to corruptly persuade another person, to wit: Person 2, with intent to influence, delay, and prevent the testimony of any person in an official proceeding.

All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1512(b)(1).

U.S. v. Michael Cohen

Michael Cohen Plea Agreement

Dear Mr. Petrillo and Ms. Lester:

This letter sets forth the full and complete plea offer to your client, Michael Cohen (hereinafter referred to as "your client" or "defendant"), from the Special Counsel's Office (hereinafter also referred to as "the Government" or "this Office"). If your client accepts the terms and conditions of this offer, please have your client execute this document in the space provided below. Upon receipt of the executed document, this letter will become the Plea Agreement (hereinafter referred to as "this Agreement"). The terms of the offer are as follows:

1. Charges and Statutory Penalties

Your client agrees to waive indictment and plead guilty to a Criminal Information, a copy of which is attached, charging your client with making false statements to the U.S. Congress, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2).

Your client understands that a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 carries a maximum sentence of 5 years' imprisonment; a fine of not more than $250,000, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3571(b)(3); a term of supervised release of not more than 3 years, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b)(2); and an obligation to pay any applicable interest or penalties on fines and restitution not timely made.

In addition, your client agrees to pay a special assessment of $100 per felony conviction to the Clerk of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. Your client also understands that, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3572 and § 5E1.2 of the United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual (2017) (hereinafter "Sentencing Guidelines," "Guidelines," or "U.S.S.G."), the Court may also impose a fine that is sufficient to pay the federal government the costs of any imprisonment, term of supervised release, and period of probation.

2. Plea

Your client understands and acknowledges that this Agreement is contingent upon the entry of a guilty plea by the defendant in this case. If your client fails to enter a guilty plea, this Agreement and any proceedings pursuant to this Agreement may be withdrawn or voided in whole or in part at the option of this Office.

3. Factual Stipulations

Your client agrees that the factual allegations found within the Criminal Information fairly and accurately describe your client's actions and involvement in the offense to which your client is pleading guilty.

4. Additional Charges

In consideration of your client's guilty plea to the above offense, your client will not be further prosecuted criminally by this Office for the conduct set forth in the attached Criminal Information; for any other false statements made by him to the U.S. Congress or to this Office in connection with the conduct described in the Criminal Information; and for obstructing, aiding or abetting in the obstruction of, or conspiring to obstruct or commit perjury before congressional or grand jury investigations in connection with the conduct described in the Criminal Information.

5. Sentencing Guidelines Analysis

Your client understands that the sentence in this case will be determined by the Court, pursuant to the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), including a consideration of the applicable guidelines and policies set forth in the Sentencing Guidelines. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(B), and to assist the Court in determining the appropriate sentence, the parties agree to the following:

A. Estimated Offense Level Under the Guidelines

The parties agree that the following Sentencing Guidelines sections apply:

U. S S G. § 2B1 .1(a) (2) Base Offense Level: 6

Total: 6

B. Acceptance of Responsibility

The Government agrees that a 2-level reduction will be appropriate, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, provided that your client clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility, to the satisfaction of the Government, through your client's allocution, adherence to every provision of this Agreement, and conduct between entry of the plea and imposition of sentence.

Nothing in this Agreement limits the right of the Government to seek denial of the adjustment for acceptance of responsibility, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, and/or imposition of an adjustment for obstruction of justice, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, regardless of any agreement set forth above, should your client move to withdraw your client's guilty plea after it is entered, or should it be determined by the Government that your client has either (a) engaged in conduct, unknown to the Government at the time of the signing of this Agreement, that constitutes obstruction of justice, (b) engaged in additional criminal conduct after signing this Agreement, or (c) taken any other action inconsistent with acceptance of responsibility.

In accordance with the above, the applicable Guidelines Offense Level will be at least 4.

C. Estimated Criminal History Category

Based upon the information now available to this Office, your client was previously convicted in United States v. Cohen, No. 1:18-cr-602 (WHP) (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2018). As of this date, your client has not been sentenced in that matter.

Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(c) and 4A1.2(a)(4), your client is estimated to have one criminal history point, and your client's Criminal History Category is estimated to be I. Your client acknowledges that if additional convictions are discovered during the pre-sentence investigation by the United States Probation Office, your client's criminal history points may increase.

D. Estimated Applicable Guidelines Range

Based upon the agreed total offense level and the estimated criminal history category set forth above, your client's estimated Sentencing Guidelines range is zero months to six months' imprisonment (the "Estimated Guidelines Range"). In addition, the parties agree that, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2, should the Court impose a fine, at Guidelines level 4, the estimated applicable fine range is $500 to $9,500. Your client reserves the right to ask the Court not to impose any applicable fine.

The parties agree that, solely for the purposes of calculating the applicable range under the Sentencing Guidelines, neither a downward nor upward departure from the Estimated Guidelines Range set forth above is warranted. Accordingly, neither party will seek any departure or adjustment to the Estimated Guidelines Range, nor will either party suggest that the Court consider such a departure or adjustment, except as provided above. Moreover, your client understands and acknowledges that the Estimated Guidelines Range agreed to by the parties is not binding on the Probation Office or the Court. Should the Court determine that a different guidelines range is applicable, your client will not be permitted to withdraw your client's guilty plea on that basis, and the Government and your client will still be bound by this Agreement.

Your client understands and acknowledges that the terms of this section apply only to conduct that occurred before the execution of this Agreement. Should your client commit any conduct after the execution of this Agreement that would form the basis for an increase in your client's base offense level or justify an upward departure (examples of which include, but are not limited to, obstruction of justice, failure to appear for a court proceeding, criminal conduct while pending sentencing, and false statements to law enforcement agents, the probation officer, or the Court), the Government is free under this Agreement to seek an increase in the base offense level based on that post-agreement conduct.

6. Agreement under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)

Based upon the information known to the Government at the time of the signing of this Agreement, the parties further agree that a sentence within the Estimated Guidelines Range would constitute a reasonable sentence in light of all of the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), should such a sentence be subject to appellate review notwithstanding the appeal waiver provided below.

7. Reservation of Allocution and Cooperation

The Government and your client reserve the right to describe fully, both orally and in writing, to the sentencing judge, the nature and seriousness of your client's misconduct, including any misconduct not described in the charges to which your client is pleading guilty.

The Government agrees to bring to the Court's attention at sentencing in this matter and in United States v. Cohen, No. 1:18-cr-602 (WHP) (S.D.N.Y.) the nature and extent of the defendant's cooperation with this Office, on the condition that your client continues to respond and provide truthful information regarding any and all matters as to which this Office deems relevant. The defendant must at all times give complete, truthful, and accurate information and testimony, and must not commit, or attempt to commit, any further crimes.

The Government agrees not to oppose the transfer of this case in its entirety or for the purposes of sentencing to the Judge in United States v. Cohen, No. 1:18-cr-602 (WHP) (S.D.N.Y.).

The parties also reserve the right to inform the presentence report writer and the Court of any relevant facts, to dispute any factual inaccuracies in the presentence report, and to contest any matters not provided for in this Agreement. In the event that the Court considers any Sentencing Guidelines adjustments, departures, or calculations different from any agreements contained in this Agreement, or contemplates a sentence outside the Guidelines range based upon the general sentencing factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the parties reserve the right to answer any related inquiries from the Court. In addition, if in this Agreement the parties have agreed to recommend or refrain from recommending to the Court a particular resolution of any sentencing issue, the parties reserve the right to full allocution in any post-sentence litigation. The parties retain the full right of allocution in connection with any post-sentence motion which may be filed in this matter and/or any proceeding(s) before the Bureau of Prisons. In addition, your client acknowledges that the Government is not obligated and does not intend to file any post-sentence downward departure motion in this case pursuant to Rule 35(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.

8. Court Not Bound by this Agreement or the Sentencing Guidelines

Your client understands that the sentence in this case will be imposed in accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), upon consideration of the Sentencing Guidelines. Your client further understands that the sentence to be imposed is a matter solely within the discretion of the Court. Your client acknowledges that the Court is not obligated to follow any recommendation of the Government at the time of sentencing. Your client understands that neither the Government's recommendation nor the Sentencing Guidelines are binding on the Court.

Your client acknowledges that your client's entry of a guilty plea to the charged offense authorizes the Court to impose any sentence, up to and including the statutory maximum sentence, which may be greater than the applicable Guidelines range. The Government cannot, and does not, make any promise or representation as to what sentence your client will receive. Moreover, it is understood that your client will have no right to withdraw your client's plea of guilty should the Court impose a sentence that is outside the Guidelines range or if the Court does not follow the Government's sentencing recommendation. The Government and your client will be bound by this Agreement, regardless of the sentence imposed by the Court. Any effort by your client to withdraw the guilty plea because of the length of the sentence shall constitute a breach of this Agreement.

9. Waivers

A. Venue

Your client waives any challenge to venue in the Southern District of New York.

B. Statute of Limitations

Your client agrees that, should the conviction following your client's plea of guilty pursuant to this Agreement be vacated for any reason, any prosecution, based on the conduct set forth in the attached Criminal Information, that is not time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations on the date of the signing of this Agreement (including any counts that the Government has agreed not to prosecute or to dismiss at sentencing pursuant to this Agreement) may be commenced or reinstated against your client, notwithstanding the expiration of the statute of limitations between the signing of this Agreement and the commencement or reinstatement of such prosecution. It is the intent of this Agreement to waive all defenses based on the statute of limitations with respect to any prosecution of conduct set forth in the attached Criminal Information that is not time-barred on the date that this Agreement is signed.

C. Trial Rights

Your client understands that by pleading guilty in this case your client agrees to waive certain rights afforded by the Constitution of the United States and/or by statute or rule. Your client agrees to forego the right to any further discovery or disclosures of information not already provided at the time of the entry of your client's guilty plea. Your client also agrees to waive, among other rights, the right to be indicted by a Grand Jury, the right to plead not guilty, and the right to a jury trial. If there were a jury trial, your client would have the right to be represented by counsel, to confront and cross-examine witnesses against your client, to challenge the admissibility of evidence offered against your client, to compel witnesses to appear for the purpose of testifying and presenting other evidence on your client's behalf, and to choose whether to testify. If there were a jury trial and your client chose not to testify at that trial, your client would have the right to have the jury instructed that your client's failure to testify could not be held against your client. Your client would further have the right to have the jury instructed that your client is presumed innocent until proven guilty, and that the burden would be on the United States to prove your client's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. If your client were found guilty after a trial, your client would have the right to appeal your client's conviction. Your client understands that the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States protects your client from the use of self-incriminating statements in a criminal prosecution. By entering a plea of guilty, your client knowingly and voluntarily waives or gives up your client's right against self-incrimination.

Your client acknowledges discussing with you Rule 11(f) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and Rule 410 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which ordinarily limit the admissibility of statements made by a defendant in the course of plea discussions or plea proceedings if a guilty plea is later withdrawn. Your client knowingly and voluntarily waives the rights that arise under these rules in the event your client withdraws your client's guilty plea or withdraws from this Agreement after signing it.

Your client also agrees to waive all constitutional and statutory rights to a speedy sentence and agrees that the plea of guilty pursuant to this Agreement will be entered at a time decided upon by the parties with the concurrence of the Court. Your client understands that the date for sentencing will be set by the Court.

D. Appeal Rights

Your client understands that federal law, specifically 18 U.S.C. § 3742, affords defendants the right to appeal their sentences in certain circumstances. Your client agrees to waive the right to appeal the sentence in this case, including but not limited to any term of imprisonment, fine, forfeiture, award of restitution, term or condition of supervised release, authority of the Court to set conditions of release, and the manner in which the sentence was determined, except to the extent the Court sentences your client above the statutory maximum or guidelines range determined by the Court or your client claims that your client received ineffective assistance of counsel, in which case your client would have the right to appeal the illegal sentence or above-guidelines sentence or raise on appeal a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, but not to raise on appeal other issues regarding the sentencing. In agreeing to this waiver, your client is aware that your client's sentence has yet to be determined by the Court. Realizing the uncertainty in estimating what sentence the Court ultimately will impose, your client knowingly and willingly waives your client's right to appeal the sentence, to the extent noted above, in exchange for the concessions made by the Government in this Agreement.

E. Collateral Attack

Your client also waives any right to challenge the conviction entered or sentence imposed under this Agreement or otherwise attempt to modify or change the sentence or the manner in which it was determined in any collateral attack, including, but not limited to, a motion brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 or Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), except to the extent such a motion is based on newly discovered evidence or on a claim that your client received ineffective assistance of counsel. Your client reserves the right to file a motion brought under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), but agrees to waive the right to appeal the denial of such a motion.

F. Privacy Act and FOIA Rights

Your client also agrees to waive all rights, whether asserted directly or by a representative, to request or receive from any department or agency of the United States any records pertaining to the investigation or prosecution of this case, including and without limitation any records that may be sought under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552, or the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, for the duration of the Office's investigation.

10. Restitution

Your client understands that the Court has an obligation to determine whether, and in what amount, mandatory restitution applies in this case under 18 U.S.C. § 3663A. The Government and your client agree that mandatory restitution does not apply in this case.

11. Breach of Agreement

Your client understands and agrees that, if after entering this Agreement, your client fails specifically to perform or to fulfill completely each and every one of your client's obligations under this Agreement, or engages in any criminal activity prior to sentencing, your client will have breached this Agreement. In the event of such a breach: (a) the Government will be free from its obligations under this Agreement; (b) your client will not have the right to withdraw the guilty plea; (c) your client will be fully subject to criminal prosecution for any other crimes, including perjury and obstruction of justice; and (d) the Government will be free to use against your client, directly and indirectly, in any criminal or civil proceeding, all statements made by your client and any of the information or materials provided by your client, including such statements, information and materials provided pursuant to this Agreement or during the course of any debriefings conducted in anticipation of, or after entry of, this Agreement, whether or not the debriefings were previously characterized as "off-the-record" debriefings, and including your client's statements made during proceedings before the Court pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Your client understands and agrees that the Government shall be required to prove a breach of this Agreement only by a preponderance of the evidence, except where such breach is based on a violation of federal, state, or local criminal law, which the Government need prove only by probable cause in order to establish a breach of this Agreement.

Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to permit your client to commit perjury, to make false statements or declarations, to obstruct justice, or to protect your client from prosecution for any crimes not included within this Agreement or committed by your client after the execution of this Agreement. Your client understands and agrees that the Government reserves the right to prosecute your client for any such offenses. Your client further understands that any perjury, false statements or declarations, or obstruction of justice relating to your client's obligations under this Agreement that takes place after execution of this Agreement shall constitute a breach of this Agreement. In the event of such a breach, your client will not be allowed to withdraw your client's guilty plea.

12. Complete Agreement

Other than a proffer agreement executed on August 7, 2018 and continued on September 12, September 18, October 8, October 17, November 12, and November 20, 2018, no agreements, promises, understandings, or representations have been made by the parties or their counsel other than those contained in writing herein, nor will any such agreements, promises, understandings, or representations be made unless committed to writing and signed by your client, defense counsel, and the Office. The proffer agreement, with respect to the Government, is superseded as noticed herein if the Agreement is breached.

This Office recognizes that, in connection with this Agreement, the defendant is entering into an agreement with the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York concerning the potential effect of this Agreement on the sentencing in United States v. Cohen, No. 1:18-cr-602 (WHP) (S.D.N.Y.).

Your client further understands that other than as set forth herein, this Agreement is binding only upon the Office, and does not bind any other United States Attorney's Office, nor does it bind any other state, local, or federal prosecutor. It also does not bar or compromise any civil, tax, or administrative claim pending or that may be made against your client.

If the foregoing terms and conditions are satisfactory, your client may so indicate by signing this Agreement no later than November 29, 2018.

Sincerely yours,
ROBERT S. MUELLER, III
Special Counsel

DEFENDANT'S ACCEPTANCE

I have read every page of this Agreement and have discussed it with my attorneys, Guy Petrillo and Amy Lester. I fully understand this Agreement and agree to it without reservation. I do this voluntarily and of my own free will, intending to be legally bound. No threats have been made to me nor am I under the influence of anything that could impede my ability to understand this Agreement fully. I am pleading guilty because I am in fact guilty of the offense identified in this Agreement.

I reaffirm that absolutely no promises, agreements, understandings, or conditions have been made or entered into in connection with my decision to plead guilty except those set forth in this Agreement. I am satisfied with the legal services provided by my attorneys in connection with this Agreement and matters related to it.

ATTORNEY'S ACKNOWLEDGMENT

I have read every page of this Agreement, reviewed this Agreement with my client, Michael Cohen, and fully discussed the provisions of this Agreement with my client. These pages accurately and completely set forth the entire Agreement.

Michael Cohen Criminal Information

The Special Counsel charges:

Background

The Defendant

1. From in or around 2007 through in or around January 2017, MICHAEL COHEN, the defendant, was an attorney and employee of a Manhattan-based real estate company (the "Company"). COHEN held the title of "Executive Vice President" and "Special Counsel" to the owner of the Company ("Individual 1").

False Statements to the U.S. Congress

2. On or about January 13, 2017, the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence ("SSCI") announced that it would conduct an investigation into Russian election interference and possible links between Russia and individuals associated with political campaigns. On or about January 25, 2017, the House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence ("HPSCI") announced that it also was conducting an investigation into Russian election interference and possible links between Russia and individuals associated with political campaigns.

3. On or about August 28, 2017, COHEN caused a two-page letter to be sent on his behalf to SSCI and HPSCI. The letter addressed his efforts at the Company to pursue a branded property in Moscow, Russia (the "Moscow Project"). COHEN stated the purpose of the letter was "to provide the Committee with additional information regarding the proposal," referring to the Moscow Project.

4. In the letter to SSCI and HPSCI, COHEN knowingly and deliberately made the following false representations:

a. The Moscow Project ended in January 2016 and was not discussed extensively with others in the Company. "The proposal was under consideration at the [Company] from September 2015 until the end of January 2016. By the end of January 2016, I determined that the proposal was not feasible for a variety of business reasons and should not be pursued further. Based on my business determinations, the [Company] abandoned the [Moscow Project] proposal. . . To the best of my knowledge, [Individual 1] was never in contact with anyone about this proposal other than me on three occasions. . I did not ask or brief [Individual 1], or any of his family, before I made the decision to terminate further work on the proposal."

b. COHEN never agreed to travel to Russia in connection with the Moscow Project and "never considered" asking Individual 1 to travel for the project. "I primarily communicated with the Moscow-based development company through a U.S. citizen third-party intermediary, [Individual 2]. . [Individual 2] constantly asked me to travel to Moscow as part of his efforts to push forward the discussion of the proposal. I ultimately determined that the proposal was not feasible and never agreed to make a trip to Russia. . Despite overtures by [Individual 2], I never considered asking [Individual 1] to travel to Russia in connection with this proposal."

c. COHEN did not recall any Russian government response or contact about the Moscow Project. "In mid-January 2016, [Individual 2] suggested that I send an email to [Russian Official 1], the Press Secretary for the President of Russia, since the proposal would require approvals within the Russian government that had not been issued. Those permissions were never provided. I decided to abandon the proposal less than two weeks later for business reasons and do not recall any response to my email, nor any other contacts by me with [Russian Official 1] or other Russian government officials about the proposal."

5. On or about September 19, 2017, COHEN was scheduled to appear before SSCI accompanied by counsel. In prepared remarks released to the public, COHEN stated, "I assume we will discuss the rejected proposal to build a [Company-branded] property in Moscow that was terminated in January of 2016; which occurred before the Iowa caucus and months before the very first primary. This was solely a real estate deal and nothing more. I was doing my job. I would ask that the two-page statement about the Moscow proposal that I sent to the Committee in August be incorporated into and attached to this transcript."

6. On or about October 25, 2017, COHEN gave testimony to SSCI, which included testimony about the Moscow Project consistent with his prepared remarks and his two-page statement.

7. In truth and in fact, and as COHEN well knew, COHEN's representations about the Moscow Project he made to SSCI and HPSCI were false and misleading. COHEN made the false statements to (1) minimize links between the Moscow Project and Individual 1 and (2) give the false impression that the Moscow Project ended before "the Iowa caucus and . . the very first primary," in hopes of limiting the ongoing Russia investigations. COHEN attempted to conceal or minimize through his false statements the following facts:

a. The Moscow Project was discussed multiple times within the Company and did not end in January 2016. Instead, as late as approximately June 2016, COHEN and Individual 2 discussed efforts to obtain Russian governmental approval for the Moscow Project. COHEN discussed the status and progress of the Moscow Project with Individual 1 on more than the three occasions COHEN claimed to the Committee, and he briefed family members of Individual 1 within the Company about the project.

b. COHEN agreed to travel to Russia in connection with the Moscow Project and took steps in contemplation of Individual l's possible travel to Russia. COHEN and Individual 2 discussed on multiple occasions traveling to Russia to pursue the Moscow Project.

i. COHEN asked Individual 1 about the possibility of Individual 1 traveling to Russia in connection with the Moscow Project, and asked a senior campaign official about potential business travel to Russia.

ii. On or about May 4, 2016, Individual 2 wrote to COHEN, "I had a chat with Moscow. ASSUMING the trip does happen the question is before or after the convention. Obviously the pre-meeting trip (you only) can happen anytime you want but the 2 big guys where [sic] the question. said I would confirm and revert." COHEN responded, "My trip before Cleveland. [Individual 1] once he becomes the nominee after the convention."

iii. On or about May 5, 2016, Individual 2 followed up with COHEN and wrote, "[Russian Official 1] would like to invite you as his guest to the St. Petersburg Forum which is Russia's Davos it's June 16-19. He wants to meet there with you and possibly introduce you to either [the President of Russia] or [the Prime Minister of Russia], as they are not sure if 1 or both will be there. He said anything you want to discuss including dates and subjects are on the table to discuss."

iv. On or about May 6, 2016, Individual 2 asked COHEN to confirm those dates would work for him to travel. COHEN wrote back, "Works for me."

v. From on or about June 9 to June 14, 2016, Individual 2 sent numerous messages to COHEN about the travel, including forms for COHEN to complete. However, on or about June 14, 2016, COHEN met Individual 2 in the lobby of the Company's headquarters to inform Individual 2 he would not be traveling at that time.

c. COHEN did recall that in or around January 2016, COHEN received a response from the office of Russian Official 1, the Press Secretary for the President of Russia, and spoke to a member of that office about the Moscow Project.

i. On or about January 14, 2016, COHEN emailed Russian Official l's office asking for assistance in connection with the Moscow Project. On or about January 16, 2016, COHEN emailed Russian Official l's office again, said he was trying to reach another high-level Russian official, and asked for someone who spoke English to contact him.

ii. On or about January 20, 2016, COHEN received an email from the personal assistant to Russian Official 1 ("Assistant 1"), stating that she had been trying to reach COHEN and requesting that he call her using a Moscow-based phone number she provided.

iii. Shortly after receiving the email, COHEN called Assistant 1 and spoke to her for approximately 20 minutes. On that call, COHEN described his position at the Company and outlined the proposed Moscow Project, including the Russian development company with which the Company had partnered. COHEN requested assistance in moving the project forward, both in securing land to build the proposed tower and financing the construction. Assistant 1 asked detailed questions and took notes, stating that she would follow up with others in Russia.

iv. The day after COHEN's call with Assistant 1, Individual 2 contacted him, asking for a call. Individual 2 wrote to COHEN, "It's about [the President of Russia] they called today."

COUNT 1
(False Statements)

8. Paragraphs 1 through 7 of this Information are re-alleged and incorporated by reference as if fully set forth herein.

9. On or about August 28, 2017, the defendant MICHAEL COHEN, in the District of Columbia and elsewhere, in a matter within the jurisdiction of the legislative branch of the Government of the United States, knowingly and willfully made a materially false, fictitious, and fraudulent statement and representation, to wit, COHEN caused to be submitted a written statement to SSCI containing material false statements about the Moscow Project, including false statements about the timing of the Moscow Project, discussions with people in the Company and in Russia about the Moscow Project, and contemplated travel to Russia in connection with the Moscow Project.

(Title 18, United States Code, Section 1001 (a) (2).)

U.S. v. Paul Manafort

Paul Manafort Jr Superseding Criminal Information

The Special Counsel informs the Court:

1. PAUL J. MANAFORT, JR. (MANAFORT) served for years as a political consultant and lobbyist. Between at least 2006 and 2015, MANAFORT conspired with Richard W. Gates (Gates), Konstantin Kilimnik (Kilimnik), and others to act, and acted, as unregistered agents of a foreign government and political party. Specifically, MANAFORT conspired to act and acted as an agent of the Government of Ukraine, the Party of Regions (a Ukrainian political party whose leader Victor Yanukovych was President from 2010 to 2014), President Yanukovych, and the Opposition Bloc (a successor to the Party of Regions that formed in 2014 when Yanukovych fled to Russia). MANAFORT generated more than 60 million dollars in income as a result of his Ukraine work. In order to hide Ukraine payments from United States authorities, from approximately 2006 through at least 2016, MANAFORT, with the assistance of Gates and Kilimnik, laundered the money through scores of United States and foreign corporations, partnerships, and bank accounts.

2. In furtherance of the scheme, MANAFORT funneled millions of dollars in payments into foreign nominee companies and bank accounts, opened by him and his underlings in nominee names and in various foreign countries, including Cyprus, Saint Vincent & the Grenadines (Grenadines), and the United Kingdom. MANAFORT hid the existence of the foreign companies and bank accounts, falsely and repeatedly reporting to his tax preparers and to the United States that he had no foreign bank accounts.

3. In furtherance of the scheme, MANAFORT concealed from the United States his work as an agent of, and millions of dollars in payments from, Ukraine and its political parties and leaders. Because MANAFORT directed a campaign to lobby United States officials and the United States media on behalf of the Government of Ukraine, the President of Ukraine, and Ukrainian political parties, he was required by law to report to the United States his work and fees. MANAFORT did not do so, either for himself or any of his companies. Instead, when the Department of Justice sent inquiries to MANAFORT in 2016 about his activities, MANAFORT responded with a series of false and misleading statements.

4. In furtherance of the scheme, MANAFORT used his hidden overseas wealth to enjoy a lavish lifestyle in the United States, without paying taxes on that income. MANAFORT, without reporting the income to his bookkeeper or tax preparers or to the United States, spent millions of dollars on luxury goods and services for himself and his extended family through payments wired from offshore nominee accounts to United States vendors. MANAFORT also used these offshore accounts to purchase multi-million dollar properties in the United States. Manafort then borrowed millions of dollars in loans using these properties as collateral, thereby obtaining cash in the United States without reporting and paying taxes on the income. In order to increase the amount of money he could access in the United States, Manafort defrauded the institutions that loaned money on these properties so that they would lend him more money at more favorable rates than he would otherwise be able to obtain.

5. Manafort laundered more than $30 million to buy property, goods, and services in the United States, income that he concealed from the United States Treasury, the Department of Justice, and others. MANAFORT cheated the United States out of over $15 million in taxes.

Relevant Individuals And Entities

6. MANAFORT was a United States citizen. He resided in homes in Virginia, Florida, and Long Island, New York.

7. In 2005, MANAFORT and another partner created Davis Manafort Partners, Inc. (DMP) to engage principally in political consulting. DMP had staff in the United States, Ukraine, and Russia. In 2011, MANAFORT created DMP International, LLC (DMI) to engage in work for foreign clients, in particular political consulting, lobbying, and public relations for the Government of Ukraine, the Party of Regions, and members of the Party of Regions. DMI was a partnership solely owned by MANAFORT and his spouse. Gates and Kilimnik worked for both DMP and DMI and served as close confidants of MANAFORT.

8. The Party of Regions was a pro-Russia political party in Ukraine. Beginning in approximately 2006, it retained MANAFORT, through DMP and then DMI, to advance its interests in Ukraine, including the election of its slate of candidates. In 2010, its candidate for President, Yanukovych, was elected President of Ukraine. In 2014, Yanukovych fled Ukraine for Russia in the wake of popular protests of widespread governmental corruption. Yanukovych, the Party of Regions, and the Government of Ukraine were Manafort, DMP, and DMI clients.

9. The European Centre for a Modern Ukraine (the Centre) was created in or about 2012 in Belgium as a mouthpiece for Yanukovych and the Party of Regions. The Centre was used by MANAFORT and others in order to lobby and conduct a public relations campaign in the United States and Europe on behalf of the existing Ukraine regime. The Centre effectively ceased to operate upon the downfall of Yanukovych in 2014.

10. MANAFORT owned or controlled the following entities, which were used in the scheme (the MANAFORT entities):

Domestic Entities
Entity NameDate CreatedIncorporation Location
Daisy Manafort, LLC (PM)August 2008Virginia
March 2011Florida
Davis Manafort International LLC (PM)March 2007Delaware
DMP (PM)March 2005Virginia
March 2011Florida
Davis Manafort, Inc. (PM)October 1999Delaware
November 1999Virginia
DMI (PM)June 2011Delaware
March 2012Florida
Global Sites LLC (PM, RG)July 2008Delaware
Jesand Investment Corporation (PM)April 2002Virginia
Jesand Investments Corporation (PM)March 2011Florida
John Hannah, LLC (PM)April 2006Virginia
March 2011Florida
Lilred, LLC (PM)December 2011Florida
LOAV Ltd. (PM)April 1992Delaware
MC Brooklyn Holdings, LLC (PM)November 2012New York
MC Soho Holdings, LLC (PM)January 2012Florida
April 2012New York
Smythson LLC (also known as Symthson LLC) (PM, RG)July 2008Delaware
Cypriot Entities
Entity NameDate CreatedIncorporation Location
Actinet Trading Limited (PM, RG)May 2009Cyprus
Black Sea View Limited (PM, RG)August 2007Cyprus
Bletilla Ventures Limited (PM, RG)October 2010Cyprus
Global Highway Limited (PM, RG)August 2007Cyprus
Leviathan Advisors Limited (PM, RG)August 2007Cyprus
LOAV Advisors Limited (PM, RG)August 2007Cyprus
Lucicle Consultants Limited (PM, RG)December 2008Cyprus
Marziola Holdings Limited (PM)March 2012Cyprus
Olivenia Trading Limited (PM, RG)March 2012Cyprus
Peranova Holdings Limited (Peranova) (PM, RG)June 2007Cyprus
Serangon Holdings Limited (PM, RG)January 2008Cyprus
Yiakora Ventures Limited (PM)February 2008Cyprus
Other Foreign Entities
Entity NameDate CreatedIncorporation Location
Global Endeavour Inc. (also known as Global Endeavor Inc.) (PM)UnknownGrenadines
Jeunet Ltd. (PM)August 2011Grenadines
Pompolo Limited (PM, RG)April 2013United Kingdom

11. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) was a bureau in the United States Department of the Treasuly responsible for administering the tax laws of the United States and collecting taxes owed to the Treasury.

The Scheme

12. Between in or around 2006 and 2017, both dates being approximate and inclusive, in the District of Columbia and elsewhere, MANAFORT and others devised and intended to devise, and executed and attempted to execute, a scheme and artifice to defraud, and to obtain money and property by means of false and fraudulent pretenses, representations, and promises from the United States, banks, and other financial institutions. As pan of the scheme, MANAFORT repeatedly provided false information to financial bookkeepers, tax accountants, and legal counsel, among others.

MANAFORT’s Wiring Of Money From Offshore Accounts Into The United States

13. In order to use the money in the offshore nominee accounts of the MANAFORT entities without paying taxes on it, MANAFORT caused millions of dollars in wire transfers from these accounts to be made for goods, services, and real estate. He did not report these transfers as income to DMP, DMI, or MANAFORT.

14. From 2008 to 2014, MANAFORT caused the following wires, totaling over $12,000,000, to be sent to the vendors listed below for personal items. MANAFORT did not pay taxes on this income, which was used to make the purchases.

PayeeTransaction DateOriginating Account HolderCountry of OriginationAmount of Transaction
S.P.&C. Home Improvement Ince (Home Improvement Company in the Hamptons, New York)6/10/2008LOAV Advisors LimitedCyprus$107,000
6/25/2008LOAV Advisors LimitedCyprus$23,500
7/7/2008LOAV Advisors LimitedCyprus$20,000
8/5/2008Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$59,000
9/2/2008Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$272,000
10/6/2008Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$109,000
10/24/2008Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$107,800
11/20/2008Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$77,400
12/22/2008Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$100,000
1/14/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$9,250
1/29/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$97,670
2/25/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$108,100
4/16/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$94,394
5/7/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$54,000
5/12/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$9,550
6/1/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$86,650
6/18/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$34,400
7/31/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$106,000
8/28/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$37,000
9/23/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$203,500
10/26/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$38,800
11/18/2009Global Highway LimitedCyprus$130,906
3/8/2010Global Highway LimitedCyprus$124,000
5/11/2010Global Highway LimitedCyprus$25,000
7/8/2010Global Highway LimitedCyprus$28,000
7/23/2010Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$26,500
8/12/2010Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$138,900
9/2/2010Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$31,500
10/6/2010Global Highway LimitedCyprus$67,600
10/14/2010Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$107,600
10/18/2010Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$31,500
12/16/2010Global Highway LimitedCyprus$46,160
2/7/2011Global Highway LimitedCyprus$36,500
3/22/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$26,800
4/4/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$195,000
5/3/2011Global Highway LimitedCyprus$95,000
5/16/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$6,500
5/31/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$70,000
6/27/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$39,900
7/27/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$95,000
10/24/2011Global Highway LimitedCyprus$22,000
10/25/2011Global Highway LimitedCyprus$9,300
11/15/2011Global Highway LimitedCyprus$74,000
11/23/2011Global Highway LimitedCyprus$22,300
11/29/2011Global Highway LimitedCyprus$6,100
12/12/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$17,800
1/17/2012Global Highway LimitedCyprus$29,800
1/20/2012Global Highway LimitedCyprus$42,600
2/9/2012Global Highway LimitedCyprus$22,300
2/23/2012Global Highway LimitedCyprus$75,000
2/28/2012Global Highway LimitedCyprus$22,300
3/28/2012PeranovaCyprus$37,500
4/18/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$50,000
5/15/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$79,000
6/5/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$45,000
6/19/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$11,860
7/9/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$10,800
7/18/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$88,000
8/7/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$48,800
9/27/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$100,000
11/20/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$298,000
12/20/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$55,000
1/29/2013Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$149,000
3/12/2013Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$375,000
8/29/2013Global Endeavour Inc.Grenadines$200,000
11/13/2013Global Endeavour Inc.Grenadines$75,000
11/26/2013Global Endeavour Inc.Grenadines$80,000
12/6/2013Global Endeavour Inc.Grenadines$130,000
12/12/2013Global Endeavour Inc.Grenadines$90,000
4/22/2014Global Endeavour Inc.Grenadines$56,293
8/18/2014Global Endeavour Inc.Grenadines$34,660
Total$5,434,793
Big Picture Solutions (Home Automation, Lighting, and Home Entertainment Company in Florida)3/22/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$12,000
3/28/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$25,000
4/27/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$12,000
5/16/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$25,000
11/15/2011Global Highway LimitedCyprus$17,006
11/23/2011Global Highway LimitedCyprus$11,000
2/28/2012Global Highway LimitedCyprus$6,200
10/31/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$290,000
12/17/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$160,600
1/15/2013Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$194,000
1/24/2013Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$6,300
2/12/2013Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$51,600
2/26/2013Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$260,000
7/15/2013Pompolo Limited"United Kingdom"$175,575
10/31/2013Global Endeavour Inc.Grenadines$73,000
5/23/2014Global Endeavour Inc.Grenadines$99,960
Total$1,319,281
J&J Oriental Rug Gallery (Antique Rug Store in Alexandria, Virginia)10/7/2008Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$15,750
3/17/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$46,200
4/16/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$7,400
4/27/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$65,000
5/7/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$210,000
7/15/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$200,000
3/31/2010Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$140,000
6/16/2010Global Highway LimitedCyprus$250,000
Total$934,350
Vendor D (Related to Vendor C)2/28/2012Global Highway LimitedCyprus$100,000
Vendor D Total$100,000
Alan Couture (Men's Clothing Store in New York)11/7/2008Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$32,000
2/5/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$22,750
4/27/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$13,500
10/26/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$32,500
3/30/2010Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$15,000
5/11/2010Global Highway LimitedCyprus$39,000
6/28/2010Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$5,000
8/12/2010Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$32,500
11/17/2010Global Highway LimitedCyprus$11,500
2/7/2011Global Highway LimitedCyprus$24,000
3/22/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$43,600
3/28/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$12,000
4/27/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$3,000
6/30/2011Global Highway LimitedCyprus$24,500
9/26/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$12,000
11/2/2011Global Highway LimitedCyprus$26,700
12/12/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$46,000
2/9/2012Global Highway LimitedCyprus$2,800
2/28/2012Global Highway LimitedCyprus$16,000
3/14/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$8,000
4/18/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$48,550
5/15/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$7,000
6/19/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$21,600
8/7/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$15,500
11/20/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$10,900
12/20/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$7,500
1/15/2013Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$37,000
2/12/2013Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$7,000
2/26/2013Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$39,000
9/3/2013Global Endeavour Inc.Grenadines$81,500
10/15/2013Global Endeavour Inc.Grenadines$53,000
11/26/2013Global Endeavour Inc.Grenadines$13,200
4/24/2014Global Endeavour Inc.Grenadines$26,680
9/11/2014Global Endeavour Inc.Grenadines$58,435
Total$849,215
Scott L. Wilson Landscaping (Landscaper in the Hamptons, New York)4/27/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$34,000
5/12/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$45,700
6/1/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$21,500
6/18/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$29,000
9/21/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$21,800
5/11/2010Global Highway LimitedCyprus$44,000
6/28/2010Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$50,000
7/23/2010Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$19,000
9/2/2010Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$21,000
10/6/2010Global Highway LimitedCyprus$57,700
10/18/2010Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$26,000
12/16/2010Global Highway LimitedCyprus$20,000
3/22/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$50,000
5/3/2011Global Highway LimitedCyprus$40,000
6/1/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$44,000
7/27/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$27,000
8/16/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$13,450
9/19/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$12,000
10/24/2011Global Highway LimitedCyprus$42,000
11/2/2011Global Highway LimitedCyprus$37,350
Total$655,500
Vendor G (Antique Dealer in New York)9/2/2010Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$165,000
10/18/2010Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$165,000
2/28/2012Global Highway LimitedCyprus$190,600
3/14/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$75,000
2/26/2013Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$28,310
Vendor G Total$623,910
Fashion World, Inc. d/b/a/ Bijan (Clothing Store in Beverly Hills, California)6/25/2008LOAV Advisors LimitedCyprus$52,000
12/16/2008Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$49,000
12/22/2008Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$10,260
8/12/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$76,400
5/11/2010Global Highway LimitedCyprus$85,000
11/17/2010Global Highway LimitedCyprus$128,280
5/31/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$64,000
11/15/2011Global Highway LimitedCyprus$48,000
12/17/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$7,500
Total$520,440
Aegis Holdings (Investment Company)9/3/2013Global Endeavour Inc.Grenadines$500,000
Total$500,000
Paul Sabatello(Contractor in Florida)11/15/2011Global Highway LimitedCyprus$8,000
12/5/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$11,237
12/21/2011Black Sea View LimitedCyprus$20,000
2/9/2012Global Highway LimitedCyprus$51,000
5/17/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$68,000
6/19/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$60,000
7/18/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$32,250
9/19/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$112,000
11/30/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$39,700
1/9/2013Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$25,600
2/28/2013Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$4,700
Total$432,487
New Leaf Landscape Maintenance LLC (Landscaper in the Hamptons, New York)12/5/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$4,115
12/5/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$4,115
3/1/2012Global Highway LimitedCyprus$50,000
6/6/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$47,800
6/25/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$17,900
6/27/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$18,900
2/12/2013Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$3,300
7/15/2013Pompolo LimitedUnited Kingdom$13,325
11/25/2013Global Endeavour Inc.Grenadines$9,400
4/15/2014Global Endeavour Inc.Grenadines$33,211
5/13/2014Global Endeavour Inc.Grenadines$30,965
9/11/2014Global Endeavour Inc.Grenadines$26,769
Total$255,685
Don Beyer Motors Inc. (Payments Relating to Three Range Rovers)4/12/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$83,525
5/2/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$12,525
6/29/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$67,655
Total$163,705
Federal Stone and Brick LLC (Contractor in Virginia)11/20/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$45,000
12/7/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$21,000
12/17/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$21,000
1/17/2013Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$18,750
1/29/2013Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$9,400
2/12/2013Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$10,500
Total$125,650
Sensoryphile, Inc. (Audio, Video, and Control System Home Integration and Installation Company in the Hamptons, New York)1/29/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$10,000
3/17/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$21,725
4/16/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$24,650
12/2/2009Global Highway LimitedCyprus$10,000
3/8/2010Global Highway LimitedCyprus$20,300
4/23/2010Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$8,500
7/29/2010Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$17,650
Total$112,825
American Service Center Associates of Alexiandria (Purchase of Mercedes Benz)10/5/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$62,750
Total$62,750
"Land Rover of Palm Beach (Purchase of Range Rover)"12/30/2008Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$47,000
Total$47,000
Vendor Q (Property Management Company in South Carolina)9/2/2010Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$10,000
10/6/2010Global Highway LimitedCyprus$10,000
10/18/2010Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$10,000
2/8/2011Global Highway LimitedCyprus$13,500
2/9/2012Global Highway LimitedCyprus$2,500
Vendor Q Total$46,000
Vendor R (Art Gallery in Florida)2/9/2011Global Highway LimitedCyprus$17,900
2/14/2013Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$14,000
Vendor R Total$31,900
Vendor S (Housekeeping in New York)9/26/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$5,000
9/19/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$5,000
10/9/2013Global Endeavour Inc.Grenadines$10,000
Vendor S Total$20,000

15. In 2012, MANAFORT caused the following wires to be sent to the entities listed below to purchase the real estate also listed below, MANAFORT did not report the money used to make these purchases on his 2012 tax return.

Property PurchasedPayeeDateOriginating AccountCountry of OriginationAmount
Howard Street Condominium (New York)"DMP International LLC"2/1/2012PeranovaCyprus$1,500,000
Union Street Brownstone, (New York)Attorney Account Of [Real Estate Attorney]11/29/2012"Actinet Trading Limited"Cyprus$1,800,000
11/29/2012"Actinet Trading Limited"Cyprus$1,200,000
Arlington House (Virginia)Real Estate Trust8/31/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$1,900,000

16. MANAFORT also disguised, as purported “loans,” more than $13 million from Cypriot entities, including the overseas MANAFORT entities, to domestic entities owned by MANAFORT. For example, a $1.5 million wire from Peranova Holdings Limited (Peranova) to DMI that MANAFORT used to purchase real estate on Howard Street in Manhattan, New York, was recorded as a “loan” from Peranova to DMI, rather than as income. The following loans were shams designed to reduce fraudulently MANAFORT’s reported taxable income.

YearPayor / Ostensible "Lender"Payee / Ostensible "Borrower"Country of OriginationTotal Amount of "Loans"
2008Yiakora Ventures Limited"Jesand Investment Corporation"Cyprus$8,120,000
2008Yiakora Ventures LimitedDMPCyprus$500,000
2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedDMPCyprus$694,000
2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedDaisy Manafort, LLCCyprus$500,000
2012PeranovaDMICyprus$1,500,000
2014Telmar Investments Ltd.DMICyprus$900,000
2015Telmar Investments Ltd.DMICyprus$1,000,000
Total$13,214,000
MANAFORT’s Hiding Of Ukraine Lobbying And Public Relations Work

17. MANAFORT knew it was illegal to lobby government officials and engage in public relations activities (hereinafter collectively referred to as lobbying) in the United States on behalf of a foreign government or political party, without registering with the United States Government under the Foreign Agents Registration Act. MANAFORT knew he was lobbying in the United States for the Government of Ukraine, President Viktor F. Yanukovych, the Party of Regions, and the Opposition Bloc (the latter two being political parties in Ukraine), and thus he was supposed to submit a written registration statement to the United States Department of Justice. MANAFORT knew that the filing was required to disclose the name of the foreign country, all the financial payments to the lobbyist, and the specific steps undertaken for the foreign country in the United States, among other information.

18. MANAFORT knew that Ukraine had a strong interest in the United States’ taking economic and policy positions favorable to Ukraine, including not imposing sanctions on Ukraine. MANAFORT also knew that the trial and treatment of President Yanukovych’s political rival, former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, was strongly condemned by leading United States executive and legislative branch officials, and was a major hurdle to improving United States and Ukraine relations.

19. From 2006 until 2015, MANAFORT led a multi-million dollar lobbying campaign in the United States at the direction of the Government of Ukraine, President Yanukovych, the Party of Regions, and the Opposition Bloc. MANAFORT intentionally did so without registering and providing the disclosures required by law.

20. As part of the lobbying scheme, MANAFORT hired numerous firms and people to assist in his lobbying campaign in the United States. He hired Companies A, B, C, D, and E, and Law Firm A, among others, to participate in what he described to President Yanukovych in writing as a global “Engage Ukraine” lobbying campaign that he devised and led. These companies and law firm were paid the equivalent of over $11 million for their Ukraine work.

21. MANAFORT viewed secrecy for himself and for the actions of his lobbyists as integral to the effectiveness of the lobbying offensive he orchestrated for Ukraine. Filing under the Foreign Agents Registration Act would have thwarted the secrecy MANAFORT sought in order to conduct an effective campaign for Ukraine to influence both American leaders and the American public.

22. MANAFORT took steps to avoid any of these firms and people disclosing their lobbying efforts under the Foreign Agents Registration Act. As one example, even though MANAFORT engaged Company E in 2007 to lobby in the United States for the Government of Ukraine, MANAFORT tried to dissuade Company E from filing under the Foreign Agents Registration Act. Only after MANAFORT ceased to use Company E in the fall of 2007 did Company E disclose its work for Ukraine, in a belated filing under the Act in 2008.

23. MANAFORT took other measures to keep the Ukraine lobbying as secret as possible. For example, MANAFORT, in written communications on or about May 16, 2013, directed his lobbyists (including Persons D1 and D2, who worked for Company D) to write and disseminate within the United States news stories that alleged that Tymoshenko had paid for the murder of a Ukrainian official. MANAFORT stated that it should be “push[ed]” “[w]ith no fingerprints.” “It is very important we have no connection.” MANAFORT stated that “[m]y goal is to plant some stink on Tymo.” Person D1 objected to the plan, but ultimately Persons D1 and D2 complied with MANAFORT’s direction. The Foreign Agents Registration Act required MANAFORT to disclose such lobbying, as MANAFORT knew. He did not.

The Hapsburg Group and Company D

24. As part of the lobbying scheme, starting in 2011, MANAFORT secretly retained Company D and a group of four former European heads of state and senior officials (including a former Austrian Chancellor, Italian Prime Minister, and Polish President) to lobby in the United States and Europe on behalf of Ukraine. The former politicians, called the Hapsburg Group by MANAFORT, appeared to be providing solely their independent assessments of Government of Ukraine policies, when in fact they were paid by Ukraine. MANAFORT explained in an “EYES ONLY” memorandum in or about June 2012 that his purpose was to “assemble a small group of high-level European infuencial [sic] champions and politically credible friends who can act informally and without any visible relationship with the Government of Ukraine.”

25. Through MANAFORT, the Government of Ukraine retained an additional group of lobbyists (Company D and Persons D1 and D2). In addition to lobbying itself, Company D secretly served as intermediaries between the Hapsburg Group and MANAFORT and the Government of Ukraine. In or about 2012 through 2013, MANAFORT directed more than the equivalent of 700,000 euros to be wired from at least three of his offshore accounts to the benefit of Company D to pay secretly for its services.

26. All four Hapsburg Group members, at the direction, and with the direct assistance, of MANAFORT, advocated positions favorable to Ukraine in meetings with United States lawmakers, interviews with United States journalists, and ghost written op-eds in American publications. In or about 2012 through 2014, MANAFORT directed more than 2 million euros to be wired from at least four of his offshore accounts to pay secretly the Hapsburg Group. To avoid European taxation, the contract with the Hapsburg Group falsely stated that none of its work would take place in Europe.

27. One of the Hapsburg Group members, a former Polish President, was also a representative of the European Parliament with oversight responsibility for Ukraine. MANAFORT solicited that official to provide MANAFORT inside information about the European Parliament’s views and actions toward Ukraine and to take actions favorable to Ukraine. MANAFORT also used this Hapsburg Group member’s current European Parliament position to Ukraine’s advantage in his lobbying efforts in the United States. In the fall of 2012, the United States Senate was considering and ultimately passed a resolution critical of President Yanukovych’s treatment of former Prime Minister Tymoshenko. MANAFORT engaged in an all-out campaign to try to kill or delay the passage of this resolution. Among the steps he took was having the Hapsburg Group members reach out to United States Senators, as well as directing Companies A and B to have private conversations with Senators to lobby them to place a “hold” on the resolution. MANAFORT told his lobbyists to stress to the Senators that the former Polish President who was advocating against the resolution was currently a designated representative of the President of the European Parliament, to give extra clout to his supposedly independent judgment against the Senate resolution. MANAFORT never revealed to the Senators or to the American public that any of these lobbyists or Hapsburg Group members were paid by Ukraine.

28. In another example, on May 16, 2013, another member of the Hapsburg Group lobbied in the United States for Ukraine. The Hapsburg Group member accompanied his country’s prime minister to the Oval Office and met with the President and Vice President of the United States, as well as senior United States officials in the executive and legislative branches. In written communications sent to MANAFORT, Person D1 reported that the Hapsburg Group member delivered the message of not letting “Russians Steal Ukraine from the West.” The Foreign Agents Registration Act required MANAFORT to disclose such lobbying, as MANAFORT knew. He did not.

Law Firm Report and Tymoshenko

29. As another part of the lobbying scheme, in 2012, on behalf of President Yanukovych and the Government of Ukraine’s Ministry of Justice, MANAFORT solicited a United States law firm to write a report evaluating the trial of Yanukovych’s political opponent Yulia Tymoshenko. MANAFORT caused Ukraine to hire the law firm so that its report could be used in the United States and elsewhere to defend the Tymoshenko criminal trial and argue that President Yanukovych and Ukraine had not engaged in selective prosecution.

30. MANAFORT retained a public relations firm (Company C) to prepare a media roll-out plan for the law firm report. MANAFORT used one of his offshore accounts to pay Company C the equivalent of more than $1 million for its services.

31. MANAFORT worked closely with Company C to develop a detailed written lobbying plan in connection with what MANAFORT termed the “selling” of the report. This campaign included getting the law firm’s report “seeded” to the press in the United States—that is, to leak the report ahead of its official release to a prominent United States newspaper and then use that initial article to influence reporting globally. As part of the roll-out plan, on the report’s issuance on December 13, 2012, MANAFORT arranged to have the law firm disseminate hard copies of the report to numerous government officials, including senior United States executive and legislative branch officials.

32. MANAFORT reported on the law firm’s work on the report and Company C’s lobbying plan to President Yanukovych and other representatives of the Government of Ukraine. For example, in a July 27, 2012 memorandum to President Yanukovych’s Chief of Staff, MANAFORT reported on “the global rollout strategy for the [law firm’s] legal report, and provide[d] a detailed plan of action[]” which included step-by-step lobbying outreach in the United States.

33. MANAFORT directed lobbyists to tout the report as showing that President Yanukovych had not selectively prosecuted Tymoshenko. But in November 2012 MANAFORT had been told privately in writing by the law firm that the evidence of Tymoshenko’s criminal intent “is virtually non-existent” and that it was unclear even among legal experts that Tymoshenko lacked power to engage in the conduct central to the Ukraine criminal case. These facts, known by MANAFORT, were not disclosed to the public.

34. Manafort knew that the report also did not disclose that the law firm, in addition to being retained to write the report, was retained to represent Ukraine itself, including in connection with the Tymoshenko case and to provide training to the trial team prosecuting Tymoshenko.

35. MANAFORT also knew that the Government of Ukraine did not want to disclose how much the report cost. More than $4.6 million was paid to the law firm for its work. MANAFORT used one of his offshore accounts to funnel $4 million to pay the law firm, a fact that MANAFORT did not disclose to the public. Instead, the Government of Ukraine reported falsely that the report cost just $12,000.

36. MANAFORT and others knew that the actual cost of the report and the scope of the law firm’s work would undermine the report’s being perceived as an independent assessment and thus being an effective lobbying tool for MANAFORT to use to support the incarceration of President Yanukovych’s political opponent.

37. In addition to the law firm report, MANAFORT took other steps on behalf of the Government of Ukraine to tarnish Tymoshenko in the United States. In addition to disseminating stories about her soliciting murder, noted above, in October 2012, MANAFORT orchestrated a scheme to have, as he wrote in a contemporaneous communication, “[O]bama jews” put pressure on the Administration to disavow Tymoshenko and support Yanukovych. MANAFORT sought to undermine United States support for Tymoshenko by spreading stories in the United States that a senior Cabinet official (who had been a prominent critic of Yanukovych’s treatment of Tymoshenko) was supporting anti-Semitism because the official supported Tymoshenko, who in turn had formed a political alliance with a Ukraine party that espoused anti-Semitic views. MANAFORT coordinated privately with a senior Israeli government official to issue a written statement publicizing this story. MANAFORT then, with secret advance knowledge of that Israeli statement, worked to disseminate this story in the United States, writing to Person D1 “I have someone pushing it on the NY Post. Bada bing bada boom.” MANAFORT sought to have the Administration understand that “the Jewish community will take this out on Obama on election day if he does nothing.” MANAFORT then told his United States lobbyist to inform the Administration that Ukraine had worked to prevent the Administration’s presidential opponent from including damaging language in the Israeli statement, so as not to harm the Administration, and thus further ingratiate Yanukovych with the Administration.

Company A and Company B

38. As a third part of the lobbying scheme, in February 2012, MANAFORT solicited two Washington, D.C. lobbying firms (Company A and Company B) to lobby in the United States on behalf of President Yanukovych, the Party of Regions and the Government of Ukraine. For instance, in early 2012 at the inception of the relationship, Company B wrote in an email to its team about a “potential representation for the Ukraine,” having been contacted “at the suggestion of Paul Manafort who has been working on the current PM elections.”

39. MANAFORT arranged to pay Companies A and B over $2 million from his offshore accounts for their United States lobbying work for Ukraine.

40. MANAFORT provided direction to Companies A and B in their lobbying efforts, including providing support for numerous United States visits by numerous senior Ukrainian officials. Companies A and B, at MANAFORT’s direction, engaged in extensive United States lobbying. Among other things, they lobbied dozens of Members of Congress, their staff, and White House and State Department officials about Ukraine sanctions, the validity of Ukraine elections, and the propriety of President Yanukovych’s imprisoning Tymoshenko, his presidential rival.

41. In addition, with the assistance of Company A, MANAFORT also personally lobbied in the United States. He drafted and edited numerous ghost-written op-eds for publication in United States newspapers. He also personally met in March 2013 in Washington, D.C., with a Member of Congress who was on a subcommittee that had Ukraine within its purview. After the meeting, MANAFORT prepared a report for President Yanukovych that the meeting “went well” and reported a series of positive developments for Ukraine from the meeting.

42. Indeed, MANAFORT repeatedly communicated in person and in writing with President Yanukovych and his staff about the lobbying activities of Companies A and B and he tasked the companies to prepare assessments of their work so he, in turn, could brief President Yanukovych. For instance, MANAFORT wrote President Yanukovych a memorandum dated April 8, 2012, in which he provided an update on the lobbying firms’ activities “since the inception of the project a few weeks ago. It is my intention to provide you with a weekly update moving forward.” In November 2012, Gates wrote to Companies A and B that the firms needed to prepare an assessment of their past and prospective lobbying efforts so the “President” could be briefed by “Paul” “on what Ukraine has done well and what it can do better as we move into 2013.” The resulting memorandum from Companies A and B, with input from Gates, noted among other things that the “client” had not been as successful as hoped given that it had an Embassy in Washington.

43. To distance their United States lobbying work from the Government of Ukraine, and to avoid having to register as agents of Ukraine under the Foreign Agents Registration Act, MANAFORT with others arranged for Companies A and B to be engaged by a newly-formed Brussels entity called the European Centre for the Modern Ukraine (the Centre), instead of directly by the Government of Ukraine.

44. MANAFORT described the Centre as “the Brussels NGO that we have formed” to coordinate lobbying for Ukraine. The Centre was founded by a Ukraine Party of Regions member and Ukraine First Vice-Prime Minister. The head of its Board was another member of the Party of Regions, who became the Ukraine Foreign Minister.

45. In spite of these ties to Ukraine, MANAFORT and others arranged for the Centre to represent falsely that it was not “directly or indirectly supervised, directed, [or] controlled” in whole or in major part by the Government of Ukraine or the Party of Regions. MANAFORT knew that the false and misleading representations would lead Companies A and B not to register their activities pursuant to the Foreign Agents Registration Act.

46. Despite the Centre being the ostensible client of Companies A and B, MANAFORT knew that the Centre did not direct or oversee their work. The firms received direction from MANAFORT and his subordinate Gates, on behalf of the Government of Ukraine.

47. Various employees of Companies A and B understood that they were receiving direction from MANAFORT and President Yanukovych, not the Centre, which was not even operational when Companies A and B began lobbying for Ukraine. MANAFORT, Gates, and employees of both Companies A and B referred to the client in ways that made clear they knew it was Ukraine, for instance noting that the “client” had an Embassy in Washington D.C. The head of Company B told his team to think the President of Ukraine “is the client.” As a Company A employee noted to another company employee: the lobbying for the Centre was “in name only. [Y]ou’ve gotta see through the nonsense of that[.]” “It’s like Alice in Wonderland.” An employee of Company B described the Centre as a fig leaf, and the Centre’s written certification that it was not related to the Party of Regions as “a fig leaf on a fig leaf,” referring to the Centre in an email as the “European hot dog stand for a Modern Ukraine.”

Conspiring to Obstruct Justice: False and Misleading Submissions to the Department of Justice

48. In September 2016, after numerous press reports concerning MANAFORT had appeared in August, the Department of Justice National Security Division informed MANAFORT, Gates, and DMI in writing that it sought to determine whether they had acted as agents of a foreign principal under the Foreign Agents Registration Act, without registering. In November 2016 and February 2017, MANAFORT and Gates conspired to knowingly and intentionally cause false and misleading letters to be submitted to the Department of Justice, through his unwitting legal counsel. The letters, both of which were approved by MANAFORT before they were submitted by his counsel, represented falsely, among other things, that:

a. DMI’s “efforts on behalf of the Party of Regions” “did not include meetings or outreach within the U.S.”;

b. MANAFORT did not “recall meeting with or conducting outreach to U.S. government officials or U.S. media outlets on behalf of the [Centre], nor do they recall being party to, arranging, or facilitating any such communications. Rather, it is the recollection and understanding of Messrs. Gates and Manafort that such communications would have been facilitated and conducted by the [Centre’s] U.S. consultants, as directed by the [Centre]. . . .”;

c. MANAFORT had merely served as a means of introduction of Company A and Company B to the Centre and provided the Centre with a list of “potential U.S.-based consultants—including [Company A] and [Company B]—for the [Centre’s] reference and further consideration”; and

d. DMI “does not retain communications beyond thirty days” and as a result of this policy, a “search has returned no responsive documents.” The November 2016 letter attached a one-page, undated document that purported to be a DMI “Email Retention Policy.”

49. In fact, MANAFORT had: selected Companies A and B; engaged in weekly scheduled calls and frequent emails with Companies A and B to provide them directions as to specific lobbying steps that should be taken; sought and received detailed oral and written reports from these firms on the lobbying work they had performed; communicated with Yanukovych to brief him on their lobbying efforts; both congratulated and reprimanded Companies A and B on their lobbying work; communicated directly with United States officials in connection with this work; and paid the lobbying firms over $2.5 million from offshore accounts he controlled, among other things.

50. Although MANAFORT had represented to the Department of Justice in November 2016 and February 2017 that he had no relevant documents, in fact MANAFORT had numerous incriminating documents in his possession, as he knew at the time. The Federal Bureau of Investigation conducted a court-authorized search of MANAFORT’S home in Virginia in the summer of 2017. The documents attached hereto as Government Exhibits 503, 504, 517, 532, 594, 604, 606, 616, 691, 692, 697, 706 and 708, among numerous others, were all documents that MANAFORT had in his possession, custody or control (and were found in the search) and all predated the November 2016 letter.

Money Laundering Conspiracy

51. In or around and between 2006 and 2016, MANAFORT, together with others, did knowingly and intentionally conspire (a) to conduct financial transactions, affecting interstate and foreign commerce, which involved the proceeds of specified unlawful activity, to wit, felony violations of FARA in violation of Title 22, United States Code, Sections 612 and 618, knowing that the property involved in the financial transactions represented proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, with intent to engage in conduct constituting a violation of sections 7201 and 7206 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986; and (b) to transport, transmit, and transfer monetary instruments and funds from places outside the United States to and through places in the United States and from places in the United States to and through places outside the United States, with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity, to wit: a felony violation of FARA, in violation of Title 22, United States Code, Sections 612 and 618, contrary to Title 18, United States Code, Section 1956(a)(1)(A)(ii) and (a)(2)(A).

52. MANAFORT caused the following transfers to be made, knowing that they were being made to entities to carry on activities that were required to be timely reported under the Foreign Agents Registration Act, but were not:

Payee Date Payer Originating Bank Account Country of Origin Country of Destination Amount (USD)
Company A 8/2/2012 Bletilla Ventures Ltd. Bank of Cyprus Account -O480 Cyprus US $270,000.00
10/10/2012 Bletilla Ventures Ltd. Bank of Cyprus Account -O480 Cyprus US $90,000.00
11/16/2012 Bletilla Ventures Ltd. Bank of Cyprus Account -O480 Cyprus US $120,000.00
11/20/2012 Bletilla Ventures Ltd. Bank of Cyprus Account -O480 Cyprus US $182,968.07
12/21/2012 Bletilla Ventures Ltd. Bank of Cyprus Account -O480 Cyprus US $25,000.00
12/21/2012 Bletilla Ventures Ltd. Hellenic Bank Account -2501 Cyprus US $90,000.00
9/18/2013 Global Endeavour Inc. Loyal Bank Limited Account —1840 SVG* US $135,937.37
10/31/2013 Jeunet Ltd. Loyal Bank Limited Account -4978 SVG* US $167,689.40
3/28/2014 Jeunet Ltd. Loyal Bank Limited Account -4978 SVG* US $135,639.65
4/3/2014 Jeunet Ltd. Loyal Bank Limited Account -4978 SVG* US $82,979.93
Total Company A Transfers $1,300,214.42
Company B 5/30/2012 Bletilla Ventures Ltd. Bank of Cyprus Account -O480 Cyprus US $130,000.00
8/2/2012 Bletilla Ventures Ltd. Bank of Cyprus Account -O480 Cyprus US $195,000.00
10/10/2012 Bletilla Ventures Ltd. Bank of Cyprus Account -O480 Cyprus US $130,000.00
11/16/2012 Bletilla Ventures Ltd. Bank of Cyprus Account -O480 Cyprus US $50,000.00
12/21/2012 Bletilla Ventures Ltd. Bank of Cyprus Account -O480 Cyprus US $54,649.51
12/21/2012 Bletilla Ventures Ltd. Hellenic Bank Account -2501 Cyprus US $150,000.00
9/3/2013 Jeunet Ltd. Loyal Bank Limited Account -4978 SVG* US $175,857.51
10/31/2013 Jeunet Ltd. Loyal Bank Limited Account -4978 SVG* US $195,857.51
3/12/2014 Jeunet Ltd. Loyal Bank Limited Account -4978 SVG* US $26,891.78
3/21/2014 Jeunet Ltd. Loyal Bank Limited Account -4978 SVG* US $138,026.00
4/15/2014 Jeunet Ltd. Loyal Bank Limited Account -4978 SVG* US $4,728.81
4/25/2014 Jeunet Ltd. Loyal Bank Limited Account -4978 SVG* US $4,739.231
Total Company B Transfers $1,255,750.35
Law Firm B 4/19/2012 Black Sea View Limited Bank of Cyprus Account -7412 Cyprus US $2,000,000.00
5/30/2012 Black Sea View Limited Bank of Cyprus Account -7412 Cyprus US $1,000,000.00
7/13/2012 Black Sea View Limited Bank of Cyprus Account -7412 Cyprus US $1,000,000.00
Total Law Firm A Transfers $4,000,000.00
TOTAL TRANSFERS $6,555,964.77

* SVG refers to St. Vincent and the Grenadines.

MANAFORT’S Hiding Of Foreign Bank Accounts And False Tax Filings

53. United States citizens who have authority over certain foreign bank accounts—whether or not the accounts are set up in the names of nominees who act for their principals—have reporting obligations to the United States.

54. First, the Bank Secrecy Act and its implementing regulations require United States citizens to report to the United States Treasury any financial interest in, or signatory authority over, any bank account or other financial account held in foreign countries, for every calendar year in which the aggregate balance of all such foreign accounts exceeds $10,000 at any point during the year. This is commonly known as a foreign bank account report or “FBAR.” The Bank Secrecy Act requires these reports because they have a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory investigations or proceedings. The United States Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) is the custodian for FBAR filings, and FinCEN provides access to its FBAR database to law enforcement entities, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The reports filed by individuals and businesses are used by law enforcement to identify, detect, and deter money laundering that furthers criminal enterprise activity, tax evasion, and other unlawful activities.

55. Second, United States citizens also are obligated to report information to the IRS regarding foreign bank accounts. For instance, in 2010 Form 1040, Schedule B had a “Yes” or “No” box to record an answer to the question: “At any time during [the calendar year], did you have an interest in or a signature or other authority over a financial account in a foreign country, such as a bank account, securities account, or other financial account?” If the answer was “Yes,” then the form required the taxpayer to enter the name of the foreign country in which the financial account was located.

56. For each year in or about and between 2007 through at least 2014, MANAFORT had authority over foreign accounts that required an FBAR report. Specifically, MANAFORT was required to report to the United States Treasury each foreign bank account held by the foreign MANAFORT entities noted above in paragraph 10. No FBAR reports were made by MANAFORT for these accounts.

57. Furthermore, in each of MANAFORT’s tax filings for 2007 through 2014, Manafort represented falsely that he did not have authority over any foreign bank accounts. MANAFORT had repeatedly and falsely represented in writing to MANAFORT’s tax preparer that MANAFORT had no authority over foreign bank accounts, knowing that such false representations would result in false MANAFORT tax filings. For instance, on October 4, 2011, MANAFORT’s tax preparer asked MANAFORT in writing: “At any time during 2010, did you [or your wife or children] have an interest in or a signature or other authority over a financial account in a foreign country, such as a bank account, securities account or other financial account?” On the same day, MANAFORT falsely responded “NO.” MANAFORT responded the same way as recently as October 3, 2016, when MANAFORT’s tax preparer again emailed the question in connection with the preparation of MANAFORT’s tax returns: “Foreign bank accounts etc.?” MANAFORT responded on or about the same day: “NONE.”

MANAFORT’s Fraud To Increase Access To Offshore Money

58. After MANAFORT used his offshore accounts to purchase real estate in the United States, he took out mortgages on the properties thereby allowing MANAFORT to have the benefits of liquid income without paying taxes on it. Further, MANAFORT defrauded the banks that loaned him the money so that he could withdraw more money at a cheaper rate than he otherwise would have been permitted.

59. In 2012, MANAFORT, through a corporate vehicle called “MC Soho Holdings, LLC” owned by him and his family, bought a condominium on Howard Street in the Soho neighborhood in Manhattan, New York. He paid approximately $2,850,000. All the money used to purchase the condominium came from MANAFORT entities in Cyprus. MANAFORT used the property from at least January 2015 through 2016 as an income-generating rental property, charging thousands of dollars a week on Airbnb, among other places. In his tax returns, MANAFORT took advantage of the beneficial tax consequences of owning this rental property.

60. Also in 2012, MANAFORT -- through a corporate vehicle called “MC Brooklyn Holdings, LLC” similarly owned by him and his family -- bought a brownstone on Union Street in the Carroll Gardens section of Brooklyn, New York. He paid approximately $3,000,000 in cash for the property. All of that money came from a MANAFORT entity in Cyprus.

COUNT ONE
Conspiracy Against The United States

61. Paragraphs 1 through 60 are incorporated here.

62. From in or about and between 2006 and 2017, both dates being approximate and inclusive, in the District of Columbia and elsewhere, the defendant PAUL J. MANAFORT, JR., together with others, including Gates and Kilimnik, knowingly and intentionally conspired to defraud the United States by impeding, impairing, obstructing, and defeating the lawful governmental functions of a government agency, namely the Department of Justice and the Department of the Treasury, and to commit offenses against the United States, to wit, (a) money laundering (in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956); (b) tax fraud (in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1)); (c) failing to file Foreign Bank Account Reports (in violation of 31 U.S.C. §§ 5312 and 5322(b)); (d) violating the Foreign Agents Registration Act (in violation of 22 U.S.C. §§ 612, 618(a)(1), and 618(a)(2)); and (e) lying and misrepresenting to the Department of Justice (in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a) and 22 U.S.C. §§ 612 and 618(a)(2)).

63. In furtherance of the conspiracy and to effect its illegal object, MANAFORT, together with others, committed the overt acts, in the District of Columbia and elsewhere, as set forth in the paragraphs above, which are incorporated herein.

(18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 3551 et seq.)

COUNT TWO
Conspiracy to Obstruct Justice (Witness Tampering)

64. Paragraphs 1 through 60 are incorporated here.

65. From in or about and between February 23, 2018 and April 2018, both dates being approximate and inclusive, within the District of Columbia and elsewhere, the defendant PAUL J. MANAFORT, JR., together with others, including Konstantin Kilimnik, knowingly and intentionally conspired to corruptly persuade another person, to wit: Persons D1 and D2, with intent to influence, delay and prevent the testimony of any person in an official proceeding, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(1).

66. On February 22, 2018, MANAFORT was charged in the District of Columbia in a Superseding Indictment that for the first time included allegations about the Hapsburg Group and MANAFORT’s use of that group to lobby illegally in the United States in violation of the Foreign Agent Registration Act. MANAFORT knew that the Act prescribed only United States lobbying. Immediately after February 22, 2018, MANAFORT began reaching out directly and indirectly to Persons D1 and D2 to induce them to say falsely that they did not work in the United States as part of the lobbying campaign, even though MANAFORT then and there well knew that they did lobby in the United States.

67. MANAFORT committed the following overt acts directly and through his conspirators.

Date/Time* Sender Receiver Event
MANAFORT contacted Person D1 by phone and a messaging application:
2/24/2018; 15:51 (UTC) MANAFORT Person D1 Phone call (attempted): No duration.
2/24/2018; 15:51 (UTC) MANAFORT Person D1 Phone call: 1 min, 24 second call.
2/24/2018; 15:53 (UTC) MANAFORT Person D1 Text: “This is paul”
2/25/2018; 18:41 (UTC) MANAFORT Person D1 Phone call (attempted): No duration.
2/26/2018; 23:56 (UTC) MANAFORT Person D1 Text: “http://www.businessinsider.com/fonner-european-leaders-manafort-hapsburg-group-2018-2?r=UK&IR=T”
2/26/2018; 23:57 (UTC) MANAFORT Person D1 Text: “We should talk. I have made clear that they worked in Europe.”
2/27/2018; 11:03 (UTC) MANAFORT Person D1 Phone call (attempted): No duration.
2/27/2018; 11:31 (UTC) MANAFORT Person D1 Phone call (attempted): No duration.
Kilimnik contacted Person D2 a messaging application, sending four messages:
2/28/2018; 01:49 (CEST) Kilimnik Person D2 “[Person D2], hi! How are you? Hope you are doing fine. ;))”
2/28/2018; 01:51 (CEST) Kilimnik Person D2 “My friend P is trying to reach [Person D1] to brief him on what's going on.”
2/28/2018; 01:51 (CEST) Kilimnik Person D2 “If you have a chance to mention this to [Person D1] - would be great”
2/28/2018; 01:53 (CEST) Kilimnik Person D2 “Basically P wants to give him a quick summary that he says to everybody (which is true) that our friends never lobbied in the US, and the purpose of the program was EU”
Kilimnik contacted Person D2 using a different messaging application, sending five messages:
2/28/2018; 06:01 (CEST) Kilimnik Person D2 “Hey, how are you? This is K.”
2/28/2018; 06:01 (CEST) Kilimnik Person D2 “Hope you are doing fine.”
2/28/2018; 06:01 (CEST) Kilimnik Person D2 “My friend P is trying to reach [Person D1] to brief him on what's going on”
2/28/2018; 06:02 (CEST) Kilimnik Person D2 “Basically P wants to give him a quick summary that he says to everybody (which is true) that our friends never lobbied in the US, and the purpose of the program was EU”
2/28/2018; 06:03 (CEST) Kilimnik Person D2 “If you have a chance to mention this to [First Initial of Person D1 ’s Name]. - it would be great. It would be good to get them connected to discuss in person. P is his friend.”
Kilimnik contacted Person D2 using two different applications, sending three messages:
2/28/2018; 06:03 (CEST) Kilimnik Person D2 “If you have a chance to mention this to [First Initial of Person D1 ’s Name]. - it would be great. It would be good to get them connected to discuss in person. P is his friend.”
4/4/2018; 08:53 (CEST) Kilimnik Person D2 “Hey. This is Konstantin. My friend P asked me again to help connect him with [Person D1]. Can you help?”
4/4/2018; 08:54 (CEST) Kilimnik Person D2 Hey. My friend P has asked me again if there is any way to help connect him through [Person D1]”
4/4/2018; 08:54 (CEST) Kilimnik Person D2 “I tried him on all numbers.”
Kilimnik contacted Person D1 using a messaging application:
4/4/2018; 13:00 (UTC) Kilimnik Person D1 “Hi. This is K. My friend P is looking for ways to connect to you to pass you several messages. Can we arrange that.”

*UTC and CEST refer to Coordinated Universal Time and Central European Summer Time, respectively.

(18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 3551 et seq.)

FORFEITURE ALLEGATIONS

68. Upon conviction of the offense charged in Count One, the defendant PAUL J. MANAFORT, JR., shall forfeit to the United States any property, real or personal, involved in such offense, and any property traceable to such property, and any property, real or personal, which constitutes or is derived from proceeds traceable to the offense, pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Sections 981(a)(1)(A), 981(a)(1)(C), and 982(a)(1), and Title 28, United States Code, Section 2461(c). The United States will also seek a judgment against the defendant for a sum of money representing the property described in this paragraph (to be offset by the forfeiture of any specific property).

69. The property subject to forfeiture by PAUL J. MANAFORT, JR., includes, but is not limited to, the following listed assets:

a. The real property and premises commonly known as 377 Union Street, Brooklyn, New York 11231 (Block 429, Lot 65), including all appurtenances, improvements, and attachments thereon, and any property traceable thereto;

b. The real property and premises commonly known as 29 Howard Street, #4D, New York, New York 10013 (Block 209, Lot 1104), including all appurtenances, improvements, and attachments thereon, and any property traceable thereto;

c. The real property and premises commonly known as 174 Jobs Lane, Water Mill, New York 11976, including all appurtenances, improvements, and attachments thereon, and any property traceable thereto;

d. All funds held in account number XXXXXX0969 at The Federal Savings Bank, and any property traceable thereto;

e. All funds seized from account number XXXXXX1388 at Capital One N.A., and any property traceable thereto; and

f. All funds seized from account number XXXXXX9952 at The Federal Savings Bank, and any property traceable thereto;

g. Northwestern Mutual Universal Life Insurance Policy 18268327, and any property traceable thereto;

h. All funds held in account number XXXX7988 at Charles A. Schwab & Co. Inc., and any property traceable thereto; and

i. The real property and premises commonly known as 1046 N. Edgewood Street, Arlington, Virginia 22201, including all appurtenances, improvements, and attachments thereon, and any property traceable thereto.

Substitute Assets

70. If any of the property described above as being subject to forfeiture, as a result of any act or omission of the defendant

a. cannot be located upon the exercise of due diligence;

b. has been transferred or sold to, or deposited with, a third party;

c. has been placed beyond the jurisdiction of the court;

d. has been substantially diminished in value; or

e. has been commingled with other property that cannot be subdivided without difficulty; it is the intent of the United States of America, pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 982(b) and Title 28, United States Code, Section 2461 ( c), incorporating Title 21 , United States Code, Section 853, to seek forfeiture of any other property of said defendant.

List of exhibits for the trial of Paul Manafort

The United States of America, by and through undersigned counsel, hereby submits its list of trial exhibits.

Ex. No.DescriptionObj.Off'dAdm.
1APhotograph - 1046 N Edgewood Street, Arlington, VA   
1BPhotograph - 29 Howard Street, New York, NY   
1CPhotograph - 377 Union Street, Brooklyn, NY   
1DPhotograph - 601 N Fairfax Street, Alexandria, VA   
1EPhotograph - 174 Jobs Lane, Bridgehampton, NY   
2AImmunity Order - Witness A   
2BImmunity Order - Witness B   
2CImmunity Order - Witness C   
2DImmunity Order - Witness D   
2EImmunity Order - Witness E   
32005.10.24 Consulting Agreement   
42009.07.01 Consulting Agreement   
52006.01.03 Memo P. Manafort, T. Devine, V. Yanukovych, et al re Messages for January Next Wave of Television and Radio Ads   
6Devine Mulvey Longabaugh Invoices to Davis Manafort (2010, 2014)   
72010.02.03 Email T. Devine to P. Manafort re Election Night Speech   
82010.02.15 Email T. Devine to P. Manafort, et al re Job Well Done Case 1:18-cr-00083-TSE Document 142 Filed 7/18/18 Page 1 of 21 PageID# 2204   
92010.02.16 Email T. Devine to P. Manafort re FYI   
102010.08.12 Memo P. Manafort to V. Yanukovych et al re Media Strategy   
112010.09.01 Email T. Devine to P. Manafort, R. Gates, et al re Talking Points   
122011.09.20 Email Chain D. Rabin, J. Mulvey, P. Manafort, R. Gates, K. Kilimnik, T. Devine, et al re Ukraine - First Draft   
132012.04 Email Chain T. Devine, R. Gates, P. Manafort, et al re Ukraine   
142012.08.06 Email T. Devine to P. Manafort re Memo   
152014.03.31 Email T. Devine to R. Gates, et al re Call - Important   
162014.03.31 Email T. Devine to R. Gates, et al re Draft Proposal   
172014.06.09 Email T. Devine to R. Gates, et al re Kyiv   
182014.06.14 Email T. Devine to K. Kilimnik, R. Gates, et al re Ukraine Trip   
192014.06.19 Email T. Devine to K. Kilimnik re Can u resend the talking points   
202010.07.12 Memo Devine Mulvey Longabaugh & Rabin Strasberg to Davis Manafort Partners re 2010 Message Strategy and Proposal #1   
212010.07.12 Memo Devine Mulvey Longabaugh & Rabin Strasberg to Davis Manafort Partners re 2010 Message Strategy and Proposal #2   
222010.09.09 Chart re Every Level V4   
232010.09.28 Invoice Rabin Strasberg to Davis Manafort Partners   
242010.10.15 Invoice Rabin Strasberg to Davis Manafort Partners   
252012.04.16 Memo D. Rabin, A. Strasberg to P. Manafort, R. Gates re Ukraine Media   
262012.04.19 Memo D. Rabin, A. Strasberg to K. Kilimnik, P. Manafort & R. Gates re Meeting Agenda   
272012.04.24 Memo D. Rabin, A. Strasberg to P. Manafort re Kyiv Meetings   
282012.05.02 Email Chain K. Kilimnik, V. Tolmach, P. Manafort, A. Strasberg, T. Fabrizio, D. Rabin & R. Gates re Euro 2012 Scripts   
292012.06.29 Memo D. Rabin, A. Strasberg to P. Manafort re New film crew recommendations   
302012.10.23 Invoice D. Rabin to DMP International   
312014.04.18 Invoice D. Rabin to DMP International   
322014.05.12 Invoice D. Rabin to DMP International   
33APhotograph - V. Yanukovych #1   
33BPhotograph - V. Yanukovych #2   
33CPhotograph - V. Yanukovych #3   
342017.06.27 DMP International FARA Filing   
352015.06.23 Peranova Loan Forgiveness Letter   
362016.03.08 Signed Banc of California Personal Financial Statement and Loan Application   
372017.01.13 First Nationwide Title Disbursement Statement   
38Genesis Capital Documents   
39MC Brooklyn Holdings Ledger   
402013.01.15 VY Agenda   
412013.04.05 Memo P. Manafort to S. Lyovochkin re PR Effort this week in Kyiv   
422013.04.22 Memo P. Manafort to V. Yanukovych re US Consultants   
432013.04.25 Memo P. Manafort to S. Lyovochkin re Summary of Overdue Accounts   
442014.09 Ukraine OB Campaign Strategy Powerpoint   
452014.09.24 OB Daily Talking Points   
462014.10.07 Memo P. Manafort to Campaign HQ re OB Campaign Leaflets   
47Memo re May 17 Rallies   
482010.03.01 Sensoryphile Invoice for $20,000   
49Big Picture Solutions Invoice   
50Big Picture Solutions Bill of Materials   
512011.11.08 Signed SP&C Home Improvement Renovation Proposal for 174 Jobs Lane   
522012.02.16 Signed SP&C Home Improvement Renovation Proposal for 29 Howard St   
532013.03.01 SP&C Proposal for 83 Whooping Hollow Road   
54SP&C Home Improvement Proposal for 174 Jobs Lane   
55Photographs - Clothing with Alan Couture Labels   
56Photographs - Clothing with House of Bijan Labels   
57Photographs - House of Bijan Watch   
58J&J Oriental Rug Gallery Documents   
59Onessimo Fine Art Certificates of Authenticity for Paintings   
60A2016 Season New York Yankees Account   
60BUkraine Documents   
60CParty of Regions Advance and Training   
60DResidential Lease Agreement, Request for Tax Transcripts, Mercedes Benz Records, and Authorization Forms   
60EUkrainian Strategy Memos   
61Chart - P. Manafort Foreign Entities   
62ACyprus Incorporation Documents   
62BSt. Vincent and the Grenadines Incorporation Documents   
62CUnited Kingdom Incorporation Documents   
63Chart - P. Manafort Foreign Bank Accounts   
64ABank Records - Cyprus   
64BBank Records - St. Vincent and the Grenadines   
64CBank Records - United Kingdom   
65AChart - Aegis Holdings Payments   
65BChart - Alan Couture Payments   
65CChart - Big Picture Solutions Payments   
65DChart - Federal Stone & Brick Payments   
65EChart - House of Bijan Payments   
65FChart - J&J Oriental Rug Gallery Payments   
65GChart - Land Rover of Alexandria Motors Payments   
65HChart - Mercedes Benz of Alexandria Payments   
65IChart - New Leaf Landscape Payments   
65JChart - Sabatello Construction Payments   
65KChart - Scott Wilson Landscaping Payments   
65LChart - Sensoryphile Payments   
65MChart - SP&C Home Improvement Payments   
66Chart - P. Manafort Domestic Entities   
67AVirginia Incorporation Documents   
67BDelaware Incorporation Documents   
68Chart - Property Overview   
69APayment Flow Chart for 29 Howard St Property   
69BPayment Flow Chart for 1046 N Edgewood St Property   
69CPayment Flow Chart for 377 Union St Property   
70AFirst Republic Bank Accounts XXXXXXX6573 and XXXXXXX7373 for Jesand   
70BFirst Republic Bank/Pershing Account XXXXXXX5358 for J. Manafort   
70CFirst Republic Bank Account XXXXXXX6524 for DMP International   
70DFirst Republic Bank Account XXXXXXX9730 for P. and K. Manafort   
70EFirst Republic Bank Account XXXXXXX5868 for MC Soho   
71TD Bank Trust Account XXXXXX5374 for B. Baldinger   
72Chart - Vendor and Property Payments From Abroad   
73AFBAR Chart for 2010   
73BFBAR Chart for 2011   
73CFBAR Chart for 2012   
73DFBAR Chart for 2013   
73EFBAR Chart for 2014   
74Deposit Analysis - Foreign Source of Funds Received by Foreign Accounts   
75Chart - P. Manafort Summary of Tax Returns   
76Summary of Foreign Wires to 3rd Party Vendors for the Benefit of Paul Manafort   
77Chart - P. Manafort Reported Personal Income   
78Chart - Analysis of Foreign Bank Accounts   
79Chart - Selected Transactions   
80Chart - FARA Analysis   
812012.11.19 Email Chain D. DeLuca to P. Manafort, A. Manafort, J. Browning re Contract   
822012.10.26 Email from P. Manafort to D. DeLuca re Manafort Project, Edgewood St, Arlington, VA   
83Draft of Pergola   
84Photograph - Pergola   
85Photograph - Backyard   
86Federal Stone and Brick Bank Records   
872013.05.29 Email Chain P. Manafort, D. Browning & D. DeLuca re Invoice from Federal Stone and Brick   
882012.08.21 Check from A. Manafort to McEnearney   
892012.08.21 Sales Contract for 1046 N. Edgewood St, Arlington, VA   
902012.08.31 A. Manafort Landtech Receipt   
912012.09.01 Email W. Holland to L. Flynn, P. Manafort re 1046 N. Edgewood St   
922012.09.10 Settlement Statement   
93Chart - Purchase of 1046 N. Edgewood St, Arlington, VA   
94Vendor Chart - SP&C   
94ASP&C Home Improvements Invoices (2010-2014)   
95SP&C Home Improvement Bank Records   
96APhotograph - Backyard   
96BPhotograph - Basement   
96CPhotograph - Front of House   
96DPhotograph - Kitchen   
96EPhotograph - Side of House -1   
96FPhotograph - Side of House -2   
96GPhotograph - Waterfall Pond   
97Vendor Chart - Alan Couture   
97AAlan Couture Invoices (2010-2014)   
98Alan Couture Bank Records   
992011.03.21 Email P. Manafort to M. Katzman re update   
1002013.08.27 Email M. Katzman to P. Manafort re Statement 7/23/13   
1012014.03.24 Email M. Katzman to R. Gates re Wire transfers   
102Vendor Chart - Big Picture Solutions   
102ABig Picture Solutions Invoices (2011-2014)   
103Vendor Chart - Mercedes Benz of Alexandria   
103A2012.10.01 Invoice for K. Manafort Purchase of Mercedes Benz SL550   
103B2012.10.01 Buyers Order for K. Manafort Purchase of Mercedes Benz SL550   
104Photographs - Mercedes Benz owned by P. Manafort   
1052012.10.01 K. Manafort Promissory Note for Mercedes Benz SL550   
1062012.10.05 $62,750 Wire Transfer from Lucicle Consultants Limited to Mercedes Benz of Alexandria   
107Vendor Chart - New Leaf Landscape   
107ANew Leaf Landscape Invoices (2010-2014)   
108APhotograph - Bridgehampton Driveway   
108BPhotograph - Bridgehampton Pond   
108CPhotograph - Bridgehampton Side of House   
108DPhotograph - Bridgehampton Pergola   
108EPhotograph - Bridgehampton Putting Green   
108FPhotograph - Bridgehampton Pool House   
109New Leaf Landscape Bank Records   
1102012.06.21 Proposal   
111Vendor Chart - House of Bijan   
111AHouse of Bijan Invoices (2010-2012)   
112House of Bijan Bank Records   
1132014.10.15 New York Yankees Ticket Agreement   
1142011.11.28 Email from D. Saltmarsh to R. Barre & N. Pizzutello re FW 2012 renewal payment   
1152016.03.22 Email P. Manafort to D. Fox re Yankees Season Ticket Licensee News   
1162017.04.03 Email P. Manafort to D. Fox re Yankees 2017   
117FinCEN Certifications   
118Airbnb 29 Howard St Active Listing Days   
119Airbnb 29 Howard St Listings   
120Airbnb 29 Howard St Reservations   
121A2011 Davis Manafort Partners General Ledger   
121B2011 Davis Manafort Partners Financial Statements   
121C2011 P. Manafort and K. Manafort General Ledger   
121D2011 DMP International General Ledger   
121E2011 DMP International Financial Statements   
122A2012 DMP International General Ledger   
122B2012 DMP International Financial Statements   
122C2012 P. Manafort and K. Manafort General Ledger   
123A2013 DMP International General Ledger   
123B2013 DMP International Financial Statements   
123C2013 P. Manafort and K. Manafort Financial Statements   
124A2014 DMP International General Ledger   
124B2014 DMP International Financial Statements   
124C2014 P. Manafort and K. Manafort Financial Statements   
125A2015 DMP International General Ledger   
125B2015 DMP International Financial Statements   
125C2015 P. Manafort and K. Manafort Financial Statements   
126A2016 DMP International General Ledger   
126B2016.07.31 DMP International 2016 YTD Financial Statement   
126C2016.11.30 DMP International 2016 YTD Financial Statement   
126D2016 DMP International P&L   
126E2016 DMP International Financial Statements   
126F2016 P. Manafort and K. Manafort Financial Statements   
1272015.02.05 Email Chain J. Manafort, K. Manafort, P. Ayliff, H. Washkuhn re MC Soho   
1282015.02.24 Email Chain H. Washkuhn, C. O'Brien, P. Ayliff, R. Gates et al re DMP International   
1292015.04.13 Email Chain H. Washkuhn, P. Ayliff, C. O'Brien, R. Gates, et al re DMP International   
1302015.08.26 Email Chain L. Tanner, C. O'Brien, H. Washkuhn re DMP International LLC   
1312015.12.01 Email Chain J. Yohai, H. Washkuhn, J. Manafort, P. Manafort re Howard St December Rent   
1322015.12.31 Email Chain H. Washkuhn, P. Manafort, R. Gates, C. Laporta, P. Ayliff re Time Sensitive - Collection of Information   
1332016 1.06 Email Chain H. Washkuhn & P. Manafort re Bills Through 1.15.16   
1342016.01.07 Email Chain P. Manafort, R. Gates & H. Washkuhn re Transfer   
1352016.01.29 Email Chain R. Gates & H. Washkuhn re Transfer - Urgent   
1362016.02.22 Email Chain D. Duggan, H. Washkuhn, J. Yohai, P. Manafort et al re Evidence of Insurance; Declarations Page; Invoice attached - 377 Union Street   
1372016.02.24 Email R. Gates to M. Francis, P. Manafort, H. Washkuhn re Manafort Chubb Insurance Properties - 377 Union St & 123 Baxter Street - Declarations - NO Mortgagee listed both   
1382016.03.16 Email Chain L. Tanner, R. Gates & H. Washkuhn re 2015 P&L - IMPT (#1)   
1392016.03.16 Email Chain L. Tanner, R. Gates & H. Washkuhn re 2015 P&L - IMPT (#2)   
1402016.03.16 Email H. Washkuhn to R. Gates re 2015 P&L IMPT   
1412016.04.04 Email J. Yohai to P. Manafort and H. Washkuhn re Selene Finance Invoices   
1422016.05.24 Email Chain H. Washkuhn, R. Gates & P. Manafort re Funds URGENT   
1432016.06.02 Email Chain J. Yohai, H. Washkuhn, P. Manafort, et al re Travelers Auto Cancellation - J. Manafort - invoice attached   
1442016.06.02 Email Chain J. Yohai, H. Washkuhn, P. Manafort, et al re Travelers Auto Cancellation - J. Manafort - invoice attached   
1452016.08.10 Email Chain A. Ivakhnik, H. Washkuhn, C. Laporta, P. Manafort re Documents needed for Loan   
1462016.08.11 Email Chain H. Washkuhn, A. Ivakhnik, P. Manafort, C. Laporta re Documents needed for Loan   
1472016.08.21 Email Chain R. Gates, P. Manafort & H. Washkuhn re DMP Open Invoices   
1482016.12.20 Email Chain R. Gates, H. Washkuhn & P. Manafort re NKSFB Fee   
1492017.01.04 Email Chain, H. Washkuhn, D. Raico, C. Laporta et al re Financials for P. Manafort   
1502015.12.31 SOHO Holdings Company Returns   
1512012.12.31 MAN001-07 DMP International   
152KWC Tax Organizers for P. Manafort (2012-2014)   
153KWC Engagement Letters (2012-2016)   
1542014.08.26 Email Chain P. Ayliff, R. Gates, C. O'Brien, C. Laporta re Paul's pending matters   
1552014.09.02 Email Chain R. Gates, P. Ayliff, C. O'Brien, C. Laporta re Union Street   
1562015.03.19 Email Chain R. Gates, C. O'Brien, P. Ayliff, C. Laporta re NYC Property LLCs   
1572015.08.26 Email Chain R. Gates, C. O'Brien, C. Laporta, P. Ayliff re Pending Items   
1582015.09.15 Email Chain R. Gates, C. O'Brien, P. Ayliff, C. Laporta re Call Me   
1592015.09.16 Email R. Gates to C. Laporta re DMP International, LLC   
1602015.09.16 Email C. Laporta to R. Gates re Loan doc?   
1612015.12.31 Email P. Manafort to H. Washkuhn re Time Sensitive - Collection of Information   
1622016.01.07 Email C. Laporta to D. Fallarino, P. Manafort re PJM CPA FIRM - Account Manager Details - C. Laporta   
1632016.02.04 Email Chain C. Laporta, D. Fallarino, M. Francis, R. Gates, P. Manafort re DMP Int'l Income Question   
1642016.02.05 Email C. Laporta to R. Gates re Manafort #XXXXX5212   
1652016.02.08 Email R. Gates to C. Laporta re Letter   
1662016.02.08 Email R. Gates to C. Laporta re Letter   
1672016.02.09 Email R. Gates to C. Laporta re Letter   
1682016.02.24 Email Chain C. Laporta, M. Francis, D. Fallarino, R. Gates, P. Manafort re Manafort #XXXXX5212   
1692016.03.15 Email Chain C. Laporta, P. Manafort, R. Gates re 377 Union St Construction Loan   
1702016.03.25 DMP International Ledger Report re Peranova   
1712016.04.05 Email Chain C. Laporta, C. O'Brien, R. Gates re DMP International Questions   
1722016.04.12 Email R. Gates to C. O'Brien re Pending Questions   
1732016.05.02 Email R. Gates to C. Laporta re Letter   
1742016.05.16 Email Chain C. Laporta, D. Fallarino, R. Gates re Manafort Items Needed   
1752016.08.10 Email C. Laporta to P. Manafort re 377 Union St loan   
1762016.08.11 Email Chain C. Laporta, A. Ivakhnik, P. Manafort, H. Washkuhn re Documents needed for Loan   
1772016.08.11 Email Chain H. Washkuhn, A. Ivakhnik, C. Laporta, P. Manafort re Documents needed for Loan   
1782016.09.04 Email Chain P. Ayliff, R. Gates, C. O'Brien, C. Laporta re Paul's tax returns - more questions   
1792016.09.13 Email P. Manafort to R. Gates re Updates - DMP   
1802016.09.14 Email Chain R. Gates, P. Ayliff, C. Laporta re Updates - DMP   
1812016.10.04 Email Chain C. Laporta, T. Von Traer, P. Ayliff re Paul Manafort's pending matters   
1822016.10.06 Email Chain C. Laporta, P. Manafort, R. Gates re up to date?   
1832016.10.07 Email C. Laporta to P. Manafort re Lola Partners, LLC and draft gift tax returns   
1842016.12.28 Email Chain C. Laporta, R. Gates, H. Washkuhn, D. Raico re Financial Needed Asap   
1852017.06.08 Adjusting Journal Entries Report   
186DMP International 2014 1099-MISC Form   
187DMP International Funds Due to Peranova   
188[Intentionally Left Blank]   
1892015.09.15 DMP International Ledger Report - Telmar Investments   
190DMP International Ledger Reports - Peranova Entries   
191KWC Manafort Tax Returns Chart   
1922011.09.09 Peranova Loan Agreement   
193TB-01 - Adjusted Trial Balance -2014   
194TB-01 - Adjusted Trial Balance -2015   
1952015.09.15 Email R. Gates to C. Laporta re Forms   
1962009.09.09 Email Chain N. Lakkis, P. Ayliff, P. Manafort & D. Walters re LOAV   
1972011.03.24 Email from P. Manafort to M. Chrysostomides re Transfers from Leviathan   
1982011.08.21 Email from P. Ayliff to P. Manafort re 2010 Taxes   
1992011.10.04 Email Chain P. Ayliff, N. Lakkis, P. Manafort re 2010 tax filing   
2002011.11.29 Email Chain from P. Manafort to R. Gates re Payments   
2012012.06.29 Email Chain R. Gates, N. Lakkis, D. Walters & N. Lakkis re Foreign Accounts   
2022012.09.06 Email Chain R. Gates, N. Lakkis, P. Ayliff, C. O'Brien re DMP international, LLC tax return - DUE 9.17.12   
2032012.09.16 Email Chain R. Gates, N. Lakkis, P. Ayliff, & C. O'Brien re FINAL FINAL Questions   
2042012.10.14 P. Manafort Signed IRS Form 8879   
2052013.02.05 Shipment from KWC to P. Manafort   
2062013.06.24 Email Chain R. Gates, N. Lakkis, P. Ayliff, C. O'Brien re Foreign account report due 6.30.13   
2072013.08.29 Email from P. Ayliff to R. Gates & C. O'Brien re Paul unidentified transaction   
2082014.09.02 Email Chain R. Gates, P. Ayliff, C O'Brien & C. Laporta re Union Street   
2092014.09.04 Email from R. Gates to P. Ayliff re Paul's tax returns - more questions   
2102014.09.14 Email Chain H. Washkuhn, P. Ayliff, C. Laporta, R. Gates & L. Tanner re MC Soho Holdings   
2112014.12.07 Email Chain P. Ayliff, C O'Brien & C. Laporta re Call with Gates - for the 2014 file   
2122015.01.08 Email From P. Manafort to P. Ayliff re - UBS Mortgage   
2132015.02.05 Email Chain P. Manafort, J. Manafort, Yohai, K. Manafort, P. Ayliff, H. Washkuhn re MC Soho   
2142015.03.19 Email Chain R. Gates, C. O'Brien, P. Ayliff, C. Laporta re NYC Property LLCs   
2152016.03.16 Email Chain P. Ayliff, N. Zeien, R. Gates, H. Washkuhn, C. O'Brien & C. Laporta re DMP International - Open Items   
2162016.10.03 Email Chain P. Manafort, C. Laporta, R. Gates & P. Ayliff re P. Manafort's pending matters   
217Selected KWC Invoices Manafort-Related Entities   
2182015.09.11 Email Chain C. O'Brien, C. Laporta, P. Ayliff, H. Washkuhn & R. Gates re DMP Sports Tickets   
2192015.09.15 Email from C. O'Brien to R. Gates cc C. Laporta, P. Ayliff re DMP Loan   
2202015.10.07 Email Chain R. Gates & C. O'Brien re Paul's 1040   
2212016.04.05 Email Chain R. Gates, C. O'Brien, C. Laporta re DMP International Questions   
2222016.04.15 Email Chain R. Gates, C. O'Brien, C. Laporta & P. Ayliff re Pending Questions   
2232015.12.24 Email Chain P. Manafort, D. Fallarino re 27 Howard Street Refi   
2242016.01.15 Email Chain D. Fallarino, M. Francis, J. Del Bene re Citizens Bank, N.A. Package Submitted (Loan Number XXXXX3998)   
2252016.01.21 Email Chain P. Manafort, D. Fallarino, M. Francis re locked   
2262016.01.21 Email P. Manafort to M. Francis re Part One   
2272016.01.27 Initial Loan Documents   
2282016.01.27 Email P. Manafort to M. Francis re Remaining Docs - Howard Mortgage   
2292016.02.02 Email P. Manafort to M. Francis re Use of Cash Memo   
2302016.02.04 Email Chain C. Laporta. D. Fallarino, M. Francis, R. Gates, P. Manafort re DMP Int'l Income Question   
2312016.02.09 Email Chain D. Fallarino, P. Manafort, M. Francis re DMP Int'l Income question   
2322016.02.12 Email Chain M. Guadron, D. Fallarino, T. Rodriguez re Manafort #XXXXX5212   
2332016.02.17 Log Entry Email P. Miceli, M. Guadron, D. Fallarino, M. Francis re ATP submitted Loan XXXXX5212 - Manafort, P.   
2342016.02.19 Log Entry Email S. Taft, M. Guadron, D. Fallarino re Secret Exception Request Submission [Manafort/XXXXX5212]   
2352016.02.21 Email Chain M. Francis, P. Manafort, H. Washkuhn, R. Gates, D. Fallarino re final document request   
2362016.02.23 Email M. Francis to D. Duggan re manafort morgagee clause update   
2372016.02.23 Email Chain R. Gates, M. Francis, P. Manafort, H. Washkuhn re Final Document Request   
2382016.02.24 Email D. Duggan to M. Francis re manafort morgagee clause update   
2392016.02.24 Email D. Duggan to M. Francis re manafort morgagee clause update   
2402016.02.24 Email Chain M. Francis, R. Gates, P. Manafort, H. Washkuhn re Final Document Request   
2412016.02.24 Email Chain M. Francis, R. Gates, P. Manafort, H. Washkuhn re Final Document Request   
2422016.02.24 Email Chain R. Gates, M. Francis, P. Manafort, H. Washkuhn re Manafort Chubb Insurance Properties - 377 Union St & 123 Baxter Street - Declarations - NO Mortgagee listed both   
2432016.02.24 Email Chain C. Laporta, M. Francis, D. Fallarino, R. Gates, P. Manafort re Manafort #XXXXX5212   
2442016.02.24 Email M. Francis to J. Dos Santos re Manafort Additional conditions   
2452016.03.04 29 Howard St Signed 1003 Form ($2,730,000 Conventional)   
2462016.03.04 29 Howard St Signed 1003 Form ($682,500 HELOC)   
2472016.03.04 29 Howard St Closing Documents   
2482016.04.25 Email Chain P. Manafort, R. Gates, J. Yohai, D. Fallarino, C. Laporta, T. Rodriguez, H. Washkuhn re 377 Union St Construction Loan   
2492016.05.02 Letter C. Laporta to D. Fallarino   
2502016.05.02 Letter P. Manafort to D. Fallarino   
2512016.05.06 Email Chain P. Manafort, D. Fallarino, R. Gates. T. Rodriguez re Primary Residence Letter - Union St   
2522016.05.09 Email Chain T. Rodriguez, J. Yohai, D. Fallarino, P. Manafort re 377 Union St Consruction Loan   
2532016.05.16 Email Chain C. Laporta, P. Manafort, R. Gates, D. Fallarino, J. Yohai, T. Rodriguez re Manafort Items Needed   
2542016.05.17 Email Chain P. Manafort, R. Gates, D. Fallarino, J. Yohai, T. Rodriguez re Manafort Items Needed   
2552016.07.13 377 Union St Uniform Residential Loan Application   
2562016.08.09 Email Chain T. Rodriguez, D. Fallarino, P. Miceli, M. Guadron re Manafort - OMG   
2572016.08.16 Email T. Rodriguez to D. Fallarino re Manafort file   
2582017.08.17 Email Chain D. Fallarino, A. Howey, T. Rodriguez, M. Francis   
2592016.02.09 Email Chain D. Duggan, S. Belleau, J .Yohai, P. Manafort Re Evidence of Insurance; Decl. Page; Invoice Att. - 377 Union St   
2602016.02.22 Email Chain D. Duggan, H. Washkuhn, P. Manafort, J. Yohai re Evidence of Insurance; Decl. Page; Invoice Att. - 377 Union St   
2612016.02.23 Email D. Duggan to H. Washkuhn re Manafort Insurance Requests   
2622016.02.24 Email D. Duggan to R. Gates re Manafort Chubb Insurance Properties - 377 Union St & 123 Baxter Street - Declarations - NO Mortgagee listed both   
2632016.02.24 Email D. Duggan to R. Gates re Call   
264Moody Insurance Client Log   
2652016.07.28 Email S. Calk to D. Raico et al re Revised Portfolio Summary - P. Manafort and J. Yohai   
2662016.08.02 Email Chain C. Laporta, A. Ivakhnik, D. Raico, P. Manafort, R. Gates & H. Washkuhn re Documents Needed for Loan   
2672016.08.03 Email Chain C. Laporta, A. Ivakhnik, P. Manafort, & H. Washkuhn re Documents Needed for Loan   
2682016.08.03 Email D. Raico to P. Manafort re Need S. Calk Resume   
2692016.08.04 Email P. Manafort to S. Calk re S. Calk- Professional Bio   
2702016.08.10 Email Chain A. Ivakhnik, H. Washkuhn, C. Laporta, P. Manafort re Documents needed for Loan   
2712016.08.11 Email Chain C. Laporta, A. Ivakhnik, P. Manafort, H. Washkuhn re Documents needed for Loan   
2722016.08.11 Email Chain H. Washkuhn, A. Ivakhnik, C. Laporta, P. Manafort re Documents needed for Loan   
2732016.08.11 Notice Titled Mortgage Fraud is Investigated by the FBI   
2742016.08.16 Email Chain A. Ivakhnik, T. Horn, D. Raico re 2013 P. Manafort's tax returns   
2752016.09.13 Email Chain T. Horn J. Ubarri, J. Norini, J. Brennan re Manafort   
2762016.10.05 Email D. Raico to J. Ubarri re Manafort/Yohai and M. Bello files - update post S. Calk meeting   
2772016.10.07 Email Chain S. Calk, P. Manafort, D. Raico re Closing on Nottingham & Bridgehampton Loans   
2782016.10.11 Email Chain T. Horn, D. Raico, P. Manafort, C. Laporta, J. Brennan re My 2015 Tax Return - FINAL Draft   
2792016.10.19 Email Chain J. Brennan, J. Ubarri, P. Manafort, D. Raico, B. Baldinger, J. Yohai re Restructure framework of Loan Agreement   
2802016.10.19 Email P. Manafort to B. Baldinger, D. Raico, J. Yohai re Restructure framework of Loan Agreement   
2812016.10.20 Email Chain D. Raico, P. Manafort, B. Baldinger, J. Yohai re Restructure framework of Loan Agreement   
2822016.10.21 Email P. Manafort to D. Raico re DMP P&L Sept 2016   
2832016.10.21 Email Chain D. Raico, E. Cholakis, P. Manafort re DMP P&L Sept 2016   
2842016.10.21 Email Chain D. Raico, J. Ubarri, J. Brennan re Manafort loan   
2852016.10.26 Email Chain C. Laporta, P. Manafort, D. Raico, J. Yohai, B. Baldinger & H. Washkuhn re Hampton Refinance - Deliverables Update   
2862016.10.26 Email Chain T. Horn, D. Raico, J. Brennan et al re Manafort Review - compared both files too   
2872016.10.28 Signed Uniform Residential Loan Application Bridgehampton   
2882016.10.28 Undisclosed Debt Acknowledgement   
2892016.11.01 377 Union St Uniform Residential Loan Application   
2902016.11.08 Email Chain V. Bartholomew, D. Raico. S. Miller, A. Sparks re Request for supporting documentation - Mr. P. Manafort/Loan #XXX3572   
2912016.12.07 Email D. Raico to J. Brennan re Moving forward with Manafort's Brooklyn property   
2922017.01.04 Email Chain H. Washkuhn, D. Raico, C. Laporta re Financials for P. Manafort   
2932017.01.05 377 Union St Loan Memorandum   
2942016.08.11 2401 Nottingham Uniform Residential Loan Application   
2952016.03.08 Personal Financial Statement and Loan Application   
2962016.03.09 Banc of California Loan Application   
2972016.03.10 Emails R. Gates to P. Manafort re Personal Finance Statement and P. Manafort to P. Kaufman re Schedule of Real Estate   
2982016.03.16 Email R. Gates to P. Kaufman, P. Manafort, J. Yohai re Manafort BTRs   
2992016.03.16 Email R. Gates to P. Kaufman, P. Manafort, & J. Yohai re Response   
3002016.03.23 Email P. Manafort to P. Kaufman, J. Yohai re K. Manafort PFS   
3012016.03.23 Email Chain J. Yohai, P. Manafort, R. Gates, P. Kaufman, K. LaPorte re Manafort Yohai information   
3022016.05.05 Email Chain S. Bently, T. Quick, G. Seferian, P. Kaufman, K. LaPorte, et al re Baylor Holdings   
3032016.05.09 Credit Approval Memorandum   
3042016.05.11 Baylor Holdings LLC Resolution to Borrow   
3052016.05.11 Business Loan Agreement   
3062016.05.11 Commercial Guaranty   
307[Intentionally Left Blank]   
3082016.07.13 Email K. LaPorte, T. Holmes, G. Seferian et al re Baylor Holding, LLC   
3092016.09.08 Memo K. LaPorte to File, G. Seferian, P. Alexander re Meeting with P. Manafort and J. Yohai   
3102017.03.23 Handwritten Notes   
3112017.06.27 Forbearance Agreement   
312Handwritten Notes on Chart   
3132016.02.08 P. Manafort Borrower's Affidavit   
3142016.02.09 377 Union St Building Loan Agreement   
3152016.02.09 Evidence of Property Insurance   
3162016.02.09 P. Manafort Borrower's Affidavit   
3172016.02.09 P. Manafort Guarantee   
3182016.02.09 P. Manafort Guarantee   
3192016.02.23 Recorded Building Loan Mortgage and Security Agreement   
3202016.02.23 Recorded Mortgage, Assignment of Leases and Rents and Security Agreement   
3212016.09.02 Email Chain J. Day, B. Baldinger & J. Yohai re M. Solow communications   
3222016.09.20 Genesis Capital v. MC Brooklyn Holdings et al Filed Notice of Pendency   
3232016.09.20 Genesis Capital v. MC Brooklyn Holdings et al Served Notice of Pendency   
3242017.01.23 Genesis Capital v. MC Brooklyn et al Affirmation Canceling Notice of Pendency   
325AP. Manafort American Express Bank Records for Account No. XXXXXXXXXXX-3007   
325BP. Manafort American Express Bank Records for Account No. XXXXXXXXXXX-5007   
325CP. Manafort American Express Bank Records for Account No. XXXXXXXXXXX-6002   
326R. Gates American Express Bank Records for Account No. XXXXXXXXXXX-3003   
327Aegis Holdings Stipulation   
327AAegis Holdings Stipulation Exhibit   
328First Nationwide Title Stipulation   
328AFirst Nationwide Title Stipulation Exhibits   
329J&J Oriental Rug Gallery Stipulation   
329AJ&J Oriental Rug Gallery Stipulation Exhibits   
330Kensington Vanguard Stipulation   
330AKensington Vanguard Stipulation Exhibits   
331Land, Carroll & Blair Stipulation   
331ALand, Carroll & Blair Stipulation Exhibits   
332Land Rover of Alexandria Stipulation   
332ALand Rover of Alexandria Stipulation Exhibits   
333Mercedes Benz of Alexandria Stipulation   
333AMercedes Benz of Alexandria Stipulation Exhibit   
334Sabatello Construction Stipulation   
334ASabatello Construction Stipulation Exhibits   
335Scott Wilson Landscaping Stipulation   
335AScott Wilson Landscaping Stipulation Exhibit   
336Sensoryphile Stipulation   
336ASensoryphile Stipulation Exhibits   
337Tax Returns Stipulation   
337A1040 Paul J. Manafort 2010 (certified)   
337B1040 Paul J. Manafort 2011 (certified)   
337C1040 Paul J. Manafort 2012 (certified)   
337D1040 Paul J. Manafort 2013 (certified)   
337E1040 Paul J. Manafort 2014 (certified)   
337F1065 DMP International 2011 (certified)   
337G1065 DMP International 2012 (certified)   
337H1065 DMP International 2013 (certified)   
337I1065 DMP International 2014 (certified)   
337J1065 MC Brooklyn 2012-2014 (lack of records)   
337K1065 MC Soho 2012-2014 (lack of records)   
337L1065 MC Soho 2015 (certified)   
337M1065 MC Soho 2016 (certified)   
337N1120S Davis Manafort Partners 2010 (certified)   
337O1120S Davis Manafort Partners 2011 (certified)   
337P1120S Davis Manafort Partners 2012-2014 (lack of records)   
337Q1120S John Hannah 2010 (certified)   
337R1120S John Hannah 2011 (certified)   
337S1120S John Hannah 2012 (certified)   
337T1120S John Hannah 2013 (certified)   
337U1120S John Hannah 2014 (certified)   
338AR. Gates 2009 Passport   
338BR. Gates 2011 Passport   
338CR. Gates 2013 Passport   
3392007 Ukraine Team Contact List   
3402010.02.20 Memo P. Manafort to V. Yanukovych re Launch of Public Affairs Plan   
3412012.04.08 Memo P. Manafort to V. Yanukovych re AC Project - Update   
3422012.06.04 Email Chain P. Manafort, K. Kilimnik & R. Gates re ST documents   
3432012.06.19 Memo P. Manafort to AK re Polling Project - Update   
3442012.07.12 Email K. Kilimnik to P. Manafort & R. Gates re EI Outreach - International Plan   
3452012.07.13 Email K. Kilimnik to P. Manafort, R. Gates re Demidko documents - Party program   
3462012.10.06 Email P. Manafort to K. Kilimnik, R. Gates, D. Rabin et. al. re Memo on campaign Status   
3472013.02.04 Memo P. Manafort to V. Yanukovych re US Government Activity   
3482013.02.19 Memo P. Manafort to V. Yanukovych re US Government Update   
3492013.02.21 Memo P. Manafort to V. Yanukovych re Hapsburg - Update   
3502013.04.22 Memo P. Manafort to V. Yanukovych re US Consultants   
351Memo P. Manafort to BVK, S. Lyovochkin re Campaign budget for national and regional TV, radio advertising   
3522014.10.29 Memo P. Manafort to S. Lyovochkin & R. Akhmetov re Roadmap for November - December 2014   
353DMP International Consulting Agreement   
3542010.01.31 Memo P. Manafort to V. Yanukovych, et al re Final Week - Strategy, Tactics and Messages   
3552010.02.16 Memo P. Manafort to V. Yanukovych re Professional Team - Bonuses   
3562010.02.22 Memo P. Manafort to V. Yanukovych re Wire Transfer Details for Personal Bonuses   
3572010.04.06 Memo P. Manafort to K. Kilimnik re SL Staff Meeting   
3582010.04.09 Memo P. Manafort to V. Yanukovych re Goals of US Trip   
3592011.10.11 Memo P. Manafort to V. Yanukovych and S. Lyovochkin re Consulting Payments   
360A2010.05.01 Leviathan and Telmar Consultancy Agreement   
360B2011.11.01 Peranova and Telmar Consultancy Agreement   
360C2012.04.01 Black Sea and Dresler Consultancy Agreement   
360D2012.06.01 Black Sea and Telmar Consultancy Agreement   
360E2012.06.05 Black Sea and Dresler Consultancy Agreement   
360F2014.03.01 DMP International and Telmar Consultancy Agreement   
360G2014.05.15 DMP International and Telmar Consultancy Agreement   
3612013.09.20 Email A. Damianou to R. Gates re Yiakora   
3622014.01.24 Email C. Nicolaou to R. Gates & G. Ioannou re Payments/Transfers   
3632015.07.10 Email R. Gates to K. Kilimnik re Contract for 1   
3642015.08.25 Email K. Kilimnik to R. Gates re Contract for 1   
3652015.08.28 Email Chain P. Manafort, R. Gates & K. Kilimnik re FYI   
366Invoice DMP International to Opposition Bloc Party   
3672014.03.19 Email A. Damianou to R. Gates re Serangon Holdings Limited   
3682014.05.02 Email A. Damianou to R. Gates re Cyprus Companies   
369A2009.11.09 Taunton Global Highway Loan   
369B2010.04.30 Novirex Global Highway Loan   
369C2010.06.07 Sea Chaika Leviathan Loan   
369D2010.06.15 Telmar Leviathan Loan   
369E2010.06.28 Leviathan DMP Loan   
369F2011.11.02 Telmar Peranova Loan   
369G2011.12.21 Black Sea Jeunet Loan   
369H2012.02.01 Telmar Lucicle Loan   
369I2012.02.06 Mistaro Lucicle Loan   
369J2012.02.20 Inlord Actinet Loan   
369K2012.04.19 Dresler Black Sea Loan   
369L2012.06.26 Firemax Actinet Loan   
369M2012.06.26 Telmar Black Sea Loan   
369N2012.07.13 Novirex Olivenia Loan   
369O2012.08.20 Bedel Bletilla Loan   
369P2012.09.14 Telmar Bletilla Loan   
369Q2012.10.09 Novirex Black Sea Loan   
3702011.11.29 Email Chain P. Manafort, R. Gates re Payments   
3712013.07.30 Invoice Pompolo Limited to Telmar Investments   
3722013.03.21 R. Gates Agenda   
3732014.12.13 Email Chain R. Gates, P. Manafort re con call this morning - around 800 am   
3742013.09.11 Email Chain R. Gates, N. Lakkis, P. Ayliff, C. O'Brien re DMP International   
3752015.04.17 Email Chain R. Gates, P. Manafort re Tax - Extensions   
3762015.08.31 Email Chain H. Washkuhn, E. Paik, L. Tanner, R. Gates re Income   
3772016.03.16 Email P. Manafort to R. Gates re 377 Union St Construction Loan   
3782016.09.13 Email Chain H. Washkuhn, R. Gates, L. Tanner re Manafort related entities - due by 9.15   
3792016.07.26 Email Chain H. Washkuhn, R. Gates re DMP Funding   
3802016.01.06 Email P. Manafort to R. Gates re VIP TIME SENSITIVE   
3812016.02.23 Email Chain R. Gates, M. Francis, P. Manafort re Final Document Request   
3822016.02.24 Email Chain M. Francis, R. Gates, P. Manafort, H. Washkuhn re Final Document Request   
3832016.02.24 Email Chain D. Duggan & R. Gates re Call   
3842016.02.24 Email Chain R. Gates & P. Manafort re Update   
3852016.02.24 Email D. Duggan to R. Gates, N. Azzam re Manafort Chubb Insurance Properties - 377 Union St & 123 Baxter Street   
3862016.02.24 Email R. Gates to M. Francis, cc P. Manafort, H. Washkuhn re Manafort Chubb Insurance Properties   
3872016.02.08 Email R. Gates to C. Laporta re Letter   
3882016.02.08 Email Chain P. Manafort & R. Gates re Letter   
3892016.02.08 Email R. Gates to P. Manafort re Letter   
3902016.02.08 Email Chain R. Gates & C. Laporta re Letter   
3912016.03.16 Email Chain R. Gates, P. Manafort, J. Yohai re needs   
3922016.03.16 Email Chain P. Manafort & R. Gates re Responses   
3932016.03.16 Email Chain R. Gates & H. Washkuhn re 2015 P&L - IMPT   
3942016.03.16 Email Chain L. Tanner, R. Gates, H. Washkuhn re 2015 P&L - IMPT   
3952016.03.16 Email Chain R. Gates, L. Tanner, H. Washkuhn re 2015 P&L - IMPT   
3962016.03.16 Email R. Gates to P. Kaufman re Manafort BTRs   
3972016.03.15 Email Chain C. Laporta, R. Gates, P. Manafort, D. Fallarino, J. Yohai re 377 Union St Consruction Loan   
3982016.03.15 Email R. Gates, P. Manafort, C. Laporta re 377 Union St Consruction Loan   
3992016.04.05 Email Chain R. Gates & C. O'Brien re DMP International Questions   
4002016.03.22 Email Chain P. Manafort, D. Fallarino, R. Gates re 377 Union St Consruction Loan   
4012016.05.01 Email Chain P. Manafort, R. Gates, D. Fallarino, J. Yohai, T. Rodriguez re 377 Union St Consruction Loan   
4022016.05.02 Email R. Gates to C. Laporta re Letter   
4032016.05.06 Email Chain P. Manafort, R. Gates, D. Fallarino, T. Rodriguez re Primary Residence Letter - Union St   
4042016.05.16 Email Chain C. Laporta, D. Fallarino, R. Gates, P. Manafort, T. Rodriguez, J. Yohai re Manafort Items Needed   
4052016.10.21 Email Chain P. Manafort, R. Gates, H. Washkuhn re 2016 P&L   
4062016.10.21 Email P. Manafort to R. Gates re 2016 P&L   
4072016.10.21 Email R. Gates to P. Manafort re 2016 P&L   
4082016.10.21 Email R. Gates to P. Manafort re 2016 P&L   
4092016.10.21 Email P. Manafort to R. Gates re AGENDA   
4102016.10.21 Email P. Manafort to R. Gates re pls convert   
4112016.10.21 Email R. Gates to P. Manafort re pls convert   
412AP. Manafort 2008 Passport   
412BP. Manafort 2016 Passport   
412CP. Manafort 2017 Passport   
4132010.01.01 - 2017.07.25 P. Manafort AT&T Phone Records   
4142010.06.01 Email P. Manafort to K. Kilimnik re Q and A for VY   
4152010.06.02 Email P. Manafort to K. Kilimnik re Press and Diplomatic Package   
4162011.11.29 Email Chain P. Manafort & R. Gates re Payments   
4172012.07.14 Email Chain P. Manafort, D. Rabin, T. Fabrizio, B. Ward, K. Kilimnik, R. Gates & V. Stepanov re testimonials, Accomplishments, schedule   
4182014.05.24 Email P. Manafort to K. Kilimnik cc R. Gates re Organization of Package of documents   
4192014.08.25 Email Chain P. Manafort, N. Azzam, T. Barry & R. Joyce re Mortgage Rates   
4202015.09.25 Email Chain P. Manafort & R. Gates re update   
4212016.01.21 Email Chain P. Manafort, M. Francis & D. Fallarino re locked!   
4222016.01.26 Email P. Manafort to J. Yohai re Howard St Appraisal   
4232016.02.09 Email Chain P. Manafort, R. Gates, M. Francis & D. Fallarino re Lease for 5th Ave property   
4242016.02.11 Email Chain P. Manafort, R. Gates, D. Fallarino & M. Francis re Letter of Forgiveness   
4252016.02.12 Email P. Manafort to J. Yohai re Citizens Loan - Howard St   
4262016.02.16 Email Chain P. Manafort, R. Gates, K. Mazzocco, T. Barry & H. Washkuhn re Personal and DMP bills   
4272016.02.17 Email Chain P. Manafort & R. Gates re My signature   
4282016.02.24 Email P. Manafort to D. Fallarino re 2 issues re Union St and Baxter St   
4292016.02.26 Email Chain P. Manafort, R. Gates, M. Francis & D. Fallarino re Success   
4302016.03.09 Email R. Gates to P. Manafort re Personal Finance Statement   
4312016.03.10 Email P. Kaufman to P. Manafort re Schedule of Real Estate   
4322016.05.22 Email Chain P. Manafort, R. Gates, D. Fallarino, J. Yohai & C. Laporta re 377 Union St Consruction Loan   
4332016.08.04 Email Chain S. Calk & P. Manafort re S. Calk- Professional Bio   
4342016.08.15 Email J. Wetzel to P. Manafort re Scan   
4352016.10.26 Email Chain J. Yohai, P. Manafort, J. Yohai & D. Raico re Hampton Refinance - Deliverables Update   
436Certificates of Authenticity  

The government further respectfully requests leave of the Court to file additional exhibits if necessary.

Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT S. MUELLER, III
Special Counsel

By:
Andrew Weissmann
Greg D. Andres
Brandon L. Van Grack
Special Assistant United States Attorneys
Special Counsel’s Office
U.S. Department of Justice
950 Pennsylvania Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20530
Telephone: (202) 616-0800

Uzo Asonye
Assistant United States Attorney
Eastern District of Virginia

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 18th day of July, 2018, I will cause to be filed electronically the foregoing with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system, which will then send a notification of such filing (NEF) to the following:

Thomas E. Zehnle (VA Bar No. 27755)
Law Office of Thomas E. Zehnle
601 New Jersey Avenue, N.W., Suite 620
Washington, D.C. 20001
tezehnle@gmail.com

Jay R. Nanavati (VA Bar No. 44391)
Kostelanetz & Fink LLP
601 New Jersey Avenue, N.W., Suite 620
Washington, D.C. 20001
jnanavati@kflaw.com

Uzo Asonye
Assistant United States Attorney
U.S. Attorney’s Office
Eastern District of Virginia
2100 Jamieson Avenue
Alexandria, VA 22314
uzo.asonye@usdoj.gov
Phone: (703) 299-3700
Fax: (703) 299-3981
Attorney for the United States of America

The government's witness list in the case against Paul Manafort

The United States of America, by and through undersigned counsel, hereby submits its list of potential witnesses.

  1. Ali, Hesham
  2. Ayliff, Philip
  3. Brennan, James
  4. Day, John
  5. DeLuca, Douglas
  6. Devine, Tad
  7. Duggan, Donna
  8. Evenson, Darin
  9. Gates, Richard
  10. Holland, Wayne
  11. Jacobson, Stephen
  12. James, Melinda
  13. Katzman, Maximillian
  14. Kirimca, Irfan
  15. Laporta, Cindy
  16. LaPorte, Kevin
  17. Liss, Paula
  18. Magionos, Morgan
  19. Maxwell, Joel
  20. Metzler, Amanda
  21. Miceli, Peggy
  22. Michael, Renee
  23. Mikuska, Matthew
  24. O’Brien, Conor
  25. Opsut, Daniel
  26. Rabin, Daniel
  27. Raico, Dennis
  28. Regolizio, Michael
  29. Rodriguez, Taryn
  30. Seferian, Gary
  31. Sullivan, Stacey
  32. Trusko, Alex
  33. Wall, Ronald
  34. Washkuhn, Heather
  35. Welch, Michael

The government reserves the right to revise or supplement this list.

Respectfully submitted,

ROBERT S. MUELLER, III
Special Counsel

By:
Uzo Asonye
Assistant United States Attorney
Eastern District of Virginia

Andrew Weissmann
Greg D. Andres
Brandon L. Van Grack
Special Assistant United States Attorneys

Special Counsel’s Office
U.S. Department of Justice
950 Pennsylvania Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20530
Telephone: (202) 616-0800

Paul Manafort Plea Agreement

Dear Counsel:

This letter sets forth the full and complete plea offer to your client Paul J. Manafort, Jr. (hereinafter referred to as “your client” or “defendant”) from the Special Counsel’s Office (hereinafter also referred to as “the Government” or “this Office”). If your client accepts the terms and conditions of this offer, please have your client execute this document in the space provided below. Upon receipt of the executed document, this letter will become the Plea Agreement (hereinafter referred to as the “Agreement”). The terms of the offer are as follows.

1. Charges and Statutory Penalties

Your client agrees to plead guilty in the above-captioned case to all elements of all objects of all the charges in a Superseding Criminal Information, which will encompass the charges in Counts One and Two of a Superseding Criminal Information, charging your client with:

A. conspiracy against the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (which includes a conspiracy to: (a)money1aunder (in Violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956); (b) commit tax fraud (in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1)); (c) fail to file Foreign Bank Account Reports (in Violation of 31 U.S.C. §§ 5314 and 5322(b)); (d) Violate the Foreign Agents Registration Act (in Violation of 22 U.S.C. §§ 612, 618(a)(1), and 618(a)(2)); and (e) to lie to the Department of Justice (in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a) and 22 U.S.C. §§ 612 and 618(a)(2)); and

B. conspiracy against the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, to wit: conspiracy to obstruct justice by tampering with witnesses while on pre-trial release (in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512).

The defendant also agrees not to appeal any trial or pre-trial issue in the Eastern District of Virginia, or to challenge in the district court any such issue, and admits in the attached “Statement of the Offense” his guilt of the remaining counts against him in United States v. Paul J. Manafort. Jr., Crim. No. 1:18-cr-83 (TSE) (hereafter “Eastern District of Virginia”) A copy of the Superseding Criminal Information and Statement of the Offense are attached.

Your client understands that each Violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 carries a maximum sentence of 5 years’ imprisonment; a fine of not more than $250,000, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3571(b)(3); a term of supervised release of not more than 3 years, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b)(2); and an obligation to pay any applicable interest or penalties on fines and restitution not timely made, and forfeiture.

In addition, your client agrees to pay a mandatory special assessment of $200 to the Clerk of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Your client also understands that, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3572 and § 5E1.2 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, Guidelines Manual (2016) (hereinafter “Sentencing Guidelines,” “Guidelines,” or “U.S.S.G.”), the Court may also impose a fine that is sufficient to pay the federal government the costs of any imprisonment, term of supervised release, and period of probation.

2. Factual Stipulations

Your client agrees that the attached Statement of the Offense fairly and accurately describes and summarizes your client’s actions and involvement in the offenses to which your client is pleading guilty, as well as crimes charged in the Eastern District of Virginia that remain outstanding, as well as additional acts taken by him. Please have your client sign and return the Statement of the Offense, along with this Agreement.

3. Additional Charges

In consideration of your client’s guilty plea to the above offenses, and upon the completion of full cooperation as described herein and fulfillment of all the other obligations herein, no additional criminal charges will be brought against the defendant for his heretofore disclosed participation in criminal activity, including money laundering, false statements, personal and corporate tax and FBAR offenses, bank fraud, Foreign Agents Registration Act violations for his work in Ukraine, and obstruction of justice. In addition, subject to the terms of this Agreement, at the time of sentence or at the completion of his successful cooperation, whichever is later, the Government will move to dismiss the remaining counts of the Indictment in this matter and in the Eastern District of Virginia and your client waives venue as to such charges in the event he breaches this Agreement. Your client also waives all rights under the Speedy Trial act as to any outstanding charges.

4. Sentencing Guidelines Analysis

Your client understands that the sentence in this case will be determined by the Court, pursuant to the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), including a consideration of the applicable guidelines and policies set forth in the Sentencing Guidelines. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(B), and to assist the Court in determining the appropriate sentence, the Office estimates the Guidelines as follows:

A. Estimated Offense Level Under the Guidelines
Base offense level +8 2S1.1(a) Base Offense Level:
(1) The offense level for the underlying offense from which the laundered funds were derived, if (A) the defendant committed the underlying offense (or would be accountable for the underlying offense under subsection (a)(1)(A) of §lBl.3 (Relevant Conduct)); and (B) the offense level for that offense can be determined; or
(2) 8 plus the number of offense levels from the table in §2B1.1 (Theft, Property Destruction, and Fraud) corresponding to the value of the laundered funds, otherwise.
+22 Using more than $25 million threshold under 2B1.1
Enhancement +2 2S1.1(b)(2)(B) permits enhancement for 2 points if the conviction is pursuant to §1956.
Enhancement +2 281.1(b)(3) adds two points for sophisticated laundering (which the guidelines lists as involving shell corporations and offshore financial accounts.
Enhancement: +4 3B1.1(a) aggravating role — 5 or more participants or otherwise extensive
Enhancement: +2 301.1 obstruction
Combined Offense level +0 3D1.4
Acceptance: -3 3E1.1(b) acceptance of responsibility
Total for Counts One and Two: 37 Advisory guidelines range of 210-262

The defendant agrees that all of the Sentencing Guidelines for money laundering applicable to charges brought under 18 U.S.C. § 1956 apply to Count One of the Superseding Criminal Information brought under 18 U.S.C. § 371.

For the purposes of the Sentencing Guidelines analysis, the government calculates the highest guideline range among the offenses, namely the object of the conspiracy to violate Title 18 U.S.C. § 1956. The defendant’s estimated guideline range for Count Two, the conspiracy to obstruct justice, is 30 (before any reduction for acceptance of responsibility), and would be grouped with Count One pursuant to §3D1.2(c).

B. Acceptance of Responsibility

The Government agrees that a 2-level reduction will be appropriate, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, provided that your client clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility, to the satisfaction of the Government, through your client’s allocution, adherence to every provision of this Agreement, and conduct between entry of the plea and imposition of sentence. If the defendant has accepted responsibility as described above, and if the defendant pleads guilty on or before September 14, 2018, subject to the availability of the Court, an additional one-level reduction will be warranted, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1 . 1(b).

Nothing in this Agreement limits the right of the Government to seek denial of the adjustment for acceptance of responsibility, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, and/or imposition of an adjustment for obstruction of justice, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3C1 . 1 , regardless of any agreement set forth herein, should your client move to withdraw his guilty plea after it is entered, or should it be determined by the Government that your client has either (a) engaged in conduct, unknown to the Government at the time of the signing of this Agreement, that constitutes obstruction of justice, or (b) engaged in additional criminal conduct after signing this Agreement.

In accordance with the above, the applicable Guidelines Offense Level will be at least 37.

C. Estimated Criminal History Category

Based upon the information now available to this Office, your client has no criminal convictions, other than in the Eastern District of Virginia. Your client acknowledges that depending on when he is sentenced here and how the Guidelines are interpreted, he may have a criminal history. If additional convictions are discovered during the pre-sentence investigation by the United States Probation Office, your client’s criminal history points may increase.

D. Estimated Applicable Guidelines Range

Based upon the total offense level and the estimated criminal history category set forth above, the Office calculates your client’s estimated Sentencing Guidelines range is 210 months to 262 months’ imprisonment (the “Estimated Guidelines Range”). In addition, the Office calculates that, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2, should the Court impose a fine, at Guidelines level 37. the estimated applicable fine range is $40,000 to $400,000. Your client reserves the right to ask the Court not to impose any applicable fine.

Your client agrees that, solely for the purposes of calculating the applicable range under the Sentencing Guidelines, a downward departure from the Estimated Guidelines Range set forth above is not warranted, subject to the paragraphs regarding cooperation below. Accordingly, you will not seek any departure or adjustment to the Estimated Guidelines Range set forth above, nor suggest that the Court consider such a departure or adjustment for any other reason other than those specified above. Your client also reserves the right to disagree with the Estimated Guideline Range calculated by the Office with respect to role in the offense. However, your client understands and acknowledges that the Estimated Guidelines Range agreed to by the Office is not binding on the Probation Office or the Court. Should the Court or Probation Office determine that a different guidelines range is applicable, your client will not be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea on that basis, and the Government and your client will still be bound by this Agreement.

Your client understands and acknowledges that the terms of this section apply only to conduct that occurred before the execution of this Agreement. Should your client engage in any conduct after the execution of this Agreement that would form the basis for an increase in your client’s base offense level or justify an upward departure (examples of which include, but are not limited to, obstruction of justice, failure to appear for a court proceeding, criminal conduct while pending sentencing, and false statements to law enforcement agents, the probation officer, or the Court), the Government is free under this Agreement to seek an increase in the base offense level based on that post—agreement conduct.

5. Agreement as to Sentencing Allocution

Based upon the information known to the Government at the time of the signing of this Agreement, the parties further agree that a sentence within the Estimated Guidelines Range (or below) would constitute a reasonable sentence in light of all of the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), should such a sentence be subject to appellate review notwithstanding the appeal waiver provided below.

6. Reservation of Allocation

The Government and your client reserve the right to describe fully, both orally and in writing, to the sentencing judge, the nature and seriousness of your client’s misconduct, including any misconduct not described in the charge to which your client is pleading guilty.

The parties also reserve the right to inform the presentence report writer and the Courts of any relevant facts, to dispute any factual inaccuracies in the presentence report, and to contest any matters not provided for in this Agreement. In the event that the Courts considers any Sentencing Guidelines adjustments, departures, or calculations different from any agreements contained in this Agreement, or contemplates a sentence outside the Guidelines range based upon the general sentencing factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 35 53(a), the parties reserve the right to answer any related inquiries from the Courts. In addition, your client acknowledges that the

Government is not obligated to file any post—sentence downward departure motion in this case pursuant to Rule 35(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.

7. Court Not Bound by this Agreement or the Sentencing Guidelines

Your client understands that the sentence in this case will be imposed in accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), upon consideration of the Sentencing Guidelines. Your client further understands that the sentence to be imposed is a matter solely within the discretion of the Courts. Your client acknowledges that the Courts are not obligated to follow any recommendation of the Government at the time of sentencing or to grant a downward departure based on your client’s substantial assistance to the Government, even if the Government files a motion pursuant to Section 5K1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines. Your client understands that neither the Government’s recommendation nor the Sentencing Guidelines are binding on the Courts.

Your client acknowledges that your client’s entry of a guilty plea to the charged offenses authorizes the Court to impose any sentence, up to and including the statutory maximum sentence, which may be greater than the applicable Guidelines range determined by the Court. Although the parties agree that the sentences here and in the Eastern District of Virginia should run concurrently to the extent there is factual overlap (i.e. the tax and foreign bank account charges), that recommendation is not binding on either Court. The Government cannot, and does not, make any promise or representation as to what sentences your client will receive. Moreover, your client acknowledges that your client will have no right to withdraw your client’s plea of guilty should the Courts impose sentences that are outside the Guidelines range or if the Courts do not follow the Government’s sentencing recommendation. The Government and your client will be bound by this Agreement, regardless of the sentence imposed by the Courts. Any effort by your client to withdraw the guilty plea because of the length of the sentence shall constitute a breach of this Agreement.

8. Cooperation

Your client shall cooperate fully, truthfully, completely, and forthrightly with the Government and other law enforcement authorities identified by the Government in any and all matters as to which the Government deems the cooperation relevant. This cooperation will include, but is not limited to, the following:

(a) The defendant agrees to be fully debriefed and to attend all meetings at which his presence is requested, concerning his participation in and knowledge of all criminal activities.

(b) The defendant agrees to furnish to the Government all documents and other material that may be relevant to the investigation and that are in the defendant’s possession or control and to participate in undercover activities pursuant to the specific instructions of law enforcement agents or the Government.

(c) The defendant agrees to testify at any proceeding in the District of Colombia or elsewhere as requested by the Government.

(d) The defendant consents to adjournments of his sentences as requested by the Government.

(e) The defendant agrees that all of the defendant’s obligations under this agreement continue after the defendant is sentenced here and in the Eastern District of Virginia; and

(f) The defendant must at all times give complete, truthful, and accurate information and testimony, and must not commit, or attempt to commit, any further crimes.

Your client acknowledges and understands that, during the course of the cooperation outlined in this Agreement, your client will be interviewed by law enforcement agents and/or Government attorneys. Your client waives any right to have counsel present during these interviews and agrees to meet with law enforcement agents and Government attorneys outside of the presence of counsel. If, at some future point, you or your client desire to have counsel present during interviews by law enforcement agents and/or Government attorneys, and you communicate this decision in writing to this Office, this Office will honor this request, and this change will have no effect on any other terms and conditions of this Agreement.

Your client shall testify fully, completely and truthfully before any and all Grand Juries in the District of Columbia and elsewhere, and at any and all trials of cases or other court proceedings in the District of Columbia and elsewhere, at which your client’s testimony may be deemed relevant by the Government.

Your client understands and acknowledges that nothing in this Agreement allows your client to commit any criminal violation of local, state or federal law during the period of your client’s cooperation With law enforcement authorities or at any time prior to the sentencing in this case. The commission of a criminal offense during the period of your client’s cooperation or at any time prior to sentencing will constitute a breach of this Agreement and will relieve the Government of all of its obligations under this Agreement, including, but not limited to, its obligation to inform this Court of any assistance your client has provided. However, your client acknowledges and agrees that such a breach of this Agreement will not entitle your client to withdraw your client’s plea of guilty or relieve your client of the obligations under this Agreement.

Your client agrees that the sentencing in this case and in the Eastern District of Virginia may be delayed until your client’s efforts to cooperate have been completed, as determined by the Government, so that the Courts Will have the benefit of all relevant information before a sentence is imposed.

9. Government’s Obligations

The Government will bring to the Courts’ attention at the time of sentencing the nature and extent of your client’s cooperation or lack of cooperation. The Government will evaluate the full nature and extent of your client’s cooperation to determine whether your client has provided substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense. If this Office determines that the defendant has provided substantial assistance in the form of truthful information and, where applicable, testimony, the Office will file motions pursuant to Section 5K1.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines. Defendant will then be free to argue for any sentence below the advisory Sentencing Guidelines range calculated by the Probation Office, including probation.

10. Waivers

A. Venue

Your client waives any challenge to venue in the District of Columbia.

B. Statute of Limitations

Your client agrees that, should any plea or conviction following your client’s pleas of guilty pursuant to this Agreement, or the guilty verdicts in the Eastern District of Virginia, be vacated, set aside, or dismissed for any reason (other than by government motion as set forth herein), any prosecution based on the conduct set forth in the attached Statement of the Offense, as well as any crimes that the Government has agreed not to prosecute or to dismiss pursuant to this Agreement, that is not time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations on the date of the signing of this Agreement, may be commenced or reinstated against your client, notwithstanding the expiration of the statute of limitations between the signing of this Agreement and the commencement or reinstatement of such prosecution. It is the intent of this Agreement to waive all defenses based on the statute of limitations with respect to any prosecution of conduct set forth in the attached Statement of the Offense, or any other crimes that the Government has agreed not to prosecute, that are not time-barred on the date that this Agreement is signed. The Office and any other party will be free to use against your client, directly and indirectly, in any criminal or civil proceeding, all statements made by your client, including the Statement of the Offense, and any of the information or materials provided by your client, including such statements, information, and materials provided pursuant to this Agreement or during the course of any debriefings conducted in anticipation of, or after entry of, this Agreement, Whether or not the debriefings were previously a part of proffer-protected debriefings, and your client’s statements made during proceedings before the Court pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.

C. Trial and Other Rights

Your client understands that by pleading guilty in this case your client agrees to waive certain rights afforded by the Constitution of the United States and/or by statute or rule. Your client agrees to forgo the right to any further discovery or disclosures of information not already provided at the time of the entry of your client’s guilty plea. Your client also agrees to waive, among other rights, the right to be indicted by a Grand Jury, the right to plead not guilty, and the right to a jury trial. If there were a jury trial, your client would have the right to be represented by counsel, to confront and cross-examine Witnesses against your client, to challenge the admissibility of evidence offered against your client, to compel witnesses to appear for the purpose of testifying and presenting other evidence on your client’s behalf, and to choose whether to testify. If there were a jury trial and your client chose not to testify at that trial, your client would have the right to have the jury instructed that your client’s failure to testify could not be held against your client. Your client would further have the right to have the jury instructed that your client is presumed innocent until proven guilty, and that the burden would be on the United States to prove your client’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. If your client were found guilty after a trial, your client would have the right to appeal your client’s conviction. Your client understands that the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States protects your client from the use of compelled self—incriminating statements in a criminal prosecution. By entering a plea of guilty, your client knowingly and voluntarily waives or gives up your client’s right against compelled self—incrimination.

Your client acknowledges discussing with you Rule 11(f) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and Rule 410 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which ordinarily limit the admissibility of statements made by a defendant in the course of plea discussions or plea proceedings if a guilty plea is later withdrawn. Your client knowingly and voluntarily hereby waives the rights that arise under these rules to object to the use of all such statements by him on and after September 10, 2018, in the event your client breaches this agreement, withdraws his guilty plea, or seeks to withdraw from this Agreement after signing it. This Agreement supersedes the proffer agreement between the Government and the client.

Your client also agrees to waive all constitutional and statutory rights to a speedy sentence and agrees that the pleas of guilty pursuant to this Agreement will be entered at a time decided upon by the parties with the concurrence of the Court. Your client understands that the date for sentencing will be set by the Courts.

Your client agrees not to accept remuneration or compensation of any sort, directly or indirectly, for the dissemination through any means, including but not limited to books, articles, speeches, blogs, podcasts, and interviews, however disseminated, regarding the conduct encompassed by the Statement of the Offense, or the investigation by the Office or prosecution of any criminal or civil cases against him.

D. Appeal Rights

Your client understands that federal law, specifically 18 U.S.C. § 3742, affords defendants the right to appeal their sentences in certain circumstances. Your client agrees to waive the right to appeal the sentences in this case and the Eastern District of Virginia, including but not limited to any term of imprisonment, fine, forfeiture, award of restitution, term or condition of supervised release, authority of the Courts to set conditions of release, and the manner in which the sentences were determined, except to the extent the Courts sentence your client above the statutory maximum or guidelines range determined by the Courts or your client claims that your client received ineffective assistance of counsel, in which case your client would have the right to appeal the illegal sentence or above-guidelines sentence or raise on appeal a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, but not to raise on appeal other issues regarding the sentencings. In agreeing to this waiver, your client is aware that your client’s sentences have yet to be determined by the Courts. Realizing the uncertainty in estimating what sentences the Courts ultimately will impose, your client knowingly and willingly waives your client’s right to appeal the sentence, to the extent noted above, in exchange for the concessions made by the Government in this Agreement.

E. Collateral Attack

Your client also waives any right to challenge the conviction entered or sentence imposed under this Agreement or in the Eastern District of Virginia or otherwise attempt to modify or change the sentences or the manner in which they were determined in any collateral attack, including, but not limited to, a motion brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 or Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), except to the extent such a motion is based on a claim that your client received ineffective assistance of counsel.

Your client agrees that with respect to all charges referred to herein he is not a “prevailing party” within the meaning of the “Hyde Amendment,” 18 U.S.C. § 3006A note, and will not file any claim under that law.

F. Privacy Act and FOIA Rights

Your client also agrees to waive all rights, whether asserted directly or by a representative, to request or receive from any department or agency of the United States any records pertaining to the investigation or prosecution of this case, including and without limitation any records that may be sought under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552, or the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, for the duration of the Special Counsel’s investigation.

11. Restitution

Your client understands that the Court has an obligation to determine whether, and in what amount, mandatory restitution applies in this case under 18 U.S.C. § 3663A. The Government and your client agree that mandatory restitution does not apply in this case.

12. Forfeiture

a) Your client agrees to the forfeiture set forth in the Forfeiture Allegations in the Superseding Criminal Information to which your client is pleading guilty. Your client further agrees to forfeit criminally and civilly the following properties (collectively, the “Forfeited Assets”) to the United States pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Sections 981(a)(1)(A), 981(a)(1)(C), 982(a)(1), 982(a)(2); Title 21, United States Code, Section 853(p), and Title 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c), and further agrees to waive all interest in such assets in any administrative or judicial forfeiture proceeding, whether criminal or civil, state or federal:

1) The real property and premises commonly known as 377 Union Street, Brooklyn, New York 11231 (Block 429, Lot 65), including all appurtenances, improvements, and attachments thereon, and any property traceable thereto;

2) The real property and premises commonly known as 29 Howard Street, #4D, New York, New York 10013 (Block 209, Lot 1104), including all appurtenances, improvements, and attachments thereon, and any property traceable thereto;

3) The real property and premises commonly known as 174 J obs Lane, Water Mill, New York 11976, including all appurtenances, improvements, and attachments thereon, and any property traceable thereto;

4) All funds held in account number 0969 at The Federal Savings Bank, and any property traceable thereto;

5) All funds seized from account number 1388 at Capital One NA, and any property traceable thereto;

6) All funds seized from account number 9952 at The Federal Savings Bank, and any property traceable thereto;

7) Northwestern Mutual Universal Life Insurance Policy and any property traceable thereto;

8) The real property and premises commonly known as 123 Baxter Street, #5D, New York, New York 10016 in lieu of 1046 N. Edgewood Street; and

9) The real property and premises commonly known as 721 F ifth Avenue, #43 G, New York, New York 10022 in lieu of all funds from account number " at Charles Schwab & Co. Inc., and any property traceable thereto.

Your client agrees that his consent to forfeiture is final and irrevocable as to his interests in the Forfeited Assets.

b) Your client agrees that the facts set forth in the Statement of Facts and admitted to by your client establish that the Forfeited Assets are forfeitable to the United States pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Sections 981 and 982, Title 21, United States Code, Section 853, and Title 28, United States Code, Section 2461. Your client admits that the Forfeited Assets numbered 1 through 7, above, represent property that constitutes or is derived from proceeds of, and property involved in, the criminal offenses in the Superseding Criminal Information to which ,your client is pleading guilty. Your client further agrees that all the Forfeited Assets (numbered 1 through 9) can additionally be considered substitute assets for the purpose of forfeiture to the United States pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 982(b); Title 21, United States Code, Section 853(p); and Title 28, United States Code, Section 2461(0).

c) Your client agrees that the Court may enter a preliminary order of forfeiture for the Forfeited Assets at the time of your client’s guilty plea or at any time before sentencing, and consents thereto. Your client agrees that the Court can enter a Final Order of Forfeiture for the Forfeited Assets, and could do so as part of his sentence.

(1) Your client further agrees that the government may choose in its sole discretion how it wishes to accomplish forfeiture of the property whose forfeiture your client has consented to in this plea agreement, whether by criminal or civil forfeiture, using judicial or non-judicial forfeiture processes. If the government chooses to effect the forfeiture provisions of this plea agreement through the criminal forfeiture process, your client agrees to the entry of orders of forfeiture for such property and waives the requirements of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 11(b)(1)(J) and 32.2 regarding notice of the forfeiture in the charging instrument, advice regarding the forfeiture at the change-of-plea hearing, announcement of the forfeiture at sentencing, and incorporation of the forfeiture in the judgment.

e) Your client understands that the United States may institute civil or administrative forfeiture proceedings against all forfeitable property in which your client has an interest, including the Forfeited Assets, without regard to the status of his criminal conviction. Your client further consents to the civil forfeiture of the Forfeited Assets to the United States, without regard to the status of his criminal conviction. In connection therewith, your client specifically agrees to waive all right, title, and interest in the Forfeited Assets, both individually and on behalf of DMP International, Summerbreeze LLC, or any other entity of which he is an officer, member, or has any ownership interest. Your client waives all defenses based on statute of limitations and venue with respect to any administrative or civil forfeiture proceeding related to the Forfeited Assets.

f) Your client represents that with respect to each of the Forfeited Assets, he is either the sole and rightful owner and that no other person or entity has any claim or interest, or that he has secured the consent from any other individuals or entities having an interest in the Forfeited Assets to convey their interests in the Forfeited Assets to him prior to entry of the Order of Forfeiture (with the exception of previously disclosed mortgage holders). Your client warrants that he has accurately represented to the Government all those individuals and entities having an interest in the Forfeited Assets and the nature and extent of those interests, including any mortgages or liens on the Forfeited Assets. Your client agrees to take all steps to pass clear title to the Forfeited Assets to the United States (with the exception of previously disclosed mortgage liens). Your client further agrees to testify truthfully in any judicial forfeiture proceeding, and to take all steps to effectuate the same as requested by the Government. Your client agrees to take all steps requested by the Government to obtain from any other parties by any lawful means any records of assets owned at any time by your client, including but not limited to the Forfeited Assets, and to otherwise facilitate the effectuation of forfeiture and the maximization of the value of Forfeited Assets for the United States.

g) Your client agrees that, to the extent that he does not convey to the United States clear title to each of the Forfeited Assets, the United States is entitled, in its sole discretion, either to vacatur of the plea agreement or to forfeiture to the United States of a sum of money equal to the value of that asset at the time this agreement was executed. Your client consents to modification of any Order of Forfeiture at any point to add such sum of money as a forfeiture judgment in substitution for Forfeited Assets.

h) Your client hereby abandons any interest he has in all forfeitable property and consents to any disposition of the property by the government without further notice or obligation whatsoever owning to your client.

i) Your client agrees not to interpose any claim, or to assist others to file or interpose any claim, to the Forfeited Assets in any proceeding, including but not limited to any civil or administrative forfeiture proceedings and any ancillary proceedings related to criminal forfeiture. Your client agrees that he shall not file any petitions for remission, restoration, or any other assertion of ownership or request for return relating to the Forfeited Assets, or any other action or motion seeking to collaterally attack the seizure, restraint, forfeiture, or conveyance of the Forfeited Assets, nor shall your client assist any other in filing any such claims, petitions, actions, or motion. Contesting or assisting others in contesting forfeiture shall constitute a material breach of the Agreement, relieving the United States of all its obligations under the Agreement. Your client agrees not to seek or accept, directly or indirectly, reimbursement or indemnification from any source with regard to the assets forfeited pursuant to this Agreement.

j) In the event your client fails to deliver the assets forfeited pursuant to this agreement, or in any way fails to adhere to the forfeiture provisions of this agreement, the United States reserves all remedies available to it, including but not limited to vacating the Agreement based on a breach of the Agreement by your client.

k) Your client agrees that the forfeiture provisions of this plea agreement are intended to, and will, survive him notwithstanding the abatement of any underlying criminal conviction after the execution of this Agreement.

l) Your client agrees that he will not claim, assert, or apply for, directly or indirectly, any tax deduction, tax credit, or any other taxable offset with regard to any federal, state, or local tax or taxable income for payments of any assets forfeited pursuant to this Agreement.

m) Your client agrees to waive all constitutional and statutory challenges in any manner (including, but not limited to, direct appeal) to any forfeiture carried out in accordance with this Agreement on any grounds, including that the forfeiture constitutes an excessive fine or punishment.

13. Breach of Agreement

Your client understands and agrees that, if after entering this Agreement, your client fails specifically to perform or to fulfill completely each and every one of your client’s obligations under this Agreement, or engages in any criminal activity prior to sentencing or during his cooperation (whichever is later), your client will have breached this Agreement. Should it be judged by the Government in its sole discretion that the defendant has failed to cooperate fully, has intentionally given false, misleading or incomplete information or testimony, has committed or attempted to commit any further crimes, or has otherwise violated any provision of this agreement, the defendant will not be released from his pleas of guilty but the Government will be released from its obligations under this agreement, including (a) not to oppose a downward adjustment of two levels for acceptance of responsibility described above, and to make the motion for an additional one-level reduction described above and (b) to file the motion for a downward departure for cooperation described above. Moreover, the Government may withdraw the motion described above, if such motion has been filed prior to sentencing. In the event that it is judged by the Government that there has been a breach: (a) your client will be fully subject to criminal prosecution, in addition to the charges contained in the Superseding Criminal Information, for any crimes to which he has not pled guilty, including perjury and obstruction of justice; and (b) the Government and any other party will be free to use against your client, directly and indirectly, in any criminal or civil proceeding, all statements made by your client, including the Statement of the Offense, and any of the information or materials provided by your client, including such statements, information, and materials provided pursuant to this Agreement or during the course of any debriefings conducted in anticipation of, or after entry of, this Agreement, whether or not the debriefings were previously a part of proffer- protected debriefings, and your client’s statements made during proceedings before the Court pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Your client understands and agrees that the Government shall be required to prove a breach of this Agreement only by good faith.

Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to protect your client from prosecution for any crimes not included within this Agreement or committed by your client after the execution of this Agreement. Your client understands and agrees that the Government reserves the right to prosecute your client for any such offenses. Your client further understands that any perjury, false statements or declarations, or obstruction of justice relating to your client’s obligations under this Agreement shall constitute a breach of this Agreement. In the event of such a breach, your client will not be allowed to withdraw your client’s guilty plea.

14. Complete Agreement

Apart from the written proffer agreement initially dated September 11, 2018, which this Agreement supersedes, no agreements, promises, understandings, or representations have been made by the parties or their counsel other than those contained in writing herein, nor will any such agreements, promises, understandings, or representations be made unless committed to writing and signed by your client, defense counsel, and the Office.

Your client further understands that this Agreement is binding only upon the Office. This Agreement does not bind any United States Attorney’s Office, nor does it bind any other state, local, or federal prosecutor. It also does not bar or compromise any civil, tax, or administrative claim pending or that may be made against your client.

If the foregoing terms and conditions are satisfactory, your client may so indicate by signing this Agreement and the Statement of the Offense, and returning both to the Office no later than September 14, 2018.

DEFENDANTS ACCEPTANCE

I have read every page of this Agreement and have discussed it with my attorneys Kevin Downing, Thomas Zehnle, and Richard Westling. I am fully satisfied with the legal representation by them, who I have chosen to represent me herein. Nothing about the quality of the representation of other counsel is affecting my decision herein to plead guilty. I fully understand this Agreement and agree to it without reservation. I do this voluntarily and of my own free will, intending to be legally bound. No threats have been made to me nor am I under the influence of anything that could impede my ability to understand this Agreement fully. I am pleading guilty because I am in fact guilty of the offense identified in this Agreement.

I reaffirm that absolutely no promises, agreements, understandings, or conditions have been made or entered into in connection with my decision to plead guilty except those set forth in this Agreement. I am satisfied with the legal services provided by my attorneys in connection With this Agreement and matters related to it.

ATTORNEYS’ ACKNOWLEDGMENT

I have read every page of this Agreement, reviewed this Agreement with my client, Paul J. Manafort, and fully discussed the provisions of this Agreement with my client. These pages accurately and completely set forth the entire Agreement. I concur in my client’s desire to plead guilty as set forth in this Agreement.

Motion to revoke Paul Manaforts pretrial release for witness tampering

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §3148, the United States of America, by and through Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller, III, hereby moves the Court to revoke or revise the current Order authorizing the release of defendant Paul J. Manafort, Jr. (Manafort) to the Pretrial Services Agency’s high—intensity supervision program. The evidence set forth below and in the attached declaration of Federal Bureau of Investigation (F BI) Special Agent Brock W. Domin establishes probable cause to believe that Manafort has violated 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(1) by attempting to tamper with potential witnesses while on pretrial release and, accordingly, has violated the conditions of his release. That Violation triggers a statutory presumption that no conditions or combination of release conditions will assure the safety of the community and of others. See 18 U.S.C. § 3148(a)-(c). The government therefore requests that the Court promptly schedule the hearing called for by the statute to determine Manafort’s release status. See id. § 3148(b).[1]

A. Factual Background

1. Manafort Was Released To Home Confinement Subject To The Standard Condition That He Not Commit Any Federal, State, Or Local Crime

On October 27, 2017, Manafort was first indicted by a grand jury in this District on nine counts, including conspiracy to defraud and commit offenses against the United States, conspiracy to launder money, failure to file reports of foreign bank accounts, making false and misleading statements, and acting as an unregistered agent of a foreign principal. The charges included allegations that Manafort lied to a wide array of people to carry out the charged crimes. Doc. 13. On October 30, 2017 , Manafort was permitted to surrender to the government after providing his passport to the FBI. Following his arraignment, Manafort was, upon the parties’ consent, ordered released to the Pretrial Service Agency’s high—intensity supervision program and subject to the condition of home confinement and a $10 million bond. See Doc. 9, 10/30/2017 Tr. 19. The order releasing Manafort to home confinement, which Manafort signed, informed him that he was “not to commit any criminal offense nor Violate any condition of this release order — a rearrest for any offense based upon probable cause may be grounds for revoking your release.” Doc. 9 at 2.

Since Manafort was released into the high—intensity supervision program, his conditions of release have been the subject of repeated motions concerning the security necessary to release him from home detention. See, e.g., Doc. 32, 66, 153, 182, and 229. None of those motions has altered the basic requirement that Manafort not commit a federal, state, or local crime during the period of his release. Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b) (providing that, even when a defendant is released “on personal recognizance,” release is “subject to the condition that the person not commit a Federal, State, or local crime”).

For instance, on November 4, 2017 , Manafort moved this Court to modify his conditions of release to permit, among other things, travel within the District of Columbia and the states of Florida, New York, and Virginia. Doc. 32. On November 6, the Court held a hearing on the motion and found that release on Manafort’s personal recognizance with an unsecured appearance bond would not reasonably assure his appearance. 11/6/2017 Tr. 24:25-25:5. On December 15, 2017, the Court further ordered that Manafort would, upon the satisfactory posting of a sufficient bond and the fulfillment of various other conditions, be released from home confinement and permitted to travel within a limited geographic area around his residence. See Doc. 95, see also 12/1 1/ 17 Tr. 15:14-16:9 (noting that the Court was prepared to modify the condition of home confinement but “required financial information that would satisfy . . . the two applicable conditions under the Bail Reform Act”). Manafort’s inability to satisfy the financial conditions necessary to ensure his release have, to date, prevented him from securing the modification he seeks. Like the October 30 Order, the Court’s December 15 Order provided that Manafort’s pretrial release must, in accordance with the Bail Reform Act, be “subject to the condition that [he] not commit a Federal, State, or local crime.” Doc. 95 at 1 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)), see also Doc. 95 at 2 (determining, as a necessary condition of release, that “Defendant must not commit any federal, state, or local crime”).

2. Manafort ’s Attempts to Influence Potential Witnesses

On February 23, 2018, the grand jury returned the operative Superseding Indictment of Manafort. Doc. 202. As relevant here, the Superseding Indictment included new allegations concerning a part of Manafort’s lobbying scheme that is alleged to have Violated the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA), 22 U.S.C. § 611 et seq. Informally referred to by Manafort and his co-conspirators as the “Hapsburg” group, this part of the charged illegal United States lobbying scheme involved the secret retention of a group of former senior European politicians who would act as third-party paid lobbyists for Ukraine. Manafort was alleged to have funneled to the Hapsburg group more than 2 million euros from overseas accounts he controlled. See Superseding Indictment W 30—3 1.

Two individuals who were principals of a public-relations company (Company D) acted as intermediaries between Manafort, Person A, co-defendant Richard Gates, and the Hapsburg group. Those two individuals are described herein as Persons D1 and D2. Manafort, with the assistance of Person A and Gates, managed the work of Persons D1 and D2 on behalf of Ukraine (along with the work of Companies A, B, and C, and others).[2]

Persons D1 and D2’s work for Manafort, which included their work directing the Hapsburg group, was—from its inception—directed at both the United States and Europe. Manafort himself wrote a June 25, 2011 memorandum to Person D1 describing the goals and deliverables of Persons D1 and D2’s work for Ukraine. Manafort stated that a “goal of the program . . . is to educate western media, expand the media awareness of what is really happening and establish mechanisms to maintain a constant flow of information into Europe and the US,” including “Washington.” Domin Decl. 11 6. Similarly, Manafort noted in a “conference call agenda” that one deliverable of Persons D1 and D2’s work would be “Print/electronic media coverage in European [sic] and US,” and that Ukraine’s contract with Persons D1 and D2’s company would “cover the EU and the US.” Id.

Pursuant to Persons D1 and D2’s scope of work—and in coordination with Manafort, Person A, Persons D1 and D2, and others—the Hapsburg group directly lobbied and conducted public relations work in the United States. For example, in September 2012, Manafort and Gates, with the assistance of Persons D1 and D2, arranged for members of the Hapsburg group to contact United States senators directly to lobby on behalf of Ukraine in connection with the Senate’s potential condemnation of the imprisonment of Yulia Tymoshenko. Domin Decl. 11 9. In addition, in early 2013, Manafort and Gates arranged for members of the Hapsburg group to meet with members of Congress and their staffs. Manafort and Gates further directed Persons D1 and D2 to draft an op-ed in the name of one of the members of the Hapsburg group, and arranged for its placement in The Hill—a newspaper published in Washington, D.C—at or around the time that the member of the Hapsburg group was in the United States. Id. 11 10. Persons D1 and D2 did the same with respect to another op-ed by a member of the Hapsburg group placed in The New York Times in January 2014. 161.112.

Following the public disclosure of the February 23 Superseding Indictment, Manafort and Person A—who is a longtime associate of Manafort’s—repeatedly contacted Persons D1 and D2 in an effort to secure materially false testimony concerning the activities of the Hapsburg group. Neither Person D1 nor D2 had had any recent contact with Manafort or Person A. But after the Superseding Indictment was publicly disclosed, Manafort called Person D1 on Persons Dl’s cellular phone. Person D1 sought to avoid Manafort, so Person D1 ended the call. Domin Decl. 1111 14, 20.

The day after the Superseding Indictment was made public, Manafort also sent Person D1 a text message on an encrypted application, stating “This is paul.” Domin Decl. 11 14.3 Two days later, on February 26, 2018, Manafort used the same encrypted application to send Person D1 a news article describing the Superseding Indictment’s allegations concerning the Hapsburg group, which included the statement that “two European politicians were secretly paid around €2 million by Manafort in order to ‘take positions favorable to Ukraine, including by lobbying in the United States.’”4 One minute after sending the news article, Manafort wrote: “We should talk. I have made clear that they worked in Europe.” Domin Decl. 11 15. Toll records for one of Manafort’s phones indicate that Manafort had a short call with Person D1 on February 24, 2018, and that Manafort attempted to call Person D1 again on February 25 and 27 , 2018. Id. 11 14.

As noted in Special Agent Domin’s declaration, Person D1 has told the government that he understood Manafort’s outreach to be an effort to “suborn perjury,” because Person D1 knew that the Hapsburg group worked in the United States—not just Europe. Domin Decl. 11 19.

In an effort to connect Manafort with Person D1, Person A reached out to Person D2, a longtime partner of Person D1. On February 28, five days after the Superseding Indictment, Person A attempted to contact Person D2 Via an encrypted messaging application. Person A wrote: “My friend P is trying to reach [Person D1] to brief him on what’s going on.” Domin Decl. 11 17. Two minutes later, Person A added: “Basically P wants to give him a quick summary that he says to everybody (which is true) that our friends never lobbied in the US, and the purpose of the program was EU.” Id. Approximately five hours later, Person A switched to another encrypted application and sent a similar series of messages to Person D2, including a message relaying Manafort’s “summary” that the Hapsburg group never lobbied in the United States. Id.

The February 2018 messages were not Person A’s only efforts to put Manafort in contact with Persons D1 and D2. In April 2018, Person A reached out to Person D1, relaying the message:

“My friend P is looking for ways to connect to you to pass you several messages. Can we arrange that.” Domin Decl. 11 18. Person A contacted Person D2 Via two encrypted applications the same day, reiterating his need for help in connecting Person D1 with Manafort. Person A added in his final text to Person D2: “I tried him [i.e., Person D1] on all numbers.” Id.5

Like Person D1, Person D2 understood that Manafort and Person A were reaching out to him and Person D1 in an effort to influence the testimony of potential witnesses. Domin Decl. 11 19, 20. Person D2 explained that he and Person D1 had been responsible for interfacing with the Hapsburg group, and acted as “intermediaries” between Manafort and Ukraine government officials and the Hapsburg group. Id. 11 20. Person D2 further stated his opinion that Manafort and Person A’s outreach to him and Person D1 was an effort to get them to relay a message to the Hapsburg group: if the members of the Hapsburg group were contacted by anyone, they should say that their lobbying and public relations work was exclusively in Europe—a representation that would be contrary to Person D’s knowledge that the Hapsburg group worked in both Europe and the United States. Id. 11 19, 20.

B. Legal Standard

“The Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3141 et seq., permits the revocation of release and an order of detention for a person who has been released under 18 U.S.C. § 3142 and has Violated a condition of that release.” United States v. Addison, 984 F. Supp. 1, 2 (D.D.C. 1997). As relevant here, an “attorney for the Government may initiate a proceeding for revocation of an order of release by filing a motion with the district court.” 18 U.S.C. § 3148(b). Section 3148 further provides that the judicial officer hearing the motion:

shall enter an order of revocation and detention if, after a hearing, the judicial officer—

(1) finds that there is—

(A) probable cause to believe that the person has committed a Federal, State, or local crime while on release; or

(B) clear and convincing evidence that the person has Violated any other condition of release; and

(2) finds that--

(A) based on the factors set forth in [18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)], there is no condition or combination of conditions of release that will assure that the person will not flee or pose a danger to the safety of any other person or the community, or

(B) the person is unlikely to abide by any condition or combination of conditions of release.

Id. (emphasis added).

The government’s motion here is based on Section 3148(b)(1)(A), which requires “probable cause to believe” that Manafort has committed (as pertinent here) a federal “crime while on release.” The probable-cause standard is not an onerous one. As the Second Circuit explained in an analogous case, “[p]robable cause under§ 3148(b)(1)(A) requires only a practical probability that the evidence supports a finding that the defendant has committed a crime while on bail.” United States v. LaFontaihe, 210 F.3d 125, 133 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks, citation, and ellipses omitted); accord, e.g., United States v. Aron, 904 F.2d 221, 224 (5th Cir. 1990) (“[T]o satisfy the probable cause requirement of § 3148(b)(1)(A), the facts available to the judicial officer must warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the defendant has committed a crime while on bail”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Notably, once a court finds probable cause to believe that the defendant committed a crime while on release, “a rebuttable presumption arises that no condition or combination of conditions will assure that the person will not pose a danger to the safety of any other person or the community.” 18 U.S.C. § 3148(b). If the defendant rebuts that presumption and a court finds “that there are conditions of release that will assure that the person will not flee or pose a danger to the safety of any other person or the community, and that the person will abide by such conditions,” then the court “shall treat the person in accordance with the provisions of [18 U.S.C. § 3142] and may amend the conditions of release accordingly.” Id. , see United States v. McKethan, 602 F. Supp. 719, 722 (D.D.C. 1985) (explaining that, where the government seeks detention “based upon a charge that a defendant has committed a felony while on release, § 3142 does not come into play unless and until the judicial officer finds under § 3148(b)(2)(B) that the defendant has overcome the statutory rebuttable presumption”). Nonetheless, the statutory “presumption does not disappear once the defendant has produced some rebuttal evidence, but continues to be weighed along with other factors.” LaFontaine, 210 F.3d at 130 (quotation marks omitted).

C. The Defendant Has Violated The Release Condition That He Not Commit Any Federal Crime

The facts set forth above and in Special Agent Domin’s Declaration establish probable cause to believe that Manafort has Violated his conditions of release by attempting to tamper with witnesses, in Violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(1). A Violation based on commission of a federal crime triggers the statutory presumption in favor of detention.

1. Section 1512(b)(1) proscribes “knowingly . . . corruptly persuad[ing]” or “attempt[ing] to” corruptly persuade another person “with intent to . . . influence . . . the testimony of any person in an official proceeding.” 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(1).6 As relevant here, the statute’s plain language 6 Section 1512(b)(1) provides in full:

(b) Whoever knowingly uses intimidation, threatens, or corruptly persuades another person, or attempts to do so, or engages in misleading conduct toward another person, with intent to— reaches “non-coercive attempts to tamper with witnesses,” United States v. Khatami, 280 F.3d 907, 912 (9th Cir. 2002), including attempts “to persuade a witness to give false testimony,” United States v. Cruzado-Laureaho, 404 F.3d 470, 487 (1st Cir. 2005). See also United States v. Baldridge, 559 F.3d 1126, 1142 (10th Cir.) (“All circuits that have considered the issue have” held “that a non-coercive attempt to persuade a witness to lie to investigators constitutes a Violation of § 1512(b).”), cert. denied, 556 US. 1226 (2009).

That straightforward construction of the statute—that Section 1512(b)(1) reaches non- coercive witness tampering—is borne out by the DC. Circuit’s decisions applying the statute. In United States v. Morrison, 98 F.3d 619 (DC. Cir. 1996), for example, the court affirmed the conviction of a defendant who had tried to corrupt a witness “by exhorting her to Violate her legal duty to testify truthfully in court,” an effort that the witness understood as a request that she “‘perjure’ herself.” Id. at 630. More recently, the defendant in United States v. Gurr, 471 F.3d 144 (DC. Cir. 2006), was charged with conspiracy and other offenses arising from his role in financial malfeasance at a credit union. After his arrest, the defendant and another credit-union employee attempted to persuade a witness to sign an affidavit falsely stating that the witness had authorized money to be transferred from her account. Id. at 154. The DC. Circuit upheld Gurr’s conviction under Section 1512(b)(1), rejecting his argument that the evidence was insufficient “because there was no evidence of cooperation between Gurr and the other credit union employee and no evidence that the witness was intimidated or threatened.” Id. The court explained that Gurr

(1) influence, delay, or prevent the testimony of any person in an official proceeding, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both. “was not charged with intimidating or threatening [the witness], and the jury could reasonably find that Gurr, with the assistance of [the other employee], attempted to ‘corruptly persuade [ ]’ [the witness] in order to influence her testimony by having her sign a false affidavit.” Id.

In support of its conclusion, the court in Gurr cited with approval several out-of-circuit decisions involving non-coercive efforts to influence witness testimony that are similar to Manafort’s conduct here. For example, United States v. LaShay, 417 F.3d 715 (7th Cir. 2005), involved a gas station employee’s efforts to convince a co-worker to lie for him about a $2,000 check that the defendant had received from the gas station’s owner. The court in LaShay followed decisions of the Second Circuit holding that “corrupt” persuasion occurs (1) “where a defendant tells a potential witness a false story as if the story were true, intending that the witness believe the story and testify to it,” and (2) where a “defendant trie[s] to persuade a witness to give a false account that tracked the defendant’s position.” Id. at 718 (quoting, respectively, United States v. Gabriel, 125 F.3d 89, 102 (2d Cir. 1997), and LaFontaihe, supra, 210 F.3d at 132). Applying those principles to the facts before it, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the employee’s Section 1512 conviction, concluding that “[a] jury could properly View LaShay’s remarks [to his co-worker] as an unstated invitation to lie.” Id. at 719.

In LaFontaine, one of the Second Circuit decisions discussed in LaShay, the district court revoked the bail of a defendant who had tampered with a witness after her indictment. See 210 F.3d at 128-3 3. The defendant there participated in a fraudulent-billing scheme in which her health clinic performed cosmetic surgeries for patients but billed them out as necessary procedures to obtain insurance payments. After her arrest in the scheme, the defendant was recorded on a jail call “reminding” a relative and former employee (Reyes) that Reyes’ mother had undergone the procedures listed on the clinics’ false bills. When she was released from custody, the defendant then met with Reyes several times, including one occasion on which the defendant played for Reyes a recording of the jail call “reminder” about her mother’s surgeries. The Second Circuit upheld the decision revoking the defendant’s bail, concluding that her “attempt to review the ‘facts’ that would likely become part of Reyes[’s] trial testimony . . . satisf[ies] the requirements of the witness tampering statute and, consequently, of the bail revocation statute.” Id. at 133. In so concluding, the court rejected the defendant’s argument that the jail call did “not show any threats or intimidation of Reyes,” explaining that Section 1512(b)(1) “plainly does not require “physical force’ or ‘threats’ to support a tampering charge, corrupt influence is sufficient.” Id.

Finally, the First Circuit’s decision in Cruzaalo, supra, involved a corrupt mayor who extorted money and kickbacks from local businesses and, after learning of the investigation, pressured various individuals to conform their stories to his. The First Circuit characterized Cruzado’s challenge to the sufficiency of the eVidence as “simple: all he did was urge witnesses to tell the truth, which is not a crime.” 404 F.3d at 487. But the court rejected that challenge. While “Cruzado did ask that [witnesses] tell the truth,” the court explained, “his version of ‘the truth’ that he urged upon them was anything but the truth.” Id. The jury could therefore find that Cruzado was trying to persuade witnesses to testify to something other than their true beliefs, which was sufficient to support his Section 1512(b)(1) convictions. Id.

2. Under these decisions, the evidence recited above and in Special Agent Domin’s Declaration establishes probable cause to believe that Manafort Violated Section 1512(b)(1) by attempting to persuade Persons D1 and D2—both directly and through an intermediary—to support a materially false narrative in connection with the charges in the Superseding Indictment.

The string of communications with Persons D1 and D2 establishes a Violation of Section 1512(b)(1) under the probable-cause standard. Manafort sent Person D1 a news article that reported on allegations in the recent Superseding Indictment that members of the Hapsburg group performed lobbying and public-relations work in the United States, not just in Europe, which is a key difference for purposes of liability under FARA. See 22 U.S.C. § 611(c)(1) (defining “agent of a foreign principal” as a person who, as relevant here, engages in various acts “within the United States”). Manafort then messaged Person D1 that he had “made clear that” the Hapsburg group “worked in Europe,” a message that Person D1 reasonably understood to embody one form of corrupt persuasion criminalized by Section 1512(b)(1)—viz., an attempt “to persuade a witness to give a false account that track[s] the defendant’s position.” LaShay, 417 F.3d at 718. Indeed, Person D 1’s understanding of the message as an effort to “suborn perjury” is itself a strong indication that Manafort acted both “corruptly” and with the intent to “influence” a third party’s testimony, as required by Section 1512(b)(1). See, e.g., Morrison, 98 F.3d at 629—30 (affirming Section 1512 conviction where witness understood defendant’s request to provide false testimony as asking her “to ‘perjure’ herself’).

Person A’s outreach to Person D2 on behalf of Manafort is equally probative of a Section 1512(b)(1) Violation. As described in Special Agent Domin’s Declaration, Person D2 perceived Person A’s series of messages as an effort by Manafort to influence the accounts of potential witnesses in his case about the nature of the work performed behalf of Ukraine. At the very least, Person A’s statements and Person D2’s description of them establish “a practical probability that the evidence supports a finding that the defendant has committed a crime while on bail.” LaFontaihe, 210 F.3d at 133.

As an initial matter, the content and context of Person A’s messages indicate that Person A was reaching out to Person D2 at Manafort’s request. That much is evident from Person A’s initial message to Person D2 that Manafort was “trying to reach [Person D 1] to brief him on what’s going on.” It would strain credulity to suggest that Person A—a close confidant of Manafort for years— undertook that outreach without Manafort’s knowledge and approval, especially given the timing of the messages (they followed closely on the heels of Manafort’s own outreach to Person D1, after a lengthy hiatus with no communications with Persons D1 or D2), their content (they sought to arrange a communication with Manafort), and the person with an overriding legal interest in the communication (Manafort). The inference that Person A acted on Manafort’s behalf is all the more reasonable in light of evidence already before this Court demonstrating that Manafort and Person A coordinated in connection with an op-ed that appeared in the Kyiv Post during Manafort’s home confinement. See Decl. of Special Agent Brock W. Domin, Doc. 123, Exs. A & B (Dec. 8, 20 17).

Furthermore, the story that Person A conveyed to Person D2 was, like the message Manafort conveyed to Person D1, false. Person A wrote: “Basically P wants to give him a quick summary that he says to everybody (which is true) that our friends never lobbied in the US, and the purpose of the program was EU.” Domin Decl. 11 17 . As explained above, that description of the geographic reach of the Hapsburg group’s activities is both false and central to the applicability of FARA to Manafort’s “Hapsburg group” scheme. Person A’s message is thus a “false story” conveyed “as if the story were true,” LaShay, 417 F.3d at 718, and an attempt “to persuade a witness to give a false account that tracked the defendant’s position,” id. See also Cruzado, 404 F.3d at 487 (affirming Section 1512(b) conviction where, although the defendant asked witnesses to “tell the truth,” the “version of ‘the truth’ that he urged upon them was anything but the truth”). Person A’s message consequently amounts to an attempt to corruptly persuade a witness proscribed by Section 1512(b)(1).

It is no defense that Manafort conveyed messages to Person D2 through an intermediary. Section 1512(b)(1)’s language is sufficiently expansive to reach acts designed “to influence testimony at a proceeding by corruptly persuading [one] person through another.” United States v. Norris, 753 F. Supp. 2d 492, 505 (ED. Pa. 2010) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Amato, 86 F. App’x 447, 450 (2d Cir. 2004) (unpublished) (upholding Section 1512 conviction where the defendant believed a third party was cooperating against him, the defendant was concerned the third party would testify against him at trial, and the “defendant directed intermediaries” to reach out to the third party and deliver a message). And even if Section 1512 alone did not reach corrupt persuasion accomplished through intermediaries, 18 U.S.C. § 2 makes it a crime both to cause an unwitting third party to corruptly persuade a potential witness and to aid and abet a complicit party in committing corrupt persuasion.

In sum, the government’s evidence establishes probable cause that Manafort Violated the witness-tampering statute both through his direct outreach to Person D1 and his intermediary’s outreaches to Persons D1 and D2. As a result, Manafort Violated the condition of release requiring that he not commit any federal, state, or local crime. See LaFontaine, 210 F.3d at 133.

3. A finding of probable cause to believe that Manafort violated his conditions of release by committing the federal crime of witness tampering triggers the statutory presumption that no condition or combination of conditions can assure that Manafort “will not pose a danger to the safety of any other person or the community.” 18 U.S.C. § 3148(b), see United States v. Cook, 880 F.2d 1158, 1162 (10th Cir. 1989) (explaining that “[o]nce the presumption arises, the ball is in the defendant’s court, and it is incumbent on the defendant to come forward with some evidence to rebut the presumption”) (internal citation omitted). And with respect to “danger to . . . the community,” courts have recognized that a defendant’s “attempts to influence the testimony of’ potential witnesses “constitute the type of danger to the community that [can] support detention.” LaFontaihe, 210 F.3d at 135; see, e.g., United States v. Gilley, 771 F. Supp. 2d 1301, 1308 (MD. Ala. 201 1) (explaining that a probable-cause finding that a defendant engaged in witness tampering goes to “the very integrity of [the court’s] own processes and the fair administration of justice,” and implicates “not only the singular concern of keeping a defendant from engaging in illegal conduct, but also the public concern of encouraging all witnesses and all potential witnesses to come forward and provide information helpful to the implementation of justice”) (internal brackets and quotation marks omitted).

The Second Circuit’s decision in LaFontaine, supra, is instructive. The fraud defendant there argued that she posed no danger to the community because, unlike in other witness-tampering cases, she was “a white-collar criminal with no connection to the mob . . . or to narcotics,” and the evidence showed at most that she “persistently ‘fed’ [a witness] false testimony with the expectation that [the witness] would adopt it.” 210 F.3d at 134. The Second Circuit rejected that argument. It explained that “obstruction of justice ha[d] been a traditional ground for pretrial detention by the courts, even” before the Bail Reform Act of 1984 made “dangerousness” a basis for detention. lal, see id. (stating that “pretrial trial detention [i]s even more justified in cases of Violations related to the trial process (such as witness tampering) than in cases where the defendant’s past criminality was said to support a finding of general dangerousness”). And although the court acknowledged that “witness tampering that is accomplished by means of Violence may seem more egregious,” it concluded that “the harm to the integrity of the trial is the same no matter which form the tampering takes.” Id. at 135. The court therefore affirmed the district court’s conclusion that the defendant “posed a danger to the community,” id. at 134, and that revocation was warranted under Section 3148(b), id. at 135.

Revocation of the terms of the current Order is appropriate here for many of the same reasons. Manafort’s efforts to influence the testimony of potential witnesses, both directly and through an intermediary, threaten “the integrity of the trial” even though those efforts have not been Violent in nature and the underlying prosecution involves “white-collar” offenses rather than “narcotics” or Violent crimes. See LaFontaine, 210 F.3d at 134. At the same time, Manafort’s obstructive conduct—carried out at a time when he was seeking relief from his current conditions of release—instills little confidence that restrictions short of detention will assure Manafort’s compliance with the Court’s orders and prevent him from committing further crimes. To the contrary, that conduct is strong evidence that Manafort is conscious of his guilt of the FARA allegations added in the Superseding Indictment and that he has a greater incentive to flee than this Court (and another) already found him to possess in connection with the earlier indictments. See 11/6/2017 Tr. 24-25 (citing Manafort’s “risk of flight” as one factor weighing against release on personal recognizance), Doc. 25 at 2, United States v. Manafort, No. 1:18-cr-63 (E.D. Va. March 9, 2018) (finding that Manafort “poses a substantial risk of flight”).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the government moves the Court to conduct a hearing pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3148(b) and to revoke or revise its current Order authorizing Manafort’s release to the Pretrial Services Agency’s high-intensity supervision program.

Dated: June 4, 2018

Respectfully submitted,

ROBERT S. MUELLER, III
Special Counsel

/s/Ahdrew Weissmahh
Andrew Weissmarm
Greg D. Andres (D.D.C. Bar No. 459221)
Scott A.C. Meisler
Brian M. Richardson

Special Counsel’s Office
950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20530
Telephone: (202) 616-0800
Attorneys for the United States of America


[1] By minute order entered on May 31, 2018, the Court granted the government leave to file a supplemental response to Manafort’s motion to reconsider the conditions of his release (Doc. 291). The government submits this motion as its supplemental response to avoid any question about the Court’s authority to revoke the release Order under Section 3148. Cf. United States v. Koumbairia, No. 07-cr-61, 2007 WL 1307909, at *2 (D.D.C. May 3, 2007) (noting that the “question of whether a revocation proceeding could be initiated without . . . a written government motion remained unresolved”).<

[2] The references to anonymized companies and individuals in this motion mirror those used in the Superseding Indictment (e.g., Doc. 202 W 24, 29, 31) and in other pleadings in this and related cases. See, e.g., Gov’t Sent. Mem. at 2, United States v. van der Zwaan, No. 1:18-cr-31 (D.D.C. March 27, 2017) (Doc. 19).

[3] Persons D1 and D2 both preserved the messages they received from Manafort and Person A, which were sent on encrypted applications, and have provided them to the government. Domin Decl. 11 12 n.1

[4] Michael Kranz, F ormer European leaders struggle to explain themselves after Mueller claims Paul Manafortpaid them to lobby for Ukraine, Business Insider (Feb. 25, 2018), available at http ://www.businessinsider.con1/forrner—european—leaders-manafort—hapsburg-group-20 18- 2?1=UK&IR=T

[5] A chart summarizing the contacts and attempted contacts discussed in this motion is attached to Special Agent Domin’s Declaration as Exhibit N.

Joint status report contending that Paul Manafort breached his plea agreement

The United States of America, by and through Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller, III, and Paul J. Manafort, Jr., by and through counsel, respectfully submit this joint status report to request, in light of recent developments, that the Court direct the preparation of a Presentence Investigation Report and schedule sentencing in this matter, as well as set a schedule for any pre-sentencing submissions and motions.

The government reports that:

1. On September 14, 2018, one business day before jury selection was scheduled in this matter, defendant Paul J. Manafort, Jr., pleaded guilty to a superseding information, charging him with two criminal conspiracy counts that encompassed all the criminal conduct alleged in the Superseding Indictment in this district. As the Court is aware, that criminal conduct occurred over a decade, up through April 2018.

2. Manafort pleaded pursuant to a plea agreement that required his “fully, truthfully, completely, and forthrightly” cooperating with the government. Plea Agreement, Doc. 422 ¶ 8; Plea Hr’g Tr. 39:10-17, 48:11-16, Sept. 14, 2018. The plea agreement provides that if the defendant fails to fulfill completely “each and every one” of his obligations under this agreement, or “engages in any criminal activity prior to sentencing,” the defendant will be in breach of the agreement. A breach relieves the government of any obligations it has under the agreement, including its agreement to a reduction in the Sentencing Guidelines for acceptance of responsibility, but leaves intact all the obligations of the defendant as well as his guilty pleas. Plea Agreement, Doc. 422 ¶¶ 4B, 8, & 13. Plea Agreement, Doc. 422 ¶¶ 7 & 9.

3. After signing the plea agreement, Manafort committed federal crimes by lying to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Special Counsel’s Office on a variety of subject matters, which constitute breaches of the agreement.

The government will file a detailed sentencing submission to the Probation Department and the Court in advance of sentencing that sets forth the nature of the defendant’s crimes and lies, including those after signing the plea agreement herein.

4. As the defendant has breached the plea agreement, there is no reason to delay his sentencing herein.

The defendant reports that:

5. After signing the plea agreement, Manafort met with the government on numerous occasions and answered the government’s questions. Manafort has provided information to the government in an effort to live up to his cooperation obligations. He believes he has provided truthful information and does not agree with the government’s characterization or that he has breached the agreement. Given the conflict in the parties’ positions, there is no reason to delay the sentencing herein, and he asks the Court to set a sentencing date in this matter.

Dated: November 26, 2018

Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT S. MUELLER, III
Special Counsel

Attorneys for the United States of America

Kevin M. Downing (D.C. Bar No. 1013984)
Law Office of Kevin M. Downing
601 New Jersey Avenue NW, Suite 620
Washington, DC 20001
(202) 754-1992
kevindowning@kdowninglaw.com

Attorneys for defendant, Paul J. Manafort, Jr.

Andrew Weissmann
Jeannie S. Rhee (D.D.C. Bar No. 464127)
Greg D. Andres (D.D.C. Bar No. 459221)
Special Counsel’s Office
950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20530
Telephone: (202) 616-0800

Thomas E. Zehnle (D.C. Bar No. 415556)
Law Office of Thomas E. Zehnle
601 New Jersey Avenue NW, Suite 620
Washington, DC 20001
(202) 368-4668
tezehnle@gmail.com

Richard W. Westling (D.C. Bar No. 990496)
Epstein Becker & Green, P.C.
1227 25th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20037
Tel: 202-861-1868
Fax: 202-296-2882
Email: rwestling@ebglaw.com

Paul Manafort Statement of the Offenses and Other Acts

Pursuant to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 11, the United States and the defendant PAUL J. MANAFORT, JR. (MANAFORT) stipulate and agree that the following facts are true and accurate. These facts do not constitute all of the facts known to the parties concerning the charged offense and covered conduct. This statement is being submitted by the parties to demonstrate that sufficient facts exist to establish that the defendant committed the offenses to which he is pleading guilty.

Count 1: Conspiracy Against the United States (18 U.S.C §371)

1. At all relevant times herein, MANAFORT was an owner of Davis Manafort Partners, Inc. (DMP) 0r DMP International, LLC (DMI) or both. MANAFORT engaged in a variety of criminal schemes, and knowingly, intentionally, and willfully conspired with Richard W. Gates, Konstantin Kilimnik, and others to carry out the criminal schemes that make up Counts One and Two of the Information, as more fully set forth below.

A. FARA Conspiracy
22 U.S.C. §§ 612 and 618(a)(1)
MANAFORT’s Lobbying in the United States on Behalf of the Government of Ukraine

2. MANAFORT knew it was illegal to lobby government officials and engage in public relations activities (hereinafter collectively referred to as lobbying) in the United States on behalf of a foreign government or political party, without registering with the United States Government under the Foreign Agents Registration Act. MANAFORT knew he was lobbying in the United States for the Government of Ukraine, President Viktor F. Yanukovych, the Party of Regions, and the Opposition Bloc (the latter two being political parties in Ukraine), and thus he was supposed to submit a written registration statement to the United States Department of Justice. MANAFORT knew that the filing was required to disclose the name of the foreign country, all the financial payments to the lobbyist, and the specific steps undertaken for the foreign country in the United States, among other information.

3. MANAFORT knew that Ukraine had a strong interest in the United States’ taking economic and policy positions favorable to Ukraine, including not imposing sanctions on Ukraine. MANAFORT also knew that the trial and treatment of President Yanukovych’s political rival, former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, was strongly condemned by leading United States executive and legislative branch officials, and was a major hurdle to improving United States and Ukraine relations.

4. From 2006 until 2015, MANAFORT led a multi-million dollar lobbying campaign in the United States at the direction of the Government of Ukraine, President Yanukovyeh, the Party of Regions, and the Opposition Bloc. MANAFORT intentionally did so without registering and providing the disclosures required by law.

5. As part of the lobbying scheme, MANAFORT hired numerous firms and people to assist in his lobbying campaign in the United States. He hired Companies A, B, C, D, and E, and Law Firm A, among others, to participate in what he described to President Yanukovych in writing as a global “Engage Ukraine” lobbying campaign that he devised and led. These companies and law firm were paid the equivalent of over $11 million for their Ukraine work.

6. MANAFORT viewed secrecy for himself and for the actions of his lobbyists as integral to the effectiveness of the lobbying offensive he orchestrated for Ukraine. Filing under the Foreign Agents Registration Act would have thwarted the secrecy MANAFORT sought in order to conduct an effective campaign for Ukraine to influence both American leaders and the American public.

7. MANAFORT took steps to avoid any of these firms and people disclosing their lobbying efforts under the Foreign Agents Registration Act. As one example, even though MANAFORT engaged Company B in 2007 to lobby in the United States for the Government of Ukraine, MANAFORT tried to dissuade Company E from filing under the Foreign Agents Registration Act. Only after MANAFORT ceased to use Company E in the fall of 2007 did Company E disclose its work for Ukraine, in a belated filing under the Act in 2008.

8. MANAFORT took other measures to keep the Ukraine lobbying as secret as possible. For example, MANAFORT, in written communications on or about May 16, 2013, directed his lobbyists (including Persons D1 and D2, who worked for Company D) to write and disseminate Within the United States news stories that alleged that Tymoshenko had paid for the murder of a Ukrainian official. MANAFORT stated that it should be “push[ed]” “[w]ith no fingerprints.” “It is very important we have no connection.” MANAFORT stated that “[m]y goal is to plant some stink on Tymo.” Person D1 objected to the plan, but ultimately Persons D1 and D2 complied with M‘ANAFORT’S direction. The Foreign Agents Registration Act required MANAFORT to disclose such lobbying, as MANAFORT knew. He did not.

The Hamburg Group and Company D

9. As part of the lobbying scheme, starting in 2011, MANAFORT secretly retained Company D and a group of four former European heads of state and senior officials (including a former Austrian Chancellor, Italian Prime Minister, and Polish President) to lobby in the United States and Europe on behalf of Ukraine. The former politicians, called the Hapsburg Group by MANAFORT, appeared to be providing solely their independent assessments of Government of Ukraine policies, when in fact they were paid by Ukraine. MANAFORT explained in an “EYES ONLY” memorandum in or about June 2012 that his purpose was to “assemble a small group of high—level European infuencial [sic] champions and politically credible friends who can act informally and without any visible relationship with the Government of Ukraine,”

10. Through MANAFORT, the Government of Ukraine retained an additional group of lobbyists (Company D and Persons D1 and D2). In addition to lobbying itself, Company D secretly served as intermediaries between the Hapsburg Group and MANAFORT and the Government of Ukraine. In or about 2012 through 2013, MANAFORT directed more than the equivalent of 700,000 euros to be wired from at least three of his offshore accounts to the benefit of Company D to pay secretly for its services.

11. All four Hapsburg Group members, at the direction, and with the direct assistance, of MANAFORT, advocated positions favorable to Ukraine in meetings with United States lawmakers, interviews with United States journalists, and ghost written op-eds in American publications. In or about 2012 through 2014, MANAFORT directed more than 2 million euros to be wired from at least four of his offshore accounts to pay secretly the Hapsburg Group. To avoid European taxation, the contract with the Hapsburg Group falsely stated that none of its work would take place in Europe.

12. One of the Hapsburg Group members, a former Polish President, was also a representative of the European Parliament with oversight responsibility for Ukraine. MANAFORT solicited that official to provide MANAFORT inside information about the European Parliament’s views and actions toward Ukraine and to take actions favorable to Ukraine. MANAFORT also used this Hapsburg Group member’s current European Parliament position to Ukraine’s advantage in his lobbying efforts in the United States. In the fall 01°20] 2, the United States Senate was considering and ultimately passed a resolution critical of President Yanukovych’s treatment of former Prime Minister Tymoshenko. MANAFORT engaged in an all—out campaign to try to kill or delay the passage of this resolution. Among the steps he took was having the Hapsburg Group members reach out to United States Senators, as well as directing Companies A and B to have private conversations with Senators to lobby them to place a “hold” on the resolution. MANAFORT told his lobbyists to stress to the Senators that the former Polish President who was advocating against the resolution was currently a designated representative of the President of the European Parliament, to give extra clout to his supposedly independent judgment against the Senate resolution. MANAFORT never revealed to the Senators or to the American public that any of these lobbyists or Hapsburg Group members were paid by Ukraine.

13. In another example, on May 16, 2013, another member of the Hapsburg Group lobbied in the United States for Ukraine. The Hapsburg Group member accompanied his country’s prime minister to the Oval Office and met with the President and Vice President of the United States, as well as senior United States officials in the executive and legislative branches. In written communications sent to MANAFORT, Person D1 reported that the Hapsburg Group member delivered the message of not letting “Russians Steal Ukraine from the West.” The Foreign Agents Registration Act required MANAFORT to disclose such lobbying, as MANAFORT knew. He did not.

Law Firm Report and Tymoshenko

14. As another part of the lobbying scheme, in 2012, on behalf of President Yanukovych and the Government of Ukraine’s Ministry of Justice, MANAFORT solicited a United States law firm to write a report evaluating the trial of Yanukovych’s political opponent Yulia Tymoshenko. MANAFORT caused Ukraine to hire the law firm so that its report could be used in the United States and elsewhere to defend the Tymoshenko criminal trial and argue that President Yanukovych and Ukraine had not engaged in selective prosecution.

15. MANAFORT retained a public relations firm (Company C) to prepare a media roll-out plan for the law firm report. MANAFORT used one of his offshore accounts to pay Company C the equivalent of more than $1 million for its services.

16. MANAFORT worked closely with Company C to develop a detailed written lobbying plan in connection with What MANAFORT termed the “selling” of the report. This campaign included getting the law firm’s report “seeded” to the press in the United States; that is, to leak the report ahead of its official release to a prominent United States newspaper and then use that initial article to influence reporting globally. As part of the roll—out plan, on the report’s issuance on December 13, 2012, MANAFORT arranged to have the law firm disseminate hard copies of the report to numerous government officials, including senior United States executive and legislative branch officials.

17. MANAFORT reported on the law firm’s work on the report and Company C’s lobbying plan to President Yanukovych and other representatives of the Government of Ukraine. For example, in a July 27, 2012 memorandum to President Yanukovych’ 5 Chief of Staff, MANAFORT reported on “the global rollout strategy for the [law firm’s] legal report, and provide[d] a detailed plan of action[]” which included step-by-step lobbying outreach in the United States.

18. MANAFORT directed lobbyists to tout the report as showing that President Yanukovych had not selectively prosecuted Tymoshenko. But in November 2012 MANAFORT had been told privately in writing by the law firm that the evidence of Tymoshenko’s criminal intent “is Virtually non-existent” and that it was unclear even among legal experts that Tymoshenko lacked power to engage in the conduct central to the Ukraine criminal case. These facts, known by MANAFORT, were not disclosed to the public.

19. MANAFORT knew that the report also did not disclose that the law firm, in addition to being retained to write the report, was retained to represent Ukraine itself, including in connection with the Tymoshenko case and to provide training to the trial team prosecuting Tymoshenko.

20. MANAFORT also knew that the Government of Ukraine did not want to disclose how much the report cost. More than $4.6 million was paid to the law firm for its work. MANAFORT used one of his offshore accounts to funnel $4 million to pay the law firm, a fact that MANAFORT did not disclose to the public. Instead, the Government of Ukraine reported falsely that the report cost just $12,000.

21. MANAFORT and others knew that the actual cost of the report and the scope of the law firm’s work would undermine the report’s being perceived as an independent assessment and thus being an effective lobbying tool for MANAFORT to use to support the incarceration of President Yanukovych’s political opponent.

22. In addition to the law firm report, MANAFORT took other steps on behalf of the Government of Ukraine to tarnish Tymoshenko in the United States. In addition to disseminating stories about her soliciting murder, noted above, in October 2012, MANAFORT orchestrated a scheme to have, as he wrote in a contemporaneous communication, “[O]bama jews” put pressure on the Administration to disavow Tymoshenko and support Yanukovych. MANAFORT sought to undermine United States support for Tymoshenko by spreading stories in the United States that a senior Cabinet official (who had been a prominent critic of Yanukovyeh’s treatment 01" Tymoshenko) was supporting anti—Semitism because the official supported Tymoshenko, who in turn had formed a political alliance with a Ukraine party that espoused anti-Semitic Views. MANAFORT coordinated privately with a senior Israeli government official to issue a written statement publicizing this story. MANAFORT then, with secret advance knowledge of that Israeli statement, worked to disseminate this story in the United States, writing to Person D1 “I have someone pushing it on the NY Post. Bada bing bada boom.” MANAFORT sought to have the Administration understand that “the Jewish community will take this out on Obama on election day if he does nothing.” MANAFORT then told his United States lobbyist to inform the Administration that Ukraine had worked to prevent the Administration’s presidential opponent from including damaging language in the Israeli statement, so as not to harm the Administration, and thus further ingratiate Yanukovych with the Administration.

Company A and Company B

23. As a third part of the lobbying scheme, in February 2012, MANAFORT solicited two Washington, DC. lobbying firms (Company A and Company B) to lobby in the United States on behalf of President Yanukovych, the Party of Regions and the Government of Ukraine. For instance, in early 2012 at the inception of the relationship, Company B wrote in an email to its team about a “potential representation for the Ukraine,” having been contacted “at the suggestion of Paul Manafort Who has been working on the current PM elections.”

24. MANAFORT arranged to pay Companies A and B over $2 million from his offshore accounts for their United States lobbying work for Ukraine.

25. MANAFORT provided direction to Companies A and B in their lobbying efforts, including providing support for numerous United States visits by numerous senior Ukrainian officials. Companies A and B, at MANAFORT’s direction, engaged in extensive United States lobbying. Among other things, they lobbied dozens of Members of Congress, their staff, and White House and State Department officials about Ukraine sanctions, the validity of Ukraine elections, and the propriety of President Yanukovych’s imprisoning Tymoshenko, his presidential rival.

26. In addition, with the assistance of Company A, MANAFORT also personally lobbied in the United States. He drafted and edited numerous ghost-written op-eds for publication in United States newspapers. He also personally met in March 2013 in Washington, DC, With a Member of Congress who was on a subcommittee that had Ukraine within its purview. After the meeting, MANAFORT prepared a report for President Yanukovych that the meeting “went well” and reported a series of positive developments for Ukraine from the meeting.

27. Indeed, MANAFORT repeatedly communicated in person and in writing with President Yanukovych and his staff about the lobbying activities of Companies A and B and he tasked the companies to prepare assessments of their work so he, in turn, could brief President Yanukovych. For instance, MANAFORT wrote President Yanukovych a memorandum dated April 8, 2012, in which he provided an update on the lobbying firms’ activities “since the inception of the project a few weeks ago. It is my intention to provide you with a weekly update moving forward.” In November 2012, Gates wrote to Companies A and B that the firms needed to prepare an assessment of their past and prospective lobbying efforts so the “President” could be briefed by “Paul” “on what Ukraine has done well and what it can do better as we move into 2013.” The resulting memorandum from Companies A and B, with input from Gates, noted among other things that the “client” had not been as successful as hoped given that it had an Embassy in Washington.

28. To distance their United States lobbying work from the Government of Ukraine, and to avoid having to register as agents of Ukraine under the Foreign Agents Registration Act, MANAFORT with others arranged for Companies A and B to be engaged by a newly-formed Brussels entity called the European Centre for the Modern Ukraine (the Centre), instead of directly by the Government of Ukraine.

29. MANAFORT described the Centre as “the Brussels NGO that we have formed” to coordinate lobbying for Ukraine. The Centre was founded by a Ukraine Party of Regions member and Ukraine First Vice—Prime Minister. The head of its Board was another member of the Party of Regions, who became the Ukraine Foreign Minister.

30. In spite of these ties to Ukraine, MANAFORT and others arranged for the Centre to represent falsely that it was not “directly or indirectly supervised, directed, [or] controlled” in whole or in major part by the Government of Ukraine or the Party of Regions. MANAFORT knew that the false and misleading representations would lead Companies A and B not to register their activities pursuant to the Foreign Agents Registration Act.

31. Despite the Centre being the ostensible client of Companies A and B, MANAFORT knew that the Centre did not direct or oversee their work. The firms received direction from MANAFORT and his subordinate Gates, on behalf of the Government of Ukraine.

32. As MANAFORT knows from giving directions to Companies A and B, and from the discovery material provided herein, various employees of Companies A and B understood that they were receiving direction from MANAFORT and President Yanukovych, not the Centre, which was not even operational when Companies A and B began lobbying for Ukraine. MANAFORT, Gates, and employees of both Companies A and B referred to the client in ways that made clear they knew it was Ukraine, for instance noting that the “client” had an Embassy in Washington DC. The head of Company B told his team to think the President of Ukraine “is the client.” As a Company A employee noted to another company employee: the lobbying for the Centre was “in name only. [Y]ou’ve gotta see through the nonsense of that[.]” “It’s like Alice in Wonderland.” An employee of Company B described the Centre as a fig leaf, and the Centre’s written certification that it was not related to the Party of Regions as “a fig leaf on a fig leaf,” referring to the Centre in an email as the “European hot dog stand for a Modern Ukraine.”

Conspiring to Obstruct Justice: False and Misleading Submissions to the Department of Justice

33. In September 2016, after numerous press reports concerning MANAFORT had appeared in August, the Department of Justice National Security Division informed MANAFORT, Gates, and DMI in writing that it sought to determine whether they had acted as agents of a foreign principal under the Foreign Agents Registration Act, without registering. In November 2016 and February 2017, MANAFORT and Gates conspired to knowingly and intentionally cause false and misleading letters to be submitted to the Department of Justice, through his unwitting legal counsel. The letters, both of which were approved by MANAFORT before they were submitted by his counsel, represented falsely, among other things, that:

a. DMI’s “efforts on behalf of the Party of Regions” “did not include meetings or outreach within the U.S.”;

b. MANAFORT did not “recall meeting with or conducting outreach to U.S. government officials or U.S. media outlets on behalf of the [Centre], nor do they recall being party to, arranging, or facilitating any such communications. Rather, it is the recollection and understanding of Messrs. Gates and Manafort that such communications would have been facilitated and conducted by the [Centre’s] U.S. consultants, as directed by the [Centre]. . . .”;

c. MANAFORT had merely served as a means of introduction of Company A and Company B to the Centre and provided the Centre with a list of “potential U.S.-based consultants—including [Company A] and [Company B]—for the [Centre’s] reference and further consideration.”

d. DMI “does not retain communications beyond thirty days” and as a result of this policy, a “search has returned no responsive documents.” The November 2016 letter attached a one-page, undated document that purported to be a DMI “Email Retention Policy.”

34. In fact, MANAFORT had: selected Companies A and B; engaged in weekly scheduled calls and frequent emails with Companies A and B to provide them directions as to specific lobbying steps that should be taken; sought and received detailed oral and written reports from these firms on the lobbying work they had performed; communicated with Yanukovych to brief him on their lobbying efforts; both congratulated and reprimanded Companies A and B on their lobbying work; communicated directly with United States officials in connection with this work; and paid the lobbying firms over $2.5 million from offshore accounts he controlled, among other things.

35. Although MANAFORT had represented to the Department of Justice in November 2016 and February 2017 that he had no relevant documents, in fact MANAFORT had numerous incriminating documents in his possession, as he knew at the time. The Federal Bureau of Investigation conducted a court-authorized search of MANAFORT’S home in Virginia in the summer of 2017. The documents attached hereto as Government Exhibits 503, 504, 517, 532, 594, 604, 606, 616, 691, 692, 697, 706 and 708, among numerous others, were all documents that MANAFORT had in his possession (and were found in the search) and all pre-dated the November 2016 letter.

B. Money Laundering Conspiracy

36. In or around and between 2006 and 2016, MANAFORT, together with others, did knowingly and intentionally conspire (a) to conduct financial transactions, affecting interstate and foreign commerce, which involved the proceeds of specified unlawful activity, to wit, felony Violations of FARA in violation of Title 22, United States Code, Sections 612 and 618, knowing that the property involved in the financial transactions represented proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, with intent to engage in conduct constituting a violation of sections 7201 and 7206 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986; and (b) to transport, transmit, and transfer monetary instruments and funds from places outside the United States to and through places in the United States and from places in the United States to and through places outside the United States, with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity, to wit: a felony violation of FARA, in violation of Title 22, United States Code, Sections 612 and 618, contrary to Title 18, United States Code, Section 1956(a)(1)(A)(ii) and (a)(2)(A).

37. MANAFORT caused the following transfers to be made, knowing that they were being made to entities to carry on activities that were required to be timely reported under the Foreign Agents Registration Act, but were not:

Payee Date Payer Originating Bank Account Country of Origin Country of Destination Amount (USD)
Company A 8/2/2012 Bletilla Ventures Ltd. Bank of Cyprus Account -O480 Cyprus US $270,000.00
10/10/2012 Bletilla Ventures Ltd. Bank of Cyprus Account -O480 Cyprus US $90,000.00
11/16/2012 Bletilla Ventures Ltd. Bank of Cyprus Account -O480 Cyprus US $120,000.00
11/20/2012 Bletilla Ventures Ltd. Bank of Cyprus Account -O480 Cyprus US $182,968.07
12/21/2012 Bletilla Ventures Ltd. Bank of Cyprus Account -O480 Cyprus US $25,000.00
12/21/2012 Bletilla Ventures Ltd. Hellenic Bank Account -2501 Cyprus US $90,000.00
9/18/2013 Global Endeavour Inc. Loyal Bank Limited Account —1840 SVG* US $135,937.37
10/31/2013 Jeunet Ltd. Loyal Bank Limited Account -4978 SVG* US $167,689.40
3/28/2014 Jeunet Ltd. Loyal Bank Limited Account -4978 SVG* US $135,639.65
4/3/2014 Jeunet Ltd. Loyal Bank Limited Account -4978 SVG* US $82,979.93
Total Company A Transfers $1,300,214.42
Company B 5/30/2012 Bletilla Ventures Ltd. Bank of Cyprus Account -O480 Cyprus US $130,000.00
8/2/2012 Bletilla Ventures Ltd. Bank of Cyprus Account -O480 Cyprus US $195,000.00
10/10/2012 Bletilla Ventures Ltd. Bank of Cyprus Account -O480 Cyprus US $130,000.00
11/16/2012 Bletilla Ventures Ltd. Bank of Cyprus Account -O480 Cyprus US $50,000.00
12/21/2012 Bletilla Ventures Ltd. Bank of Cyprus Account -O480 Cyprus US $54,649.51
12/21/2012 Bletilla Ventures Ltd. Hellenic Bank Account -2501 Cyprus US $150,000.00
9/3/2013 Jeunet Ltd. Loyal Bank Limited Account -4978 SVG* US $175,857.51
10/31/2013 Jeunet Ltd. Loyal Bank Limited Account -4978 SVG* US $195,857.51
3/12/2014 Jeunet Ltd. Loyal Bank Limited Account -4978 SVG* US $26,891.78
3/21/2014 Jeunet Ltd. Loyal Bank Limited Account -4978 SVG* US $138,026.00
4/15/2014 Jeunet Ltd. Loyal Bank Limited Account -4978 SVG* US $4,728.81
4/25/2014 Jeunet Ltd. Loyal Bank Limited Account -4978 SVG* US $4,739.231
Total Company B Transfers $1,255,750.35
Law Firm B 4/19/2012 Black Sea View Limited Bank of Cyprus Account -7412 Cyprus US $2,000,000.00
5/30/2012 Black Sea View Limited Bank of Cyprus Account -7412 Cyprus US $1,000,000.00
7/13/2012 Black Sea View Limited Bank of Cyprus Account -7412 Cyprus US $1,000,000.00
Total Law Firm A Transfers $4,000,000.00
TOTAL TRANSFERS $6,555,964.77

* SVG refers to St. Vincent and the Grenadines.

C. Tax and Foreign Bank Account Conspiracy
26 U.S.C. § 7206(1)
31 U.S.C. $8 5314 and 5322(3)

38. From 2008 through 2014, MANAFORT caused millions of dollars of wire transfers to be made from offshore nominee accounts, without paying taxes on that income. The payments were made for goods, services, and real estate. MANAFORT also hid income by denominating various overseas payments as “loans,” thereby evading payment of any taxes on that income by MANAFORT.

39. MANAFORT directly and through Gates repeatedly misled his bookkeeper and tax accountants, including by not disclosing Manafort’s overseas accounts and income. Further, MANAFORT and Gates, acting at Manafort’s instruction, classified overseas payments made to MANAFORT falsely as “loans” to avoid incurring additional taxes on the income.

40. MANAFORT owned and controlled a range of foreign bank accounts in Cyprus, the Grenadines, and the United Kingdom. MANAFORT directly and through Gates maintained these accounts, including by managing them and by making substantial transfers from the accounts to both himself and vendors for personal items for him and his family. MANAFORT was aware that many of these accounts held well in excess of $10,000 in the aggregate at some point during each year in which they existed. MANAFORT did not report the accounts’ existence to his bookkeeper and his tax preparers in an effort to hide them, and to allow him to avoid disclosing their existence on an FBAR filing.

41. MANAFORT was aware at the time that it was illegal to hide income from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) by failing to account for reportable income on his income tax returns. MANAFORT was also aware that it was illegal to fail to report information to the IRS regarding the existence of foreign bank accounts, as required by Schedule B of the IRS Form 1040. MANAFORT also understood at the time that a U.S. person who had a financial interest in, or signature or other authority over, a bank account or other financial account in a foreign country, which exceeded $10,000 in any one year (at any time during that year), was required to report the account to the Department of the Treasury. MANAFORT also understood, after 2010, that the failure to make such a report constituted a crime.

42. Knowing the existence of his reportable foreign accounts and hidden income, MANAFORT knowingly, intentionally, and willfully filed and conspired to file false tax returns from 2006-2015 in that he said he did not have reportable foreign bank accounts when he knew that he did, he did not report income that he knew he in fact had earned, and he did not file Foreign Bank Account Reports. MANAFORT failed to report over $15 million in income during the period 2010-2014.

FORFEITURE

43. The following assets constitute or were derived from proceeds of MANAFORT’s conspiracy to violate the Foreign Agents Registration Act and/or they constitute property involved in MANAFORT’S conspiracy to launder money in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956 or are traceable thereto and/or they represent substitute assets for such property which has been made unavailable for forfeiture by the acts or omissions of MANAFORT:

a) The real property and premises commonly known as 377 Union Street, Brooklyn, New York 11231 (Block 429, Lot 65), including all appurtenances, improvements, and attachments thereon, and any property traceable thereto;

b) The real property and premises commonly known as 29 Howard Street, #4D, New York, New York 10013 (Block 209, Lot 1 104), including all appurtenances, improvements, and attachments thereon, and any property traceable thereto;

c) The real property and premises commonly known as 174 Jobs Lane, Water Mill, New York 11976, including all appurtenances, improvements, and attachments thereon, and any property traceable thereto;

d) All funds held in account number XXXXXXO969 at The Federal Savings Bank, and any property traceable thereto;

e) All funds seized from account number XXXXXX1388 at Capital One N .A. and any property traceable thereto;

f) All funds seized from account number XXXXXX9952 at The Federal Savings Bank and any property traceable thereto;

g) Northwestern Mutual Universal Life Insurance Policy and any property traceable thereto;

h) The real property and premises commonly known as 123 Baxter Street, #5D, New York, New York 10016 in lieu of 1046 N. Edgewood Street; and

i) The real property and premises commonly known as 721 Fifth Avenue, #43G, New York, New York 10022 in lieu of all funds from account number at Charles Schwab & Co. Inc., and any property traceable thereto.

Count Two: Witness Tampering Conspiracy (18 U.S.C. § 371}

44. From in or about and between February 23, 2018, and April 2018, both dates being approximate and inclusive, within the District of Columbia and elsewhere, the defendant PAUL J . MANAFORT, JR., together with others, including Konstantin Kilimnik, knowingly and intentionally conspired to eorruptly persuade another person, to wit: Persons D1 and D2, with intent to influence, delay and prevent the testimony of any person in an official proceeding, in violation of18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(1). The facts set forth with respect to Count One are incorporated herein.

45. On February 22, 2018, MANAFORT was charged in the District of Columbia in a Superseding Indictment that for the first time included allegations about the Hapsburg Group and MANAFORT’s use of that group to lobby illegally in the United States in violation of the Foreign Agent Registration Act. MANAFORT knew that the Act prescribed only United States lobbying. Immediately after February 22, 2018, MANAFORT began reaching out directly and indirectly to Persons D1 and D2 to induce them to say falsely that they did not work in the United States as part of the lobbying campaign, even though MANAFORT then and there well knew that they did lobby in the United States.

46. MANAFORT committed the following overt acts directly and through his conspirators.

Date/Time* Sender Receiver Event
MANAFORT contacted Person D1 by phone and a messaging application:
2/24/2018; 15:51 (UTC) MANAFORT Person D1 Phone call (attempted): No duration.
2/24/2018; 15:51 (UTC) MANAFORT Person D1 Phone call: 1 min, 24 second call.
2/24/2018; 15:53 (UTC) MANAFORT Person D1 Text: “This is paul”
2/25/2018; 18:41 (UTC) MANAFORT Person D1 Phone call (attempted): No duration.
2/26/2018; 23:56 (UTC) MANAFORT Person D1 Text: “http://www.businessinsider.com/fonner-european-leaders-manafort-hapsburg-group-2018-2?r=UK&IR=T”
2/26/2018; 23:57 (UTC) MANAFORT Person D1 Text: “We should talk. I have made clear that they worked in Europe.”
2/27/2018; 11:03 (UTC) MANAFORT Person D1 Phone call (attempted): No duration.
2/27/2018; 11:31 (UTC) MANAFORT Person D1 Phone call (attempted): No duration.
Kilimnik contacted Person D2 a messaging application, sending four messages:
2/28/2018; 01:49 (CEST) Kilimnik Person D2 “[Person D2], hi! How are you? Hope you are doing fine. ;))”
2/28/2018; 01:51 (CEST) Kilimnik Person D2 “My friend P is trying to reach [Person D1] to brief him on what's going on.”
2/28/2018; 01:51 (CEST) Kilimnik Person D2 “If you have a chance to mention this to [Person D1] - would be great”
2/28/2018; 01:53 (CEST) Kilimnik Person D2 “Basically P wants to give him a quick summary that he says to everybody (which is true) that our friends never lobbied in the US, and the purpose of the program was EU”
Kilimnik contacted Person D2 using a different messaging application, sending five messages:
2/28/2018; 06:01 (CEST) Kilimnik Person D2 “Hey, how are you? This is K.”
2/28/2018; 06:01 (CEST) Kilimnik Person D2 “Hope you are doing fine.”
2/28/2018; 06:01 (CEST) Kilimnik Person D2 “My friend P is trying to reach [Person D1] to brief him on what's going on”
2/28/2018; 06:02 (CEST) Kilimnik Person D2 “Basically P wants to give him a quick summary that he says to everybody (which is true) that our friends never lobbied in the US, and the purpose of the program was EU”
2/28/2018; 06:03 (CEST) Kilimnik Person D2 “If you have a chance to mention this to [First Initial of Person D1 ’s Name]. - it would be great. It would be good to get them connected to discuss in person. P is his friend.”
Kilimnik contacted Person D2 using two different applications, sending three messages:
2/28/2018; 06:03 (CEST) Kilimnik Person D2 “If you have a chance to mention this to [First Initial of Person D1 ’s Name]. - it would be great. It would be good to get them connected to discuss in person. P is his friend.”
4/4/2018; 08:53 (CEST) Kilimnik Person D2 “Hey. This is Konstantin. My friend P asked me again to help connect him with [Person D1]. Can you help?”
4/4/2018; 08:54 (CEST) Kilimnik Person D2 Hey. My friend P has asked me again if there is any way to help connect him through [Person D1]”
4/4/2018; 08:54 (CEST) Kilimnik Person D2 “I tried him on all numbers.”
Kilimnik contacted Person D1 using a messaging application:
4/4/2018; 13:00 (UTC) Kilimnik Person D1 “Hi. This is K. My friend P is looking for ways to connect to you to pass you several messages. Can we arrange that.”

*UTC and CEST refer to Coordinated Universal Time and Central European Summer Time, respectively.

Other Acts

1. Bank/Bank Fraud Conspiracy
18 U.S.C. 1344 and 1349
Bank Fraud Conspiracy / Citizens Bank / $3.4 million loan
(Charged as Count 24 in the Eastern District of Virginia Superseding Indictment)

47. Between December 2015 and March 2016, MANAFORT conspired to intentionally defraud Citizens Bank in connection with his application for a mortgage for approximately $3.4 million. The mortgage related to a condominium on Howard Street in the Soho neighborhood of Manhattan, New York. During the course of the conspiracy, MANAFORT made and caused to be made, a series of false and fraudulent representations to the bank in order to secure the loan, including the following: (a) MANAFORT falsely represented the amount of debt he had by failing to disclose on his loan application the existence of a mortgage on his Union Street property (from Genesis Capital); (b) MANAFORT caused an insurance broker to provide Citizens Bank false information, namely, an outdated insurance report that did not list the Union Street loan (from Genesis Capital); (c) MANAFORT falsely stated that a $1.5 million Peranova loan had been forgiven in 2015; and (d) MANAFORT falsely represented to the lender and its agents that the Howard Street property was a secondary home used as such by his daughter and son-in-law and was not held as a rental property. These statements were material to Citizens Bank.

48. Citizens Bank was a financial institution chartered by the United States.

Bank Fraud Conspiracy / Banc of California / $1 million loan> (Charged as Count 26 in the Eastern District of Virginia Superseding Indictment)

49. In approximately February 2016, MANAFORT conspired to intentionally defraud Banc of California in connection with his application for a business loan. During the course of the conspiracy, MANAFORT made and caused to be made a series of false and fraudulent representations to the bank, including the following: (a) the submission of a false statement of assets and liabilities that failed to disclose a loan on the Union Street property (from Genesis Capital) and misrepresented, among other things, the amount of the mortgage on the Howard Street property; and (b) the submission of a doctored 2015 DMI profit and loss statement (P&L) that overstated DMI’s 2015 income by more than $4 million. These statements were material to Banc of California.

50. Banc of California was a financial institution chartered by the United States.

Bank Fraud Conspiracy / Citizens Bank / $5.5 million loan Charged as Count 28 in the Eastern District of Virginia Superseding Indictment)

51. Between December 2015 and March 2016, MANAFORT conspired to intentionally defraud Citizens Bank in connection with his application for a mortgage for approximately $5.5 million on a property at Union Street in Brooklyn, New York. During the course of the conspiracy, MANAFORT made or caused to be made a series of false and fraudulent material representations to the bank in order to secure the loan, including the following: (a) the submission of a false statement of assets and liabilities that hid a prior loan on the Union Street property (from Genesis Capital), among other liabilities; and (b) the submission of a falsified 2016 DMI P&L that overstated DMI’s income by more than $2 million.

Bank Fraud/Bank Fraud Conspiracy / The Federal Savings Bank / $9.5 million loan & $6.5 million loan
(Charged in Counts 29. 30, 31 & 32 in the Eastern District of Virginia Superseding Indictment)

52. Between April 2016 and January 2017, MANAFORT conspired to intentionally defraud, and did defraud, The Federal Savings Bank in connection With his applications for the following two loans: (a) a loan for approximately $9.5 million related to various properties, including a house in Bridgehampton, New York, and (b) a loan for approximately $6.5 million related to his Union Street property. During the course of the fraudulent scheme, MANAFORT made and caused to be made a series of false and fraudulent material representations to the bank in order to secure both loans, including the following: (a) MANAFORT provided the bank with doctored P&Ls for DMI for both 2015 and 2016, overstating its income by millions of dollars; and (b) MANAFORT falsely represented to The Federal Savings Bank that he had lent his credit card to a friend Who had incurred more than $200,000 in charges relating to the purchase of Yankee tickets.

53. Both loans were extended by The Federal Savings Bank.

54. The Federal Savings Bank was a financial institution chartered by the United States.

DEFENDANT'S ACCEPTANCE

I have read every page of this Agreement and have discussed it with my attorneys Kevin Downing, Thomas Zehnle, and Richard Westling. I am fully satisfied with the legal representation by them, who I have chosen to represent me herein. Nothing about the quality of the representation of other counsel is affecting my decision herein to plead guilty. I fully understand this Agreement and agree to it without reservation. I do this voluntarily and of my own free will, intending to be legally bound. No threats have been made to me nor am I under the influence of anything that could impede my ability to understand this Agreement fully. I am pleading guilty because I am in fact guilty of the offense identified in this Agreement.

I reaffirm that absolutely no promises, agreements, understandings, or conditions have been made or entered into in connection with my decision to plead guilty except those set forth in this Agreement. I am satisfied with the legal services provided by my attorneys in connection with this Agreement and matters related to it.

ATTORNEYS’ ACKNOWLEDGMENT

I have read every page of this Agreement, reviewed this Agreement with my client, Paul J. Manafort, and fully discussed the provisions of this Agreement with my client. These pages accurately and completely set forth the entire Agreement. I concur in my client’s desire to plead guilty as set forth in this Agreement.

U.S. v. Russian intelligence officers

Indictment of 12 Russian intelligence officers

The Grand Jury for the District of Columbia charges:

COUNT ONE

(Conspiracy to Commit an Offense Against the United States)

1. In or around 2016, the Russian Federation (“Russia”) operated a military intelligence agency called the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (“GRU”). The GRU had multiple units, including. Units 26165 and 74455, engaged in cyber operations that involved the staged releases of documents stolen through computer intrusions. These units conducted large-scale cyber operations to interfere with the 2016 US. Presidential election.

2. Defendants VIKTOR BORISOVICH NETYKSHO, BORIS ALEKSEYEVICH ANTONOV, DMITRIY SERGEYEVICH BADlN, IVAN SERGEYEVICH YERMAKOV, ALEKSEY VIKTOROVICH LUKASHEV, SERGEY ALEKSANDROVICH MORGACHEV, NIKOLAY YURYEVICH KOZACHEK, PAVEL VYACHESLAVOVICH YERSHOV, ARTEM ANDREYEVICH MALYSHEV, ALEKSANDR VLADIMIROVICH OSADCHUK, and ALEKSEY ALEKSANDROVICH POTEMKIN were GRU officers who knowingly and intentionally conspired with each other, and with persons known and unknown to the Grand Jury (collectively the “Conspirators”), to gain unauthorized access (to “hack”) into the computers of U.S. persons and entities involved in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, steal documents from those computers, and stage releases of the stolen documents to interfere with the 2016 U.S. presidential election.

3. Starting in at least March 2016, the Conspirators used a variety of means to hack the email accounts of volunteers and employees of the U.S. presidential campaign of Hillary Clinton (the “Clinton Campaign”), including the email account of the Clinton Campaign’s chairman.

4. By in or around April 2016, the Conspirators also hacked into the computer networks of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (“DCCC”) and the Democratic National Committee (“DNC”). The Conspirators covertly monitored the computers of dozens of DCCC and DNC employees, implanted hundreds of files containing malicious computer code (“malware”), and stole emails and other documents from the DCCC and DNC.

5. By in or around April 2016, the Conspirators began to plan the release of materials stolen from the Clinton Campaign, DCCC, and DNC.

6. Beginning in or around June 2016, the Conspirators staged and released tens of thousands of the stolen emails and documents. They did so using fictitious online personas, including “DCLeaks” and “Guccifer 2.0.”

7. The Conspirators also used the Guccifer 2.0 persona to release additional stolen documents through a website maintained by an organization (“Organization 1”), that had previously posted documents stolen from U.S. persons, entities, and the U.S. government. The Conspirators continued their U.S. election-interference operations through in or around November 2016.

8. To hide their connections to Russia and the Russian government, the Conspirators used false identities and made false statements about their identities. To further avoid detection, the Conspirators used a network of computers located across the world, including in the United States, and paid for this infrastructure using cryptocurrency.

Defendants

9. Defendant VIKTOR BORISOVICH NETYKSHO (HeTanmo BHKTOp Bopnconnq) was the Russian military officer in command of Unit 26165, located at 20 Komsomolskiy Prospekt, Moscow, Russia. Unit 26165 had primary responsibility for hacking the DCCC and DNC, as well as the email accounts of individuals affiliated with the Clinton Campaign.

10. Defendant BORIS ALEKSEYEVICH ANTONOV (AHTOHOB Bopnc AneKceeBm) was a Major in the Russian military assigned to Unit 26165. ANTONOV oversaw a department within Unit 26165 dedicated to targeting military, political, governmental, and non-governmental organizations with spearphishing emails and other computer intrusion activity. ANTONOV held the title “Head of Department.” In or around 2016, ANTONOV supervised other co-conspirators who targeted the DCCC, DNC, and individuals affiliated with the Clinton Campaign.

11. Defendant DMITRIY SERGEYEVICH BADIN (EalIPIH IanTpnfi Cepreenmi) was a Russian military officer assigned to Unit 26165 who held the title “Assistant Head of Department.” In or around 2016, BADIN, along with ANTONOV, supervised other (re-conspirators who targeted the DCCC, DNC, and individuals affiliated with the Clinton Campaign.

12. Defendant IVAN SERGEYEVICH YERMAKOV (EpMaKOB I/IBaH Cepreeana) was a Russian military officer assigned to ANTONOV’s department within Unit 26165. Since in or around 2010, YERMAKOV used various online personas, including “Kate S. Milton,” “James McMorgans,” and “Karen W. Millen,” to conduct hacking operations on behalf of Unit 26165. In or around March 2016, YERMAKOV participated in hacking at least two email accounts from which campaign-related documents were released through DCLeaks. In or around May 2016, YERMAKOV also participated in hacking the DNC email server and stealing DNC emails that were later released through Organization 1.

13. Defendant ALEKSEY VIKTOROVICH LUKASHEV (nyameB Aneiccefi Bmcropomm) was a Senior Lieutenant in the Russian military assigned to ANTONOV’s department within Unit 26165. LUKASHEV used various online personas, including “Den Katenberg” and “Yuliana Martynova.” In or around 2016, LUKASHEV sent spearphishing emails to members of the Clinton Campaign and affiliated individuals, including the chairman of the Clinton Campaign.

14. Defendant SERGEY ALEKSANDROVICH MORGACHEV (MopI‘aueB Cepreiz’l AneKcaI-mponmr) was a Lieutenant Colonel in the Russian military assigned to Unit 26165. MORGACHEV oversaw a department within Unit 26165 dedicated to developing and managing malware, including a hacking tool used by the GRU known as “X-Agent.” During the hacking of the DCCC and DNC networks, MORGACHEV supervised the co-conspirators who developed and monitored the X-Agent malware implanted on those computers.

15. Defendant NIKOLAY YURYEVICH KOZACHEK (KO3a‘IeK HnKonai/‘I IOpLeBHq) was a Lieutenant Captain in the Russian military assigned to MORGACHEV’S department within Unit 26165. KOZACHEK used a variety of monikers, including “kazak” and “blablabla1234565.” KOZACHEK developed, customized, and monitored X-Agent malware used to hack the DCCC and DNC networks beginning in or around April 2016.

16. Defendant PAVEL VYACHESLAVOVICH YERSHOV (Epmoa Haaen BaqecnaBOBI/Iq) was a Russian military officer assigned to MORGACHEV’S department within Unit 26165. In or around 2016, YERSHOV assisted KOZACHEK and other co-conspirators in testing and customizing X-Agent malware before actual deployment and use.

17. Defendant ARTEM ANDREYEVICH MALYSHEV (MaJILIIIIeB ApTeM AmpeeBI/I‘I) was a Second Lieutenant in the Russian military assigned to MORGACHEV’s department within Unit 26165. MALYSHEV used a variety of monikers, including “djangomagicdev” and “realblatr.” In or around 2016, MALYSHEV monitored X-Agent malware implanted on the DCCC and DNC networks.

18. Defendant ALEKSANDR VLADIMJROVICH OSADCHUK (Ocanqu AJICKCaH/Ip Bnanmvmpomq) was a Colonel in the Russian military and the commanding officer of Unit 74455. Unit 74455 was located at 22 Kirova Street, Khimki, Moscow, a building referred to Within the GRU as the “Tower.” Unit 74455 assisted in the release of stolen documents through the DCLeaks and Guccifer 2.0 personas, the promotion of those releases, and the publication of anti-Clinton content on social media accounts operated by the GRU.

19. Defendant ALEKSEY ALEKSANDROVICH POTEMKIN (HoreMKnH Aneiccefi AneKcaanoanq) was an officer in the Russian military assigned to Unit 74455. POTEMKIN was a supervisor in a department within Unit 74455 responsible for the administration of computer infrastructure used in cyber operations. Infrastructure and social media accounts administered by POTEMKIN’S department were used, among other things, to assist in the release of stolen documents through the DCLeaks and Guccifer 2.0 personas.

Object of the Conspiracy

20. The object of the conspiracy was to hack into the computers of US. persons and entities involved in the 2016 US. Presidential election, steal documents from those computers, and stage releases of the stolen documents to interfere with the 2016 US. Presidential election.

Manner and Means of the Conspiracy
Spearphishing Operations

21. ANTONOV, BADIN, YERMAKOV, LUKASHEV, and their co-conspirators targeted victims using a technique known as spearphishing to steal victims’ passwords or otherwise gain access to their computers. Beginning by at least March 2016, the Conspirators targeted over 300 individuals affiliated with the Clinton Campaign, DCCC, and DNC.

a. For example, on or about March 19, 2016, LUKASHEV and his co-conspirators created and sent a spearphishing email to the chairman of the Clinton Campaign. LUKASHEV used the account “john356g ” at an online service that abbreviated lengthy website addresses (referred to as a “URL-shortening service”). LUKASHEV used the account to mask a link contained in the spearphishing email, which directed the recipient to a GRU-created website. LUKASHEV altered the appearance of the sender email address in order to make it look like the email was a security notification from Google (a technique known as “spoofing”), instructing the user to change his password by clicking the embedded link. Those instructions were followed. On or about March 21, 2016, LUKASHEV, YERMAKOV, and their co-conspirators stole the contents of the chairman’s email account, which consisted of over 50,000 emails.

b. Starting on or about March 19, 2016, LUKASHEV and his co-conspirators sent spearphishing emails to the personal accounts of other individuals affiliated with the Clinton Campaign, including its campaign manager and a senior foreign policy advisor. On or about March 25, 2016, LUKASHEV used the same john356gh account to mask additional links included in spearphishing emails sent to numerous individuals affiliated with the Clinton Campaign, including Victims 1 and 2. LUKASHEV sent these emails from the Russia-based email account hi.mymail@yandex.com that he spoofed to appear to be from Google.

c. On or about March 28, 2016, YERMAKOV researched the names of Victims 1 and 2 and their association with Clinton on various social media sites. Through their spearphishing operations, LUKASHEV, YERMAKOV, and their co-conspirators successfully stole email credentials and thousands of emails from numerous individuals affiliated with the Clinton Campaign. Many of these stolen emails, including those from Victims 1 and 2, were later released by the Conspirators through DCLeaks.

d. On or about April 6, 2016, the Conspirators created an email account in the name (with a one-letter deviation from the actual spelling) of a known member of the Clinton Campaign. The Conspirators then used that account to send spearphishing emails to the work accounts of more than thirty different Clinton Campaign employees. In the spearphishing emails, LUKASHEV and his co-conspirators embedded a link purporting to direct the recipient to a document titled “hillary-clinton — favorable-rating.xlsx.” In fact, this link directed the recipients’ computers to a GRU — created website.

22. The Conspirators spearphished individuals affiliated with the Clinton Campaign throughout the summer of 2016. For example, on or about July 27, 2016, the Conspirators attempted after hours to spearphish for the first time email accounts at a domain hosted by a third-party provider and used by Clinton’s personal office. At or around the same time, they also targeted seventy-six email addresses at the domain for the Clinton Campaign.

Hacking into the DCCC Network

23. Beginning in or around March 2016, the Conspirators, in addition to their spearphishing, efforts, researched the DCCC and DNC computer networks to identify technical specifications and vulnerabilities.

a. For example, beginning on or about March 15, 2016, YERMAKOV ran a technical query for the DNC’s internet protocol configurations to identify connected devices.

b. On or about the same day, YERMAKOV searched for open-source information about the DNC network, the Democratic Party, and Hillary Clinton.

c. On or about April 7, 2016, YERMAKOV ran a technical query for the DCCC’s internet protocol configurations to identify connected devices.

24. By in or around April 2016, within days of YERMAKOV’s searches regarding the DCCC, the Conspirators hacked into the DCCC computer network. Once they gained access, they installed and managed different types of malware to explore the DCCC network and steal data.

a. On or about April 12, 2016, the Conspirators used the stolen credentials of a DCCC Employee (“DCCC Employee 1”) to access the DCCC network. DCCC Employee 1 had received a spearphishing email from the Conspirators on or about April 6, 2016, and entered her password after clicking on the link.

b. Between in or around April 2016 and June 2016, the Conspirators installed multiple versions of their X-Agent malware on at least ten DCCC computers, which allowed them to monitor individual employees’ computer activity, steal passwords, and maintain access to the DCCC network.

c. X — Agent malware implanted on the DCCC network transmitted information from the victims’ computers to a GRU-leased server located in Arizona. The Conspirators referred to this server as their “AMS” panel. KOZACHEK, MALYSHEV, and their co-conspirators logged into the AMS panel to use X — Agent’s keylog and screenshot functions in the course of monitoring and surveilling activity on the DCCC computers. The keylog function allowed the Conspirators to capture keystrokes entered by DCCC employees. The screenshot function allowed the Conspirators to take pictures of the DCCC employees’ computer screens.

d. For example, on or about April 14, 2016, the Conspirators repeatedly activated X-Agent’s keylog and screenshot functions to surveil DCCC Employee 1’s computer activity over the course of eight hours. During that time, the Conspirators captured DCCC Employee 1’s communications with co-workers and the passwords she entered while working on fundraising and voter outreach projects. Similarly, on or about April 22, 2016, the Conspirators activated X-Agent’s keylog and screenshot functions to capture the discussions of another DCCC Employee (“DCCC Employee 2”) about the DCCC’s finances, as well as her individual banking information and other personal topics.

25. On or about April 19, 2016, KOZACHEK, YERSHOV, and their co — conspirators remotely configured an overseas computer to relay communications between X-Agent malware and the AMS panel and then tested X-Agent’s ability to connect to this computer. The Conspirators referred to this computer as a “middle server.” The middle server acted as a proxy to obscure the connection between malware at the DCCC and the Conspirators’ AMS panel. On or about April 20, 2016, the Conspirators directed X-Agent malware on the DCCC computers to connect to this middle server and receive directions from the Conspirators.

Hacking into the DNC Network

26. On or about April 18, 2016, the Conspirators hacked into the DNC’s computers through their access to the DCCC network. The Conspirators then installed and managed different types of malware (as they did in the DCCC network) to explore the DNC network and steal documents.

a. On or about April 18, 2016, the Conspirators activated X-Agent’s keylog and screenshot functions to steal credentials of a DCCC employee who was authorized to access the DNC network. The Conspirators hacked into the DNC network from the DCCC network using stolen credentials. By in or around June 2016, they gained access to approximately thirty-three DNC computers.

b. In or around April 2016, the Conspirators installed X-Agent malware on the DNC network, including the same versions installed on the DCCC network. MALYSHEV and his co-conspirators monitored the X-Agent malware from the AMS panel and captured data from the victim computers. The AMS panel collected thousands of keylog and screenshot results from the DCCC and DNC computers, such as a screenshot and keystroke capture of DCCC Employee 2 Viewing the DCCC’s online banking information.

Theft of DCCC and DNC Documents

27. The Conspirators searched for and identified computers within the DCCC and DNC networks that stored information related to the 2016 US. Presidential election. For example, on or about April 15, 2016, the Conspirators searched one hacked DCCC computer for terms that included “hillary,” “cruz,” and “trump.” The Conspirators also copied select DCCC folders, including “Benghazi Investigations.” The Conspirators targeted computers containing information such as opposition research and field operation plans for the 2016 elections.

28. To enable them to steal a large number of documents at once without detection, the Conspirators used a publicly available tool to gather and compress multiple documents on the DCCC and DNC networks. The Conspirators then used other GRU malware, known as “X — Tunnel,” to move the stolen documents outside the DCCC and DNC networks through encrypted channels.

a. For example, on or about April 22, 2016, the Conspirators compressed gigabytes of data from DNC computers, including opposition research. The Conspirators later moved the compressed DNC data using X-Tunnel to a GRU-leased computer located in Illinois.

b. On or about April 28, 2016, the Conspirators connected to and tested the same computer located in Illinois. Later that day, the Conspirators used X-Tunnel to connect to that computer to steal additional documents from the DCCC network.

29. Between on or about May 25, 2016 and June 1, 2016, the Conspirators hacked the DNC Microsoft Exchange Server and stole thousands of emails from the work accounts of DNC employees. During that time, YERMAKOV researched PowerShell commands related to accessing and managing the Microsoft Exchange Server.

30. On or about May 30, 2016, MALYSHEV accessed the AMS panel in order to upgrade custom AMS software on the server. That day, the AMS panel received updates from approximately thirteen different X — Agent malware implants on DCCC and DNC computers.

31. During the hacking of the DCCC and DNC networks, the Conspirators covered their tracks by intentionally deleting logs and computer files. For example, on or about May 13, 2016, the Conspirators cleared the event logs from a DNC computer. On or about June 20, 2016, the Conspirators deleted logs from the AMS panel that documented their activities on the panel, including the login history.

Efforts to Remain on the DCCC and DNC Networks

32. Despite the Conspirators’ efforts to hide their activity, beginning in or around May 2016, both the DCCC and DNC became aware that they had been hacked and hired a security company (“Company 1”) to identify the extent of the intrusions. By in or around June 2016, Company 1 took steps to exclude intruders from the networks. Despite these efforts, a Linux-based version of X-Agent, programmed to communicate with the GRU-registered domain linukal.net, remained on the DNC network until in or around October 2016.

33. In response to Company 1’s efforts, the Conspirators took countermeasures to maintain access to the DCCC and DNC networks.

a. On or about May 31, 2016, YERMAKOV searched for open-source information about Company 1 and its reporting on X-Agent and X-Tunnel. On or about June 1, 2016, the Conspirators attempted to delete traces of their presence on the DCCC network using the computer program CCleaner.

b. On or about June 14, 2016, the Conspirators registered the domain actblues.com, which mimicked the domain of a political fundraising platform that included a DCCC donations page. Shortly thereafter, the Conspirators used stolen DCCC credentials to modify the DCCC website and redirect visitors to the actblues.com domain.

On or about June 20, 2016, after Company 1 had disabled X-Agent on the DCCC network, the Conspirators spent over seven hours unsuccessfully trying to connect to X-Agent. The Conspirators also tried to access the DCCC network using previously stolen credentials.

34. In or around September 2016, the Conspirators also successfully gained access to DNC computers hosted on a third-party cloud-computing service. These computers contained test applications related to the DNC’s analytics. After conducting reconnaissance, the Conspirators gathered data by creating backups, or “snapshots,” of the DNC’s cloud-based systems using the cloud provider’s own technology The Conspirators then moved the snapshots to cloud-based accounts they had registered with the same service, thereby stealing the data from the DNC.

Stolen Documents Released through DCLeaks

35. More than a month before the release of any documents, the Conspirators constructed the online persona DCLeaks to release and publicize stolen election-related documents. On or about April 19, 2016, after attempting to register the domain electionleaks.com, the Conspirators registered the domain dcleaks.com through a service that anonymized the registrant. The funds used to pay for the dcleaks.com domain originated from an account at an online cryptocurrency service that the Conspirators also used to fund the lease of a Virtual private server registered with the operational email account dirbinsaabol@mail.com. The dirbinsaabol email account was also used to register the john356gh URL-shortening account used by LUKASHEV to spearphish the Clinton Campaign chairman and other campaign-related individuals.

36. On or about June 8, 2016, the Conspirators launched the public website dcleaks.com, which they used to release stolen emails. Before it shutdown in or around March 2017, the site received over one million page Views. The Conspirators falsely claimed on the site that DCLeaks was started by a group of “American hacktivists,” when in fact it was started by the Conspirators.

37. Starting in or around June 2016 and continuing through the 2016 US. Presidential election, the Conspirators used DCLeaks to release emails stolen from individuals affiliated with the Clinton Campaign. The Conspirators also released documents they had stolen in other spearphishing operations, including those they had conducted in 2015 that collected emails from individuals affiliated with the Republican Party.

38. On or about June 8, 2016, and at approximately the same time that the dcleaks.com website was launched, the Conspirators created a DCLeaks Facebook page using a preexisting social media account under the fictitious name “Alice Donovan.” In addition to the DCLeaks Facebook page, the Conspirators used other social media accounts in the names of fictitious U.S. persons such as “Jason Scott” and “Richard Gingrey” to promote the DCLeaks website. The Conspirators accessed these accounts from computers managed by POTEMKJN and his co — conspirators.

39. On or about June 8, 2016, the Conspirators created the Twitter account @dcleaks_. The Conspirators operated the @dcleaks_ Twitter account from the same computer used for other efforts to interfere with the 2016 US. presidential election. For example, the Conspirators used the same computer to operate the Twitter account @BaltimoreIsWhr, through which they encouraged U.S. audiences to “[j]oin our flash mob” opposing Clinton and to post images with the hashtag #BlacksAgainstHillary.

Stolen Documents Released through Guccifer 2.0

40. On or about June 14, 2016, the DNC — through Company 1 — publicly announced that it had been hacked by Russian government actors. In response, the Conspirators created the online persona Guccifer 2,0 and falsely claimed to be a lone Romanian hacker to undermine the allegations of Russian responsibility for the intrusion.

41. On or about June 15, 2016, the Conspirators logged into a Moscow — based server used and managed by Unit 74455 and, between 4:19 PM and 4:56 PM Moscow Standard Time, searched for certain words and phrases, including:

Search Term(s)
“some hundred sheets”
“some hundreds of sheets”
dcleaks
illuminati
mnpoxo naseernmfi nepenon [widely known translation]
“worldwide known”
“think twice about”
“company’s competence”

42. Later that day, at 7:02 PM Moscow Standard Time, the online persona Guccifer 2.0 published its first post on a blog site created through WordPress. Titled “DNC’s sewers hacked by a lone hacker,” the post used numerous English words and phrases that the Conspirators had searched for earlier that day (bolded below):

Worldwide known cyber security company [Company 1] announced that the Democratic National Committee (DNC) servers had been hacked by “sophisticated” hacker groups.

I’m very pleased the company appreciated my skills so highly)) […]

Here are just a few does from many thousands I extracted when hacking into DNC’s network. […]

Some hundred sheets! This’s a serious case, isn’t it? […]

I guess [Company 1] customers should think twice about company’s competence.

F[***] the Illuminati and their conspiracies!!!!!!!!! F[***] [Company 1]!!!!!!!!!

43. Between in or around June 2016 and October 2016, the Conspirators used Guccifer 2.0 to release documents through WordPress that they had stolen from the DCCC and DNC. The Conspirators, posing as Guccifer 2.0, also shared stolen documents with certain individuals.

a. On or about August 15, 2016, the Conspirators, posing as Guccifer 2.0, received a request for stolen documents from a candidate for the US. Congress. The Conspirators responded using the Guccifer 2.0 persona and sent the candidate stolen documents related to the candidate’s opponent.

b. On or about August 22, 2016, the Conspirators, posing as Guccifer 2.0, transferred approximately 2.5 gigabytes of data stolen from the DCCC to a then-registered state lobbyist and online source of political news. The stolen data included donor records and personal identifying information for more than 2,000 Democratic donors.

c. On or about August 22, 2016, the Conspirators, posing as Guccifer 2.0, sent a reporter stolen documents pertaining to the Black Lives Matter movement. The reporter responded by discussing when to release the documents and offering to write an article about their release.

44. The Conspirators, posing as Guccifer 2.0, also communicated with US. persons about the release of stolen documents. On or about August 15, 2016, the Conspirators, posing as Guccifer 2.0, wrote to a person who was in regular contact with senior members of the presidential campaign of Donald J. Trump, “thank u for writing back … do u find anyt[h]ing interesting in the docs i posted?” On or about August 17, 2016, the Conspirators added, “please tell me if i can help u anyhow … it would be a great pleasure to me.” On or about September 9, 2016, the Conspirators, again posing as Guccifer 2.0, referred to a stolen DCCC document posted online and asked the person, “what do u think of the info on the turnout model for the democrats entire presidential campaign.” The person responded, “[p]retty standard.”

45. The Conspirators conducted operations as Guccifer 2.0 and DCLeaks using overlapping computer infrastructure and financing.

a. For example, between on or about March 14, 2016 and April 28, 2016, the Conspirators used the same pool of bitcoin funds to purchase a virtual private network (“VPN”) account and to lease a server in Malaysia. In or around June 2016, the Conspirators used the Malaysian server to host the dcleaks.com website.

On or about July 6, 2016, the Conspirators used the VPN to log into the @Guccifer_2 Twitter account. The Conspirators opened that VPN account from the same server that was also used to register malicious domains for the hacking of the DCCC and DNC networks.

b. On or about June 27, 2016, the Conspirators, posing as Guccifer 2.0, contacted a U.S. reporter with an offer to provide stolen emails from “Hillary Clinton’s staff.” The Conspirators then sent the reporter the password to access a nonpublic, password-protected portion of dcleaks.com containing emails stolen from Victim 1 by LUKASHEV, YERMAKOV, and their co-conspirators in or around March 2016.

46. On or about January 12, 2017, the Conspirators published a statement on the Guccifer 2.0 WordPress blog, falsely claiming that the intrusions and release of stolen documents had “totally no relation to the Russian government.”

Use of Organization 1

47. In order to expand their interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, the Conspirators transferred many of the documents they stole from the DNC and the chairman of the Clinton Campaign to Organization 1. The Conspirators, posing as Guccifer 2.0, discussed the release of the stolen documents and the timing of those releases with Organization 1 to heighten their impact on the 2016 U.S. presidential election.

a. On or about June 22, 2016, Organization 1 sent a private message to Guccifer 2.0 to “[s]end any new material [stolen from the DNC] here for us to review and it will have a much higher impact than what you are doing.” On or about July 6, 2016, Organization 1 added, “if you have anything hillary related we want it in the next tvveo [sic] days prefable [sic] because the DNC [Democratic National Convention] is approaching and she will solidify bernie supporters behind her after.” The Conspirators responded, “ck … i see.” Organization 1 explained, “we think trump has only a 25% chance of winning against hillary … so conflict between bernie and hillary is interesting.”

b. After failed attempts to transfer the stolen documents starting in late June 2016, on or about July 14, 2016, the Conspirators, posing as Guccifer 2.0, sent Organization 1 an email with an attachment titled “wk dnc linkl.txt.gpg.” The Conspirators explained to Organization 1 that the encrypted file contained instructions on how to access an online archive of stolen DNC documents. On or about July 18, 2016, Organization 1 confirmed it had “the 1Gb or so archive” and would make a release of the stolen documents “this week.”

48. On or about July 22, 2016, Organization 1 released over 20,000 emails and other documents stolen from the DNC network by the Conspirators. This release occurred approximately three days before the start of the Democratic National Convention. Organization 1 did not disclose Guccifer 2.0’s role in providing them. The latest-in-time email released through Organization 1 was dated on or about May 25, 2016, approximately the same day the Conspirators hacked the DNC Microsoft Exchange Server.

49. On or about October 7, 2016, Organization 1 released the first set of emails from the chairman of the Clinton Campaign that had been stolen by LUKASHEV and his co-conspirators. Between on or about October 7, 2016 and November 7, 2016, Organization 1 released approximately thirty-three tranches of documents that had been stolen from the chairman of the Clinton Campaign. In total, over 50,000 stolen documents were released.

Statutory Allegations

50. Paragraphs 1 through 49 of this Indictment are re-alleged and incorporated by reference as if fully set forth herein.

51. From at least in or around March 2016 through November 2016, in the District of Columbia and elsewhere, Defendants NETYKSHO, ANTONOV, BADlN, YERMAKOV, LUKASHEV, MORGACHEV, KOZACHEK, YERSHOV, MALYSHEV, OSADCHUK, and POTEMKJN, together with others known and unknown to the Grand Jury, knowingly and intentionally conspired to commit offenses against the United States, namely:

a. To knowingly access a computer without authorization and exceed authorized access to a computer, and to obtain thereby information from a protected computer, where the value of the information obtained exceeded $5,000, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1030(a)(2)© and 1030(c)(2)(B); and

b. To knowingly cause the transmission of a program, information, code, and command, and as a result of such conduct, to intentionally cause damage without authorization to a protected computer, and where the offense did cause and, if completed, would have caused, loss aggregating $5,000 in Value to at least one person during a one-year period from a related course of conduct affecting a protected computer, and damage affecting at least ten protected computers during a one-year period, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1030(a)(5)(A) and 1030(c)(4)(B).

52. In furtherance of the Conspiracy and to effect its illegal objects, the Conspirators committed the overt acts set forth in paragraphs 1 through 19, 21 through 49, 55, and 57 through 64, which are re-alleged and incorporated by reference as if fully set forth herein.

53. In furtherance of the Conspiracy, and as set forth in paragraphs 1 through 19, 21 through 49, 55, and 57 through 64, the Conspirators knowingly falsely registered a domain name and knowingly used that domain name in the course of committing an offense, namely, the Conspirators registered domains, including dcleaks.com and actblues.com, with false names and addresses, and used those domains in the course of committing the felony offense charged in Count One.

All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 371 and 3559(g)(1).

COUNTS TWO THROUGH NINE

(Aggravated Identity Theft)

54. Paragraphs 1 through 19, 21 through 49, and 57 through 64 of this Indictment are re-alleged and incorporated by reference as if fully set forth herein.

55. On or about the dates specified below, in the District of Columbia and elsewhere, Defendants VlKTOR BORISOVICH NETYKSHO, BORIS ALEKSEYEVICH ANTONOV, DMITRIY SERGEYEVICH BADlN, IVAN SERGEYEVICH YERMAKOV, ALEKSEY VIKTOROVICH LUKASHEV, SERGEY ALEKSANDROVICH MORGACHEV, NIKOLAY YURYEVICH KOZACHEK, PAVEL VYACHESLAVOVICH YERSHOV, ARTEM ANDREYEV’ICH MALYSHEV, ALEKSANDR VLADIMIROVICH OSADCHUK, and ALEKSEY ALEKSANDROVICH POTEMKIN did knowingly transfer, possess, and use, without lawful authority, a means of identification of another person during and in relation to a felony violation enumerated in Title 18, United States Code, Section 1028A(c), namely, computer fraud in Violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1030(a)(2)© and 1030(c)(2)(B), knowing that the means of identification belonged to another real person:

CountApproximate DateVictimMeans of Identification
2March 21, 2016Victim 3Username and password for personal email account
3March 25, 2016Victim 1Username and password for personal email account
4April 12, 2016Victim 4Username and password for DCCC computer network
5April 15, 2016Victim 5Username and password for DCCC computer network
6April 18, 2016Victim 6Username and password for DCCC computer network
7May 10, 2016Victim 7Username and password for DNC computer network
8June 2, 2016Victim 2Username and password for personal email account
9June 6, 2016Victim 8Username and password for personal email account

All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1028A(a)(1) and 2.

COUNT TEN

(Conspiracy to Launder Money)

56. Paragraphs 1 through 19, 21 through 49, and 55 are re — alleged and incorporated by reference as if fully set forth herein.

57. To facilitate the purchase of infrastructure used in their hacking activity — including hacking into the computers of U.S. persons and entities involved in the 2016 U.S. presidential election and releasing the stolen documents — the Defendants conspired to launder the equivalent of more than $95,000 through a Web of transactions structured to capitalize on the perceived anonymity of cryptocurrencies such as bitcoin.

58. Although the Conspirators caused transactions to be conducted in a variety of currencies, including U.S. dollars, they principally used bitcoin when purchasing servers, registering domains, and otherwise making payments in furtherance of hacking activity. Many of these payments were processed by companies located in the United States that provided payment processing services to hosting companies, domain registrars, and other Vendors both international and domestic. The use of bitcoin allowed the Conspirators to avoid direct relationships with traditional financial institutions, allowing them to evade greater scrutiny of their identities and sources of funds.

59. All bitcoin transactions are added to a public ledger called the Blockchain, but the Blockchain identifies the parties to each transaction only by alphanumeric identifiers known as bitcoin addresses. To further avoid creating a centralized paper trail of all of their purchases, the Conspirators purchased infrastructure using hundreds of different email accounts, in some cases using a new account for each purchase. The Conspirators used fictitious names and addresses in order to obscure their identities and their links to Russia and the Russian government. For example, the dcleaks.com domain was registered and paid for using the fictitious name “Carrie Feehan” and an address in New York. In some cases, as part of the payment process, the Conspirators provided vendors with nonsensical addresses such as “usa Denver AZ,”’“gfhghghfhgfh fdgfdg WA,” and “1 2 dwd District of Columbia.”

60. The Conspirators used several dedicated email accounts to track basic bitcoin transaction information and to facilitate bitcoin payments to vendors. One of these dedicated accounts, registered with the username “gfadel47,” received hundreds of bitcoin payment requests from approximately 100 different email accounts. For example, on or about February 1, 2016, the gfadel47 account received the instruction to “[p]lease send exactly 0.026043 bitcoin to” a certain thirty-four character bitcoin address. Shortly thereafter, a transaction matching those exact instructions was added to the Blockchain.

61. On occasion, the Conspirators facilitated bitcoin payments using the same computers that they used to conduct their hacking activity, including to create and send test spearphishing emails. Additionally, one of these dedicated accounts was used by the Conspirators in or around 2015 to renew the registration of a domain (linuxkrnlnet) encoded in certain X-Agent malware installed on the DNC network.

62. The Conspirators funded the purchase of computer infrastructure for their hacking activity in part by “mining” bitcoin. Individuals and entities can mine bitcoin by allowing their computing power to be used to verify and record payments on the bitcoin public ledger, a service for which they are rewarded with freshly-minted bitcoin. The pool of bitcoin generated from the GRU’s mining activity was used, for example, to pay a Romanian company to register the domain dcleaks.com through a payment processing company located in the United States.

63. In addition to mining bitcoin, the Conspirators acquired bitcoin through a variety of means designed to obscure the origin of the funds. This included purchasing bitcoin through peer-to-peer exchanges, moving funds through other digital currencies, and using pre-paid cards. They also enlisted the assistance of one or more third — party exchangers who facilitated layered transactions through digital currency exchange platforms providing heightened anonymity.

64. The Conspirators used the same funding structure — and in some cases, the very same pool of funds to purchase key accounts, servers, and domains used in their election — related hacking activity.

a. The bitcoin mining operation that funded the registration payment for dcleaks.com also sent newly-minted bitcoin to a bitcoin address controlled by “Daniel Farell,” the persona that was used to renew the domain linuxkrnlnet. The bitcoin mining operation also funded, through the same bitcoin address, the purchase of servers and domains used in the GRU’s spearphishing operations, including accounts- qooqle.com and account — gooogle.com.

b. On or about March 14, 2016, using funds in a bitcoin address, the Conspirators purchased a VPN account, which they later used to log into the @Guccifer_2 Twitter account. The remaining funds from that bitcoin address were then used on or about April 28, 2016, to lease a Malaysian server that hosted the dcleaks.com website.

c. The Conspirators used a different set of fictitious names (including “Ward DeClaur” and “Mike Long”) to send bitcoin to a US. company in order to lease a server used to administer X-Tunnel malware implanted on the DCCC and DNC networks, and to lease two servers used to hack the DNC’s cloud network.

Statutory Allegations

65. From at least in or around 2015 through 2016, within the District of Columbia and elsewhere, Defendants VIKTOR BORISOVICH NETYKSHO, BORIS ALEKSEYEVICH ANTONOV, DMITRIY SERGEYEVICH BADlN, IVAN SERGEYEVICH YERMAKOV, ALEKSEY VIKTOROVICH LUKASHEV, SERGEY ALEKSANDROVICH MORGACHEV, NIKOLAY YURYEVICH KOZACHEK, PAVEL VYACHESLAVOVICH YERSHOV, ARTEM ANDREYEVICH MALYSHEV, ALEKSANDR VLADIMIROVICH OSADCHUK, and ALEKSEY ALEKSANDROVICH POTEMKIN, together with others, known and unknown to the Grand Jury, did knowingly and intentionally conspire to transport, transmit, and transfer monetary instruments and funds to a place in the United States from and through a place outside the United States and from a place in the United States to and through a place outside the United States, with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity, namely, a violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1030, contrary to Title 18, United States Code, Section l956(a)(2)(A).

All in Violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1956(h).

COUNT ELEVEN

(Conspiracy to Commit an Offense Against the United States)

66. Paragraphs 1 through 8 of this Indictment are re-alleged and incorporated by reference as if fully set forth herein.

Defendants

67. Paragraph 18 of this Indictment relating to ALEKSANDR VLADIMIROVICH OSADCHUK is re — alleged and incorporated by reference as if fully set forth herein.

68. Defendant ANATOLIY SERGEYEVICH KOVALEV (KonaneB AHaronnfi CepreeBnq) was an officer in the Russian military assigned to Unit 74455 who worked in the GRU’s 22 Kirova Street building (the Tower).

69. Defendants OSADCHUK and KOVALEV were GRU officers who knowingly and intentionally conspired with each other and with persons, known and unknown to the Grand Jury, to hack into the computers of U.S. persons and entities responsible for the administration of 2016 U.S. elections, such as state boards of elections, secretaries of state, and U.S. companies that supplied software and other technology related to the administration of U.S. elections.

Object of the Conspiracy

70. The object of the conspiracy was to hack into protected computers of persons and entities charged with the administration of the 2016 U.S. elections in order to access those computers and steal voter data and other information stored on those computers.

Manner and Means of the Conspiracy

71. In or around June 2016, KOVALEV and his co — conspirators researched domains used by U.S. state boards of elections, secretaries of state, and other election-related entities for website vulnerabilities. KOVALEV and his co-conspirators also searched for state political party email addresses, including filtered queries for email addresses listed on state Republican Party websites.

72. In or around July 2016, KOVALEV and his co-conspirators hacked the website of a state board of elections (“SBOE 1”) and stole information related to approximately 500,000 voters, including names, addresses, partial social security numbers, dates of birth, and driver’s license numbers.

73. In or around August 2016, KOVALEV and his co-conspirators hacked into the computers of a US. vendor (“Vendor 1”) that supplied software used to verify voter registration information for the 2016 US. elections. KOVALEV and his co-conspirators used some of the same infrastructure to hack into Vendor 1 that they had used to hack into SBOE 1.

74. In or around August 2016, the Federal Bureau of Investigation issued an alert about the hacking of SBOE 1 and identified some of the infrastructure that was used to conduct the hacking. In response, KOVALEV deleted his search history. KOVALEV and his co-conspirators also deleted records from accounts used in their operations targeting state boards of elections and similar election — related entities.

75. In or around October 2016, KOVALEV and his co-conspirators further targeted state and county offices responsible for administering the 2016 US. elections. For example, on or about October 28, 2016, KOVALEV and his co-conspirators visited the websites of certain counties in Georgia, Iowa, and Florida to identify vulnerabilities.

76. In or around November 2016 and prior to the 2016 US. presidential election, KOVALEV and his co-conspirators used an email account designed to look like a Vendor 1 email address to send over 100 spearphishing emails to organizations and personnel involved in administering elections in numerous Florida counties. The spearphishing emails contained malware that the Conspirators embedded into Word documents bearing Vendor 1’s logo.

Statutory Allegations

77. Between in or around June 2016 and November 2016, in the District of Columbia and elsewhere, Defendants OSADCHUK and KOVALEV, together with others known and unknown to the Grand Jury, knowingly and intentionally conspired to commit offenses against the United States, namely:

a. To knowingly access a computer Without authorization and exceed authorized access to a computer, and to obtain thereby information from a protected computer, where the value of the information obtained exceeded $5,000, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1030(a)(2)© and 1030(c)(2)(B); and

b. To knowingly cause the transmission of a program, information, code, and command, and as a result of such conduct, to intentionally cause damage without authorization to a protected computer, and where the offense did cause and, if completed, would have caused, loss aggregating $5,000 in value to at least one person during a one-year period from a related course of conduct affecting a protected computer, and damage affecting at least ten protected computers during a one-year period, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1030(a)(5)(A) and 1030(c)(4)(B).

78. In furtherance of the Conspiracy and to effect its illegal objects, OSADCHUK, KOVALEV, and their co — conspirators committed the overt acts set forth in paragraphs 67 through 69 and 71 through 76, which are re-alleged and incorporated by reference as if fully set forth herein.

All in Violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 371.

FORFEITURE ALLEGATION

79. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2, notice is hereby given to Defendants that the United States will seek forfeiture as part of any sentence in the event of Defendants’ convictions under Counts One, Ten, and Eleven of this Indictment. Pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Sections 982(a)(2) and 1030(i), upon conviction of the offenses charged in Counts One and Eleven, Defendants NETYKSHO, ANTONOV, BADIN, YERMAKOV, LUKASHEV, MORGACHEV, KOZACHEK, YERSHOV, MALYSHEV, OSADCHUK, POTEMKIN, and KOVALEV shall forfeit to the United States any property, real or personal, which constitutes or is derived from proceeds obtained directly or indirectly as a result of such violation, and any personal property that was used or intended to be used to commit or to facilitate the commission of such offense. Pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 982(a)(1), upon conviction of the offense charged in Count Ten, Defendants NETYKSHO, ANTONOV, BADlN, YERMAKOV, LUKASHEV, MORGACHEV, KOZACHEK, YERSHOV, MALYSHEV, OSADCHUK, and POTEMKIN shall forfeit to the United States any property, real or personal, involved in such offense, and any property traceable to such property. Notice is further given that, upon conviction, the United States intends to seek a judgment against each Defendant for a sum of money representing the property described in this paragraph, as applicable to each Defendant (to be offset by the forfeiture of any specific property).

Substitute Assets

80. If any of the property described above as being subject to forfeiture, as a result of any act or omission of any Defendant —

a. cannot be located upon the exercise of due diligence;

b. has been transferred or sold to, or deposited with, a third party;

c. has been placed beyond the jurisdiction of the court;

d. has been substantially diminished in value; or

e. has been commingled with other property that cannot be subdivided without difficulty;

it is the intent of the United States of America, pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 982(b) and Title 28, United States Code, Section 2461(0), incorporating Title 21, United States Code, Section 853, to seek forfeiture of any other property of said Defendant.

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 982 and 1030(i); 28 U.S.C. §2461(c).

Robert S. Mueller, III
Special Counsel
US. Department of Justice

A TRUE BILL:
Foreperson

Date: July 13, 2018

U.S. v. Konstantin Kilimnik

Superseding indictment of Paul Manafort and Konstantin Kilmnik

The Grand Jury for the District of Columbia charges:

Introduction

At all times relevant to this Superseding Indictment:

1. Defendant PAUL J. MANAFORT, JR. (MANAFORT) served for years as a political consultant and lobbyist. Between at least 2006 and 2015, MANAFORT, through companies he ran, acted as an unregistered agent of a foreign government and foreign political parties. Specifically, he represented the Government of Ukraine, the President of Ukraine (Victor Yanukovych, who was President from 2010 to 2014), the Party of Regions (a Ukrainian political party led by Yanukovych), and the Opposition Bloc (a successor to the Party of Regions after Yanukovych fled to Russia in 2014).

2. MANAFORT generated tens of millions of dollars in income as a result of his Ukraine work. From approximately 2006 through 2017, MANAFORT, along with others including Richard W. Gates III (Gates), engaged in a scheme to hide the Ukraine income from United States authorities, while enjoying the use of the money. From approximately 2006 to 2015, when MANAFORT was generating tens of millions of dollars in income from his Ukraine activities, MANAFORT, with the assistance of Gates, avoided paying taxes by disguising tens of millions of dollars in income as alleged “loans” from nominee offshore corporate entities and by making millions of dollars in unreported payments from foreign accounts to bank accounts they controlled and United States vendors. MANAFORT also used the offshore accounts to purchase real estate in the United States, and MANAFORT used the undisclosed income to make improvements to and refinance his United States properties.

3. In furtherance of the scheme, MANAFORT, with the assistance of Gates, funneled millions of dollars in payments into numerous foreign nominee companies and bank accounts, opened by them and their accomplices in nominee names and in various foreign countries, including Cyprus, Saint Vincent & the Grenadines (Grenadines), and the Seychelles. MANAFORT concealed the existence and ownership of the foreign companies and bank accounts, falsely and repeatedly reporting to his tax preparers and to the United States that he had no foreign bank accounts.

4. In furtherance of the scheme, MANAFORT, with the assistance of Gates, concealed from the United States his work as an agent of, and millions of dollars in payments from, Ukraine and its political parties and leaders. Because MANAFORT, among other things, participated in a campaign to lobby United States officials on behalf of the Government of Ukraine, the President of Ukraine, and the Party of Regions, he was required by law to report to the United States his work and fees. MANAFORT did not do so. Instead, when the Department of Justice sent inquiries to MANAFORT and Gates in 2016 about their activities, MANAFORT and Gates responded with a series of false and misleading statements.

5. In furtherance of the scheme, MANAFORT used his hidden overseas wealth to enjoy a lavish lifestyle in the United States, without paying taxes on that income. MANAFORT, without reporting the income to his tax preparer or the United States, spent millions of dollars on luxury goods and services for himself and his extended family through payments wired from offshore nominee accounts to United States vendors. MANAFORT also used these offshore accounts to purchase multi-million dollar properties in the United States and to improve substantially another property owned by his family.

6. In total, more than $75,000,000 flowed through these offshore accounts. MANAFORT, with the assistance of Gates, laundered more than $30,000,000, income that he concealed from the United States Department of the Treasury (Treasury), the Department of Justice, and others. Relevant Individuals And Entities

7. MANAFORT was a United States citizen. He resided in homes in Virginia, Florida, and Long Island, New York.

8. In 2005, MANAFORT and another partner created Davis Manafort Partners, Inc. (DMP) to engage principally in political consulting. DMP had staff in the United States, Ukraine, and Russia. In 2011, MANAFORT created DMP International, LLC (DMI) to engage in work for foreign clients, in particular political consulting, lobbying, and public relations for the Government of Ukraine, the Party of Regions, and members of the Party of Regions. DMI was a partnership solely owned by MANAFORT and his spouse. Gates worked for both DMP and DMI and served as MANAFORT’s right-hand man. Defendant KONSTANTIN KILIMNIK (KILIMNIK) worked for DMI and oversaw its Kiev office.

9. The Party of Regions was a pro-Russia political party in Ukraine. Beginning in approximately 2006, it retained MANAFORT, through DMP and then DMI, to advance its interests in Ukraine, the United States, and elsewhere, including the election of its Ukrainian slate of candidates. In 2010, its candidate for President, Yanukovych, was elected President of Ukraine. In 2014, Yanukovych fled Ukraine for Russia in the wake of popular protests of widespread governmental corruption. Yanukovych, the Party of Regions, and the Government of Ukraine were MANAFORT, DMP, and DMI clients.

10. The European Centre for a Modern Ukraine (the Centre) was created in or about 2012 in Belgium as a mouthpiece for Yanukovych and the Party of Regions. It reported to the Ukraine First Vice Prime Minister. The Centre was used by MANAFORT, Gates, and others in order to lobby and conduct a public relations campaign in the United States and Europe on behalf of the existing Ukraine regime. The Centre effectively ceased to operate upon the downfall of Yanukovych in 2014.

11. MANAFORT, with the assistance of Gates, owned or controlled the following entities, which were used in the scheme (the MANAFORT entities):

Domestic Entities
Entity NameDate CreatedIncorporation Location
Daisy Manafort, LLC (PM)August 2008Virginia
March 2011Florida
Davis Manafort International LLC (PM)March 2007Delaware
DMP (PM)March 2005Virginia
March 2011Florida
Davis Manafort, Inc. (PM)October 1999Delaware
November 1999Virginia
DMI (PM)June 2011Delaware
March 2012Florida
Global Sites LLC (PM, RG)July 2008Delaware
Jesand Investment Corporation (PM)April 2002Virginia
Jesand Investments Corporation (PM)March 2011Florida
John Hannah, LLC (PM)April 2006Virginia
March 2011Florida
Lilred, LLC (PM)December 2011Florida
LOAV Ltd. (PM)April 1992Delaware
MC Brooklyn Holdings, LLC (PM)November 2012New York
MC Soho Holdings, LLC (PM)January 2012Florida
April 2012New York
Smythson LLC (also known as Symthson LLC) (PM, RG)July 2008Delaware
Cypriot Entities
Entity NameDate CreatedIncorporation Location
Actinet Trading Limited (PM, RG)May 2009Cyprus
Black Sea View Limited (PM, RG)August 2007Cyprus
Bletilla Ventures Limited (PM, RG)October 2010Cyprus
Global Highway Limited (PM, RG)August 2007Cyprus
Leviathan Advisors Limited (PM, RG)August 2007Cyprus
LOAV Advisors Limited (PM, RG)August 2007Cyprus
Lucicle Consultants Limited (PM, RG)December 2008Cyprus
Marziola Holdings Limited (PM)March 2012Cyprus
Olivenia Trading Limited (PM, RG)March 2012Cyprus
Peranova Holdings Limited (Peranova) (PM, RG)June 2007Cyprus
Serangon Holdings Limited (PM, RG)January 2008Cyprus
Yiakora Ventures Limited (PM)February 2008Cyprus
Other Foreign Entities
Entity NameDate CreatedIncorporation Location
Global Endeavour Inc. (also known as Global Endeavor Inc.) (PM)UnknownGrenadines
Jeunet Ltd. (PM)August 2011Grenadines
Pompolo Limited (PM, RG)April 2013United Kingdom

12. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) was a bureau in the Treasury responsible for administering the tax laws of the United States and collecting taxes owed to the Treasury.

The Scheme

13. Between in or around 2006 and 2017, both dates being approximate and inclusive, in the District of Columbia and elsewhere, MANAFORT and others devised and intended to devise, and executed and attempted to execute, a scheme and artifice to defraud, and to obtain money and property by means of false and fraudulent pretenses, representations, and promises from the United States and others. As part of the scheme, MANAFORT repeatedly provided and caused to be provided false information to financial bookkeepers, tax accountants, and legal counsel, among others.

MANAFORT’s Wiring Money From Offshore Accounts Into The United States

14. In order to use the money in the offshore nominee accounts of the MANAFORT entities without paying taxes on it, MANAFORT caused millions of dollars in wire transfers from these accounts to be made for goods, services, and real estate. He did not report these transfers as income.

15. From 2008 to 2014, MANAFORT caused the following wires, totaling over $12,000,000, to be sent to the vendors listed below for personal items. MANAFORT did not pay taxes on this income, which was used to make the purchases.

PayeeTransaction DateOriginating Account HolderCountry of OriginationAmount of Transaction
Vendor A (Home Improvement Company in the Hamptons, New York)6/10/2008LOAV Advisors LimitedCyprus$107,000
6/25/2008LOAV Advisors LimitedCyprus$23,500
7/7/2008LOAV Advisors LimitedCyprus$20,000
8/5/2008Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$59,000
9/2/2008Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$272,000
10/6/2008Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$109,000
10/24/2008Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$107,800
11/20/2008Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$77,400
12/22/2008Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$100,000
1/14/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$9,250
1/29/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$97,670
2/25/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$108,100
4/16/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$94,394
5/7/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$54,000
5/12/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$9,550
6/1/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$86,650
6/18/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$34,400
7/31/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$106,000
8/28/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$37,000
9/23/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$203,500
10/26/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$38,800
11/18/2009Global Highway LimitedCyprus$130,906
3/8/2010Global Highway LimitedCyprus$124,000
5/11/2010Global Highway LimitedCyprus$25,000
7/8/2010Global Highway LimitedCyprus$28,000
7/23/2010Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$26,500
8/12/2010Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$138,900
9/2/2010Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$31,500
10/6/2010Global Highway LimitedCyprus$67,600
10/14/2010Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$107,600
10/18/2010Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$31,500
12/16/2010Global Highway LimitedCyprus$46,160
2/7/2011Global Highway LimitedCyprus$36,500
3/22/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$26,800
4/4/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$195,000
5/3/2011Global Highway LimitedCyprus$95,000
5/16/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$6,500
5/31/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$70,000
6/27/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$39,900
7/27/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$95,000
10/24/2011Global Highway LimitedCyprus$22,000
10/25/2011Global Highway LimitedCyprus$9,300
11/15/2011Global Highway LimitedCyprus$74,000
11/23/2011Global Highway LimitedCyprus$22,300
11/29/2011Global Highway LimitedCyprus$6,100
12/12/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$17,800
1/17/2012Global Highway LimitedCyprus$29,800
1/20/2012Global Highway LimitedCyprus$42,600
2/9/2012Global Highway LimitedCyprus$22,300
2/23/2012Global Highway LimitedCyprus$75,000
2/28/2012Global Highway LimitedCyprus$22,300
3/28/2012PeranovaCyprus$37,500
4/18/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$50,000
5/15/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$79,000
6/5/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$45,000
6/19/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$11,860
7/9/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$10,800
7/18/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$88,000
8/7/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$48,800
9/27/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$100,000
11/20/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$298,000
12/20/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$55,000
1/29/2013Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$149,000
3/12/2013Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$375,000
8/29/2013Global Endeavour Inc.Grenadines$200,000
11/13/2013Global Endeavour Inc.Grenadines$75,000
11/26/2013Global Endeavour Inc.Grenadines$80,000
12/6/2013Global Endeavour Inc.Grenadines$130,000
12/12/2013Global Endeavour Inc.Grenadines$90,000
4/22/2014Global Endeavour Inc.Grenadines$56,293
8/18/2014Global Endeavour Inc.Grenadines$34,660
Vendor A Total$5,434,793
Vendor B (Home Automation, Lighting, and Home Entertainment Company in Florida)3/22/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$12,000
3/28/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$25,000
4/27/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$12,000
5/16/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$25,000
11/15/2011Global Highway LimitedCyprus$17,006
11/23/2011Global Highway LimitedCyprus$11,000
2/28/2012Global Highway LimitedCyprus$6,200
10/31/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$290,000
12/17/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$160,600
1/15/2013Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$194,000
1/24/2013Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$6,300
2/12/2013Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$51,600
2/26/2013Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$260,000
7/15/2013Pompolo Limited"United Kingdom"$175,575
11/5/2013Global Endeavour Inc.Grenadines$73,000
Vendor B Total$1,319,281
Vendor C (Antique Rug Store in Alexandria, Virginia)10/7/2008Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$15,750
3/17/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$46,200
4/16/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$7,400
4/27/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$65,000
5/7/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$210,000
7/15/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$200,000
3/31/2010Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$140,000
6/16/2010Global Highway LimitedCyprus$250,000
Vendor C Total$934,350
Vendor D (Related to Vendor C)2/28/2012Global Highway LimitedCyprus$100,000
Vendor D Total$100,000
Vendor E (Men's Clothing Store in New York)11/7/2008Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$32,000
2/5/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$22,750
4/27/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$13,500
10/26/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$32,500
3/30/2010Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$15,000
5/11/2010Global Highway LimitedCyprus$39,000
6/28/2010Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$5,000
8/12/2010Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$32,500
11/17/2010Global Highway LimitedCyprus$11,500
2/7/2011Global Highway LimitedCyprus$24,000
3/22/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$43,600
3/28/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$12,000
4/27/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$3,000
6/30/2011Global Highway LimitedCyprus$24,500
9/26/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$12,000
11/2/2011Global Highway LimitedCyprus$26,700
12/12/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$46,000
2/9/2012Global Highway LimitedCyprus$2,800
2/28/2012Global Highway LimitedCyprus$16,000
3/14/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$8,000
4/18/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$48,550
5/15/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$7,000
6/19/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$21,600
8/7/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$15,500
11/20/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$10,900
12/20/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$7,500
1/15/2013Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$37,000
2/12/2013Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$7,000
2/26/2013Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$39,000
9/3/2013Global Endeavour Inc.Grenadines$81,500
10/15/2013Global Endeavour Inc.Grenadines$53,000
11/26/2013Global Endeavour Inc.Grenadines$13,200
4/24/2014Global Endeavour Inc.Grenadines$26,680
9/11/2014Global Endeavour Inc.Grenadines$58,435
Vendor E Total$849,215
Vendor F (Landscaper in the Hamptons, New York)4/27/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$34,000
5/12/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$45,700
6/1/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$21,500
6/18/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$29,000
9/21/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$21,800
5/11/2010Global Highway LimitedCyprus$44,000
6/28/2010Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$50,000
7/23/2010Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$19,000
9/2/2010Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$21,000
10/6/2010Global Highway LimitedCyprus$57,700
10/18/2010Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$26,000
12/16/2010Global Highway LimitedCyprus$20,000
3/22/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$50,000
5/3/2011Global Highway LimitedCyprus$40,000
6/1/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$44,000
7/27/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$27,000
8/16/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$13,450
9/19/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$12,000
10/24/2011Global Highway LimitedCyprus$42,000
11/2/2011Global Highway LimitedCyprus$37,350
Vendor F Total$655,500
Vendor G (Antique Dealer in New York)9/2/2010Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$165,000
10/18/2010Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$165,000
2/28/2012Global Highway LimitedCyprus$190,600
3/14/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$75,000
2/26/2013Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$28,310
Vendor G Total$623,910
Vendor H (Clothing Store in Beverly Hills, California)6/25/2008LOAV Advisors LimitedCyprus$52,000
12/16/2008Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$49,000
12/22/2008Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$10,260
8/12/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$76,400
5/11/2010Global Highway LimitedCyprus$85,000
11/17/2010Global Highway LimitedCyprus$128,280
5/31/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$64,000
11/15/2011Global Highway LimitedCyprus$48,000
12/17/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$7,500
Vendor H Total$520,440
Vendor I (Investment Company)9/3/2013Global Endeavour Inc.Grenadines$500,000
Vendor I Total$500,000
Vendor J (Contractor in Florida)11/15/2011Global Highway LimitedCyprus$8,000
12/5/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$11,237
12/21/2011Black Sea View LimitedCyprus$20,000
2/9/2012Global Highway LimitedCyprus$51,000
5/17/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$68,000
6/19/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$60,000
7/18/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$32,250
9/19/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$112,000
11/30/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$39,700
1/9/2013Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$25,600
2/28/2013Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$4,700
Vendor J Total$432,487
Vendor K (Landscaper in the Hamptons, New York)12/5/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$4,115
3/1/2012Global Highway LimitedCyprus$50,000
6/6/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$47,800
6/25/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$17,900
6/27/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$18,900
2/12/2013Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$3,300
7/15/2013Pompolo LimitedUnited Kingdom$13,325
11/26/2013Global Endeavour Inc.Grenadines$9,400
Vendor K Total$164,740
Vendor L (Payments Relating to Three Range Rovers)4/12/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$83,525
5/2/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$12,525
6/29/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$67,655
Vendor L Total$163,705
Vendor M (Contractor in Virginia)11/20/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$45,000
12/7/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$21,000
12/17/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$21,000
1/17/2013Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$18,750
1/29/2013Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$9,400
2/12/2013Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$10,500
Vendor M Total$125,650
Vendor N (Audio, Video, and Control System Home Integration and Installation Company in the Hamptons, New York)1/29/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$10,000
3/17/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$21,725
4/16/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$24,650
12/2/2009Global Highway LimitedCyprus$10,000
3/8/2010Global Highway LimitedCyprus$20,300
4/23/2010Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$8,500
7/29/2010Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$17,650
Vendor N Total$112,825
Vendor O (Purchase of Mercedes Benz)10/5/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$62,750
Vendor O Total$62,750
"Vendor P (Purchase of Range Rover)"12/30/2008Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$47,000
Vendor P Total$47,000
Vendor Q (Property Management Company in South Carolina)9/2/2010Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$10,000
10/6/2010Global Highway LimitedCyprus$10,000
10/18/2010Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$10,000
2/8/2011Global Highway LimitedCyprus$13,500
2/9/2012Global Highway LimitedCyprus$2,500
Vendor Q Total$46,000
Vendor R (Art Gallery in Florida)2/9/2011Global Highway LimitedCyprus$17,900
2/14/2013Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$14,000
Vendor R Total$31,900
Vendor S (Housekeeping in New York)9/26/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$5,000
9/19/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$5,000
10/9/2013Global Endeavour Inc.Grenadines$10,000
Vendor S Total$20,000

16. In 2012, MANAFORT caused the following wires to be sent to the entities listed below to purchase the real estate also listed below. MANAFORT did not report the money used to make these purchases on his 2012 tax return.

Property PurchasedPayeeDateOriginating AccountCountry of OriginationAmount
Howard Street Condominium (New York)"DMP International LLC"2/1/2012PeranovaCyprus$1,500,000
Union Street Brownstone, (New York)Attorney Account Of [Real Estate Attorney]11/29/2012"Actinet Trading Limited"Cyprus$1,800,000
11/29/2012"Actinet Trading Limited"Cyprus$1,200,000
Arlington House (Virginia)Real Estate Trust8/31/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$1,900,000
Total$6,400,000

17. MANAFORT also disguised, as purported “loans,” more than $10 million from Cypriot entities, including the overseas MANAFORT entities, to domestic entities owned by MANAFORT. For example, a $1.5 million wire from Peranova to DMI that MANAFORT used to purchase real estate on Howard Street in Manhattan, New York, was recorded as a “loan” from Peranova to DMI, rather than as income. The following loans were shams designed to reduce fraudulently MANAFORT’s reported taxable income.

YearPayor / Ostensible "Lender"Payee / Ostensible "Borrower"Country of OriginationTotal Amount of "Loans"
2008Yiakora Ventures Limited"Jesand Investment Corporation"Cyprus$8,120,000
2008Yiakora Ventures LimitedDMPCyprus$500,000
2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedDMPCyprus$694,000
2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedDaisy Manafort, LLCCyprus$500,000
2012PeranovaDMICyprus$1,500,000
2014Telmar Investments Ltd.DMICyprus$900,000
2015Telmar Investments Ltd.DMICyprus$1,000,000
Total$13,214,000

18. From 2010 to 2014, Gates caused the following wires, totaling more than $3,000,000, to be sent to entities and bank accounts of which he was a beneficial owner or he otherwise controlled.

PayeeTransaction DateOriginating Account HolderCountry of OriginationAmount of Transaction
Richard Gates United Kingdom Bank Account A3/26/2010Serangon Holdings LimitedCyprus$85,000
4/20/2010Serangon Holdings LimitedCyprus$50,000
5/6/2010Serangon Holdings LimitedCyprus$150,000
Richard Gates United Kingdom Bank Account B9/7/2010Serangon Holdings LimitedCyprus$160,000
10/13/2010Serangon Holdings LimitedCyprus$15,000
Richard Gates United States Bank Account C9/27/2010Global Highway LimitedCyprus$50,000
2010 Tax Year Total$510,000
Jemina LLC United States Bank Account D9/9/2011PeranovaCyprus$48,500
Richard Gates United Kingdom Bank Account B12/16/2011PeranovaCyprus$100,435
2011 Tax Year Total$148,935
Richard Gates United Kingdom Bank Account B1/9/2012Global Highway LimitedCyprus$100,000
1/13/2012PeranovaCyprus$100,435
2/29/2012Global Highway LimitedCyprus$28,500
3/27/2012Bletilla Ventures LimitedCyprus$18,745
4/26/2012Bletilla Ventures LimitedCyprus$26,455
5/30/2012Bletilla Ventures LimitedCyprus$15,000
5/30/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$14,650
6/27/2012Bletilla Ventures LimitedCyprus$18,745
8/2/2012Bletilla Ventures LimitedCyprus$28,745
8/30/2012Bletilla Ventures LimitedCyprus$38,745
9/27/2012Bletilla Ventures LimitedCyprus$32,345
10/31/2012Bletilla Ventures LimitedCyprus$46,332
11/20/2012Bletilla Ventures LimitedCyprus$48,547
11/30/2012Bletilla Ventures LimitedCyprus$38,532
12/21/2012Bletilla Ventures LimitedCyprus$47,836
12/28/2012Bletilla Ventures LimitedCyprus$47,836
2012 Tax Year Total$651,448
Richard Gates United Kingdom Bank Account B1/11/2013Bletilla Ventures LimitedCyprus$47,836
1/22/2013Bletilla Ventures LimitedCyprus$34,783
1/30/2013Bletilla Ventures LimitedCyprus$46,583
2/22/2013Bletilla Ventures LimitedCyprus$46,233
2/28/2013Bletilla Ventures LimitedCyprus$46,583
3/1/2013Bletilla Ventures LimitedCyprus$42,433
3/15/2013Bletilla Ventures LimitedCyprus$37,834
4/15/2013Bletilla Ventures LimitedCyprus$59,735
4/26/2013Bletilla Ventures LimitedCyprus$48,802
5/17/2013Olivenia Trading LimitedCyprus$57,798
5/30/2013Actinet Trading LimitedCyprus$45,622
6/13/2013Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$76,343
8/7/2013Pompolo Limited"United Kingdom"$250,784
9/6/2013Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$68,500
9/13/2013Cypriot AgentCyprus$179,216
Jemina LLC United States Bank Account D7/8/2013Marziola Holdings LimitedCyprus$72,500
9/4/2013Marziola Holdings LimitedCyprus$89,807
10/22/2013Cypriot AgentCyprus$119,844
11/12/2013Cypriot AgentCyprus$80,000
12/20/2013Cypriot AgentCyprus$90,000
2013 Tax Year Total$1,541,237
Jemina LLC United States Bank Account D2/10/2014Cypriot AgentCyprus$60,044
4/29/2014Cypriot AgentCyprus$44,068
10/6/2014Global Endeavour Inc.Grenadines$65,000
Bade LLC United States Bank Account E11/25/2014Global Endeavour Inc.Grenadines$120,000
2014 Tax Year Total$289,112

19. It is illegal to act as an agent of a foreign principal engaged in certain United States influence activities without registering the affiliation. Specifically, a person who engages in lobbying or public relations work in the United States (hereafter collectively referred to as lobbying) for a foreign principal, such as the Government of Ukraine or the Party of Regions, is required to provide a detailed written registration statement to the United States Department of Justice. The filing, made under oath, must disclose the name of the foreign principal, the financial payments to the lobbyist, and the measures undertaken for the foreign principal, among other information. A person required to make such a filing must further include in all lobbying material a “conspicuous statement” that the materials are distributed on behalf of the foreign principal, among other things. The filing thus permits public awareness and evaluation of the activities of a lobbyist who acts as an agent of a foreign power or foreign political party in the United States.

20. In furtherance of the scheme, from 2006 until 2014, both dates being approximate and inclusive, MANAFORT, with the assistance of Gates, KILIMNIK, and others, engaged in a multimillion dollar lobbying campaign in the United States at the direction of Yanukovych, the Party of Regions, and the Government of Ukraine. MANAFORT did so without registering and providing the disclosures required by law.

21. As one part of the scheme, in February 2012, MANAFORT, with the assistance of Gates, solicited two Washington, D.C., firms (Company A and Company B) to lobby in the United States on behalf of Yanukovych, the Party of Regions, and the Government of Ukraine. For instance, Gates wrote to Company A that it would be “representing the Government of Ukraine in [Washington,] DC.”

22. MANAFORT repeatedly communicated in person and in writing with Yanukovych, and Gates passed on directions to Company A and Company B. For instance, MANAFORT wrote Yanukovych a memorandum dated April 8, 2012, in which he provided Yanukovych an update on the lobbying firms’ activities “since the inception of the project a few weeks ago. It is my intention to provide you with a weekly update moving forward.” Toward the end of that first year, in November 2012, Gates wrote to Company A and Company B that the firms needed to prepare an assessment of their past and prospective lobbying efforts so the “President” could be briefed by “Paul” “on what Ukraine has done well and what it can do better as we move into 2013.”

23. At the direction of MANAFORT and Gates, Company A and Company B engaged in extensive lobbying. Among other things, they lobbied multiple Members of Congress and their staffs about Ukraine sanctions, the validity of Ukraine elections, and the propriety of Yanukovych’s imprisoning his presidential rival, Yulia Tymoshenko. In addition, with the assistance of Company A, MANAFORT directly lobbied a Member of Congress who had Ukraine within his subcommittee’s purview, and reported in writing that lobbying effort to senior Government of Ukraine leadership.

24. To minimize public disclosure of their lobbying campaign and distance their work from the Government of Ukraine, MANAFORT, Gates, and others arranged for the Centre to be the nominal client of Company A and Company B, even though in fact the Centre was under the ultimate direction of the Government of Ukraine, Yanukovych, and the Party of Regions. For instance, MANAFORT and Gates selected Company A and Company B, and only thereafter did the Centre sign contracts with the lobbying firms without ever meeting either company. Company A and Company B were paid for their services not by their nominal client, the Centre, but solely through offshore accounts associated with the MANAFORT entities, namely Bletilla Ventures Limited (in Cyprus) and Jeunet Ltd. and Global Endeavour Inc. (in Grenadines). In total, Company A and Company B were paid more than $2 million from these accounts between 2012 and 2014. Indeed, various employees of Company A and Company B viewed the Centre as a fig leaf. As a Company A employee noted to another employee: Gates was lobbying for the Centre “in name only. [Y]ou’ve gotta see through the nonsense of that[.]”

25. Neither Company A nor Company B registered as required with the United States Department of Justice. In order to avoid such registration, Gates provided the companies a false and misleading signed statement from the Centre, stating that it was not “directly or indirectly supervised, directed, controlled, financed, or subsidized in whole or in part by a government of a foreign country or a foreign political party.” In fact, the Centre took direction from Yanukovych and the Party of Regions, as MANAFORT and Gates knew. 26. To conceal the scheme, MANAFORT and Gates developed a false and misleading cover story that would distance themselves and the Government of Ukraine, Yanukovych, and the Party of Regions from the Centre, Company A, and Company B. For instance, in the wake of extensive press reports on MANAFORT and his connections with Ukraine, on August 16, 2016, Gates communicated false and misleading talking points to Company B in writing, including:

• Q: “Can you describe your initial contact with [Company B] and the lobbying goals he discussed with them?” A: “We provided an introduction between the [Centre] and [Company B/Company A] in 2012. The [Centre] was seeking to retain representation in Washington, DC to support the mission of the NGO.”

• A: “Our [MANAFORT and Gates’] task was to assist the [Centre to] find representation in Washington, but at no time did our firm or members provide any direct lobbying support.”

• A: “The structure of the arrangement between the [Centre] and [Company A / Company B] was worked out by the two parties.”

• Q: “Can you say where the funding from for [sic] the [Centre] came from? (this amounted to well over a million dollars between 2012 and 2014).” A: “This is a question better asked of the [Centre] who contracted with the two firms.”

• Q: “Can you describe the lobbying work specifically undertaken by [Company B] on behalf of the Party of Regions/the [Centre]?” A: “This is a question better asked to [Company B] and/or the [Centre] as the agreement was between the parties. Our firm did not play a role in the structure, nor were we registered lobbyists.” Company B through a principal replied to Gates the same day that “there’s a lot of email traffic that has you much more involved than this suggests[.] We will not disclose that but heaven knows what former employees of [Company B] or [Company A] might say.”

27. In September 2016, after numerous recent press reports concerning MANAFORT, the Department of Justice informed MANAFORT, Gates, and DMI that it sought to determine whether they had acted as agents of a foreign principal under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA), without registering. In November 2016 and February 2017, MANAFORT, Gates, and DMI caused false and misleading letters to be submitted to the Department of Justice, which mirrored the false cover story set out above. The letters, both of which were approved by MANAFORT and Gates before they were submitted, represented, among other things, that:

• DMI’s “efforts on behalf of the Party of Regions” “did not include meetings or outreach within the U.S.”;

• MANAFORT and Gates did not “recall meeting with or conducting outreach to U.S. government officials or U.S. media outlets on behalf of the [Centre], nor do they recall being party to, arranging, or facilitating any such communications. Rather, it is the recollection and understanding of Messrs. Gates and Manafort that such communications would have been facilitated and conducted by the [Centre’s] U.S. consultants, as directed by the [Centre]. . . .”;

• MANAFORT and Gates had merely served as a means of introduction of Company A and Company B to the Centre and provided the Centre with a list of “potential U.S.-based consultants—including [Company A] and [Company B]—for the [Centre’s] reference and further consideration.”

• DMI “does not retain communications beyond thirty days” and as a result of this policy, a “search has returned no responsive documents.” The November 2016 letter attached a one-page, undated document that purported to be a DMI “Email Retention Policy.”

28. In fact, MANAFORT and Gates had: selected Company A and Company B; engaged in weekly scheduled calls and frequent e-mails with Company A and Company B to provide them directions as to specific lobbying steps that should be taken; sought and received detailed oral and written reports from these firms on the lobbying work they had performed; communicated with Yanukovych to brief him on their lobbying efforts; both congratulated and reprimanded Company A and Company B on their lobbying work; communicated directly with United States officials in connection with this work; and paid the lobbying firms over $2 million from offshore accounts they controlled, among other things. In addition, court-authorized searches of MANAFORT and Gates’ DMI email accounts in 2017 and a search of MANAFORT’s Virginia residence in July 2017 revealed numerous documents, including documents related to lobbying, which were more than thirty-days old at the time of the November 2016 letter to the Department of Justice.

29. As a second part of the lobbying scheme, in 2012, MANAFORT, with the assistance of Gates, on behalf of Yanukovych and the Government of Ukraine’s Ministry of Justice, retained a United States law firm to write a report on the trial of Tymoshenko, among other things. The treatment of Tymoshenko was condemned by the United States and was viewed as a major hurdle to normalization of relations with Ukraine. MANAFORT and Gates used one of their offshore accounts to funnel $4 million to pay for the report, a fact that was not disclosed in the report or to the public. They also retained a public relations firm (Company C) to create and implement a rollout plan for the report. MANAFORT and Gates again secretly used one of their offshore accounts to pay Company C, funneling the equivalent of more than $1 million to pay for the work. MANAFORT, Gates, and their conspirators developed detailed written lobbying plans in connection with the dissemination of the law firm’s report, including outreach to United States politicians and press. MANAFORT reported on the law firm’s work and the lobbying plan to representatives of the Government of Ukraine, including President Yanukovych. For instance, a July 27, 2012, memorandum from MANAFORT noted: “[t]his document will address the global rollout strategy for the [law firm’s] legal report, and provide a detailed plan of action[].” The plans included lobbying in the United States.

30. As a third part of the lobbying scheme, in or about 2012, MANAFORT, with the assistance of Gates and KILIMNIK, on behalf of Yanukovych and the Party of Regions, secretly retained a group of former senior European politicians to take positions favorable to Ukraine, including by lobbying in the United States. The plan was for the former politicians, informally called the “Hapsburg group,” to appear to be providing their independent assessments of Government of Ukraine actions, when in fact they were paid lobbyists for Ukraine. In 2012 and 2013, MANAFORT used at least four offshore accounts to wire more than 2 million euros to pay the group of former politicians.

31. MANAFORT explained in an “EYES ONLY” memorandum created in or about June 2012 that the purpose of the “SUPER VIP” effort would be to “assemble a small group of high-level European highly influencial [sic] champions and politically credible friends who can act informally and without any visible relationship with the Government of Ukraine.” Yanukovych and the Party of Regions through MANAFORT retained an additional group of lobbyists (Company D and Persons D1 and D2, among others) to serve as intermediaries with the Hapsburg group and to engage in other lobbying for Ukraine. The Hapsburg group was led by a former European Chancellor, Foreign Politician A, who coordinated with MANAFORT, KILIMNIK, and Person D1. As explained by MANAFORT, a nongovernmental agency would be created to retain this group, but it would act “at our quiet direction.” In or about 2013, Foreign Politician A and other former politicians from the group lobbied United States Members of Congress, officials in the Executive Branch, and their staffs in coordination with MANAFORT, Gates, KILIMNIK, Persons D1 and D2, Company A, and Company B, among others. MANAFORT’s Hiding Foreign Bank Accounts And False Filings

32. United States citizens who have authority over certain foreign bank accounts—whether or not the accounts are set up in the names of nominees who act for their principals—have reporting obligations to the United States.

33. First, the Bank Secrecy Act and its implementing regulations require United States citizens to report to the Treasury any financial interest in, or signatory authority over, any bank account or other financial account held in foreign countries, for every calendar year in which the aggregate balance of all such foreign accounts exceeds $10,000 at any point during the year. This is commonly known as a foreign bank account report or “FBAR.” The Bank Secrecy Act requires these reports because they have a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory investigations or proceedings. The Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) is the custodian for FBAR filings, and FinCEN provides access to its FBAR database to law enforcement entities, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The reports filed by individuals and businesses are used by law enforcement to identify, detect, and deter money laundering that furthers criminal enterprise activity, tax evasion, and other unlawful activities.

34. Second, United States citizens are also obligated to report information to the IRS regarding foreign bank accounts. For instance, in 2010, Schedule B of IRS Form 1040 had a “Yes” or “No” box to record an answer to the question: “At any time during [the calendar year], did you have an interest in or a signature or other authority over a financial account in a foreign country, such as a bank account, securities account, or other financial account?” If the answer was “Yes,” then the form required the taxpayer to enter the name of the foreign country in which the financial account was located.

35. For each year in or about and between 2008 through at least 2014, MANAFORT had authority over foreign accounts that required an FBAR filing. Specifically, MANAFORT was required to report to the Treasury each foreign bank account held by the foreign MANAFORT entities noted above in paragraph 11 that bears the initials PM. No FBAR reports were made by MANAFORT for these accounts.

36. In each of MANAFORT’s tax filings for 2008 through 2014, MANAFORT, with the assistance of Gates, represented falsely that he did not have authority over any foreign bank accounts. MANAFORT and Gates had repeatedly and falsely represented in writing to MANAFORT’s tax preparer that MANAFORT had no authority over foreign bank accounts, knowing that such false representations would result in false tax filings in MANAFORT’s name. For instance, on October 4, 2011, MANAFORT’s tax preparer asked MANAFORT in writing: “At any time during 2010, did you [or your wife or children] have an interest in or a signature or other authority over a financial account in a foreign country, such as a bank account, securities account or other financial account?” On the same day, MANAFORT falsely responded “NO.” MANAFORT responded the same way as recently as October 3, 2016, when MANAFORT’s tax preparer again emailed the question in connection with the preparation of MANAFORT’s tax returns: “Foreign bank accounts etc.?” MANAFORT responded on or about the same day: “NONE.”

Statutory Allegations

COUNT ONE
(Conspiracy Against The United States)

37. Paragraphs 1 through 36 are incorporated here.

38. From in or about and between 2006 and 2017, both dates being approximate and inclusive, in the District of Columbia and elsewhere, the defendant PAUL J. MANAFORT, JR., together with others, knowingly and intentionally conspired to defraud the United States by impeding, impairing, obstructing, and defeating the lawful governmental functions of a government agency, namely the Department of Justice and the Treasury, and to commit offenses against the United States, to wit: the violations of law charged in Counts Three, Four, and Five, and to unlawfully, willfully, and knowingly fail to file with the Treasury an FBAR disclosing a financial interest in, and signature and other authority over, a bank, securities, and other financial account in a foreign country, which had an aggregate value of more than $10,000 in a 12-month period, in violation of 31 U.S.C. §§ 5314 and 5322(a).

39. In furtherance of the conspiracy and to effect its illegal object, MANAFORT and his conspirators committed the overt acts noted in Count Four and the overt acts, among others, in the District of Columbia and elsewhere, set forth in paragraphs 8–11,14–18, 20–31, and 35–36, which are incorporated herein.

(18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 3551 et seq.)

COUNT TWO
(Conspiracy To Launder Money)

40. Paragraphs 1 through 36 are incorporated here.

41. In or around and between 2006 and 2016, both dates being approximate and inclusive, within the District of Columbia and elsewhere, the defendant PAUL J. MANAFORT, JR., together with others, did knowingly and intentionally conspire to:

(a) transport, transmit, and transfer monetary instruments and funds from places outside the United States to and through places in the United States and from places in the United States to and through places outside the United States, with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity, to wit: a felony violation of FARA, in violation of Title 22, United States Code, Sections 612 and 618 (the “Specified Unlawful Activity”), contrary to Title 18, United States Code, Section 1956(a)(2)(A); and

(b) conduct financial transactions, affecting interstate and foreign commerce, knowing that the property involved in the financial transactions would represent the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, and the transactions in fact would involve the proceeds of the Specified Unlawful Activity, knowing that such financial transactions were designed in whole and in part (i) to engage in conduct constituting a violation of sections 7201 and 7206 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, and (ii) to conceal and disguise the nature, location, source, ownership, and control of the proceeds of the Specified Unlawful Activity, contrary to Title 18, United States Code, Section 1956(a)(1)(A)(ii) and 1956(a)(1)(B)(i).

(18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(h) and 3551 et seq.)

COUNT THREE
(Unregistered Agent Of A Foreign Principal)

42. Paragraphs 1 through 36 are incorporated here.

43. From in or about and between 2008 and 2014, both dates being approximate and inclusive, within the District of Columbia and elsewhere, the defendant PAUL J. MANAFORT, JR., knowingly and willfully acted as an agent of a foreign principal, and caused and aided and abetted Companies A, B, and C, and others, including former senior foreign politicians, to act as agents of a foreign principal, to wit, the Government of Ukraine, the Party of Regions, and Yanukovych, without registering with the Attorney General as required by law.

(22 U.S.C. §§ 612 and 618(a)(1); 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 3551 et seq.)

COUNT FOUR
(False and Misleading FARA Statements)

44. Paragraphs 1 through 36 are incorporated here.

45. On or about November 23, 2016, and February 10, 2017, within the District of Columbia and elsewhere, the defendant PAUL J. MANAFORT, JR., knowingly and willfully caused to be made a false statement of a material fact, and omitted a material fact necessary to make the statements therein not misleading, in a document filed with and furnished to the Attorney General under the provisions of FARA, to wit, the underlined statements:

• “[DMI]’s efforts on behalf of the Party of Regions and Opposition Bloc did not include meetings or outreach within the U.S.”

• “[N]either [DMI] nor Messrs. Manafort or Gates had any agreement with the [Centre] to provide services.”

• “[DMI] did provide the [Centre], at the request of members of the Party of Regions, with a list of potential U.S.-based consultants—including [Company A and Company B]—for the [Centre]’s reference and further consideration. [The Centre] then contracted directly with [Company A and Company B] to provide services within the United States for which these entities registered under the Lobbying Disclosure Act.”

• “Although Gates recalls interacting with [the Centre]’s consultants regarding efforts in the Ukraine and Europe, neither Gates nor Mr. Manafort recall meeting with or conducting outreach to U.S. government officials or U.S. media outlets on behalf of the [the Centre], nor do they recall being party to, arranging, or facilitating any such communications. Rather, it is the recollection and understanding of Messrs. Gates and Manafort that such communications would have been facilitated and conducted by the [Centre]’s U.S. consultants, as directed by the [Centre], pursuant to the agreement reached between those parties (to which [DMI] was not a party).”

• “[A] search has been conducted for correspondence containing additional information related to the matters described in [the government’s] Letters. However, as a result of [DMI’s] Email Retention Policy, which does not retain communications beyond thirty days, the search has returned no responsive communications.”

(22 U.S.C. §§ 612 and 618(a)(2); 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 3551 et seq.)

COUNT FIVE
(False Statements)

46. Paragraphs 1 through 36 and paragraph 45 are incorporated here.

47. On or about November 23, 2016, and February 10, 2017, within the District of Columbia and elsewhere, in a matter within the jurisdiction of the executive branch of the Government of the United States, the defendant PAUL J. MANAFORT, JR., knowingly and willfully did cause another: to falsify, conceal, and cover up by a scheme and device a material fact; to make a materially false, fictitious, and fraudulent statement and representation; and to make and use a false writing and document knowing the same to contain a materially false, fictitious, and fraudulent statement, to wit, the statements in the November 23, 2016, and February 10, 2017, submissions to the Department of Justice quoted in paragraph 45.

(18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1001(a), and 3551 et seq.)

COUNT SIX
(Obstruction Of Justice)

48. Paragraphs 1 through 36 are incorporated here.

49. From in or about and between February 23, 2018, and April 2018, both dates being approximate and inclusive, within the District of Columbia and elsewhere, the defendants PAUL J. MANAFORT, JR., and KONSTANTIN KILIMNIK knowingly and intentionally attempted to corruptly persuade another person, to wit: Persons D1 and D2, with intent to influence, delay, and prevent the testimony of any person in an official proceeding.

(18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1512(b)(1), and 3551 et seq.)

COUNT SEVEN
(Conspiracy to Obstruct Justice)

50. Paragraphs 1 through 36 are incorporated here. 51. From in or about and between February 23, 2018, and April 2018, both dates being approximate and inclusive, within the District of Columbia and elsewhere, the defendants PAUL J. MANAFORT, JR., and KONSTANTIN KILIMNIK knowingly and intentionally conspired to corruptly persuade another person, to wit: Persons D1 and D2, with intent to influence, delay, and prevent the testimony of any person in an official proceeding, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(1). (18 U.S.C. §§ 1512(k) and 3551 et seq.)

FORFEITURE ALLEGATION

52. Pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2, notice is hereby given to the defendants that the United States will seek forfeiture as part of any sentence in accordance with Title 18, United States Code, Sections 981(a)(1)(C) and 982(a)(1), and Title 28, United States Code, Section 2461(c), in the event of the defendants’ conviction. Upon conviction of the offense charged in Count Two, the defendant PAUL J. MANAFORT, JR., shall forfeit to the United States any property, real or personal, involved in such offense, and any property traceable to such property. Upon conviction of the offenses charged in Counts One, Three, Four, Six, and Seven, the defendants PAUL J. MANAFORT, JR., and KONSTANTIN KILIMNIK (as to Counts Six and Seven) shall forfeit to the United States any property, real or personal, which constitutes or is derived from proceeds traceable to the offense(s) of conviction. Notice is further given that, upon conviction, the United States intends to seek a judgment against the defendants for a sum of money representing the property described in this paragraph (to be offset by the forfeiture of any specific property).

53. The grand jury finds probable cause to believe that the property subject to forfeiture by PAUL J. MANAFORT, JR., includes, but is not limited to, the following listed assets:

a. The real property and premises commonly known as 377 Union Street, Brooklyn, New York 11231 (Block 429, Lot 65), including all appurtenances, improvements, and attachments thereon, and any property traceable thereto;

b. The real property and premises commonly known as 29 Howard Street, #4D, New York, New York 10013 (Block 209, Lot 1104), including all appurtenances, improvements, and attachments thereon, and any property traceable thereto;

c. The real property and premises commonly known as 1046 N. Edgewood Street, Arlington, Virginia 22201, including all appurtenances, improvements, and attachments thereon, and any property traceable thereto;

d. The real property and premises commonly known as 174 Jobs Lane, Water Mill, New York 11976, including all appurtenances, improvements, and attachments thereon, and any property traceable thereto;

e. Northwestern Mutual Universal Life Insurance Policy 18268327, and any property traceable thereto;

f. All funds held in account number XXXX7988 at Charles A. Schwab & Co. Inc., and any property traceable thereto; and

g. All funds held in account number XXXXXX0969 at The Federal Savings Bank, and any property traceable thereto.

Substitute Assets

54. If any of the property described above as being subject to forfeiture, as a result of any act or omission of the defendants

a. cannot be located upon the exercise of due diligence;

b. has been transferred or sold to, or deposited with, a third party;

c. has been placed beyond the jurisdiction of the court;

d. has been substantially diminished in value; or

e. has been commingled with other property that cannot be subdivided without difficulty;

it is the intent of the United States of America, pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 982(b) and Title 28, United States Code, Section 2461(c), incorporating Title 21 United States Code, Section 853, to seek forfeiture of any other property of said defendants.

Robert S. Mueller, III
Special Counsel
Department of Justice

U.S. v. Richard Gates

Superseding criminal information in the case against Richard Gates

The Special Counsel informs the Court:

1. RICHARD W. GATES III (GATES) served for years as a political consultant and lobbyist. Between at least 2006 and 2015, GATES and Paul J. Manafort, Jr. (Manafort) acted as unregistered agents of the Government of Ukraine, the Party of Regions (a Ukrainian political party whose leader Victor Yanukovych was President from 2010 to 2014), Yanukovych, and the Opposition Bloc (a successor to the Party of Regions that formed in 2014 when Yanukovych fled to Russia). Manafort and GATES generated tens ofmillions ofdollars in income as a result 0ftheir Ukraine work In order to hide Ukraine payments from United States authorities, from approximately 2006 through at least 2016, Manafort and GATES laundered the money through scores ofUnited States and foreign corporations, partnerships, and bank accounts.

2. In furtherance of the scheme. Manafort and GATES funneled mi11ions 0f do1lars in payments into foreign nominee companies and bank accounts, opened by them and their accomplices in nominee names and in various foreign countries, including Cyprus, Saint Vincent & the Grenadines (Grenadines), and the Seychelles Manafort and GATES hid the existence of the foreign companies and bank accounts, falsely and repeatedly reporting to their tax preparers and to the United States that they had no foreign bank accounts.

3. In furtherance ofthe scheme, Manafort and GATES concealed from the United States their work as agents 01‘, and millions ofdollars in payments from, Ukraine and its political parties and leaders. Because Manafort and GATES, among other things, directed a campaign to lobby United States officials on behalfofthe Government okaraine, the President of Ukraine, and Ukrainian political parties, they were required by law to report to the United States their work and fees. Manafort and GATES did not do so. Instead, when the Department of Justice sent inquiries to Manafort and GATES in 2016 about their activities, Manafon and GATES responded with a series of false and misleading statements.

4. In furtherance of the scheme, Manafort used his hidden overseas wealth to enjoy a lavish lifestyle in the United States, without paying taxes on that income. Manafort, without reporting the income to his tax preparer or the United States, spent millions ofdollars on luxury goods and services for himself and his extended family through payments wired from offshore nominee accounts to United States vendors. Manafort also used these offshore accounts to purchase multi- million dollar properties in the United States. Manafort then borrowed millions ofdollars in loans using these properties as collateral, thereby obtaining cash in the United States without reporting and paying taxes on the income. In order to increase the amount ofmoney he could access in the United States, Manafort defrauded the institutions that loaned money on these properties so that they would lend him more money at more favorable rates than he would otherwise be able to obtain.

5. GATES aided Manafort in obtaining money from these offshore accounts, which he was instrumental in opening. Like Manafort, GATES used money from these offshore accounts to pay for his personal expenses, including his mortgage, children’s tuition, and interior decorating ofhis Virginia residence.

6. In total, more than $75,000,000 flowed through the offshore accounts. Manafort laundered more than $18,000,000, which was used by him to buy property, goods, and services in the United States, income that he concealed from the United States Treasury, the Department of J ustice, and others. GATES transferred more than $3,000,000 from the offshore accounts to other accounts that he controlled.

Relevant Individuals And Entities

7. Manafort was a United States citizen. He resided in homes in Virginia, Florida, and Long Island, New York.

8. GATES was a United States citizen. He resided in Virginia.

9. In 2005, Manafort and another partner created Davis Manafort Partners, Inc. (DMP) to engage principally in political consulting. DMP had staff in the United States, Ukraine, and Russia. In 201 l, Manafort created DMP International, LLC (DMI) to engage in work for foreign clients, in patticular political consulting, lobbying, and public relations for the Govemment of Ukraine, the Party ofRegions, and members ofthe Party ofRegions. DMl was a partnership solely owned by Manafort and his spouse. GATES worked for both DMP and DM1 and served as Manafort‘s right—hand man.

10. The Party of Regions was a pro-Russia political party in Ukraine. Beginning in approximately 2006, it retained Manafort, through DMP and then DMI, to advance its interests in Ukraine, including the election of its slate of candidates. In 2010, its candidate for President, Yanukovych, was elected President of Ukraine. In 2014, Yanukovyeh fled Ukraine for Russia in the wake of popular protests of widespread governmental corruption. Yanukovych, the Party of Regions, and the Government of Ukraine were Manafort, DMP, and DM1 clients.

11. The European Centre for a Modern Ukraine (the Centre) was created in or about 2012 in Belgium as a mouthpiece for Yanukovych and the Party of Regions. The Centre was used by Manafort, GATES, and others in order to lobby and conduct a public relations campaign in the United States and Europe on behalt‘ofthe existing Ukraine regime. The Centre effectively ceased to operate upon the downfall of Yanukovych in 2014.

12. Manafort and GATES owned or controlled the following entities, which were used in the scheme (the Manafort-GATES entities):

Domestic Entities
Entity NameDate CreatedIncorporation Location
Daisy Manafort, LLC (PM)August 2008Virginia
March 2011Florida
Davis Manafort International LLC (PM)March 2007Delaware
DMP (PM)March 2005Virginia
March 2011Florida
Davis Manafort, Inc. (PM)October 1999Delaware
November 1999Virginia
DMI (PM)June 2011Delaware
March 2012Florida
Global Sites LLC (PM, RG)July 2008Delaware
Jesand Investment Corporation (PM)April 2002Virginia
Jesand Investments Corporation (PM)March 2011Florida
John Hannah, LLC (PM)April 2006Virginia
March 2011Florida
Lilred, LLC (PM)December 2011Florida
LOAV Ltd. (PM)April 1992Delaware
MC Brooklyn Holdings, LLC (PM)November 2012New York
MC Soho Holdings, LLC (PM)January 2012Florida
April 2012New York
Smythson LLC (also known as Symthson LLC) (PM, RG)July 2008Delaware
Cypriot Entities
Entity NameDate CreatedIncorporation Location
Actinet Trading Limited (PM, RG)May 2009Cyprus
Black Sea View Limited (PM, RG)August 2007Cyprus
Bletilla Ventures Limited (PM, RG)October 2010Cyprus
Global Highway Limited (PM, RG)August 2007Cyprus
Leviathan Advisors Limited (PM, RG)August 2007Cyprus
LOAV Advisors Limited (PM, RG)August 2007Cyprus
Lucicle Consultants Limited (PM, RG)December 2008Cyprus
Marziola Holdings Limited (PM)March 2012Cyprus
Olivenia Trading Limited (PM, RG)March 2012Cyprus
Peranova Holdings Limited (Peranova) (PM, RG)June 2007Cyprus
Serangon Holdings Limited (PM, RG)January 2008Cyprus
Yiakora Ventures Limited (PM)February 2008Cyprus
Other Foreign Entities
Entity NameDate CreatedIncorporation Location
Global Endeavour Inc. (also known as Global Endeavor Inc.) (PM)UnknownGrenadines
Jeunet Ltd. (PM)August 2011Grenadines
Pompolo Limited (PM, RG)April 2013United Kingdom

13. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) was a bureau in the United States Department ofthe Treasury responsible for administering the tax laws ofthe United States and collecting taxes owed to the Treasury.

The Scheme

14. Between in or around 2008 and 2017, both dates being approximate and inclusive, in the District of Columbia and elsewhere, Manafort and GATES devised and intended to devise, and executed and attempted to execute, a scheme and artifice to defraud, and to obtain money and property by means oft‘alse and fraudulent pretenses, representations, and promises from the United States, banks, and other financial institutions. As part of the scheme, Manafort and GATES repeatedly provided false information to financial bookkeepers, tax accountants, and legal counsel, among others.

Manafort And GATES’ Wiring OfMoney From Offshore Accounts Into The United States

15. In order to use the money in the offshore nominee accounts of the Manafort-GATES entities without paying taxes on it, Manafort and GATES caused millions ofdollars in wire transfers from these accounts to be made for goods, services, and real estate. They did not report these transfers as income to DMP, DMI, or Manafort.

16. From 2008 to 2014, Manafort caused the following wires, totaling over $12,000,000, to be sent to the vendors listed below for personal items. Manafort did not pay taxes on this income, which was used to make the purchases.

PayeeTransaction DateOriginating Account HolderCountry of OriginationAmount of Transaction
Vendor A (Home Improvement Company in the Hamptons, New York)6/10/2008LOAV Advisors LimitedCyprus$107,000
6/25/2008LOAV Advisors LimitedCyprus$23,500
7/7/2008LOAV Advisors LimitedCyprus$20,000
8/5/2008Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$59,000
9/2/2008Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$272,000
10/6/2008Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$109,000
10/24/2008Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$107,800
11/20/2008Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$77,400
12/22/2008Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$100,000
1/14/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$9,250
1/29/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$97,670
2/25/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$108,100
4/16/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$94,394
5/7/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$54,000
5/12/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$9,550
6/1/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$86,650
6/18/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$34,400
7/31/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$106,000
8/28/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$37,000
9/23/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$203,500
10/26/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$38,800
11/18/2009Global Highway LimitedCyprus$130,906
3/8/2010Global Highway LimitedCyprus$124,000
5/11/2010Global Highway LimitedCyprus$25,000
7/8/2010Global Highway LimitedCyprus$28,000
7/23/2010Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$26,500
8/12/2010Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$138,900
9/2/2010Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$31,500
10/6/2010Global Highway LimitedCyprus$67,600
10/14/2010Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$107,600
10/18/2010Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$31,500
12/16/2010Global Highway LimitedCyprus$46,160
2/7/2011Global Highway LimitedCyprus$36,500
3/22/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$26,800
4/4/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$195,000
5/3/2011Global Highway LimitedCyprus$95,000
5/16/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$6,500
5/31/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$70,000
6/27/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$39,900
7/27/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$95,000
10/24/2011Global Highway LimitedCyprus$22,000
10/25/2011Global Highway LimitedCyprus$9,300
11/15/2011Global Highway LimitedCyprus$74,000
11/23/2011Global Highway LimitedCyprus$22,300
11/29/2011Global Highway LimitedCyprus$6,100
12/12/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$17,800
1/17/2012Global Highway LimitedCyprus$29,800
1/20/2012Global Highway LimitedCyprus$42,600
2/9/2012Global Highway LimitedCyprus$22,300
2/23/2012Global Highway LimitedCyprus$75,000
2/28/2012Global Highway LimitedCyprus$22,300
3/28/2012PeranovaCyprus$37,500
4/18/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$50,000
5/15/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$79,000
6/5/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$45,000
6/19/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$11,860
7/9/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$10,800
7/18/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$88,000
8/7/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$48,800
9/27/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$100,000
11/20/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$298,000
12/20/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$55,000
1/29/2013Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$149,000
3/12/2013Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$375,000
8/29/2013Global Endeavour Inc.Grenadines$200,000
11/13/2013Global Endeavour Inc.Grenadines$75,000
11/26/2013Global Endeavour Inc.Grenadines$80,000
12/6/2013Global Endeavour Inc.Grenadines$130,000
12/12/2013Global Endeavour Inc.Grenadines$90,000
4/22/2014Global Endeavour Inc.Grenadines$56,293
8/18/2014Global Endeavour Inc.Grenadines$34,660
Vendor A Total$5,434,793
Vendor B (Home Automation, Lighting, and Home Entertainment Company in Florida)3/22/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$12,000
3/28/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$25,000
4/27/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$12,000
5/16/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$25,000
11/15/2011Global Highway LimitedCyprus$17,006
11/23/2011Global Highway LimitedCyprus$11,000
2/28/2012Global Highway LimitedCyprus$6,200
10/31/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$290,000
12/17/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$160,600
1/15/2013Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$194,000
1/24/2013Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$6,300
2/12/2013Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$51,600
2/26/2013Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$260,000
7/15/2013Pompolo Limited"United Kingdom"$175,575
11/5/2013Global Endeavour Inc.Grenadines$73,000
Vendor B Total$1,319,281
Vendor C (Antique Rug Store in Alexandria, Virginia)10/7/2008Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$15,750
3/17/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$46,200
4/16/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$7,400
4/27/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$65,000
5/7/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$210,000
7/15/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$200,000
3/31/2010Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$140,000
6/16/2010Global Highway LimitedCyprus$250,000
Vendor C Total$934,350
Vendor D (Related to Vendor C)2/28/2012Global Highway LimitedCyprus$100,000
Vendor D Total$100,000
Vendor E (Men's Clothing Store in New York)11/7/2008Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$32,000
2/5/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$22,750
4/27/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$13,500
10/26/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$32,500
3/30/2010Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$15,000
5/11/2010Global Highway LimitedCyprus$39,000
6/28/2010Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$5,000
8/12/2010Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$32,500
11/17/2010Global Highway LimitedCyprus$11,500
2/7/2011Global Highway LimitedCyprus$24,000
3/22/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$43,600
3/28/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$12,000
4/27/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$3,000
6/30/2011Global Highway LimitedCyprus$24,500
9/26/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$12,000
11/2/2011Global Highway LimitedCyprus$26,700
12/12/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$46,000
2/9/2012Global Highway LimitedCyprus$2,800
2/28/2012Global Highway LimitedCyprus$16,000
3/14/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$8,000
4/18/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$48,550
5/15/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$7,000
6/19/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$21,600
8/7/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$15,500
11/20/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$10,900
12/20/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$7,500
1/15/2013Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$37,000
2/12/2013Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$7,000
2/26/2013Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$39,000
9/3/2013Global Endeavour Inc.Grenadines$81,500
10/15/2013Global Endeavour Inc.Grenadines$53,000
11/26/2013Global Endeavour Inc.Grenadines$13,200
4/24/2014Global Endeavour Inc.Grenadines$26,680
9/11/2014Global Endeavour Inc.Grenadines$58,435
Vendor E Total$849,215
Vendor F (Landscaper in the Hamptons, New York)4/27/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$34,000
5/12/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$45,700
6/1/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$21,500
6/18/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$29,000
9/21/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$21,800
5/11/2010Global Highway LimitedCyprus$44,000
6/28/2010Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$50,000
7/23/2010Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$19,000
9/2/2010Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$21,000
10/6/2010Global Highway LimitedCyprus$57,700
10/18/2010Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$26,000
12/16/2010Global Highway LimitedCyprus$20,000
3/22/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$50,000
5/3/2011Global Highway LimitedCyprus$40,000
6/1/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$44,000
7/27/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$27,000
8/16/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$13,450
9/19/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$12,000
10/24/2011Global Highway LimitedCyprus$42,000
11/2/2011Global Highway LimitedCyprus$37,350
Vendor F Total$655,500
Vendor G (Antique Dealer in New York)9/2/2010Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$165,000
10/18/2010Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$165,000
2/28/2012Global Highway LimitedCyprus$190,600
3/14/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$75,000
2/26/2013Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$28,310
Vendor G Total$623,910
Vendor H (Clothing Store in Beverly Hills, California)6/25/2008LOAV Advisors LimitedCyprus$52,000
12/16/2008Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$49,000
12/22/2008Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$10,260
8/12/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$76,400
5/11/2010Global Highway LimitedCyprus$85,000
11/17/2010Global Highway LimitedCyprus$128,280
5/31/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$64,000
11/15/2011Global Highway LimitedCyprus$48,000
12/17/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$7,500
Vendor H Total$520,440
Vendor I (Investment Company)9/3/2013Global Endeavour Inc.Grenadines$500,000
Vendor I Total$500,000
Vendor J (Contractor in Florida)11/15/2011Global Highway LimitedCyprus$8,000
12/5/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$11,237
12/21/2011Black Sea View LimitedCyprus$20,000
2/9/2012Global Highway LimitedCyprus$51,000
5/17/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$68,000
6/19/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$60,000
7/18/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$32,250
9/19/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$112,000
11/30/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$39,700
1/9/2013Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$25,600
2/28/2013Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$4,700
Vendor J Total$432,487
Vendor K (Landscaper in the Hamptons, New York)12/5/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$4,115
3/1/2012Global Highway LimitedCyprus$50,000
6/6/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$47,800
6/25/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$17,900
6/27/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$18,900
2/12/2013Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$3,300
7/15/2013Pompolo LimitedUnited Kingdom$13,325
11/26/2013Global Endeavour Inc.Grenadines$9,400
Vendor K Total$164,740
Vendor L (Payments Relating to Three Range Rovers)4/12/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$83,525
5/2/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$12,525
6/29/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$67,655
Vendor L Total$163,705
Vendor M (Contractor in Virginia)11/20/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$45,000
12/7/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$21,000
12/17/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$21,000
1/17/2013Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$18,750
1/29/2013Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$9,400
2/12/2013Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$10,500
Vendor M Total$125,650
Vendor N (Audio, Video, and Control System Home Integration and Installation Company in the Hamptons, New York)1/29/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$10,000
3/17/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$21,725
4/16/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$24,650
12/2/2009Global Highway LimitedCyprus$10,000
3/8/2010Global Highway LimitedCyprus$20,300
4/23/2010Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$8,500
7/29/2010Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$17,650
Vendor N Total$112,825
Vendor O (Purchase of Mercedes Benz)10/5/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$62,750
Vendor O Total$62,750
"Vendor P (Purchase of Range Rover)"12/30/2008Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$47,000
Vendor P Total$47,000
Vendor Q (Property Management Company in South Carolina)9/2/2010Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$10,000
10/6/2010Global Highway LimitedCyprus$10,000
10/18/2010Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$10,000
2/8/2011Global Highway LimitedCyprus$13,500
2/9/2012Global Highway LimitedCyprus$2,500
Vendor Q Total$46,000
Vendor R (Art Gallery in Florida)2/9/2011Global Highway LimitedCyprus$17,900
2/14/2013Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$14,000
Vendor R Total$31,900
Vendor S (Housekeeping in New York)9/26/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$5,000
9/19/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$5,000
10/9/2013Global Endeavour Inc.Grenadines$10,000
Vendor S Total$20,000

17. In 2012, Manafort caused the following wires to be sent to the entities listed below to purchase the real estate also listed below. Manafort did not report the money used to make these purchases on his 2012 tax return.

Property PurchasedPayeeDateOriginating AccountCountry of OriginationAmount
Howard Street Condominium (New York)"DMP International LLC"2/1/2012PeranovaCyprus$1,500,000
Union Street Brownstone, (New York)Attorney Account Of [Real Estate Attorney]11/29/2012"Actinet Trading Limited"Cyprus$1,800,000
11/29/2012"Actinet Trading Limited"Cyprus$1,200,000
Arlington House (Virginia)Real Estate Trust8/31/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$1,900,000

Manafort And GATES’ Hiding Okaraine Lobbying And Public Relations Work

18. It is illegal to act as an agent ofa foreign principal engaged in certain United States influence activities without registering the affiliation. Specifically, a person who engages in lobbying or public relations work in the United States (hereafter collectively referred to as lobbying) for a foreign principal such as the Government okaraine or the Party ofRegions is required to provide a detailed written registration statement to the United States Department ofJustice. The filing, made under oath, must disclose the name ofthe foreign principal, the financial payments to the lobbyist, and the measures undertaken for the foreign principal, among other information. A person required to make such a filing must further make in all lobbying material a “conspicuous statement” that the materials are distributed on behalt'ofthe foreign principal, among other things. The filing thus permits public awareness and evaluation ofthe activities ofa lobbyist who acts as an agent ofa foreign power or foreign political party in the United States.

19. In furtherance of the scheme, From 2006 until 2014, both dates being approximate and inclusive, Manafort and GATES engaged in a multi-million dollar lobbying campaign in the United States at the direction of Yanukovych, the Party of Regions, and the Government of Ukraine. Manafort and GATES did so without registering and providing the disclosures required by law.

20. As part ofthe scheme, in February 2012, Manafort and GATES solicited two Washington. D.C., firms (Company A and Company B) to lobby in the United States on behalfonanukovych, the Party OIchions, and the Government of Ukraine. For instance, GATES wrote to Company A that it would be “representing the Government okaraine in [Washington,] DC.”

21. Manafort repeatedly communicated in person and in writing with Yanukovych, and GATES passed on directions to Company A and Company B. For instance, Manafort wrote Yanukovyeh a memorandum dated April 8, 2012, in which he provided Yanukovych an update on the lobbying firms’ activities “since the inception ofthe project a few weeks ago. It is my intention to provide you with a weekly update moving forward.” Toward the end ofthat first year, in November 2012, GATES wrote to Company A and Company B that the firms needed to prepare an assessment of their past and prospective lobbying efforts so the “President” could be briefed by “Paul” “on what Ukraine has done well and what it can do better as we move into 2013.”

22. At the direction of Manafort and GATES, Com pany A and Company B engaged in extensive lobbying. Among other things, they lobbied multiple Members ofCongress and their staffs about Ukraine sanctions, the validity of Ukraine elections, and the propriety of Yanukovych’s imprisoning his presidential rival, Yulia Tymoshenko (who had served as Ukraine President prior to Yanukovych). Manafort and GATES also lobbied in connection with the roll out ofa report concerning the Tymoshenko trial commissioned by the Government 01" Ukraine. Manafort and GATES used one oftheir offshore accounts to funnel $4 million to pay secretly for the report.

23. To minimize public disclosure oftheir lobbying campaign, Manafort and GATES arranged for the Centre to be the nominal client ofCompany A and Company B, even though in fact the Centre was under the ultimate direction ofthe Govemment okaraine, Yanukovych, and the Patty of Regions. For instance, Manafort and GATES selected Company A and Company B, and only thereafier did the Centre sign contracts with the lobbying firms without ever meeting either company. Company A and Company B were paid for their services not by their nominal client, the Centre, but solely through off—shore accounts associated with the Manafort—GATES entities, namely Bletilla Ventures Limited (in Cyprus) and Jeunet Ltd. and Global Endeavour 1nc. (in Grenadines). In total, Company A and Company B were paid more than $2 million from these accounts between 2012 and 2014.

  • 24. ’1‘0 conceal the scheme, Manafort and GATES developed a false and misleading cover story that would distance themselves and the Government of Ukraine, Yanukovych, and the Party of Regions from the Centre, Company A, and Company B. For instance, in the wake of extensive press reports on Manafort and his connections with Ukraine, on August 16, 2016, GATES communicated false talking points to Company B in writing, including:
  • Q: “Can you describe your initial contact with [Company B] and the lobbying goals he discussed with them?” A: “We provided an introduction between the [Centre] and [Company B/Company A] in 2012. The [Centre] was seeking to retain representation in Washington, DC to support the mission ofthe NGO.”
  • A: “Our [Manafort and GATES’] task was to assist the [Centre] find representation in Washington, but at no time did our firm or members provide any direct lobbying support.”
  • A: “The structure ofthe arrangement between the [Centre] and [Company A and Company B] was worked out by the two parties."
  • Q: “Can you say where the funding from for [sic] the [Centre] came from? (this amounted to well over a million dollars between 2012 and 2014).” A: “This is a question better asked of the [Centre] who contracted with the two firms.”
  • Q: “Can you describe the lobbying work specifically undertaken by [Company B] on behalfofthe Party ofRegions/the [Centre]?” A: “This is a question better asked to Company B and/or the [Centre] as the agreement was between the parties. Our firm did not play a role in the structure, nor were we registered lobbyists.”
  • Company B through a principal replied to GATES the same day that “there’s a lot ofemail traffic that has you much more involved than this suggests[.] We will not disclose that but heaven knows what former employees of [Company B] or [Company A] might say.”

    25. In September 2016, after numerous recent press reports concerning Manafort, the Department ofJustiee informed Manafon, GATES, and DM1 that it sought to determine whether they had acted as agents ofa foreign principal under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (PARA), without registering. In November 2016 and February 2017, Manafort, GATES, and DM1 caused false and misleading> letters to be submitted to the Department ofJustiee, which mirrored the false cover story set out above. The letters, both of which were approved by Manafort and GATES before they were submitted, represented, among other things, that:

    26. In fact, Manafort and GATES had: selected Company A and Company B; engaged in weekly scheduled calls and frequent emails with Company A and Company B to provide them directions as to specific lobbying steps that should be taken; sought and received detailed oral and written reports from these firms on the lobbying work they had perfomted; communicated with Yanukovych to briefhim on their lobbying efforts; both congratulated and reprimanded Company A and Company B on their lobbying work; communicated directly with United States officials in connection with this work; and paid the lobbying firms over $2 million from offshore accounts they controlled. among other things. In addition, court-authorized searches of Manafort and GATES‘ DMI email accounts and Manafort‘s Virginia residence in July 2017 revealed numerous documents, including documents related to lobbying, which were more than thirty—days old at the time ofthe November 2016 letter to the Department of Justice.

    Manafort And GATES‘ Hiding ()fForeign Bank Accounts And False Filings

    27. United States citizens who have authority over certain foreign bank accounts -- whether or not the accounts are set up in the names ofnominees who act for their principals -- have reporting obligations to the United States.

    28. First, the Bank Secrecy Act and its implementing regulations require United States Citizens to report to the United States Treasury any financial interest in, or signatory authority over, any bank account or other financial account held in foreign countries, for every calendar year in which the aggregate balance of all such foreign accounts exceeds $10,000 at any point during the year. This is commonly known as a foreign bank account report or “FBAR.” The Bank Secrecy Act requires these reports because they have a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory investigations or proceedings. The United States Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) is the custodian for FBAR filings, and FinCEN provides access to its FBAR database to law enforcement entities, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The reports filed by individuals and businesses are used by law enforcement to identify, detect, and deter money laundering that furthers criminal enterprise activity, tax evasion, and other unlawful activities.

    29. Second, United States citizens also are obligated to report information to the IRS regarding foreign bank accounts. For instance, in 2010 Form 1040, Schedule 13 had a “Yes” or “No” box to record an answer to the question: “At any time during> [the calendar year], did you have an interest in or a signature or other authority over a financial account in a foreign country, such as a bank account, securities account, or other financial account?" If the answer was “Yes," then the form required the taxpayer to enter the name 01‘ the Foreign country in which the financial account was located.

    30. For each year in or about and between 2008 through at least 2014, Manafott had authority over foreign accounts that required an FBAR report. Specifically, Manafort was required to report to the United States Treasury each foreign bank account held by the foreign Manafort-GATES entities noted above in paragraph 12 that bear the initials PM. No FBAR reports were made by Manafort for these accounts.

    31. For each year in or about and between 2008 through at least 2013, GATES had authority over foreign accounts that required an FBAR report. Specifically, GATES was required to repoll to the United States Treasury each foreign bank account held by the foreign Manafott-GATES entities noted above in paragraph 12 that bear the initials RG, as well as three other accounts in the United Kingdom. No FEAR reports were made by GATES for these accounts.

    32. Funhermore, in each ofManafort’s tax filings for 2008 through 2014, Manafort represented falsely that he did not have authority over any foreign bank accounts. Manafort and GATES had repeatedly and falsely represented in writing to Manafort’s tax preparer that Manafort had no authority over foreign bank accounts, knowing that such false representations would result in false Manafort tax filings. For instance, on October 4, 2011, Manafort’s tax preparer asked Manafort in writing: “At any time during 2010, did you [or your wife or children] have an interest in or a signature or other authority over a financial account in a foreign country, such as a bank account, securities account or other financial account?” On the same day, Manafort falsely responded "NO.” Manafort responded the same way as recently as October 3, 2016, when Manafort‘s tax preparer again emailed the question in connection with the preparation ol'Manal‘orts tax rctums: "Foreign bank accounts etc?" Manafort responded on or about the same day: “NONE." Manafort And GATES’ Fraud To Increase Access To Offshore Money

    33. After Manafort used his offshore accounts to purchase real estate in the United States. he took out mortgages on the properties thereby allowing Manafort to have the benefits of liquid income without paying taxes on it. Further, Manafort defrauded the banks that loaned him the money so that he could withdraw more money at a cheaper rate than he otherwise would have been permitted.

    34. In 2012, Manafort, through a corporate vehicle called “MC Soho Holdings, LLC” owned by him and his family, bought a condominium on Howard Street in the Soho neighborhood in Manhattan, New York. He paid approximately $2,850,000. All the money used to purchase the condominium came from Manafort entities in Cyprus. Manafort used the property from at least January 2015 through 2016 as an income-generating rental property, charging thousands of dollars a week on Airbnb, among other places. In his tax returns, Manafort took advantage of the beneficial tax consequences ofowning this rental property.

    35. In late 2015 through early 2016, Manafort applied for a mortgage on the condominium. Because the bank would permit a greater loan amount if the property were owner-occupied, Manafort falsely represented to the bank and its agents that it was a secondary home used as such by his daughter and son—in-law and was not a property held as a rental property. For instance, on January 26, 2016, Manafort wrote to his son-in-law to advise him that when the bank appraiser came to assess the condominium his son-in—law should "[rlcmember, he believes that you and [Manal‘ort's daughter] are living there.” Based on a request from Manafort, GATES caused a document to be created which listed the Howard Street property as the second home of Manafort’s daughter and son—in-law, when GATES knew this fact to be false. As a result of‘ his false representations, in March 2016 the bank provided Manafort a loan for approximately $3.185.000.

    36. Also in 2012, Manafort —- through acorporate vehicle called “MC Brooklyn Holdings,1.I.C” similarly owned by him and his family -- bought a brownstone on Union Street in the Carroll Gardens section of Brooklyn, New York. He paid approximately $3,000,000 in cash for the property. All of that money came from a Manafort entity in Cyprus. After purchase of the property, Manafort began renovations to transform it from a multi-family dwelling into a single family home. In late 2015 through early 2016, Manafort sought to borrow cash against the property. The institution Manafort went to for the loan provided greater loan amounts for “construction loans” -- that is, loans that required the loan amounts to be used to pay solely for construction of the property and thus increase the value of the property serving as the loan‘s collateral. The institution would thus loan money against the expected completed value ofthe property, which in the case ofthe Union Street property was estimated to be $8,000,000. In early 2016, Manafort was able to obtain a loan of approximately $5,000,000, after promising the bank that approximately $1,400,000 of the loan would be used solely for construction of the Union Street property. However, Manafort never intended to limit use ofthe proceeds to construction as required by the loan contracts. In December 2015, before the loan was made, Manafort wrote his tax preparer, among others, that the construction loan “will allow me to pay back the [another Manafort apartment] mortgage in full. . . .” Further, when the construction loan closed, Manafort used hundreds of thousands of dollars from the construction loan to make a down payment on another property in California.

    COUNT ONE

    Conspiracy Against The United States

    37. From in or about and between 2006 and 2017, both dates being approximate and inclusive, in the District ofColumbia and elsewhere, the defendant RICHARD W. GATES 111, together with others, knowingly and intentionally conspired to defraud the United States by impeding, impairing, obstructing, and defeating the lawful governmental functions ofa government agency, namely the Department ofJustice and the Department of the Treasury, and to commit offenses against the United States, to wit, the violations of law charged in Counts Three through Six and Ten through Twelve ofthe Indictment returned in this matter on October 27, 2017 (Indictment). 38. In furtherance ofthe conspiracy and to effect its illegal object, GATES, together with others, committed the overt acts noted in Count Eleven ofthe Indictment and the overt acts, among others, in the District ofColumbia and elsewhere as set forth in paragraphs 9, 16, 17, 20-25, 32, and 34—36, which are incorporated herein.

    COUNT TWO

    False Statement

    39. On or about February 1, 2018, in the District of Columbia, the defendant RICHARD W. GATES 111 did willfully and knowingly make a materially false, fictitious, and fraudulent statement and representation in a matter within the jurisdiction of the executive branch of the Government of the United States, to wit, the defendant falsely stated and represented to the Special Counsel‘s Office, including Special Agents ofthe Federal Bureau oflnvestigation:

    (i) that after a March 19, 2013 meeting in Washington, DC. attended by Manafort, a senior Company A lobbyist, and a Member of Congress (the Meeting), he was told by Manafort and a senior Company A lobbyist that there were no discussions okaraine at the Meeting;

    when, in fact, as he then and there well knew:

    (ii) (a) Manafort and the senior Company A lobbyist had not made the above statements to him; (b) Manafort and the senior Company A lobbyists had told him that the meeting went well; (0) GATES had participated with Manafort in preparing a report that memorialized for Ukraine leadership the pertinent Ukraine discussions that Manafort represented had taken place at the meeting; and (d) Manafort told GATES in 2016 that Manafort told his FARA lawyer that there had been no discussion of Ukraine at the Meeting.

    (18 U.S.C. §1001(a))

    ROBERT S. MUELLER, III
    Special Counsel

    By:
    Andrew Weissmann
    Greg D. Andres
    Kyle R. Freeny
    Brian M. Richardson
    Senior/Assistant Special Counsel

    Robert Gates Plea Agreement

    Dear Counsel:

    This letter sets forth the full and complete plea offer to your client Richard W. Gates III (hereinafter referred to as “your client” or “defendant”) from the Special Counsel’s Office (hereinafter also referred to as “the Government” or “this Office”). If your client accepts the terms and conditions of this offer, please have your client execute this document in the space provided below. Upon receipt of the executed document, this letter will become the Plea Agreement (hereinafter referred to as the “Agreement”). The terms of the offer are as follows.

    1. Charges and Statutory Penalties

    Your client agrees to plead guilty to: a Superseding Criminal Information that encompasses: (a) the charge in Count One of the Indictment, charging your client with conspiracy against the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (which includes a conspiracy to violate 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1); 31 U.S.C. §§ 5312 and 5322(b); and 22 U.S.C. §§ 612, 618(a)(l), and 618(a)(2)); and (b) a charge of making a false statement to the Special Counsel’s Office, including Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, in violation of 18 U.S.C, § 1001. A copy of the Superseding Criminal Information is attached.

    Your client understands that a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 carries a maximum sentence of 5 years’ imprisonment; a fine of not more than $250,000, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3571(b)(3); a term of supervised release of not more than 3 years, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b)(2); and an obligation to pay any applicable interest or penalties on fines and restitution not timely made.

    Your client understands that a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 carries a maximum sentence of 5 years’ imprisonment; a fine of $250,000, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3571(b)(3); a term of supervised release of not more than 3 years, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b)(2); and an obligation to pay any applicable interest or penalties on fines and restitution not timely made.

    In addition, your client agrees to pay a mandatory special assessment of $200 to the Clerk of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Your client also understands that, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3572 and § 5E1.2 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, Guidelines Manual (2016) (hereinafter “Sentencing Guidelines,” “Guidelines,” or “U.S.S.G.”), the Court may also impose a fine that is sufficient to pay the federal government the costs of any imprisonment, term of supervised release, and period of probation.

    2. Factual Stipulations

    Your client agrees that the attached “Statement of the Offense” fairly and accurately describes and summarizes your client’s actions and involvement in the offense to which your client is pleading guilty. Please have your client sign and return the Statement of the Offense, along with this Agreement.

    3. Additional Charges

    In consideration of your client’s guilty plea to the above offenses, and upon the completion of full cooperation as described herein, no additional criminal charges will be brought against the defendant for his heretofore disclosed participation in criminal activity, including money laundering, false statements, personal and corporate tax and F BAR offenses, bank fraud, and obstruction of justice. In addition, subject to the terms of this Agreement, at the time of sentence, the Government will move to dismiss the remaining counts of the Indictment in this matter. In addition, the Office will move promptly to dismiss without prejudice the charges brought against your client in the Eastern District of Virginia and your client waives venue as to such charges in the event he breaches this Agreement.

    4. Sentencing Guidelines Analysis

    Your client understands that the sentence in this case will be determined by the Court, pursuant to the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), including a consideration of the applicable guidelines and policies set forth in the Sentencing Guidelines. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure ll(c)(1)(B), and to assist the Court in determining the appropriate sentence, the Office estimates the Guidelines as follows:

    A. Estimated Offense Level Under the Guidelines[1]
    Base Offense Level (U.S.S.G. §2Tl.l(a)(1) (referencing Tax Table at §2T4.1(K))(more than $9,500,000)) 26
    Aggravating Factor ((U.S.S.G. §2Tl .l(b)(1)) (source of income from criminal activity)+2
    Aggravating Factor ((U.S.S.G. §2Tl.1(b)(2))(sophisticated means)+2
    Minor Role (U.S.S.G. §3B1.2(b))-2
    Total:28
    B. Acceptance of Responsibility

    The Government agrees that a 2-level reduction will be appropriate, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, provided that your client clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility, to the satisfaction of the Government, through your client’s allocution, adherence to every provision of this Agreement, and conduct between entry of the plea and imposition of sentence. If the defendant has accepted responsibility as described above, and if the defendant pleads guilty on or before February 23, 2018, subject to the availability of the Court, an additional one-level reduction will be warranted, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1 .l (b).

    Nothing in this Agreement limits the right of the Government to seek denial of the adjustment for acceptance of responsibility, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, and/or imposition of an adjustment for obstruction of justice, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, regardless of any agreement set forth herein, should your client move to withdraw his guilty plea after it is entered, or should it be determined by the Government that your client has either (a) engaged in conduct, unknown to the Government at the time of the signing of this Agreement, that constitutes obstruction of justice, or (b) engaged in additional criminal conduct after signing this Agreement.

    In accordance with the above, the applicable Guidelines Offense Level will be at least 25.

    C. Estimated Criminal History Category

    Based upon the information now available to this Office, your client has no criminal convictions. Accordingly, your client is estimated to have no criminal history points and your client’s Criminal History Category is estimated to be Category 1. Your client acknowledges that if additional convictions are discovered during the pre-sentence investigation by the United States Probation Office, your client’s criminal history points may increase.

    D. Estimated Applicable Guidelines Range

    Based upon the agreed total offense level and the estimated criminal history category set forth above, the Office calculates your client’s estimated Sentencing Guidelines range is 57 months to 71 months’ imprisonment (the “Estimated Guidelines Range”). In addition, the parties agree that, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2, should the Court impose a fine, at Guidelines level 25, the estimated applicable fine range is $20,000 to $200,000. Your client reserves the right to ask the Court not to impose any applicable fine.

    Your client agrees that, solely for the purposes of calculating the applicable range under the Sentencing Guidelines, a downward departure from the Estimated Guidelines Range set forth above is not warranted, subject to the paragraphs regarding cooperation below and the argument that the Guidelines do not adequately reflect the defendant’s role in the offense. Accordingly, you will not seek any departure or adjustment to the Estimated Guidelines Range set forth above, nor suggest that the Court consider such a departure 0r adjustment for any other reason other than those specified above. Your client also reserves the right to disagree with the Estimated Guideline Range calculated by the Office. However, your client understands and acknowledges that the Estimated Guidelines Range agreed to by the Office is not binding on the Probation Office or the Court. Should the Court or Probation Office determine that a different guidelines range is applicable, your client will not be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea on that basis, and the Government and your client will still be bound by this Agreement.

    Your client understands and acknowledges that the terms of this section apply only to conduct that occurred before the execution of this Agreement. Should your client engage in any conduct after the execution of this Agreement that would form the basis for an increase in your client’s base offense level or justify an upward departure (examples of which include, but are not limited to, obstruction of justice, failure to appear for a court proceeding, criminal conduct while pending sentencing, and false statements to law enforcement agents, the probation officer, or the Court), the Government is free under this Agreement to seek an increase in the base offense level based on that post-agreement conduct.

    5. Agreement as to Sentencing Allocation

    Based upon the information known to the Government at the time of the signing of this Agreement, the parties further agree that a sentence within the Estimated Guidelines Range (or below) would constitute a reasonable sentence in light of all of the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(3), should such a sentence be subject to appellate review notwithstanding the appeal waiver provided below.

    6. Reservation of Allocution

    The Government and your client reserve the right to describe fully, both orally and in writing, to the sentencing judge, the nature and seriousness of your client’s misconduct, including any misconduct not described in the charge to which your client is pleading guilty.

    The parties also reserve the right to inform the presentence report writer and the Court of any relevant facts, to dispute any factual inaccuracies in the presentence report, and to contest any matters not provided for in this Agreement. In the event that the Court considers any Sentencing Guidelines adjustments, departures, 0r calculations different from any agreements contained in this Agreement, or contemplates a sentence outside the Guidelines range based upon the general sentencing factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the parties reserve the right to answer any related inquiries from the Court. in addition, your client acknowledges that the Government is not obligated to file any post-sentence downward departure motion in this case pursuant to Rule 35(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.

    7. Court Not Bound by this Agreement or the Sentencing Guidelines

    Your client understands that the sentence in this case will be imposed in accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), upon consideration of the Sentencing Guidelines. Your client further understands that the sentence to be imposed is a matter solely within the discretion of the Court. Your client acknowledges that the Court is not obligated to follow any recommendation of the Government at the time of sentencing or to grant a downward departure based on your client’s substantial assistance to the Government, even if the Government files a motion pursuant to Section 5K1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines. Your client understands that neither the Government’s recommendation nor the Sentencing Guidelines are binding on the Court.

    Your client acknowledges that your client’s entry of a guilty plea to the charged offense authorizes the Court to impose any sentence, up to and including the statutory maximum sentence, which may be greater than the applicable Guidelines range. The Government cannot, and does not, make any promise or representation as to what sentence your client will receive. Moreover, your client acknowledges that your client will have no right to withdraw your client’s plea of guilty should the Court impose a sentence that is outside the Guidelines range or if the Court does not follow the Government’s sentencing recommendation. The Government and your client will be bound by this Agreement, regardless of the sentence imposed by the Court. Any effort by your client to withdraw the guilty plea because of the length of the sentence shall constitute a breach of this Agreement.

    8. Cooperation

    Your client shall cooperate fully, truthfully, completely, and forthrightly with this Office and other law enforcement authorities identified by this Office in any and all matters as to which this Office deems the cooperation relevant. This cooperation will include, but is not limited to, the following:

    (a) The defendant agrees to be fully debriefed and to attend all meetings at which his presence is requested, concerning his participation in and knowledge of all criminal activities.

    (b) The defendant agrees to furnish to the Office all documents and other material that may be relevant to the investigation and that are in the defendant’s possession or control and to participate in undercover activities pursuant to the specific instructions of law enforcement agents or this Office.

    (c) The defendant agrees not to reveal his cooperation, or any information derived therefrom, to any third party without prior consent of the Office.

    ((1) The defendant agrees to testify at any proceeding in the District of Colombia or elsewhere as requested by the Office.

    (e) The defendant consents to adjournments of his sentence as requested by the Office.

    (f) The defendant agrees that all of the defendant’s obligations under this agreement continue after the defendant is sentenced; and

    (g) The defendant must at all times give complete, truthful, and accurate information and testimony, and must not commit, or attempt to commit, any further crimes.

    Your client acknowledges and understands that, during the course of the cooperation outlined in this Agreement, your client will be interviewed by law enforcement agents and/or Government attorneys. Your client waives any right to have counsel present during these interviews and agrees to meet with law enforcement agents and Government attorneys outside of the presence of counsel. If, at some future point, you or your client desire to have counsel present during interviews by law enforcement agents and/or Government attorneys, and you communicate this decision in writing to this Office, this Office will honor this request, and this change will have no effect on any other terms and conditions of this Agreement.

    Your client shall testify fully, completely and truthfully before any and all Grand Juries in the District of Columbia and elsewhere, and at any and all trials of cases or other court proceedings in the District of Columbia and elsewhere, at which your client’s testimony may be deemed relevant by the Government.

    Your client understands and acknowledges that nothing in this Agreement allows your client to commit any criminal violation of local, state or federal law during the period of your client’s cooperation with law enforcement authorities or at any time prior to the sentencing in this case. The commission of a criminal offense during the period of your client’s cooperation or at any time prior to sentencing will constitute a breach of this Agreement and will relieve the Government of all of its obligations under this Agreement, including, but not limited to, its obligation to inform this Court of any assistance your client has provided. However, your client acknowledges and agrees that such a breach of this Agreement will not entitle your client to withdraw your client’s plea of guilty or relieve your client of the obligations under this Agreement.

    Your client agrees that the sentencing in this case may be delayed until your client’s efforts to cooperate have been completed, as determined by the Government, so that the Court will have the benefit of all relevant information before a sentence is imposed.

    9. Government’s Obligations

    The Government will bring to the Court’s attention at the time of sentencing the nature and extent of your client’s cooperation or lack of cooperation. The Government will evaluate the full nature and extent of your client’s cooperation to determine whether your client has provided substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense. If this Office determines that the defendant has provided substantial assistance in the form of truthful information and, where applicable, testimony, the Office will file a motion pursuant to Section 5K1.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines. Defendant will then be free to argue for any sentence below the advisory Sentencing Guidelines range calculated by the Probation Office, including probation. Depending on the precise nature of the defendant’s substantial assistance, the Office may not oppose defendant’s application.

    10. Waivers

    A. Venue

    Your client waives any challenge to venue in the District of Columbia.

    B. Statute of Limitations

    Your client agrees that, should the conviction following your client’s plea of guilty pursuant to this Agreement be vacated for any reason, any prosecution, based on the conduct set forth in the attached Statement of the Offense, that is not time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations on the date of the signing of this Agreement, as well as any crimes that the Government has agreed not to prosecute or to dismiss at sentencing pursuant to this Agreement may be commenced or reinstated against your client, notwithstanding the expiration of the statute of limitations between the signing of this Agreement and the commencement or reinstatement of such prosecution. It is the intent of this Agreement to waive all defenses based on the statute of limitations with respect to any prosecution of conduct set forth in the attached Statement of the Offense that is not time-barred 0n the date that this Agreement is signed.

    C. Trial and Other Rights

    Your client understands that by pleading guilty in this case your client agrees to waive certain rights afforded by the Constitution of the United States and/or by statute or rule. Your client agrees to forgo the right to any further discovery or disclosures of information not already provided at the time of the entry of your client’s guilty plea. Your client also agrees to waive, among other rights, the right to be indicted by a Grand Jury, the right to plead not guilty, and the right to a jury trial. 1fthere were ajury trial, your client would have the right to be represented by counsel, to confront and cross-examine witnesses against your client, to challenge the admissibility of evidence offered against your client, to compel witnesses to appear for the purpose of testifying and presenting other evidence on your client’s behalf, and to choose whether to testify. If there were a jury trial and your client chose not to testify at that trial, your client would have the right to have the jury instructed that your client’s failure to testify could not be held against your client. Your client would further have the right to have the jury instructed that your client is presumed innocent until proven guilty, and that the burden would be on the United States to prove your client’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. If your client were found guilty after a trial, your client would have the right to appeal your client’s conviction. Your client understands that the F ifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States protects your client from the use of compelled self—incriminating statements in a criminal prosecution. By entering a plea of guilty, your client knowingly and voluntarily waives or gives up your client’s right against compelled self-incrimination.

    Your client acknowledges discussing with you Rule 11(1) of the F ederal Rules of Criminal Procedure and Rule 410 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which ordinarily limit the admissibility of statements made by a defendant in the course of plea discussions or plea proceedings if a guilty plea is later withdrawn. Your client knowingly and voluntarily hereby waives the rights that arise under these rules to object to the Government’s use of all such statements by him on and after January 29, 2018, in the event your client breaches this agreement, withdraws his guilty plea, or seeks to withdraw from this Agreement after signing it. This Agreement supersedes the proffer agreement between the Government and the client.

    Your client also agrees to waive all constitutional and statutory rights to a speedy sentence and agrees that the plea of guilty pursuant to this Agreement will be entered at a time decided upon by the parties with the concurrence of the Court. Your client understands that the date for sentencing will be set by the Court.

    Your client agrees not to accept remuneration or compensation of any sort, directly or indirectly, for the dissemination through any means, including but not limited to books, articles, speeches, blogs, podcasts, and interviews, however disseminated, regarding his work for Paul Manafort, the transactions alleged in the Indictment, or the investigation by the Office or prosecution of any criminal or civil cases against him.

    D. Appeal Rights

    Your client understands that federal law, specifically 18 U.S.C. § 3742, affords defendants the right to appeal their sentences in certain circumstances. Your client agrees to waive the right to appeal the sentence in this case, including but not limited to any term of imprisonment, fine, forfeiture, award of restitution, term or condition of supervised release, authority of the Court to set conditions of release, and the manner in which the sentence was determined, except to the extent the Court sentences your client above the statutory maximum or guidelines range determined by the Court or your client claims that your client received ineffective assistance of counsel, in which case your client would have the right to appeal the illegal sentence or above-guidelines sentence or raise on appeal a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, but not to raise on appeal other issues regarding the sentencing. In agreeing to this waiver, your client is aware that your client’s sentence has yet to be determined by the Court. Realizing the uncertainty in estimating what sentence the Court ultimately will impose, your client knowingly and willingly waives your client’s right to appeal the sentence, to the extent noted above, in exchange for the concessions made by the Government in this Agreement.

    E. Collateral Attack

    Your client also waives any right to challenge the conviction entered or sentence imposed under this Agreement or otherwise attempt to modify or change the sentence or the manner in which it was determined in any collateral attack, including, but not limited to, a motion brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 or Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), except to the extent such a motion is based on newly discovered evidence or on a claim that your client received ineffective assistance of counsel. Your client reserves the right to file a motion brought under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), but agrees to waive the right to appeal the denial of such a motion.

    Your client agrees that with respect to all charges referred to herein he is not a “prevailing party” within the meaning of the “Hyde Amendment,” 18 U.S.C. § 3006A note, and will not file any claim under that law.

    F. Privacy Act and FOIA Rights

    Your client also agrees to waive all rights, whether asserted directly or by a representative, to request or receive from any department or agency of the United States any records pertaining to the investigation or prosecution of this case, including and without limitation any records that may be sought under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552, or the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, for the duration of the Special Counsel’s investigation.

    11. Restitution

    Your client understands that the Court has an obligation to determine whether, and in What amount, mandatory restitution applies in this case under 18 U.S.C. § 3663A. The Government and your client agree that mandatory restitution does not apply in this case.

    12. Breach of Agreement

    Your client understands and agrees that, if after entering this Agreement, your client fails specifically to perform or to fulfill completely each and every one of your client’s obligations under this Agreement, or engages in any criminal activity prior to sentencing, your client will have breached this Agreement. Should it be judged by the Office in its sole discretion that the defendant has failed to cooperate fully, has intentionally given false, misleading or incomplete information or testimony, has committed or attempted to commit any further crimes, or has otherwise violated any provision of this agreement, the defendant will not be released from his plea of guilty but this Office will be released from its obligations under this agreement, including (a) not to oppose a downward adjustment of two levels for acceptance of responsibility described above, and to make the motion for an additional one-level reduction described above and (b) to file the motion for a downward departure for cooperation described above. Moreover, this Office may Withdraw the motion described above, if such motion has been filed prior to sentencing. 1n the event that it is judged by the Office that there has been a breach: (a) your client will be fully subject to criminal prosecution, in addition to Count One of the Indictment and the charge contained in the Superseding Criminal Information, for any crimes to which he has not pled guilty, including perjury and obstruction of justice; and (b) the Government will be free to use against your client, directly and indirectly, in any criminal or civil proceeding, all statements made by your client and any of the information or materials provided by your client, including such statements, information, and materials provided pursuant to this Agreement or during the course of any debriefings conducted in anticipation of, or afier entry of, this Agreement, whether or not the debriefings were previously a part of proffer-protected debriefings, and your client’s statements made during proceedings before the Court pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.

    Your client understands and agrees that the Government shall be required to prove a breach of this Agreement only by a preponderance of the evidence, except where such breach is based on a violation of federal, state, or local criminal law, which the Government need prove only by probable cause in order to establish a breach of this Agreement.

    Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to protect your client from prosecution for any crimes not included within this Agreement or committed by your client after the execution of this Agreement. Your client understands and agrees that the Government reserves the right to prosecute your client for any such offenses. Your client further understands that any perjury, false statements or declarations, or obstruction of justice relating to your client’s obligations under this Agreement shall constitute a breach of this Agreement. In the event of such a breach, your client will not be allowed to withdraw your client’s guilty plea.

    13. Complete Agreement

    Apart from the written proffer agreement initially dated January 29, 2018, which this Agreement supersedes, no agreements, promises, understandings, or representations have been made by the parties or their counsel other than those contained in writing herein, nor will any such agreements, promises, understandings, or representations be made unless committed to writing and signed by your client, defense counsel, and the Office.

    Your client further understands that this Agreement is binding only upon the Office. This Agreement does not bind any United States Attorney’s Office, nor does it bind any other state, local, or federal prosecutor. It also does not bar or compromise any civil, tax, or administrative claim pending or that may be made against your client.

    *****

    If the foregoing terms and conditions are satisfactory, your client may so indicate by signing this Agreement and the Statement of the Offense, and returning both to the Office no later than February 23, 2018.

    Sincerely yours,

    ROBERT S. MUELLER, III
    Special Counsel

    By:
    Adrew Weissmann
    Greg D. Andres
    Kyle R. Freeny
    Brian M. Richardson
    Senior/Assistant Special Counsels

    DEFENDANT’S ACCEPTANCE

    I have read every page of this Agreement and have discussed it with my attorney Thomas C. Green. I am fully satisfied with the legal representation by Mr. Green and his firm, who I have chosen to represent me herein. Nothing about the quality of the representation of other counsel is affecting my decision herein to plead guilty. I fully understand this Agreement and agree to it without reservation. I do this voluntarily and of my own free will, intending to be legally bound. No threats have been made to me nor am I under the influence of anything that could impede my ability to understand this Agreement fully. I am pleading guilty because I am in fact guilty of the offense identified in this Agreement.

    I reaffirm that absolutely no promises, agreements, understandings, or conditions have been made or entered into in connection with my decision to plead guilty except those set forth in this Agreement. I am satisfied with the legal services provided by my attorneys in connection with this Agreement and matters related to it.

    Richard W. Gates III
    Defendant
    Date: 23/2/18

    ATTORNEYS’ ACKNOWLEDGMENT

    I have read every page of this Agreement, reviewed this Agreement with my client, Richard W. Gates III, and fully discussed the provisions of this Agreement with my client. These pages accurately and completely set forth the entire Agreement. I concur in my client’s desire to plead guilty as set forth in this Agreement.

    Thomas C. Green
    Attorney for Defendant
    Date: 2/23/18

    [1] For the purposes of the Sentencing Guidelines analysis, the government calculates the highest guideline range among the offenses, namely the conspiracy to violate Title 26 U.S.C. §§ 7206(1). The minor role adjustment pursuant to §3B1.2(b) applies only to conspiracy to Title 26 U.S.C. §§ 7206(1) aspect of Count One. The defendant’s estimated guideline range for the Section 1001 charge would be 6 (before any reduction for acceptance of responsibility), and thus would not increase the applicable offense level pursuant to §3D1.4.

    Statement of the Offense against Richard Gates

    Pursuant to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 11, the United States and the defendant RICHARD W. GATES III (GATES) stipulate and agree that the following facts are true and accurate. These facts do not constitute all of the facts known to the parties concerning the charged offense and covered conduct. This statement is being submitted to demonstrate that sufficient facts exist to establish that the defendant committed the offense to which he is pleading guilty.

    Count 1 Conspiracy (18 U.S.C. 8 371)

    1. At all relevant times herein, GATES worked as an employee at companies run by Paul J. Manafort, Jr., and other principals, namely Davis Manafort Partners, Inc. (DMP) and DMP International, LLC. (DMI). Manafort engaged in a variety of criminal schemes, and GATES as part of his work for Manafort, DMP, and DM1 knowingly and intentionally conspired with Manafort to assist him in the criminal schemes that make up Count One of the Indictment, as more fully set forth below.

    A. Tax and FBAR Scheme

    26 U.S.C. §§ 7206(1) and 7206(2)
    31 U.S.C. 55 5314 and 5322(h)

    2. From 2008 through 20l4, Manafort, with the assistance of GATES, caused millions of dollars of wire transfers to be made from offshore nominee accounts, without Manafort paying taxes on that income. The payments were made for goods, services, and real estate. Manafort, again with the assistance of GATES, also hid income by denominating various overseas payments as “loans.” thereby evading payment of any taxes on that income by Manafort.

    3. GATES, acting on the authority of Manafort, routinely dealt with Manafort’s tax accountants in the preparation of Manafort’s tax returns. GATES was authorized by Manafort to answer questions from Manafort’s accountants, to provide documents and other information, and to review Manafort’s draft and finalized income tax returns. In doing so, GATES, with Manafort’s knowledge and agreement, repeatedly misled Manafort’s accountants, including by not disclosing Manafort’s overseas accounts and the income Further, GATES’ acting at Manafort’s instruction, continued to classify overseas payments made to Manafort as “loans” to avoid incurring additional taxes on the income.

    4. Manafort, with GATES’ assistance, owned and controlled a range of foreign bank accounts in Cyprus and the Grenadines. GATES helped maintain these accounts and arranged substantial transfers from the accounts to both Manafort and himself. GATES was aware that many of these accounts held well in excess of $10,000 in the aggregate at some point during each year in which they existed. GATES, acting at Manafort’s instruction, did not report the accounts’ existence to Manafort’s tax accountants in an effort to hide them, and to allow Manafort to avoid disclosing their existence on an FBAR filing.

    5. GATES was aware at the time that it was illegal to hide income from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) by failing to account for reportable income on Manafort’s income tax returns. GATES was also aware that it was illegal to fail to report information to the IRS regarding the existence of foreign bank accounts, as required by Schedule B of the IRS Form 1040. GATES also understood at the time that a US. person who had a financial interest in, or signature or other authority over, a bank account or other financial account in a foreign country, which exceeded $10,000 in any one year (at any time during that year), was required to report the account to the Department of the Treasury. GATES also understood, after 2010, that the failure to make such a report constituted a crime.

    B. FARA Scheme

    22 U.S.C. §§ 612 and 6181211111

    6. GATES understood that it was illegal to engage in certain activities in the United States as an agent of a foreign principal without registering with the United States Government. Specifically, a person who engages in lobbying or public relations work in the United States (hereafter collectively referred to as lobbying) for a foreign principal such as the Government of Ukraine or the Party of Regions is required to register. Manafort, together with GATES’ assistance, engaged in a scheme to avoid this registration requirement for DMI, Manafort, and others.

    7. It was part of this scheme that in or about 2012 Manafort and others obtained the approval of Ukraine President Yanukovych to implement a global lobbying strategy to promote Ukraine’s interests, including entry into the European Union. This was dubbed the anti-crisis project or AC project. Thereafter, DMI, through Manafort, and with the assistance of GATES, worked with various entities and people to lobby in the United States, among other locations. As part of this scheme, the European Centre for a Modern Ukraine (the Centre) was set up by the Government of Ukraine to coordinate lobbying principally in Europe, as well as to act as the ostensible client for two lobbying firms in the United States. The Centre reported to Ukraine Party of Regions member, and Ukraine First Vice Prime Minister, Andriy Klyuyev. The Centre largely oversaw European lobbying and Manafort and GATES generally oversaw the work of lobbyists in the United States.

    8. As one part of the AC Project, in February 20l2, GATES solicited two Washington, DC. firms (Company A and Company B) to lobby in the United States on behalf of the Party of Regions. For instance on February 21, 2012. GATES wrote to Company A that it would be “representing the Government of Ukraine in [Washington] DC."

    9. The general division of labor in managing Companies A and B’s lobbying activities was that Manafort would communicate with Yanukovyeh and his staff, and GATES dealt with coordinating the work of the two firms. For instance, in November 2012, GATES wrote to the firms that they needed to prepare an assessment of their past and prospective lobbying efforts so the “President" could be briefed by “Paul” “on what Ukraine has done well and what it can do better as we move into 2013.” The two firms engaged in extensive United States lobbying. Among other things, they lobbied multiple Members of Congress and their stalls about Ukraine sanctions, the validity of Ukraine elections, and the propriety of Yanukovych’s imprisoning his presidential rival. Yulia Tymoshenko.

    10. GATES, at Manafort’s instruction, worked with Company A to arrange for Manafort to lobby personally in the United States. Specifically, they arranged a meeting in March 20l3 in Washington, D.C. attended by Manafort, a senior Company A lobbyist, and a Member of Congress who was on a subcommittee that had Ukraine within its purview. After the meeting, Manafort, with GATES” assistance. prepared a March 2013 report to Yanukovych’s office that the meeting “went well," and reported a series of positive developments from the meeting.

    11. To distance their public United States lobbying work from the Government of Ukraine, GATES and others arranged for the Centre to represent falsely that it was not “directly or indirectly supervised, directed, [or] controlled” in whole or in major part by the Government of Ukraine or the Party of Regions. GATES knew at the time that the Centre was under the direction of Party of Regions. GATES provided false and misleading representations to a law firm for Company A, which was assessing whether a filing was required under FARA. GATES understood that the false and misleading representations would permit Companies A and B not to register their activities pursuant to FARA.

    12. In September 20l6, the Department of Justice informed Manafort, GATES, and DMI that it sought to determine whether they had acted as agents of a foreign principal under FARA without registering. In November 2016 and February 2017, GATES and Manafort caused false and misleading letters to be submitted to the Department of Justice. The letters represented, among other things, that:

    13. In fact, GATES knew that the above was false or misleading. He and Manafort had selected Companies A and B without the Centre. Further, GATES engaged in weekly scheduled calls and frequent emails with them to provide them directions as to specific lobbying steps that should be taken; sought and received detailed oral and written reports from these firms on the lobbying work they had performed; wrote communications for Manafort, at his request, to brief Yanukovych on their lobbying efforts; and arranged for payment to the lobbying firms of over $2 million from offshore accounts, among other things. In addition, GATES had provided his then FARA counsel 3 DMI document retention policy to create the misleading appearance that DMI and its employees did not have responsive documents to provide to the Department of Justice, when he knew that they in fact did.

    14. As another part of the lobbying scheme, in or about and between 2012 and 2013 the Party of Regions, through Manafort, GATES and others, secretly retained a group of former senior European politicians to take positions favorable to Ukraine, including lobbying in the United States. Although the former politicians would appear to be providing their independent assessments of actions by the Government Ukraine, in fact they were paid lobbyists for Ukraine. In or about 2012 through 2013, GATES, at Manafort’s instruction, used at least four offshore accounts to wire more than 2 million euros to pay the group of former politicians. GATES understood that none of the former politicians registered under FARA.

    15. In 2013, foreign politicians who were part of this group lobbied United States Members of Congress, the Executive Branch, and their staffs in coordination with Manafort, GATES, and Companies A and B.

    Criminal Information/ False Statement 18 U.S.C. 1001

    16. On February 1, 2018, GATES attended a proffer session with his counsel at the Special Counsel’s Office, which included Special Agents from the Federal Bureau of Investigation. During questioning concerning a March 19, 2013 meeting involving Manafort, a senior Company A lobbyist, and a Member of Congress who was on a subcommittee that had Ukraine within its purview, GATES stated falsely that he was told by Manafort and the senior Company A lobbyist that there were no discussions of Ukraine at the meeting. At the time of his proffer statement, GATES knew that: (a) Manafort and the senior Company A lobbyist had not made the above statements to him; (b) Manafort and the senior Company A lobbyists had told him that the meeting went well; (0) GATES had participated with Manafort in preparing a report that memorialized for Ukraine leadership the pertinent Ukraine discussions that Manafort represented had taken place at the meeting; and (d) Manafort told GATES in 2016 that Manafort told his FARA lawyer that there had been no discussion of Ukraine at the Meeting.

    ROBERT S. MUELLER, III
    Special Counsel

    By:
    Andrew Weissmann
    Greg D. Andres
    Kyle R. Freeny
    Brian M. Richardson
    Senior/Assistant Special Counsels

    DEFENDANT’S ACCEPTANCE

    The preceding statement is a summary, made for the purpose of providing the Court with a factual basis for my guilty plea to the charge against me. It does not include all of the facts known to me regarding this offense. I make this statement knowingly and voluntarily and because I am, in fact, guilty of the crime charged. No threats have been made to me nor am I under the influence of anything that could impede my ability to understand this Statement of Offense fully.

    I have read every word of this Statement of the Offense or have had it read to me. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, after consulting with my attorneys, I agree and stipulate to this Statement of the Office, and declare under penalty that it is true and correct.

    Richard W. Gates III
    Defendant

    23/2/18

    ATTORNEY’S ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

    I have read this statement of the offense, and have reviewed it with my client fully. I concur in my client’s desire to adopt and stipulate to ' Statement tithe Offense as true and accurate.

    Thomas C. Green, Esq.
    Attorney for the Defendant
    2/23/2018

    U.S. v. Paul Manafort and Richard Gates

    Indictment of Paul Manafort and Richard Gates

    THE GRAND JURY CHARGES THAT:

    Introduction

    At all times relevant to this Superseding Indictment:

    1. Defendants PAUL J . MANAFORT; JR. (MANAFORT) and RICHARD W. GATES III (GATES) served for years as political consultants and lobbyists. Between at least 2006 and 2015; MANAFORT and GATES acted as unregistered agents of a foreign government and foreign political parties. Specifically; they represented the Government of Ukraine, the President of Ukraine (Victor Yanukovych; who was President from 2010 to 2014); the Party of Regions (a Ukrainian political party led by Yanukovych); and the Opposition Bloc (a successor to the Party of Regions after Yanukovych fled to Russia).

    2. MANAFORT and GATES generated tens of millions of dollars in income as a result of their Ukraine work. From approximately 2006 through the present; MANAFORT and GATES engaged in a scheme to hide income from United States authorities; while enjoying the use of the money. During the first part of the scheme between approximately 2006 and 2015; MANAFORT; with GATES’ assistance; failed to pay taxes on this income by disguising it as alleged “loans” from nominee offshore corporate entities and by making millions of dollars in unreported payments from foreign accounts to bank accounts they controlled and United States vendors. MANAFORT also used the offshore accounts to purchase United States real estate, and MANAFORT and GATES used the undisclosed income to make improvements to and refinance their United States properties.

    3. In the second part of the scheme; between approximately 2015 and at least January 2017; when the Ukraine income dwindled after Yanukovych fled to Russia, MANAFORT, with the assistance of GATES; extracted money from MANAFORT’s United States real estate by; among other things; using those properties as collateral to obtain loans from multiple financial institutions. MANAFORT and GATES fraudulently secured more than twenty million dollars in loans by falsely inflating MANAFORT’s and his company’s income and by failing to disclose existing debt in order to qualify for the loans.

    4. In furtherance of the scheme; MANAFORT and GATES funneled millions of dollars in payments into numerous foreign nominee companies and bank accounts; opened by them and their accomplices in nominee names and in various foreign countries; including Cyprus; Saint Vincent & the Grenadines (Grenadines), and the Seychelles. MANAFORT and GATES hid the existence and ownership of the foreign companies and bank accounts; falsely and repeatedly reporting to their tax preparers and to the United States that they had no foreign bank accounts.

    5. In furtherance of the scheme; MANAFORT used his hidden overseas wealth to enjoy a lavish lifestyle in the United States, without paying taxes on that income. MANAFORT, without reporting the income to his tax preparer or the United States, spent millions of dollars on luxury goods and services for himself and his extended family through payments wired from offshore nominee accounts to United States vendors. MANAFORT also used these offshore accounts to purchase multi-million dollar properties in the United States and to improve substantially another property owned by his family.

    6. In furtherance of the scheme; GATES used millions of dollars from these offshore accounts to pay for his personal expenses; including his mortgage, children’s tuition, and interior decorating and refinancing of his Virginia residence.

    7. In total, more than $75,000,000 flowed through the offshore accounts. MANAFORT; with the assistance of GATES; laundered more than $30,000,000; income that he concealed from the United States Department of the Treasury (Treasury), the Department of Justice, and others. GATES obtained more than $3,000,000 from the offshore accounts; income that he too concealed from the Treasury; the Department of Justice, and others.

    Relevant Individuals And Entities

    8. MANAFORT was a United States citizen. He resided in homes in Virginia, Florida; and Long Island; New York.

    9. GATES was a United States citizen. He resided in Virginia.

    10. In 2005; MANAFORT and another partner created Davis Manafort Partners, Inc. (DMP) to engage principally in political consulting. DMP had staff in the United States, Ukraine, and Russia. In 2011; MANAFORT created DMP International; LLC (DMI) to engage in work for foreign clients, in particular political consulting, lobbying; and public relations for the Government of Ukraine; the Party of Regions, and members of the Party of Regions. DMI was a partnership solely owned by MANAFORT and his spouse. GATES worked for both DMP and DMI and served as MANAFORT’s right-hand man.

    11. The Party of Regions was a pro-Russia political party in Ukraine. Beginning in approximately 2006; it retained MANAFORT, through DMP and then DMI; to advance its interests in Ukraine, the United States, and elsewhere; including the election of its slate of candidates. In 2010; its candidate for President, Yanukovych; was elected President of Ukraine. In 2014; Yanukovych fled Ukraine for Russia in the wake of popular protests of widespread governmental corruption. Yanukovych; the Party of Regions, and the Government of Ukraine were MANAFORT; DMP; and DMI clients.

    12. MANAFORT and GATES owned or controlled the following entities; which were used in the scheme (the MANAFORT—GATES entities):

    Domestic Entities
    Entity NameDate CreatedIncorporation Location
    Daisy Manafort, LLC (PM)August 2008Virginia
    March 2011Florida
    Davis Manafort International LLC (PM)March 2007Delaware
    DMP (PM)March 2005Virginia
    March 2011Florida
    Davis Manafort, Inc. (PM)October 1999Delaware
    November 1999Virginia
    DMI (PM)June 2011Delaware
    March 2012Florida
    Global Sites LLC (PM, RG)July 2008Delaware
    Jesand Investment Corporation (PM)April 2002Virginia
    Jesand Investments Corporation (PM)March 2011Florida
    John Hannah, LLC (PM)April 2006Virginia
    March 2011Florida
    Lilred, LLC (PM)December 2011Florida
    LOAV Ltd. (PM)April 1992Delaware
    MC Brooklyn Holdings, LLC (PM)November 2012New York
    MC Soho Holdings, LLC (PM)January 2012Florida
    April 2012New York
    Smythson LLC (also known as Symthson LLC) (PM, RG)July 2008Delaware
    Cypriot Entities
    Entity NameDate CreatedIncorporation Location
    Actinet Trading Limited (PM, RG)May 2009Cyprus
    Black Sea View Limited (PM, RG)August 2007Cyprus
    Bletilla Ventures Limited (PM, RG)October 2010Cyprus
    Global Highway Limited (PM, RG)August 2007Cyprus
    Leviathan Advisors Limited (PM, RG)August 2007Cyprus
    LOAV Advisors Limited (PM, RG)August 2007Cyprus
    Lucicle Consultants Limited (PM, RG)December 2008Cyprus
    Marziola Holdings Limited (PM)March 2012Cyprus
    Olivenia Trading Limited (PM, RG)March 2012Cyprus
    Peranova Holdings Limited (Peranova) (PM, RG)June 2007Cyprus
    Serangon Holdings Limited (PM, RG)January 2008Cyprus
    Yiakora Ventures Limited (PM)February 2008Cyprus
    Other Foreign Entities
    Entity NameDate CreatedIncorporation Location
    Global Endeavour Inc. (also known as Global Endeavor Inc.) (PM)UnknownGrenadines
    Jeunet Ltd. (PM)August 2011Grenadines
    Pompolo Limited (PM, RG)April 2013United Kingdom

    13. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) was a bureau in the Treasury responsible for administering the tax laws of the United States and collecting taxes owed to the Treasury.

    The Tax Scheme

    MANAFORT And GATES’ Wiring Money From Offshore Accounts Into The United States

    14. In order to use the money in the offshore nominee accounts of the MANAFORT—GATES entities without paying taxes on it; MANAFORT and GATES caused millions of dollars in wire transfers from these accounts to be made for goods; services; and real estate. They did not report these transfers as income.

    15. From 2008 to 2014; MANAFORT caused the following wires; totaling over $12,000,000; to be sent to the vendors listed below for personal items. MANAFORT did not pay taxes on this income; which was used to make the purchases.

    PayeeTransaction DateOriginating Account HolderCountry of OriginationAmount of Transaction
    Vendor A (Home Improvement Company in the Hamptons, New York)6/10/2008LOAV Advisors LimitedCyprus$107,000
    6/25/2008LOAV Advisors LimitedCyprus$23,500
    7/7/2008LOAV Advisors LimitedCyprus$20,000
    8/5/2008Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$59,000
    9/2/2008Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$272,000
    10/6/2008Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$109,000
    10/24/2008Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$107,800
    11/20/2008Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$77,400
    12/22/2008Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$100,000
    1/14/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$9,250
    1/29/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$97,670
    2/25/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$108,100
    4/16/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$94,394
    5/7/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$54,000
    5/12/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$9,550
    6/1/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$86,650
    6/18/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$34,400
    7/31/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$106,000
    8/28/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$37,000
    9/23/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$203,500
    10/26/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$38,800
    11/18/2009Global Highway LimitedCyprus$130,906
    3/8/2010Global Highway LimitedCyprus$124,000
    5/11/2010Global Highway LimitedCyprus$25,000
    7/8/2010Global Highway LimitedCyprus$28,000
    7/23/2010Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$26,500
    8/12/2010Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$138,900
    9/2/2010Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$31,500
    10/6/2010Global Highway LimitedCyprus$67,600
    10/14/2010Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$107,600
    10/18/2010Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$31,500
    12/16/2010Global Highway LimitedCyprus$46,160
    2/7/2011Global Highway LimitedCyprus$36,500
    3/22/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$26,800
    4/4/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$195,000
    5/3/2011Global Highway LimitedCyprus$95,000
    5/16/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$6,500
    5/31/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$70,000
    6/27/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$39,900
    7/27/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$95,000
    10/24/2011Global Highway LimitedCyprus$22,000
    10/25/2011Global Highway LimitedCyprus$9,300
    11/15/2011Global Highway LimitedCyprus$74,000
    11/23/2011Global Highway LimitedCyprus$22,300
    11/29/2011Global Highway LimitedCyprus$6,100
    12/12/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$17,800
    1/17/2012Global Highway LimitedCyprus$29,800
    1/20/2012Global Highway LimitedCyprus$42,600
    2/9/2012Global Highway LimitedCyprus$22,300
    2/23/2012Global Highway LimitedCyprus$75,000
    2/28/2012Global Highway LimitedCyprus$22,300
    3/28/2012PeranovaCyprus$37,500
    4/18/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$50,000
    5/15/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$79,000
    6/5/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$45,000
    6/19/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$11,860
    7/9/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$10,800
    7/18/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$88,000
    8/7/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$48,800
    9/27/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$100,000
    11/20/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$298,000
    12/20/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$55,000
    1/29/2013Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$149,000
    3/12/2013Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$375,000
    8/29/2013Global Endeavour Inc.Grenadines$200,000
    11/13/2013Global Endeavour Inc.Grenadines$75,000
    11/26/2013Global Endeavour Inc.Grenadines$80,000
    12/6/2013Global Endeavour Inc.Grenadines$130,000
    12/12/2013Global Endeavour Inc.Grenadines$90,000
    4/22/2014Global Endeavour Inc.Grenadines$56,293
    8/18/2014Global Endeavour Inc.Grenadines$34,660
    Vendor A Total$5,434,793
    Vendor B (Home Automation, Lighting, and Home Entertainment Company in Florida)3/22/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$12,000
    3/28/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$25,000
    4/27/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$12,000
    5/16/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$25,000
    11/15/2011Global Highway LimitedCyprus$17,006
    11/23/2011Global Highway LimitedCyprus$11,000
    2/28/2012Global Highway LimitedCyprus$6,200
    10/31/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$290,000
    12/17/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$160,600
    1/15/2013Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$194,000
    1/24/2013Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$6,300
    2/12/2013Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$51,600
    2/26/2013Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$260,000
    7/15/2013Pompolo Limited"United Kingdom"$175,575
    11/5/2013Global Endeavour Inc.Grenadines$73,000
    Vendor B Total$1,319,281
    Vendor C (Antique Rug Store in Alexandria, Virginia)10/7/2008Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$15,750
    3/17/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$46,200
    4/16/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$7,400
    4/27/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$65,000
    5/7/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$210,000
    7/15/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$200,000
    3/31/2010Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$140,000
    6/16/2010Global Highway LimitedCyprus$250,000
    Vendor C Total$934,350
    Vendor D (Related to Vendor C)2/28/2012Global Highway LimitedCyprus$100,000
    Vendor D Total$100,000
    Vendor E (Men's Clothing Store in New York)11/7/2008Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$32,000
    2/5/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$22,750
    4/27/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$13,500
    10/26/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$32,500
    3/30/2010Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$15,000
    5/11/2010Global Highway LimitedCyprus$39,000
    6/28/2010Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$5,000
    8/12/2010Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$32,500
    11/17/2010Global Highway LimitedCyprus$11,500
    2/7/2011Global Highway LimitedCyprus$24,000
    3/22/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$43,600
    3/28/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$12,000
    4/27/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$3,000
    6/30/2011Global Highway LimitedCyprus$24,500
    9/26/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$12,000
    11/2/2011Global Highway LimitedCyprus$26,700
    12/12/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$46,000
    2/9/2012Global Highway LimitedCyprus$2,800
    2/28/2012Global Highway LimitedCyprus$16,000
    3/14/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$8,000
    4/18/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$48,550
    5/15/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$7,000
    6/19/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$21,600
    8/7/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$15,500
    11/20/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$10,900
    12/20/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$7,500
    1/15/2013Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$37,000
    2/12/2013Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$7,000
    2/26/2013Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$39,000
    9/3/2013Global Endeavour Inc.Grenadines$81,500
    10/15/2013Global Endeavour Inc.Grenadines$53,000
    11/26/2013Global Endeavour Inc.Grenadines$13,200
    4/24/2014Global Endeavour Inc.Grenadines$26,680
    9/11/2014Global Endeavour Inc.Grenadines$58,435
    Vendor E Total$849,215
    Vendor F (Landscaper in the Hamptons, New York)4/27/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$34,000
    5/12/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$45,700
    6/1/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$21,500
    6/18/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$29,000
    9/21/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$21,800
    5/11/2010Global Highway LimitedCyprus$44,000
    6/28/2010Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$50,000
    7/23/2010Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$19,000
    9/2/2010Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$21,000
    10/6/2010Global Highway LimitedCyprus$57,700
    10/18/2010Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$26,000
    12/16/2010Global Highway LimitedCyprus$20,000
    3/22/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$50,000
    5/3/2011Global Highway LimitedCyprus$40,000
    6/1/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$44,000
    7/27/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$27,000
    8/16/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$13,450
    9/19/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$12,000
    10/24/2011Global Highway LimitedCyprus$42,000
    11/2/2011Global Highway LimitedCyprus$37,350
    Vendor F Total$655,500
    Vendor G (Antique Dealer in New York)9/2/2010Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$165,000
    10/18/2010Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$165,000
    2/28/2012Global Highway LimitedCyprus$190,600
    3/14/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$75,000
    2/26/2013Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$28,310
    Vendor G Total$623,910
    Vendor H (Clothing Store in Beverly Hills, California)6/25/2008LOAV Advisors LimitedCyprus$52,000
    12/16/2008Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$49,000
    12/22/2008Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$10,260
    8/12/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$76,400
    5/11/2010Global Highway LimitedCyprus$85,000
    11/17/2010Global Highway LimitedCyprus$128,280
    5/31/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$64,000
    11/15/2011Global Highway LimitedCyprus$48,000
    12/17/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$7,500
    Vendor H Total$520,440
    Vendor I (Investment Company)9/3/2013Global Endeavour Inc.Grenadines$500,000
    Vendor I Total$500,000
    Vendor J (Contractor in Florida)11/15/2011Global Highway LimitedCyprus$8,000
    12/5/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$11,237
    12/21/2011Black Sea View LimitedCyprus$20,000
    2/9/2012Global Highway LimitedCyprus$51,000
    5/17/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$68,000
    6/19/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$60,000
    7/18/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$32,250
    9/19/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$112,000
    11/30/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$39,700
    1/9/2013Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$25,600
    2/28/2013Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$4,700
    Vendor J Total$432,487
    Vendor K (Landscaper in the Hamptons, New York)12/5/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$4,115
    3/1/2012Global Highway LimitedCyprus$50,000
    6/6/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$47,800
    6/25/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$17,900
    6/27/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$18,900
    2/12/2013Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$3,300
    7/15/2013Pompolo LimitedUnited Kingdom$13,325
    11/26/2013Global Endeavour Inc.Grenadines$9,400
    Vendor K Total$164,740
    Vendor L (Payments Relating to Three Range Rovers)4/12/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$83,525
    5/2/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$12,525
    6/29/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$67,655
    Vendor L Total$163,705
    Vendor M (Contractor in Virginia)11/20/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$45,000
    12/7/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$21,000
    12/17/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$21,000
    1/17/2013Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$18,750
    1/29/2013Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$9,400
    2/12/2013Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$10,500
    Vendor M Total$125,650
    Vendor N (Audio, Video, and Control System Home Integration and Installation Company in the Hamptons, New York)1/29/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$10,000
    3/17/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$21,725
    4/16/2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$24,650
    12/2/2009Global Highway LimitedCyprus$10,000
    3/8/2010Global Highway LimitedCyprus$20,300
    4/23/2010Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$8,500
    7/29/2010Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$17,650
    Vendor N Total$112,825
    Vendor O (Purchase of Mercedes Benz)10/5/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$62,750
    Vendor O Total$62,750
    "Vendor P (Purchase of Range Rover)"12/30/2008Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$47,000
    Vendor P Total$47,000
    Vendor Q (Property Management Company in South Carolina)9/2/2010Yiakora Ventures LimitedCyprus$10,000
    10/6/2010Global Highway LimitedCyprus$10,000
    10/18/2010Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$10,000
    2/8/2011Global Highway LimitedCyprus$13,500
    2/9/2012Global Highway LimitedCyprus$2,500
    Vendor Q Total$46,000
    Vendor R (Art Gallery in Florida)2/9/2011Global Highway LimitedCyprus$17,900
    2/14/2013Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$14,000
    Vendor R Total$31,900
    Vendor S (Housekeeping in New York)9/26/2011Leviathan Advisors LimitedCyprus$5,000
    9/19/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$5,000
    10/9/2013Global Endeavour Inc.Grenadines$10,000
    Vendor S Total$20,000

    16. In 2012, MANAFORT caused the following wires to be sent to the entities listed below to purchase the real estate also listed below. MANAFORT did not report the money used to make these purchases on his 2012 tax return.

    Property PurchasedPayeeDateOriginating AccountCountry of OriginationAmount
    Howard Street Condominium (New York)"DMP International LLC"2/1/2012PeranovaCyprus$1,500,000
    Union Street Brownstone, (New York)Attorney Account Of [Real Estate Attorney]11/29/2012"Actinet Trading Limited"Cyprus$1,800,000
    11/29/2012"Actinet Trading Limited"Cyprus$1,200,000
    Arlington House (Virginia)Real Estate Trust8/31/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$1,900,000
    Total$6,400,000

    17. MANAFORT and GATES also disguised, as purported “loans,” more than $10 million transferred from Cypriot entities, including the overseas MANAFORT—GATES entities, to domestic entities owned by MANAFORT. For example, a $1.5 million wire from Peranova to DMI that MANAFORT used to purchase real estate on Howard Street in Manhattan, New York, was recorded as a “loan” from Peranova to DMI, rather than as income. The following loans were shams designed to reduce fraudulently MANAFORT’s reported taxable income.

    YearPayor / Ostensible "Lender"Payee / Ostensible "Borrower"Country of OriginationTotal Amount of "Loans"
    2008Yiakora Ventures Limited"Jesand Investment Corporation"Cyprus$8,120,000
    2008Yiakora Ventures LimitedDMPCyprus$500,000
    2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedDMPCyprus$694,000
    2009Yiakora Ventures LimitedDaisy Manafort, LLCCyprus$500,000
    2012PeranovaDMICyprus$1,500,000
    2014Telmar Investments Ltd.DMICyprus$900,000
    2015Telmar Investments Ltd.DMICyprus$1,000,000
    Total$13,214,000

    18. From 2010 to 2014, GATES caused the following wires, totaling more than $3,000,000, to be sent to entities and bank accounts of which he was abeneflcial owner or he otherwise controlled. GATES did not report this income on his taX returns.

    PayeeTransaction DateOriginating Account HolderCountry of OriginationAmount of Transaction
    Richard Gates United Kingdom Bank Account A3/26/2010Serangon Holdings LimitedCyprus$85,000
    4/20/2010Serangon Holdings LimitedCyprus$50,000
    5/6/2010Serangon Holdings LimitedCyprus$150,000
    Richard Gates United Kingdom Bank Account B9/7/2010Serangon Holdings LimitedCyprus$160,000
    10/13/2010Serangon Holdings LimitedCyprus$15,000
    Richard Gates United States Bank Account C9/27/2010Global Highway LimitedCyprus$50,000
    2010 Tax Year Total$510,000
    Jemina LLC United States Bank Account D9/9/2011PeranovaCyprus$48,500
    Richard Gates United Kingdom Bank Account B12/16/2011PeranovaCyprus$100,435
    2011 Tax Year Total$148,935
    Richard Gates United Kingdom Bank Account B1/9/2012Global Highway LimitedCyprus$100,000
    1/13/2012PeranovaCyprus$100,435
    2/29/2012Global Highway LimitedCyprus$28,500
    3/27/2012Bletilla Ventures LimitedCyprus$18,745
    4/26/2012Bletilla Ventures LimitedCyprus$26,455
    5/30/2012Bletilla Ventures LimitedCyprus$15,000
    5/30/2012Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$14,650
    6/27/2012Bletilla Ventures LimitedCyprus$18,745
    8/2/2012Bletilla Ventures LimitedCyprus$28,745
    8/30/2012Bletilla Ventures LimitedCyprus$38,745
    9/27/2012Bletilla Ventures LimitedCyprus$32,345
    10/31/2012Bletilla Ventures LimitedCyprus$46,332
    11/20/2012Bletilla Ventures LimitedCyprus$48,547
    11/30/2012Bletilla Ventures LimitedCyprus$38,532
    12/21/2012Bletilla Ventures LimitedCyprus$47,836
    12/28/2012Bletilla Ventures LimitedCyprus$47,836
    2012 Tax Year Total$651,448
    Richard Gates United Kingdom Bank Account B1/11/2013Bletilla Ventures LimitedCyprus$47,836
    1/22/2013Bletilla Ventures LimitedCyprus$34,783
    1/30/2013Bletilla Ventures LimitedCyprus$46,583
    2/22/2013Bletilla Ventures LimitedCyprus$46,233
    2/28/2013Bletilla Ventures LimitedCyprus$46,583
    3/1/2013Bletilla Ventures LimitedCyprus$42,433
    3/15/2013Bletilla Ventures LimitedCyprus$37,834
    4/15/2013Bletilla Ventures LimitedCyprus$59,735
    4/26/2013Bletilla Ventures LimitedCyprus$48,802
    5/17/2013Olivenia Trading LimitedCyprus$57,798
    5/30/2013Actinet Trading LimitedCyprus$45,622
    6/13/2013Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$76,343
    8/7/2013Pompolo Limited"United Kingdom"$250,784
    9/6/2013Lucicle Consultants LimitedCyprus$68,500
    9/13/2013Cypriot AgentCyprus$179,216
    Jemina LLC United States Bank Account D7/8/2013Marziola Holdings LimitedCyprus$72,500
    9/4/2013Marziola Holdings LimitedCyprus$89,807
    10/22/2013Cypriot AgentCyprus$119,844
    11/12/2013Cypriot AgentCyprus$80,000
    12/20/2013Cypriot AgentCyprus$90,000
    2013 Tax Year Total$1,541,237
    Jemina LLC United States Bank Account D2/10/2014Cypriot AgentCyprus$60,044
    4/29/2014Cypriot AgentCyprus$44,068
    10/6/2014Global Endeavour Inc.Grenadines$65,000
    Bade LLC United States Bank Account E11/25/2014Global Endeavour Inc.Grenadines$120,000
    2014 Tax Year Total$289,112

    MANAFORT And GATES’ Hiding Foreign Bank Accounts And False Filings

    19. United States citizens who have authority over certain foreign bank accounts—whether or not the accounts are set up in the names of nominees who act for their principals—have reporting obligations to the United States.

    20. First, the Bank Secrecy Act and its implementing regulations require United States citizens to report to the Treasury any financial interest in, or signatory authority over, any bank account or other financial account held in foreign countries, for every calendar year in which the aggregate balance of all such foreign accounts exceeds $10,000 at any point during the year. This is commonly known as a foreign bank account report or “.”FBAR The Bank Secrecy Act requires these reports because they have a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory investigations or proceedings. The Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) is the custodian for FBAR filings, and FinCEN provides access to its FBAR database to law enforcement entities, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The reports filed by individuals and businesses are used by law enforcement to identify, detect, and deter money laundering that furthers criminal enterprise activity, tax evasion, and other unlawful activities.

    21. Second, United States citizens also are obligated to report information to the IRS regarding foreign bank accounts. For instance, in 2010, Schedule B of IRS Form 1040 had a “Yes” or “No” box to record an answer to the question: “At any time during [the calendar year], did you have an interest in or a signature or other authority over a financial account in a foreign country, such bank account, securities account, or other financial account?” If the answer was “Yes,” then the form required the taxpayer to enter the name of the foreign country in which the financial account was located.

    22. For each year in or about and between 2008 through at least 2014, MANAFORT had authority over foreign accounts that required an FBAR filing. Specifically, MANAFORT was required to report to the Treasury each foreign bank account held by the foreign MANAFORT—GATES entities noted above in paragraph 12 that bears the initials PM. No FBAR filings were made by MANAFORT for these accounts.

    23. For each year in or about and between 2010 through at least 2013, GATES had authority over foreign accounts that required an FBAR filing. Specifically, GATES was required to report to the United States Treasury each foreign bank account held by the foreign MANAFORT—GATES entities noted above in paragraph 12 that bears the initials RG, as well as United Kingdom Bank Accounts A and B noted in paragraph 18. No FBAR filings were made by GATES for these accounts.

    24. Furthermore, in each of MANAFORT’s tax filings for 2008 through 2014, MANAFORT, with the assistance of GATES, represented falsely that he did not have authority over any foreign bank accounts. MANAFORT and GATES had repeatedly and falsely represented in writing to MANAFORT’s tax preparer that MANAFORT had no authority over foreign bank accounts, knowing that such false representations would result in false tax filings in MANAFORT’s name. For instance, on October 4, 201 1, MANAFORT’ s tax preparer asked MANAFORT in writing: “At any time during 2010, did you [or your wife or children] have an interest in or a signature or other authority over a financial account in a foreign country, such as a bank account, securities account or other financial account?” On the same day, MANAFORT falsely responded “NO.” MANAFORT responded the same way as recently as October 3, 2016, when MANAFORT’s tax preparer again emailed the question in connection with the preparation of MANAFORT’s tax returns: “Foreign bank accounts etc?” MANAFORT responded on or about the same day: “NONE.”

    25. In each of GATES’ tax filings for 2010 through 2013, GATES represented falsely that he did not have authority over any foreign bank accounts. GATES had repeatedly and falsely represented to his tax preparers that he had no authority over foreign bank accounts, knowing that such false representations would result in false tax filings. As recently as October 2017, in preparation for his amended 2013 tax filing, GATES was asked by his tax preparer: “Did you have any foreign assets/bank accounts during 2013 or 2014?” to which he responded “no.”

    The Financial Institution Scheme

    26. Between in or around 2015 and the present, both dates being approximate and inclusive, in the Eastern District of Virginia and elsewhere, MANAFORT, GATES, and others devised and intended to devise, and executed and attempted to execute, a scheme and artifice to defraud, and to obtain money and property, by means of false and fraudulent pretenses, representations, and promises, from banks and other financial institutions. As part of the scheme, MANAFORT and GATES repeatedly provided and caused to be provided false information to banks and other lenders, among others.

    MANAFORT And GATES’ Fraud To Access Offshore Money

    27. When they were flush with Ukraine funds, MANAFORT, with the assistance of GATES, used their offshore accounts to purchase and improve real estate in the United States. When the income from Ukraine dwindled in 2014 and 2015, MANAFORT, with the assistance of GATES, obtained millions of dollars in mortgages on the United States properties, thereby allowing MANAFORT to have the benefits of liquid income without paying taxes on it. MANAFORT and GATES defrauded the lenders in various ways, including by lying about MANAFORT’s and DMI’s income, lying about their debt, and lying about MANAFORT’s use of the property and the loan proceeds. For example, MANAFORT and GATES submitted fabricated profit and loss statements (P&Ls) that inflated income, and they caused others to provide doctored financial documents.

    A. The Loan From Lender A On The Union Street Property

    28. In 2012, MANAFORT, through a corporate vehicle called “MC Brooklyn Holdings, LLC” owned by him and his family, bought a brownstone on Union Street in the Carroll Gardens section of Brooklyn, New York. He paid approximately $3,000,000 in cash for the property. All of that money came from a MANAFORT—GATES entity in Cyprus. After purchase of the property, MANAFORT began renovations to transform it from a multi-family dwelling into a single-family home. MANAFORT used proceeds of a 2015 loan obtained from a financial institution to make the renovations. In order to obtain that loan, MANAFORT falsely represented to the bank that he did not derive more than 50% of his income/wealth from a country outside the United States.

    29. In late 2015 through early 2016, MANAFORT sought to borrow cash against the Union Street property from Lender A. Lender A provided greater loan amounts for “construction loans”—that is, loans that required the loan funds to be used to pay solely for construction on the property and thus increase the value of the property serving as the loan’s collateral. The institution would thus loan money against the expected completed value of the property, which in the case of the Union Street property was estimated to be $8,000,000. In early 2016, MANAFORT was able to obtain a loan of approximately $5,000,000, after promising Lender A that approximately $1,400,000 of the loan would be used solely for construction on the Union Street property. MANAFORT never intended to limit use of the proceeds to construction as required by the loan contracts and never did. In December 2015, before the loan was made, MANAFORT wrote his tax preparer, among others, that the “construction mortgage will allow me to pay back [another Manafort apartment] mortgage in full. . . Further, when the construction loan closed, MANAFORT used hundreds of thousands of dollars for purposes unrelated to the construction of the property

    B. The Loan From Lender B On The Howard Street Property

    30. In 2012, MANAFORT, through a corporate vehicle called “MC Soho Holdings, LLC” owned by him and his family, bought a condominium on Howard Street in the Soho neighborhood of Manhattan, New York. He paid approximately $2,850,000. All the money used to purchase the condominium came from MANAFORT—GATES entities in Cyprus. MANAFORT used the property from at least January 2015 through at least August 2017 as an income-generating rental property, charging thousands of dollars a week on Airbnb, among other places. On his tax returns, MANAFORT took advantage of the beneficial tax consequences of owning this rental property.

    31. In late 2015 through early 2016, MANAFORT applied for a mortgage on the Howard Street condominium from Lender B for approximately $3.4 million. Because the bank would permit a greater loan amount if the property were owner-occupied, MANAFORT falsely represented to the lender and its agents that it was a secondary home used as such by his daughter and son-in-law and was not held as a rental property. In an email on January 6, 2016, MANAFORT noted: “[i]n order to have the maximum benefit, I am claiming Howard St. as a second home. Not an investment property.” Later, on January 26, 2016, MANAFORT wrote to his son-in-law to advise him that when the bank appraiser came to assess the condominium, his son-in-law should “[r]emember, he believes that you and [MANAFORT’s daughter] are living there.”

    32. MANAFORT, with GATES’ assistance, also made a series of false and fraudulent representations to the bank in order to secure the millions of dollars in financing. For example, MANAFORT falsely represented the amount of debt he had by failing to disclose on his loan application the existence of the Lender A mortgage on his Union Street property. That liability would have risked his qualifying for the loan. Through its own due diligence, Lender B found evidence of the existing mortgage on the Union Street property. As a result, Lender B wrote to MANAFORT and GATES that the “application has the following properties as being owned free & clear . . . Union Street,” but “[b]ased on the insurance binders that we received last night, we are showing that there are mortgages listed on these properties, can you please clarify[?]”

    33. To cover up the falsity of the loan application, GATES, on MANAFORT’s behalf, caused an insurance broker to provide Lender B false information, namely, an outdated insurance report that did not list the Union Street loan. MANAFORT and GATES knew such a representation was fraudulent. After GATES contacted the insurance broker and asked her to provide Lender B with false information, he updated MANAFORT by email on February 24, 2016. MANAFORT replied to GATES, on the same day: “good job on the insurance issues.”

    34. MANAFORT and GATES submitted additional false and fraudulent statements to Lender B. For example, MANAFORT submitted 2014 DMI tax returns to support his 2016 loan application to Lender B. Those tax returns included as a purported liability a $1.5 million loan from Peranova. Peranova was a Cypriot entity controlled by MANAFORT and GATES. On or about February 1, 2012, Peranova transferred $1.5 million to a DMI account in the United States, denominating the transfer as a loan so that MANAFORT would not have to declare the money as income. MANAFORT used the “loan” to acquire the Howard Street property.

    35. When MANAFORT needed to obtain a loan from Lender B, the existence of the Peranova “loan” undermined his creditworthiness. As a result of the listed Peranova liability, Lender B was not willing to make the loan to MANAFORT. To circumvent this issue, MANAFORT and GATES caused MANAFORT’ S tax accountant to send to Lender B back-dated documentation that falsely stated that the $1.5 million Peranova loan had been forgiven in 2015, and falsely inflated income for 2015 to mask MANAFORT’s 2015 drop in income.

    36. In March 2016, Lender B approved the loan in the amount of approximately $3.4 million (the $3.4 million loan).

    C. The Loan From Lender C

    37. In approximately February 2016, MANAFORT applied for a business loan from Lender C. MANAFORT made a series of false statements to Lender C. For example, MANAFORT submitted a false statement of assets and liabilities that failed to disclosed the Lender A loan on the Union Street property and misrepresented, among other things, the amount of the mortgage on the Howard Street property.

    38. Further, in approximately March 2016, MANAFORT and GATES submitted a doctored 2015 DMI P&L that overstated DMI’s 2015 income by more than $4 million. GATES asked DMI’s bookkeeper to send him a “Word Document version of the 2015 P&L for [DMI]” because MANAFORT wanted GATES “to add the accrual revenue which we have not received in order to send to [Lender C] The bookkeeper said she could send a .pdf version of the P&L. GATES then asked the bookkeeper to increase the DMI revenue, falsely claiming that: “[w]e have $2.4m in accrued revenue that [MANAFORT] wants added to the [DMI] 2015 income. Can you make adjustments on your end and then just send me a new scanned version[?]” The bookkeeper refused since the accounting method DMI used did not permit recording income before it was actually received.

    39. Having failed to secure a falsified P&L from the bookkeeper, GATES falsified the P&L. GATES wrote to MANAFORT and another conspirator, “I am editing Paul’s 2015 P&L statement.” GATES then sent the altered P&L to Lender C, which claimed approximately $4.45 million in net income, whereas the true P&L had less than $400,000 in net income.

    D. The Loan From Lender B On The Union Street Property

    40. In March 2016, MANAFORT, with the assistance of GATES and others, applied for a $5.5 million loan from Lender B on the Union Street property. As part of the loan process, MANAFORT submitted a false statement of assets and liabilities that hid his prior loan from Lender A on the Union Street property, among other liabilities. In addition, another conspirator on MANAFORT’s behalf submitted a falsified 2016 DMI P&L. The falsified 2016 DMI P&L overstated DMI’s income by more than $2 million, which was the amount that Lender B told MANAFORT he needed to qualify for the loan. When the document was first submitted to Lender B, a conspirator working at Lender B replied: “Looks Dr’d. Can’t someone just do a clean excel doc and pdf to me??” A subsequent version was submitted to the bank.

    E. The Loans From Lender D On The Bridgehamoton And Union Street Properties

    41. In 2016, MANAFORT sought a mortgage on property in Bridgehampton, New York from a financial institution. In connection with his application, MANAFORT falsely represented to the bank that DMI would be receiving $2.4 million in income later in the year for work on a “democratic development consulting project.” To support this representation, GATES, on MANAFORT’s behalf, provided the bank with a fake invoice for $2.4 million, directed “To Whom It May Concern,” for “[s]ervices rendered per the consultancy agreement pertaining to the parliamentary elections.” The bank, unwilling to rely on the invoice to support MANAFORT’s stated 2016 income, requested additional information. The bank was unable to obtain satisfactory support for the stated income, and the loan application was denied.

    42. MANAFORT applied to a second bank, Lender D. Between approximately July 2016 and January 2017, MANAFORT, with the assistance of GATES, sought and secured approximately $16,000,000 in two loans from Lender D. MANAFORT used the Bridgeharnpton property as collateral for one loan, and the Union Street property for the other.

    43. MANAFORT and GATES made numerous false and fraudulent representations to secure the loans. For example, MANAFORT provided the bank with doctored P&Ls for DMI for both 2015 and 2016, overstating its income by millions of dollars. The doctored 2015 DMI P&L submitted to Lender D was the same false statement previously submitted to Lender C, which overstated DMI’s income by more than $4 million. The doctored 2016 DMI P&L was inflated by MANAFORT by more than $3.5 million. To create the false 2016 P&L, on or about October 21, 2016, MANAFORT emailed GATES a .pdf version of the real 2016 DMI P&L, which showed a loss of more than $600,000. GATES converted that .pdf into a “Word” document so that it could be edited, which GATES sent back to MANAFORT. MANAFORT altered that “Word” document by adding more than $3 .5 million in income. He then sent this falsified P&L to GATES and asked that the “Word” document be converted back to a .pdf, which GATES did and returned to MANAFORT. MANAFORT then sent the falsified 2016 DMI P&L .pdf to Lender D.

    44. In addition, Lender D questioned MANAFORT about a $300,000 delinquency on his American Express card, which was more than 90 days past due. The delinquency significantly affected MANAFORT’s credit rating score. MANAFORT falsely represented to Lender D that he had lent his credit card to a friend, GATES, who had incurred the charges and had not reimbursed him. MANAFORT supplied Lender D a letter from GATES that falsely stated that GATES had borrowed MANAFORT’s credit card to make the purchases at issue and would pay him back by a date certain.

    Statutory Allegations

    COUNTS ONE THROUGH FIVE
    (Subscribing to False United States Individual Income Tax Returns For 20 10—20 14 Tax Years)

    45. Paragraphs 1 through 44 are incorporated here.

    46. On or about the dates specified below, in the Eastern District of Virginia and elsewhere, defendant PAUL J. MANAFORT, JR., willfully and knowingly did make and subscribe, and aid and abet and cause to be made and subscribed, United States Individual Income Tax Returns, Forms 1040 and Schedule B, for the tax years set forth below, which returns contained and were verified by the written declaration of MANAFORT that they were made under penalties of perjury, and which returns MANAFORT did not believe to be true and correct as to every material matter, in that the returns (a) claimed that MANAFORT did not have a financial interest in and signature and other authority over a financial account in a foreign country and (b) failed to report income, whereas MANAFORT then and there well knew and believed that he had a financial interest in, and signature and other authority over, bank accounts in a foreign country and had earned total income in excess of the reported amounts noted below:

    COUNTTAX YEARAPPROX. FILING DATEFOREIGN ACCOUNT REPORTED (Sch. B, Line 7a)TOTAL INCOME REPORTED (Line 22)
    12010October 14, 2011None$504,744
    22011October 15, 2012None$3,071,409
    32012October 7, 2013None$5,361,007
    42013October 6, 2014None$1,910,928
    52014October 14, 2015None$2,984,210

    (26 U.S.C. § 7206(1); 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 3551etseg.)

    COUNTS SIX THROUGH TEN
    (Assisting in the Preparation of False United States Individual Income Tax Returns For 20 10—20 14 Tax Years)

    47. Paragraphs 1 through 44 are incorporated here.

    48. On or about the dates specified below, in the Eastern District of Virginia and elsewhere, defendant RICHARD W. GATES III willfully and knowingly did aid and assist in, and procure, counsel, and advise the preparation and presentation to the Internal Revenue Service, of a United States Individual Income Tax Return, Form 1040 and Schedule B, of PAUL J. MANAFORT, JR., for the tax years set forth below, which returns were false and fraudulent as to a material matter, in that the returns (a) claimed that MANAFORT did not have a financial interest in, and signature and other authority over, a financial account in a foreign country and (b) failed to report income, whereas GATES then and there well knew and believed that MANAFORT had a financial interest in, and signature and other authority over, bank accounts in a foreign country and had earned total income in excess of the reported amounts noted below:

    (26 U.S.C. § 7206(2); 18 U.S.C. §3551etseg.)

    COUNTS ELEVEN THROUGH FOURTEEN (Failure To File Reports Of Foreign Bank And Financial Accounts For Calendar Years 201 1—20 14)

    49. Paragraphs 1 through 44 are incorporated here.

    50. On the filing due dates listed below, in the Eastern District of Virginia and elsewhere, defendant PAUL J. MANAFORT, JR., unlawfully, willfully, and knowingly did fail to file with the Treasury an FBAR disclosing that he had a financial interest in, and signature and other authority over, a bank, securities, and other financial account in a foreign country, which had an aggregate value of more than $10,000 in a 12-month period, during the years listed below:

    COUNTYEARDUE DATE TO FILE FBAR
    112011June 29, 2012
    122012June 30, 2013
    132013June 30, 2014
    142014June 30, 2015

    (31 U.S.C. §§ 5314 and 5322(a); 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 3551etseg.)

    COUNTS FIFTEEN THROUGH NINETEEN
    (Subscribing to False United States Individual Income Tax Returns For 20 10—20 14 Tax Years)

    51. Paragraphs 1 through 44 are incorporated here.

    52. On or about the dates specified below, in the Eastern District of Virginia and elsewhere, defendant RICHARD W. GATES III willfully and knowingly did make and subscribe, and aid and abet and cause to be made and subscribed, United States Individual Income Tax Returns, Forms 1040 and Schedule B, for the tax years set forth below, which returns contained and were verified by the written declaration of defendant GATES that they were made under penalties of perjury, and which returns defendant GATES did not believe to be true and correct as to every material matter, in that the returns (a) claimed that GATES did not have a financial interest in, and signature and other authority over, a financial account in a foreign country and (b) failed to report income, whereas GATES then and there well knew and believed that he had a financial interest in, and signature and other authority over, a financial account in a foreign country and had earned total income in excess of the reported amounts noted below:

    COUNTTAX YEARAPPROX. FILING DATEFOREIGN ACCOUNT REPORTED (Sch. B, Line 7a)TOTAL INCOME REPORTED (Line 22)
    152010July 26,2011None$194,257
    162011October 11, 2012None$250,307
    172012October 15, 2013None$365,646
    182013October15,2014None$307,363
    192014October 14, 2015None$292,892

    (26 U.S.C. § 7206(1); 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 3551 et seq.)

    COUNT TWENTY
    (Subscribing to a False Amended United States Individual Income Tax Return For 2013 Tax Year)

    53. Paragraphs 1 through 44 are incorporated here.

    54. On or about October 25, 2017, in the Eastern District of Virginia and elsewhere, defendant RICHARD W. GATES III willfully and knowingly did make and subscribe, and aid and abet and cause another to make and subscribe, a United States Individual Income Tax Return, Form 1040X, for the 2013 tax year, which return contained and was verified by the written declaration of defendant GATES that it was made under penalties of perjury, and which return defendant GATES did not believe to be true and correct as to every material matter, in that the return failed to report income, whereas GATES then and there well knew and believed that he had earned adjusted gross income in excess of the reported amount on Line 1C, to wit: $292,055.

    (26 U.S.C. § 7206(1); 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 3551 et seq.)

    COUNTS TWENTY-ONE THROUGH TWENTY-THREE
    (Failure To File Reports Of Foreign Bank And Financial Accounts For Calendar Years 201 1—2013)

    55. Paragraphs 1 through 44 are incorporated here.

    56. On the filing due dates listed below, in the Eastern District of Virginia and elsewhere, defendant RICHARD W. GATES III unlawfully, willfully, and knowingly did fail to file with the Treasury an FBAR disclosing that he had a financial interest in, and signature authority over, a bank, securities, and other financial account in a foreign country, which had an aggregate value of more than $10,000 in a 12-month period, during the years listed below:

    COUNTYEARDUE DATE TO FILE FBAR
    212011June 29, 2012
    222012June 30, 2013
    232013June 30, 2014

    (31U.S.C. §§ 5314 and 5322(a); 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 3551 et seq.)

    COUNT TWENTY-FOUR
    (Bank Fraud Conspiracy / Lender B / $3.4 million loan)

    57. Paragraphs 1 through 44 are incorporated here.

    58. On or about and between December 2015 and March 2016, both dates being approximate and inclusive, in the Eastern District of Virginia and elsewhere, defendants PAUL J. MANAFORT, JR., and RICHARD W. GATES III did knowingly and intentionally conspire to execute a scheme and artifice to defraud one or more financial institutions, to wit: Lender B, the deposits of which were insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and to obtain moneys, funds, and credits owned by and under the custody and control of such financial institution by means of materially false and fraudulent pretenses, representations, and promises, contrary to Title 18, United States Code, Section 1344.

    COUNT TWENTY-FIVE
    (18 U.S.C.§§1349 and 3551etseg.)

    (Bank Fraud / Lender B / $3.4 million loan)

    59. Paragraphs 1 through 44 are incorporated here.

    60. On or about and between December 2015 and March 2016, both dates being approximate and inclusive, in the Eastern District of Virginia and elsewhere, defendants PAUL J. MANAFORT, JR., and RICHARD W. GATES III did knowingly and intentionally execute and attempt to execute a scheme and artifice to defraud one or more financial institutions, to wit: Lender B, the deposits of which were insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and to obtain moneys, funds, and credits owned by and under the custody and control of such financial institution by means of materially false and fraudulent pretenses, representations, and promises.

    (18 U.S.C. §§ 1344, 2, and 3551etseg.)

    COUNT TWENTY-SIX
    (Bank Fraud Conspiracy / Lender C / $1 million loan)

    61. Paragraphs 1 through 44 are incorporated here.

    62. On or about and between March 2016 and May 2016, both dates being approximate and inclusive, in the Eastern District of Virginia and elsewhere, defendants PAUL J. MANAFORT, JR., and RICHARD W. GATES III did knowingly and intentionally conspire to execute a scheme and artifice to defraud one or more financial institutions, to wit: Lender C, the deposits of which were insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and to obtain moneys, funds, and credits owned by and under the custody and control of such financial institution by means of materially false and fraudulent pretenses, representations, and promises, contrary to Title 18, United States Code, Section 1344.

    (18 U.S.C.§§1349 and 3551etseg.)

    COUNT TWENTY-SEVEN
    (Bank Fraud / Lender C / $1 million loan)

    63. Paragraphs 1 through 44 are incorporated here.

    64. On or about and between December 2015 and March 2016, both dates being approximate and inclusive, in the Eastern District of Virginia and elsewhere, defendants PAUL J. MANAFORT, JR., and RICHARD W. GATES III did knowingly and intentionally execute and attempt to execute a scheme and artifice to defraud one or more financial institutions, to wit: Lender C, the deposits of which were insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and to obtain moneys, funds, and credits owned by and under the custody and control of such financial institution by means of materially false and fraudulent pretenses, representations, and promises.

    (18 U.S.C. §§ 1344, 2, and 3551etseg.)

    COUNT TWENTY-EIGHT
    (Bank Fraud Conspiracy / Lender B / $5.5 million loan)

    65. Paragraphs 1 through 44 are incorporated here.

    66. On or about and between March 2016 and August 2016, both dates being approximate and inclusive, in the Eastern District of Virginia and elsewhere, defendants PAUL J. MANAFORT, JR., and RICHARD W. GATES III did knowingly and intentionally conspire to execute a scheme and artifice to defraud one or more financial institutions, to wit: Lender B, the deposits of which were insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and to obtain moneys, funds, and credits owned by and under the custody and control of such financial institution by means of materially false and fraudulent pretenses, representations, and promises, contrary to Title 18, United States Code, Section 1344.

    (18 U.S.C.§§1349 and 3551 et seq.)

    COUNT TWENTY-NINE
    (Bank Fraud Conspiracy / Lender D / $9.5 million loan)

    67. Paragraphs 1 through 44 are incorporated here.

    68. On or about and between April 2016 and November 2016, both dates being approximate and inclusive, in the Eastern District of Virginia and elsewhere, defendants PAUL J. MANAFORT, JR., and RICHARD W. GATES III did knowingly and intentionally conspire to execute a scheme and artifice to defraud one or more financial institutions, to wit: Lender D, the deposits of which were insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and to obtain moneys, funds, and credits owned by and under the custody and control of such financial institution by means of materially false and fraudulent pretenses, representations, and promises, contrary to Title 18, United States Code, Section 1344.

    (18 U.S.C.§§1349 and 3551 et seq.)

    COUNT THIRTY
    (Bank Fraud / Lender D / $9.5 million loan)

    69. Paragraphs 1 through 44 are incorporated here.

    70. On or about and between April 2016 and November 2016, both dates being approximate and inclusive, in the Eastern District of Virginia and elsewhere, defendants PAUL J. MANAFORT, JR., and RICHARD W. GATES III did knowingly and intentionally execute and attempt to execute a scheme and artifice to defraud one or more financial institutions, to wit: Lender D, the deposits of which were insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and to obtain moneys, funds, and credits owned by and under the custody and control of such financial institution by means of materially false and fraudulent pretenses, representations, and promises.

    (18 U.S.C.§1344, 2, and 3551etseg.)

    COUNT THIRTY-ONE
    (Bank Fraud Conspiracy / Lender D / $6.5 million loan)

    71. Paragraphs 1 through 44 are incorporated here.

    72. On or about and between April 2016 and January 2017, both dates being approximate and inclusive, in the Eastern District of Virginia and elsewhere, defendants PAUL J. MANAFORT, JR., and RICHARD W. GATES III did knowingly and intentionally conspire to execute a scheme and artifice to defraud one or more financial institutions, to wit: Lender D, the deposits of which were insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and to obtain moneys, funds, and credits owned by and under the custody and control of such financial institution by means of materially false and fraudulent pretenses, representations, and promises, contrary to Title 18, United States Code, Section 1344.

    (18 U.S.C.§§1349 and 3551 et seq.)

    COUNT THIRTY-TWO
    (Bank Fraud / Lender D / $6.5 million loan)

    73. Paragraphs 1 through 44 are incorporated here.

    74. On or about and between April 2016 and January 2017, both dates being approximate and inclusive, in the Eastern District of Virginia and elsewhere, defendants PAUL J. MANAFORT, JR., and RICHARD W. GATES III did knowingly and intentionally execute and attempt to execute a scheme and artifice to defraud one or more financial institutions, to wit: Lender D, the deposits of which were insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and to obtain moneys, funds, and credits owned by and under the custody and control of such financial institution by means of materially false and fraudulent pretenses, representations, and promises.

    (18 U.S.C. §§ 1344, 2, and 3551 et seq.)

    FORFEITURE NOTICE

    75. Pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2, notice is hereby given to the defendants that the United States will seek forfeiture as part of any sentence in accordance with Title 18, United States Code, Section 982(a)(2), in the event of the defendants’ convictions under Counts Twenty-Four through Thirty-Two of this Superseding Indictment. Upon conviction of the offenses charged in Counts Twenty-Four through Thirty-Two, defendants PAUL J. MANAFORT, JR., and RICHARD W. GATES III shall forfeit to the United States any property constituting, or derived from, proceeds obtained, directly or indirectly, as a result of such Violation(s). Notice is further given that, upon conviction, the United States intends to seek a judgment against each defendant for a sum of money representing the property described in this paragraph, as applicable to each defendant (to be offset by the forfeiture of any specific property).

    76. The grand jury finds probable cause to believe that the property subject to forfeiture by PAUL J. MANAFORT, JR., includes, but is not limited to, the following listed assets:

    a. All funds held in account number XXXXXX0969 at Lender D, and any property traceable thereto.

    Substitute Assets

    77. If any of the property described above as being subject to forfeiture, as a result of any act or omission of any defendant

    a. cannot be located upon the exercise of due diligence;

    b. has been transferred or sold to, or deposited with, a third party;

    c. has been placed beyond the jurisdiction of the court;

    d. has been substantially diminished in value; or

    e. has been commingled with other property that cannot be subdivided without difficulty;

    it is the intent of the United States of America, pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 982(b) and Title 28, United States Code, Section 2461(c), incorporating Title 21, United States Code, Section 853, to seek forfeiture of any other property of said defendant.

    (18 U.S.C. § 982)

    Robert S. Mueller, III
    Special Counsel
    Department of Justice

    U.S. v. Alex van der Zwaan

    Criminal information in the case against Alex van der Zwaan

    INFORMATION

    The Special Counsel informs the Court:

    False Statements

    On November 3, 2017, the defendant, ALEX VAN DER ZWAAN, did willfully and knowingly make materially false, fictitious, and fraudulent statements and representations in a matter within the jurisdiction 0f the executive branch of the Government of the United States, to wit, the defendant falsely stated and represented to the Special Counsel’s Office, including Special Agents 0fthe Federal Bureau of Investigation, in Washington, DC, in the course of answering questions concerning his work as an attorney employed by a law firm engaged in 2012 by the Ukraine Ministry of Justice to prepare a report on the trial of Yulia Tymoshenko:

    (i) his last communication with Richard W. Gates III was in mid-August 2016 (which consisted of an innocuous text message) and his last communication with Person A was in 2014 (when VAN DER ZWAAN and Person A discussed Person A’s family); and

    (ii) he did not know why an email between him and Person A in September 2016 was not produced to the Special Counsel’s Office, when in fact, as he then and there well knew and believed:

    (i) , in or about September 2016, he spoke with both Gates and Person A regarding the Report, and surreptitiously recorded the calls; and

    (ii) he deleted and otherwise did not produce emails sought by the Special Counsel’s Office and Law Firm A, including the email between Person A and him in September 2016.

    Title 18 United States Code Section 1001 a 2

    ROBERT S. MUELLER, III
    Special Counsel

    By:
    Andrew Weissmann
    Greg D. Andres
    Kyle Freeny
    Brian M. Richardson
    Senior/Assistant Special Counsel

    Alex van der Zwaan Plea Agreement

    Dear Counsel:

    This letter sets forth the full and complete plea offer to your client Alex van der Zwaan, hereinafter referred to as “your client" or “defendant”), from the Special Counsel's Office (hereinafter also referred to as “the Government" or “this Office”). If your client accepts the terms and conditions of this offer, please have your client execute this document in the space provided below. Upon receipt of the executed document, this letter will become the Plea Agreement (hereinafter referred to as “this Agreement"). The terms of the offer are as follows;

    1. Charges and Statutory Penalties

    Your client agrees to waive indictment, plead guilty to a Criminal Information, a copy of which is attached, charging your client with one count of making false statements to the Special Counsel’s Office, including Special Agents with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2).

    Your client understands that a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 carries a maximum sentence of 5 years’ imprisonment; a fine of $250,000, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3571(b)(3); a term of supervised release of not more than 3 years, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b)(2); and an obligation to pay any applicable interest or penalties on fines and restitution not timely made.

    In addition, your client agrees to pay a mandatory special assessment of $100 per felony conviction to the Clerk of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia before sentencing. Your client also understands that. pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3572 and § SE12 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, Guidelines Manual (2016) (hereinafter “Sentencing Guidelines," “Guidelines," or “U.S.S.G.”), the Court may also impose a fine that is sufficient to pay the federal government the costs of any imprisonment, term of supervised release, and period of probation.

    2. Plea

    Your client understands and acknowledges that this Agreement and any plea of guilty which your client may enter pursuant to this Agreement are contingent upon the entry of a guilty plea by the defendant in this case. If your client fails to enter a guilty plea, this Agreement and any proceedings pursuant to this Agreement may be withdrawn or voided in whole or in part at the option of this Office.

    3. Factual Stipulations

    Your client agrees that the attached Statement of the Offense fairly and accurately describes your client’s actions and involvement in the offense to which your client is pleading guilty. Please have your client sign and return the Statement of the Offense as a written proffer of evidence, along with this Agreement.

    4. Additional Charges

    In consideration of your client’s guilty plea to the above offense, your client will not be further prosecuted criminally by this Office for the conduct set forth in the attached Statement of the Offense, for any other false statements made by him to the Office on November 3 and December 1, 2017, any destruction, deletion, and withholding of documents and evidence in connection with requests by this Office or his law firm, and any violations of the Foreign Agent Registration Act or other law arising from the preparation and/or roll out of the Tymoshenko report for the Ukraine Ministry of Justice.

    5. Sentencing Guidelines Analysis

    Your client understands that the sentence in this case will be determined by the Court, pursuant to the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), including a consideration of the applicable guidelines and policies set forth in the Sentencing Guidelines. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(B), and to assist the Court in determining the appropriate sentence, the parties agree to the following:

    A. Estimated Offense Level Under the Guidelines

    The parties agree that the following Sentencing Guidelines sections apply:

    U.S.S.G. §2Bl .1(a)(2)Base Offense Level:6
    Total:6
    B. Acceptance of Responsibility

    The Government agrees that a 2-levei reduction will be appropriate, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1 .1, provided that your client clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility, to the satisfaction of the Government, through your client’s allocution, adherence to every provision of this Agreement, and conduct between entry of the plea and imposition of sentence. Nothing in this Agreement limits the right of the Government to seek denial of the adjustment for acceptance of responsibility, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 31111, and/or imposition of an adjustment for obstruction of justice, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3Cl.l. regardless of any agreement set forth above, should your client move to withdraw your client’s guilty plea after it is entered, or should it be determined by the Government that your client has either (a) engaged in conduct, unknown to the Government at the time of the signing of this Agreement, that constitutes obstruction of justice, (b) engaged in additional criminal conduct after signing this Agreement, or (0) taken any other action inconsistent with acceptance of responsibility.

    In accordance with the above, the applicable Guidelines Offense Level will be at least 4.

    C. Estimated Criminal History Category

    Based upon the information now available to this Office. your client has no criminal convictions.

    Accordingly your client is estimated to have zero criminal history points and your client’s Criminal History Category is estimated to be 1. Your client acknowledges that if additional convictions are discovered during the pre-sentence investigation by the United States Probation Office, your client’s criminal history points may increase.

    D. Estimated Applicable Guidelines Range

    Based upon the agreed total offense level and the estimated criminal history category set forth above, your client’s estimated Sentencing Guidelines range is zero months to six months’ imprisonment (the “Estimated Guidelines Range”). In addition, the parties agree that, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2, should the Court impose a fine, at Guidelines level 4, the estimated applicable fine range is $500 to $9,500. Your client reserves the right to ask the Court not to impose any applicable fine.

    The parties agree that, solely for the purposes of calculating the applicable range under the Sentencing Guidelines, a downward departure from the Estimated Guidelines Range set forth above is not warranted. Accordingly, the defendant will not seek any departure or adjustment to the Estimated Guidelines Range, nor will he suggest that the Court consider such a departure or adjustment, except as provided above. Moreover, your client understands and acknowledges that the Estimated Guidelines Range agreed to by the parties is not binding on the Probation Office or the Court. Should the Court determine that a different guidelines range is applicable, your client will not be permitted to withdraw your client's guilty plea on that basis, and the Government and your client will still be bound by this Agreement.

    Your client understands and acknowledges that the terms of this section apply only to conduct that occurred before the execution of this Agreement. Should your client commit any conduct after the execution of this Agreement that would form the basis for an increase in your client’s base offense level or justify an upward departure (examples of which include, but are not limited to, obstruction of justice, failure to appear for a court proceeding, criminal conduct while pending sentencing, and false statements to law enforcement agents, the probation officer, or the Own), the Government is free under this Agreement to seek an increase in the base offense level based on that post-agreement conduct.

    6. Agreement as to Sentencing Allocution

    Based upon the information known to the Government at the time of the signing of this Agreement, the parties further agree that a sentence within the Estimated Guidelines Range would constitute a reasonable sentence in light of all of the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 355 3(a), should such a sentence be subject to appellate review notwithstanding the appeal waiver provided below.

    7. Reservation of Allocution

    The Government and your client reserve the right to describe fully, both orally and in writing, to the sentencing judge, the nature and seriousness of your client’s misconduct, including any misconduct not described in the charges to which your client is pleading guilty.

    The parties also reserve the right to inform the presentence report writer and the Court of any relevant facts, to dispute any factual inaccuracies in the presentence report, and to contest any matters not provided for in this Agreement. In the event that the Court considers any Sentencing Guidelines adjustments, departures, or calculations different from any agreements contained in this Agreement, or contemplates a sentence outside the Guidelines range based upon the general sentencing factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the parties reserve the right to answer any related inquiries from the Court. In addition, if in this Agreement the parties have agreed to recommend or refrain from recommending to the Court a particular resolution of any sentencing issue, the parties reserve the right to full allocution in any post-sentence litigation. The parties retain the full right of allocution in connection with any post-sentence motion which may be filed in this matter and/or any proceeding(s) before the Bureau of Prisons. In addition, your client acknowledges that the Government is not obligated and currently does not intend to file any post—sentence downward departure motion in this case pursuant to Rule 35(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.

    8. Court Not Bound by this Agreement or the Sentencing Guidelines

    Your client understands that the sentence in this case will be imposed in accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), upon consideration of the Sentencing Guidelines. Your client further understands that the sentence to be imposed is a matter solely within the discretion of the Court. Your client acknowledges that the Court is not obligated to follow any recommendation of the Government at the time of sentencing or to grant a downward departure based on your client's substantial assistance to the Government, even if the Government files a motion pursuant to Section 5Kl.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines. Your client understands that neither the Government’s recommendation nor the Sentencing Guidelines are binding on the Court.

    Your client acknowledges that your client’s entry of a guilty plea to the charged offense authorizes the Court to impose any sentence, up to and including the statutory maximum sentence, which may be greater than the applicable Guidelines range. The Government cannot, and does not, make any promise or representation as to what sentence your client will receive. Moreover, it is understood that your client will have no right to withdraw your client’s plea of guilty should the Court impose a sentence that is outside the Guidelines range or if the Court does not follow the Government’s sentencing recommendation. The Government and your client will be bound by this Agreement, regardless of the sentence imposed by the Court. Any effort by your client to withdraw the guilty plea because of the length of the sentence shall constitute a breach of this Agreement.

    9. Waivers

    A. Venue

    Your client waives any challenge to venue in the District of Columbia.

    B. Statute of Limitations

    Your client agrees that, should the conviction following your client’s plea of guilty pursuant to this Agreement be vacated for any reason, any prosecution, based on the conduct set forth in the attached Statement of the Offense, that is not time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations on the date of the signing of this Agreement (including any counts that the Government has agreed not to prosecute or to dismiss at sentencing pursuant to this Agreement) may be commenced or reinstated against your client, notwithstanding the expiration of the statute of limitations between the signing of this Agreement and the commencement or reinstatement of such prosecution. It is the intent of this Agreement to waive all defenses based on the statute of limitations with respect to any prosecution of conduct set forth in the attached Statement of the Offense that is not time-barred on the date that this Agreement is signed.

    C. Trial Rights

    Your client understands that by pleading guilty in this case your client agrees to waive certain rights afforded by the Constitution of the United States and/or by statute or rule your client agrees to forego the right to any further discovery or disclosures of information not already provided at the time of the entry of your client’s guilty plea. Your client also agrees to waive, among other rights, the right to be indicted by a Grand Jury, the right to plead not guilty, and the right to a jury trial. If there were a jury trial, your client would have the right to be represented by counsel, to confront and cross-examine witnesses against your client, to challenge the admissibility of evidence offered against your client, to compel witnesses to appear for the purpose of testifying and presenting other evidence on your client’s behalf, and to choose whether to testify. If there were a jury trial and your client chose not to testify at that trial, your client would have the right to have the jury instructed that your client’s failure to testify could not be held against your client. Your client would further have the right to have the jury instructed that your client is presumed innocent until proven guilty, and that the burden would be on the United States to prove your client’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. If your client were found guilty after a trial, your client would have the right to appeal your client’s conviction. Your client understands that the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States protects your client from the use of compelled self-incriminating statements in a criminal prosecution. By entering a plea of guilty, your client knowingly and voluntarily waives or gives up your client’s right against compelled self-incrimination.

    Your client acknowledges discussing with you Rule 11(f) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and Rule 410 of the Federal Rules Evidence, which ordinarily limit the admissibility of statements made by a defendant in the course of plea discussions or plea proceedings if a guilty plea is later withdrawn. Your client knowingly and voluntarily hereby waives the rights that arise under these rules, or from the proffer agreement dated December 1, 2017, to object to the Government‘s use of all statements by him to the government on and after November 3, 2017, in the event your client breaches this Agreement, withdraws his guilty plea, or seeks to withdraw from this Agreement after signing it.

    Your client also agrees to waive all constitutional and statutory rights to a speedy sentence and agrees that the plea of guilty pursuant to this Agreement will be entered at a time decided upon by the parties with the concurrence of the Court. Your client understands that the date for sentencing will be set by the Court.

    Your client agrees not to accept remuneration or compensation of any sort, directly or indirectly, for the dissemination of information through any means, including but not limited to books, articles, speeches, blogs, podcasts, and interviews, however disseminated, regarding his work for his employer (Law Firm A) as it relates to its work for the Ukraine Ministry of Justice, the events alleged in the Information and Statement of Facts, or the investigation by the Office or prosecution of any criminal or civil cases against him,

    D. Appeal Rights

    Your client understands that federal law, specifically 18 U.S.C. § 3742, affords defendants the right to appeal their sentences in certain circumstances Your client agrees to waive the right to appeal the sentence in this case, including but not limited to any term of imprisonment, fine, forfeiture, award of restitution, term or condition of supervised release, authority of the Court to set conditions of release, and the manner in which the sentence was determined, except to the extent the Court sentences your client above the statutory maximum or guidelines range determined by the Court or your client claims that your client received ineffective assistance of counsel, in which case your client would have the right to appeal the illegal sentence or above-guidelines sentence or raise on appeal a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, but not to raise on appeal other issues regarding the sentencing. In agreeing to this waiver, your client is aware that your client‘s sentence has yet to be determined by the Court. Realizing the uncertainty in estimating what sentence the Court ultimately will impose, your client knowingly and willingly waives your client’s right to appeal the sentence, to the extent noted above, in exchange for the concessions made by the Government in this Agreement.

    E. Collateral Attack

    Your client also waives any right to challenge the conviction entered or sentence imposed under this Agreement or otherwise attempt to modify or change the sentence or the manner in which it was determined in any collateral attack, including, but not limited to, a motion brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 or Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), except to the extent such a motion is based on newly discovered evidence or on a claim that your client received ineffective assistance of counsel. Your client reserves the right to file a motion brought under 18 U.S.C. § 35 82(c)(2), but agrees to waive the right to appeal the denial of such a motion.

    F. Privacy Act and FOIA Rights

    Your client also agrees to waive all rights, whether asserted directly or by a representative, to request or receive from any department or agency of the United States any records pertaining to the investigation or prosecution of this case, including and without limitation any records that may be sought under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552, or the Privacy Act. 5 U.S.C. § 5523, for the duration of the Office’s investigation.

    10. Restitution

    Your client understands that the Court has an obligation to determine whether, and in what amount, mandatory restitution applies in this case under 18 U.S.C. § 3663A. The Government and your client agree that mandatory restitution does not apply in this case

    11. Immigration Consequences

    Your client recognizes that because your client is not a citizen of the United States, your client‘s guilty plea and conviction make it very likely that your client’s deportation from the United States is presumptively mandatory and that, at a minimum, your client is at risk of being deported or suffering other adverse immigration consequences, Your client acknowledges discussing the possible immigration consequences (including deportation) of this guilty plea and conviction with you. Your client affirms that your client wants to plead guilty regardless of any immigration consequences that may result from the guilty plea and conviction, even if those consequences include deportation from the United States. It is agreed that your client will have no right to withdraw this guilty plea based on any actual or perceived adverse immigration consequences (including deportation) resulting from the guilty plea and conviction. It is further agreed that your client will not challenge your client’s conviction or sentence on direct appeal, or through litigation under 28 U.S.C §§ 2255 and/or 2241, on the basis of any actual or perceived adverse immigration consequences (including deportation) resulting from your client’s guilty plea and conviction.

    12. Breach of Agreement

    Your client understands and agrees that, if after entering this Agreement, your client fails specifically to perform or to fulfill completely each and every one of your client’s obligations under this Agreement, or engages in any criminal activity prior to sentencing (even if discovered by the Government after sentencing), your client will have breached this Agreement. In the event of such a breach: (a) the Government will be free from its obligations under this Agreement; (b) your client will not have the right to withdraw the guilty plea; (c) your client will be fully subject to criminal prosecution for any other crimes, including perjury and obstruction of justice; and (d) the Government will be free to use against your client, directly and indirectly, in any criminal or civil proceeding, all statements made by your client and any of the information or materials provided by your client, including such statements, information and materials provided pursuant to this Agreement or during the course of any proffer sessions conducted before or after entry of this Agreement, whether or not the debriefings were previously characterized as “off-the-record" debriefings, and including your client's statements made during proceedings before the Court pursuant to Rule ll of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.

    Your client understands and agrees that the Government shall be required to prove a breach of this Agreement only by a preponderance of the evidence, except where such breach is based on a violation of federal, state, or local criminal law, which the Government need prove only by probable cause in order to establish a breach of this Agreement.

    Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to permit your client to commit perjury, to make false statements or declarations. to obstruct justice or to protect your client from prosecution for any crimes not included within this Agreement or committed by your client utter the execution of this Agreement. Your client understands and agrees that the Government reserves the right to prosecute your client for any such offenses. Your client further understands that any perjury, false statements or declarations, or obstruction of justice relating to your client’s obligations under this Agreement shall constitute a breach of this Agreement. In the event of such a breach, your client will not be allowed to withdraw your client’s guilty plea.

    13. Complete Agreement

    Other than a proffer agreement dated December 1, 2017, no agreements, promises, understandings, or representations have been made by the parties or their counsel other than those contained in writing herein, nor will any such agreements, promises, understandings, or representations be made unless committed to writing and signed by your client, defense counsel, and the Office. The proffer agreement ls superseded as noted herein if the Agreement is breached.

    Your client further understands that this Agreement is binding only upon the Office. This Agreement does not bind any United States Attorney's Office, nor does it bind any other state, local, or federal prosecutor. It also does not bar or compromise any civil, tax, or administrative claim pending or that may be made against your client.

    If the foregoing terms and conditions are satisfactory, your client may so indicate by signing this Agreement and the Statement of the Offense and returning both to me no later than February 14, 2018.

    Sincerely yours,

    ROBERT S. MUELLER, III

    By:
    Kyle Freeny
    Brian M. Richardson
    Senior/Assistant Special Counsels
    The Special Counsel's Office

    DEFENDANT’S ACCEPTANCE

    I have read every page of this Agreement and have discussed it with my attorneys, William Schwartz and Laura Grossfield Birger. I fully understand this Agreement and agree to it without reservation. I do this voluntarily and of my own free will, intending to be legally bound. No threats have been made to me nor am I under the influence of anything that could impede my ability to understand this Agreement fully. I am pleading guilty because I am in fact guilty of the offense identified in this Agreement.

    I reaffirm that absolutely no promises, agreements, understandings, or conditions have been made or entered into in connection with my decision to plead guilty except those set forth in this Agreement. I am satisfied with the legal services provided by my attorneys in connection with this Agreement and matters related to it.

    Alex van der Zwaan
    Defendant

    ATTORNEYS’ ACKNOWLEDGMENT

    I have read every page of this Agreement, reviewed this Agreement with my client, Alex van der Zwaan, and fully discussed the provisions of this Agreement with my client. These pages accurately and completely set forth the entire Agreement. I concur in my client’s desire to plead guilty as set forth in this Agreement.

    William Schwartz
    Attorney for Defendant
    Laura Grossfield Birger
    Attorney for Defendant

    Statement of Offense in the case against Alex van der Zwaan

    Pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, the United States of America and the defendant, ALEX VAN DER ZWAAN, stipulate and agree that the following facts are true and accurate. These facts do not constitute all of the facts known to the parties concerning the charged offense; they are being submitted to demonstrate that sufficient facts exist that the defendant committed the offense to which he is pleading guilty.

    1. At all relevant times herein, the Special Counsel's Office had an open investigation into Paul J . Manafort, Jr. and Richard W. Gates III in connection with, among other things, their work in the United States on behalf of foreign principals as to which they had not registered under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (PARA). The investigation encompassed United States lobbying and public relations work on behalf of the Ukraine Ministry of Justice in 2012, including the dissemination to the United States media and others of a report written by an international law firm (Law Firm A) concerning the trial of Yulia Tymoshenko (the Report). On October 27, 2017, arising in part from this investigation, a Grand Jury indicted Manafort and Gates, among other things, for acting as unregistered agents of a foreign principal in violation of FARA, 22 U.S.C. §§ 615 and 618(a)(1). The indictment was unsealed on October 30, 2017.

    2. The defendant, ALEX VAN DER ZWAAN, was an English lawyer associated with Law Firm A. He had worked on the Report.

    3. On November 3. 2017, in Washington, DC, VAN DER ZWAAN was interviewed by the Special Counsel's Office, including Department of Justice prosecutors and Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. He was represented by counsel. He was warned that intentionally false statements to the Office could subject him to criminal charges. He indicated that he understood.

    4. VAN DER ZWAAN thereafter made materially false statements during the interview.

    5. During the November 3, 2017, interview, VAN DER ZWAAN knowingly and intentionally falsely stated the following:

    a. his last communication with Gates was in mid-August 2016, which consisted of an innocuous text message;

    b. his last communication with a longtime business associate of Manafort and Gates in Ukraine (Person A) was in 2014, when he talked with Person A about Person A’s family; and

    c. he did not know why Law Firm A had not produced to the Special Counsel’s Office a September 2016 e-mail between him and Person A.

    6. In truth and in fact, VAN DER ZWAAN well knew and believed the following facts, when he made each of the above statements:

    a. In or about September 2016, VAN DER ZWAAN spoke with both Gates and Person A regarding the Report. In early September 2016, Gates called VAN DER ZWAAN and told him to contact Person A. After the call, Gates sent VAN DER ZWAAN documents including a preliminary criminal complaint in Ukraine via an electronic application called Viber. VAN DER ZWAAN then called Person A and discussed in Russian that formal criminal charges might be brought against a former Ukrainian Minister of Justice, Law Firm A, and Manafort. VAN DER ZWAAN recorded the call. VAN DER ZWAAN then called the senior partner on the Report at Law Firm A and partially recorded that call. Finally, VAN DER ZWAAN called Gates and recorded the call. VAN DER ZWAAN also took notes of the calls.

    b. Prior to the November 3, 2017, interview, VAN DER ZWAAN did not produce to Law Firm A and deleted and otherwise did not produce emails he possessed that he understood had been requested by either the Special Counsel’s Office or Law Firm A, or both, including an email in Russian dated September 12, 2016 in which Person A asked VAN DER ZWAAN to contact Person A and to use an encrypted application.

    7. During the November 3, 2017, interview, VAN DER ZWAAN stated that he played a passive role in the roll out of the Report, limited to defending the Report to ensure Law Firm A’s work was properly portrayed. However, in or about late July-early August 2012, VAN DER ZWAAN gave, without authorization, an advance draft of the Report to the public relations firm retained by the Ukraine Ministry of Justice to manage the global press and lobbying strategy for the Report, and in September 2012 provided Gates talking points for use in the public relations campaign as to how to describe the Report in ways favorable to the client. For instance, VAN DER ZWAAN advised that the text of the Report could be used to Ukraine’s advantage if one looked beyond the Report’s description of “procedural" infractions in Tymoshenko's trial and focused instead on the fact that her defense was weak.

    By:

    ROBERT S. MUELLER, III
    Special Counsel

    Anhrew Weissmann
    Greg Donald Andres
    Kyle Freeny
    Brian M. Richardson
    Senior/Assistant Special Counsel

    DEFENDANT'S ACCEPTANCE

    The preceding statement is a summary, made for the purpose of providing the Court with a factual basis for my guilty plea to the charge against me. It does not include all of the facts known to me regarding this offense. I make this statement knowingly and voluntarily and because 1 am, in fact, guilty of the crime charged. N0 threats have been made to me 1101' am 1 under the influence of anything that could impede my ability to understand this Statement of the Offense fully.

    I have read every word of this Statement of the Offense, or have had it read to me. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 1 1, after consulting with my attorneys, 1 agree and stipulate to this Statement of the Offense, and declare under penalty of perjury that it is true and correct. I am fully satisfied with the legal representation 1 have received in connection with this plea.

    Alex van der Zwaan
    Defendant
    14 February 2018

    ATTORNEYS’ ACKNOWLEDGMENT

    I have read this Statement of the Offense, and have reviewed it with my client fully. I concur in my client’s desire to adopt and stipulate to this Statement of the Offense as true and accurate.

    William Schwartz
    Attorney for Defendant
    Laura Grossfield Birgei
    Attorney for Defendant
    February 14, 2018

    U.S. v. Internet Research Agency

    Indictment of the Internet Research Agency

    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA V.
    INTERNET RESEARCH AGENCY LLC A/K/A MEDIASINTEZ LLC A/K/A GLAVSET LLC A/K/A MIXINFO LLC A/K/A AZIMUT LLC A/K/A NOVINFO LLC,
    CONCORD MANAGENIENT AND CONSULTING LLC,
    CONCORD CATERING,
    YEVGENIY VIKTOROVICH PRIGOZHIN,
    MIKHAIL IVANOVICH BYSTROV,
    MIKHAIL LEONIDOVICH BURCHIK A/K/A MIKHAIL ABRAMOV,
    ALEKSANDRA YURYEVNA KRYLOVA,
    ANNA VLADISLAVOVNA BOGACHEVA,
    SERGEY PAVLOVICH POLOZOV,
    MARIA ANATOLYEVNA BOVDA A/K/A MARIA ANATOLYEVNA BELYAEVA,
    ROBERT SERGEYEVICH BOVDA,
    DZHEYKHUN NASIMI OGLY ASLANOV A/K/A J AYHOON ASLANOV A/K/A J AY ASLANOV,
    VADIM VLADIMIROVICH PODKOPAEV,
    GLEB IGOREVICH VASILCHENKO,
    IRINA VIKTOROVNA KAVERZINA,
    and
    VLADIMIR VENKOV,
    Defendants.

    The Grand Jury for the District of Columbia charges:

    Introduction

    1. The United States of America, through its departments and agencies, regulates the activities of foreign individuals and entities in and affecting the United States in order to prevent, disclose, and counteract improper foreign influence on US. elections and on the U. S. political system. U. S. law bans foreign nationals from making certain expenditures or financial disbursements for the purpose of influencing federal elections. US. law also bars agents of any foreign entity from engaging in political activities within the United States without first registering with the Attorney General. And US. law requires certain foreign nationals seeking entry to the United States to obtain a Visa by providing truthful and accurate information to the government. Various federal agencies, including the Federal Election Commission, the US. Department of Justice, and the U. S. Department of State, are charged with enforcing these laws.

    2. Defendant INTERNET RESEARCH AGENCY LLC (“ORGANIZATION”) is a Russian organization engaged in operations to interfere with elections and political processes. Defendants MIKHAIL IVANOVICH BYSTROV, MIKHAIL LEONIDOVICH BURCHIK, ALEKSANDRA YURYEVNA KRYLOVA, ANNA VLADISLAVOVNA BOGACHEVA, SERGEY PAVLOVICH POLOZOV, MARIA ANATOLYEVNA BOVDA, ROBERT SERGEYEVICH BOVDA, DZHEYKHUN NASIMI OGLY ASLANOV, VADIM VLADIMIROVICH PODKOPAEV, GLEB IGOREVICH VASILCHENKO, IRINA VIKTOROVNA KAVERZINA, and VLADIMIR VENKOV worked in various capacities to carry out Defendant ORGANIZATION’S interference operations targeting the United States. From in or around 2014 to the present, Defendants knowingly and intentionally conspired with each other (and with persons known and unknown to the Grand Jury) to defraud the United States by impairing, obstructing, and defeating the lawful functions of the government through fraud and deceit for the purpose of interfering with the US. political and electoral processes, including the presidential election of 2016.

    3. Beginning as early as 2014, Defendant ORGANIZATION began operations to interfere with the US. political system, including the 2016 US. presidential election. Defendant ORGANIZATION received funding for its operations from Defendant YEVGENIY VIKTOROVICH PRIGOZHIN and companies he controlled, including Defendants CONCORD MANAGEMENT AND CONSULTING LLC and CONCORD CATERING (collectively “CONCORD”). Defendants CONCORD and PRIGOZHIN spent significant funds to further the ORGANIZATION’s operations and to pay the remaining Defendants, along with other uncharged ORGANIZATION employees, salaries and bonuses for their work at the ORGANIZATION.

    4. Defendants, posing as U. S. persons and creating false U.S. personas, operated social media pages and groups designed to attract U.S. audiences. These groups and pages, which addressed divisive US. political and social issues, falsely claimed to be controlled by US. activists when, in fact, they were controlled by Defendants. Defendants also used the stolen identities of real U.S. persons to post on ORGANIZATION—controlled social media accounts. Over time, these social media accounts became Defendants’ means to reach significant numbers of Americans for purposes of interfering with the US. political system, including the presidential election of 2016.

    5. Certain Defendants traveled to the United States under false pretenses for the purpose of collecting intelligence to inform Defendants’ operations. Defendants also procured and used computer infrastructure, based partly in the United States, to hide the Russian origin of their activities and to avoid detection by US. regulators and law enforcement.

    6. Defendant ORGANIZATION had a strategic goal to sow discord in the US. political system, including the 2016 US. presidential election. Defendants posted derogatory information about a number of candidates, and by early to mid-2016, Defendants’ operations included supporting the presidential campaign of then-candidate Donald J . Trump (“Trump Campaign”) and disparaging Hillary Clinton. Defendants made various expenditures to carry out those activities, including buying political advertisements on social media in the names of US. persons and entities. Defendants also staged political rallies inside the United States, and while posing as US. grassroots entities and US. persons, and without revealing their Russian identities and ORGANIZATION affiliation, solicited and compensated real U.S. persons to promote or disparage candidates. Some Defendants, posing as US. persons and without revealing their Russian association, communicated with unwitting individuals associated with the Trump Campaign and with other political activists to seek to coordinate political activities.

    7. In order to carry out their activities to interfere in US. political and electoral processes without detection of their Russian affiliation, Defendants conspired to obstruct the lawful functions of the United States government through fraud and deceit, including by making expenditures in connection with the 2016 US. presidential election without proper regulatory disclosure; failing to register as foreign agents carrying out political activities within the United States; and obtaining Visas through false and fraudulent statements.

    (Conspiracy to Defraud the United States)

    8. Paragraphs 1 through 7 of this Indictment are re-alleged and incorporated by reference as if fully set forth herein.

    9. From in or around 2014 to the present, in the District of Columbia and elsewhere, Defendants, together with others known and unknown to the Grand Jury, knowingly and intentionally conspired to defraud the United States by impairing, obstructing, and defeating the lawful functions of the Federal Election Commission, the U. S. Department of Justice, and the U.S. Department of State in administering federal requirements for disclosure of foreign involvement in certain domestic activities.

    Defendants

    10. Defendant INTERNET RESEARCH AGENCY LLC (AreHTCTBo I/IHTepHeT I/Iccnenorsannfi) is a Russian organization engaged in political and electoral interference operations. In or around July 2013, the ORGANIZATION registered with the Russian government as a Russian corporate entity. Beginning in or around J une 2014, the ORGANIZATION obscured its conduct by operating through a number of Russian entities, including Internet Research LLC, MediaSintez LLC, GlaVSet LLC, MiXInfo LLC, Azimut LLC, and NovInfo LLC. Starting in or around 2014, the ORGANIZATION occupied an office at 55 Savushkina Street in St. Petersburg, Russia. That location became one of the ORGANIZATION’s operational hubs from which Defendants and other co-conspirators carried out their activities to interfere in the US. political system, including the 2016 US. presidential election.

    a. The ORGANIZATION employed hundreds of individuals for its online operations, ranging from creators of fictitious personas to technical and administrative support. The ORGANIZATION’s annual budget totaled the equivalent of millions of US. dollars.

    b. The ORGANIZATION was headed by a management group and organized into departments, including: a graphics department; a data analysis department; a search—engine optimization (“SEO”) department; an information—technology (“IT”) department to maintain the digital infrastructure used in the ORGANIZATION’s operations; and a finance department to budget and allocate funding.

    c. The ORGANIZATION sought, in part, to conduct what it called “information warfare against the United States of America” through fictitious U.S. personas on social media platforms and other Internet-based media.

    d. By in or around April 2014, the ORGANIZATION formed a department that went by various names but was at times referred to as the “translator project.” This project focused on the U.S. population and conducted operations on social media platforms such as YouTube, Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter. By approximately July 2016, more than eighty ORGANIZATION employees were assigned to the translator project.

    e. By in or around May 2014, the ORGANIZATION’s strategy included interfering with the 2016 U.S. presidential election, with the stated goal of “spread[ing] distrust towards the candidates and the political system in general."

    11. Defendants CONCORD MANAGEMENT AND CONSULTING LLC (Konnopn Meneamenr n KoncanrnHr) and CONCORD CATERING are related Russian entities with various Russian government contracts. CONCORD was the ORGANIZATION’s primary source of funding for its interference operations. CONCORD controlled funding, recommended personnel, and oversaw ORGANIZATION activities through reporting and interaction with ORGANIZATION management.

    a. CONCORD funded the ORGANIZATION as part of a larger CONCORD-funded interference operation that it referred to as “Project Lakhta.” Project Lakhta had multiple components, some involving domestic audiences within the Russian Federation and others targeting foreign audiences in various countries, including the United States.

    By in or around September 2016, the ORGANIZATION’s monthly budget for Project Lakhta submitted to CONCORD exceeded 73 million Russian rubles (over 1,250,000 U.S. dollars), including approximately one million rubles in bonus payments.

    To conceal its involvement, CONCORD labeled the monies paid to the ORGANIZATION for Project Lakhta as payments related to software support and development. To further conceal the source of funds, CONCORD distributed monies to the ORGANIZATION through approximately fourteen bank accounts held in the names of CONCORD affiliates, including Glavnaya Liniya LLC, Merkuriy LLC, Obshchepit LLC, Potentsial LLC, RSP LLC, ASP LLC, MTTs LLC, Kompleksservis LLC, SPb Kulinariya LLC, Almira LLC, PishcheVik LLC, Galant LLC, Rayteks LLC, and Standart LLC.

    12. Defendant YEVGENIY VIKTOROVICH PRIGOZHIN (HpI/IFOHG/IH EBFCHI/Ifi BnKTopOBnq) is a Russian national who controlled CONCORD.

    a.PRIGOZHIN approved and supported the ORGANIZATION’s operations, and Defendants and their co-conspirators were aware of PRIGOZHIN’s role.

    For example, on or about May 29, 2016, Defendants and their co-conspirators, through an ORGANIZATION—controlled social media account, arranged for a real U.S. person to stand in front of the White House in the District of Columbia under false pretenses to hold a sign that read “Happy 55th Birthday Dear Boss.” was for someone who “is a leader here and our boss . . . our funder” PRIGOZHIN’s Russian passport identifies his date of birth as June 1, 1961.

    13. Defendant MIKHAIL IVANOVICH BYSTROV (BLICTpOB Mnxann HBaHOBI/I‘I) joined the ORGANIZATION by at least in or around February 2014.

    a. By approximately April 2014, BYSTROV was the general director, the ORGANIZATION’s highest-ranking position. BYSTROV subsequently served as the head of various other entities used by the ORGANIZATION to mask its activities, including, for example, Glavset LLC, where he was listed as that entity’s general director.

    b. In or around 2015 and 2016, BYSTROV frequently communicated with PRIGOZHIN about Project Lakhta’s overall operations, including through regularly scheduled in-person meetings.

    14. Defendant MIKHAIL LEONIDOVICH BURCHIK (Bypqu Mnxann l'IeOHI/I/IOBI/Iq) A/K/A MIKHAIL ABRAMOV joined the ORGANIZATION by at least in or around October 2013. By approximately March 2014, BURCHIK was the executive director, the ORGANIZATION’s second-highest ranking position. Throughout the ORGANIZATION’s operations to interfere in the US political system, including the 2016 U.S. presidential election, BURCHIK was a manager involved in operational planning, infrastructure, and personnel. In or around 2016, BURCHIK also had in-person meetings with PRIGOZHIN.

    15. Defendant ALEKSANDRA YURYEVNA KRYLOVA (KpLIJ'IOBa AneKcaana IOpLeBHa) worked for the ORGANIZATION from at least in or around September 2013 to at least in or around November 2014. By approximately April 2014, KRYLOVA served as director and was the ORGANIZATION’s third-highest ranking employee. In 2014, KRYLOVA traveled to the United States under false pretenses for the purpose of collecting intelligence to inform the ORGANIZATION’ s operations.

    16. Defendant SERGEY PAVLOVICH POLOZOV (1101103013 Ceprefi HaBJ'IOBI/I‘I) worked for the ORGANIZATION from at least in or around April 2014 to at least in or around October 2016. POLOZOV served as the manager of the IT department and oversaw the procurement of U.S. servers and other computer infrastructure that masked the ORGANIZATION’s Russian location when conducting operations within the United States.

    17. Defendant ANNA VLADISLAVOVNA BOGACHEVA (Boraqua AHHa BJ'IaZII/ICJ'IEIBOBHEI) worked for the ORGANIZATION from at least in or around April 2014 to at least in or around July 2014. BOGACHEVA served on the translator project and oversaw the project’s data analysis group. BOGACHEVA also traveled to the United States under false pretenses for the purpose of collecting intelligence to inform the ORGANIZATION’s operations.

    18. Defendant MARIA ANATOLYEVNA BOVDA (BOBna Mapmr AHaTOJ'ILCBHa) A/K/A MARIA ANATOLYEVNA BELYAEVA (“M. BOVDA”) worked for the ORGANIZATION from at least in or around November 2013 to at least in or around October 2014. M. BOVDA served as the head of the translator proj ect, among other positions.

    19. Defendant ROBERT SERGEYEVICH BOVDA (BOBna Po6epr CepreeBnq) (“R. BOVDA”) worked for the ORGANIZATION from at least in or around November 2013 to at least in or around October 2014. R. BOVDA served as the deputy head of the translator project, among other positions. R. BOVDA attempted to travel to the United States under false pretenses for the purpose of collecting intelligence to inform the ORGANIZATION’s operations but could not obtain the necessary Visa.

    20. Defendant DZHEYKHUN NASIMI OGLY ASLANOV (ACJ'IaHOB Ibnefixyn Hachn OFJ'ILI) A/K/A JAYHOON ASLANOV A/K/A JAY ASLANOVjoined the ORGANIZATION by at least in or around September 2014. ASLANOV served as head of the translator project and oversaw many of the operations targeting the 2016 U.S. presidential election. ASLANOV was also listed as the general director of Azimut LLC, an entity used to move funds from CONCORD to the ORGANIZATION.

    21. Defendant VADIM VLADIMIROVICH PODKOPAEV (HonKonaeB Bam/IM BnannanOBI/Iq) joined the ORGANIZATION by at least in or around June 2014. PODKOPAEV served as an analyst on the translator project and was responsible for conducting U.S.-focused research and drafting social media content for the ORGANIZATION.

    22. Defendant GLEB IGOREVICH VASILCHENKO (BaCI/IIIb‘ICHKO Fne6 I/IropeBnq) worked for the ORGANIZATION from at least in or around August 2014 to at least in or around September 2016. VASILCHENKO was responsible for posting, monitoring, and updating the social media content of many ORGANIZATION—controlled accounts while posing as U.S. persons or U.S. grassroots organizations. VASILCHENKO later served as the head of two sub-groups focused on operations to interfere in the U.S. political system, including the 2016 U.S. presidential election. 23. Defendant IRINA VIKTOROVNA KAVERZINA (KaBepana I/Iana BHKTOpOBHa) joined the ORGANIZATION by at least in or around October 2014. KAVERZINA served on the translator project and operated multiple U.S. personas that she used to post, monitor, and update social media content for the ORGANIZATION.

    24. Defendant VLADIMIR VENKOV (BeHKOB BnannMI/Ip) joined the ORGANIZATION by at least in or around March 2015. VENKOV served on the translator project and operated multiple U.S. personas, which he used to post, monitor, and update social media content for the ORGANIZATION.

    Federal Regulatory Agencies

    25. The Federal Election Commission is a federal agency that administers the Federal Election Campaign Act (“FECA”). Among other things, FECA prohibits foreign nationals from making any contributions, expenditures, independent expenditures, or disbursements for electioneering communications. FECA also requires that individuals or entities who make certain independent expenditures in federal elections report those expenditures to the Federal Election Commission. The reporting requirements permit the Federal Election Commission to fulfill its statutory duties of providing the American public with accurate data about the financial activities of individuals and entities supporting federal candidates, and enforcing FECA’s limits and prohibitions, including the ban on foreign expenditures.

    26. The U.S. Department of Justice administers the Foreign Agent Registration Act (“FARA”). FARA establishes a registration, reporting, and disclosure regime for agents of foreign principals (which includes foreign non-government individuals and entities) so that the U. S. government and the people of the United States are informed of the source of information and the identity of persons attempting to influence U. S. public opinion, policy, and law. FARA requires, among other things, that persons subject to its requirements submit periodic registration statements containing truthful information about their activities and the income earned from them. Disclosure of the required information allows the federal government and the American people to evaluate the statements and activities of such persons in light of their function as foreign agents.

    27. The U.S. Department of State is the federal agency responsible for the issuance of non-immigrant Visas to foreign individuals who need a Visa to enter the United States. Foreign individuals who are required to obtain a Visa must, among other things, provide truthful information in response to questions on the Visa application form, including information about their employment and the purpose of their Visit to the United States.

    28. The conspiracy had as its object impairing, obstructing, and defeating the lawful governmental functions of the United States by dishonest means in order to enable the Defendants to interfere with U.S. political and electoral processes, including the 2016 U.S. presidential election.

    Manner and Means of the Conspiracy

    Intelligence-Gathering to Inform U.S. Operations

    29. Starting at least in or around 2014, Defendants and their co-conspirators began to track and study groups on U.S. social media sites dedicated to U.S. politics and social issues. In order to gauge the performance of various groups on social media sites, the ORGANIZATION tracked certain metrics like the group’s size, the frequency of content placed by the group, and the level of audience engagement with that content, such as the average number of comments or responses to a post.

    30. Defendants and their co-conspirators also traveled, and attempted to travel, to the United States under false pretenses in order to collect intelligence for their interference operations.

    a. KRYLOVA and BOGACHEVA, together with other Defendants and co- conspirators, planned travel itineraries, purchased equipment (such as cameras, SIM cards, and drop phones), and discussed security measures (including “evacuation scenarios”) for Defendants who traveled to the United States.

    b. To enter the United States, KRYLOVA, BOGACHEVA, R. BOVDA, and another co-conspirator applied to the U.S. Department of State for Visas to travel. During their application process, KRYLOVA, BOGACHEVA, R. BOVDA, and their co- conspirator falsely claimed they were traveling for personal reasons and did not fully disclose their place of employment to hide the fact that they worked for the ORGANIZATION.

    c. Only KRYLOVA and BOGACHEVA received Visas, and from approximately June 4, 2014 through June 26, 2014, KRYLOVA and BOGACHEVA traveled in and around the United States, including stops in Nevada, California, New Mexico, Colorado, Illinois, Michigan, Louisiana, Texas, and New York to gather intelligence. After the trip, KRYLOVA and BURCHIK exchanged an intelligence report regarding the trip.

    d. Another co-conspirator who worked for the ORGANIZATION traveled to Atlanta, Georgia from approximately November 26, 2014 through November 30, 2014. Following the trip, the co -conspirator provided POLOZOV a summary of his trip’s itinerary and expenses.

    31. In order to collect additional intelligence, Defendants and their co-conspirators posed as U.S. persons and contacted U.S. political and social activists. For example, starting in or around June 2016, Defendants and their co-conspirators, posing online as U.S. persons, communicated with a real U. S. person affiliated with a Texas-based grassroots organization. During the exchange, Defendants and their co-conspirators learned from the real U.S. person that they should focus their activities on “purple states like Colorado, Virginia & Florida.” After that exchange, Defendants and their co-conspirators commonly referred to targeting “purple states” in directing their efforts.

    Use of U.S. Social Media Platforms

    32. Defendants and their co-conspirators, through fraud and deceit, created hundreds of social media accounts and used them to develop certain fictitious U. S. personas into “leader[s] of public opinion” in the United States.

    33. ORGANIZATION employees, referred to as “specialists,” were tasked to create social media accounts that appeared to be operated by U.S. persons. The specialists were divided into day-shift and night-shift hours and instructed to make posts in accordance with the appropriate U.S. time zone. The ORGANIZATION also circulated lists of U.S. holidays so that specialists could develop and post appropriate account activity. Specialists were instructed to write about topics germane to the United States such as U.S. foreign policy and U.S. economic issues. Specialists were directed to create “political intensity through supporting radical groups, users dissatisfied with [the] social and economic situation and oppositional social movements.”

    34. Defendants and their co-conspirators also created thematic group pages on social media sites, particularly on the social media platforms Facebook and Instagram. ORGANIZATION- controlled pages addressed a range of issues, including: immigration (with group names including “Secured Borders”); the Black Lives Matter movement (with group names including “Blacktivist”); religion (with group names including “United Muslims of America” and “Army of Jesus”); and certain geographic regions within the United States (with group names including “South United” and “Heart of Texas”). By 2016, the size of many ORGANIZATION—controlled groups had grown to hundreds of thousands of online followers.

    35. Starting at least in or around 2015, Defendants and their co-conspirators began to purchase advertisements on online social media sites to promote ORGANIZATION—controlled social media groups, spending thousands of U.S. dollars every month. These expenditures were included in the budgets the ORGANIZATION submitted to CONCORD.

    36. Defendants and their co-conspirators also created and controlled numerous Twitter accounts designed to appear as if U.S. persons or groups controlled them. For example, the ORGANIZATION created and controlled the Twitter account “Tennessee GOP,” which used the handle @TEN_GOP. The @TEN_GOP account falsely claimed to be controlled by a U.S. state political party. Over time, the @TEN_GOP account attracted more than 100,000 online followers.

    37. To measure the impact of their online social media operations, Defendants and their co-conspirators tracked the performance of content they posted over social media. They tracked the size of the online U.S. audiences reached through posts, different types of engagement with the posts (such as likes, comments, and reposts), changes in audience size, and other metrics. Defendants and their co-conspirators received and maintained metrics reports on certain group pages and individualized posts.

    38. Defendants and their co-conspirators also regularly evaluated the content posted by specialists (sometimes referred to as “content analysis”) to ensure they appeared authentic—as if operated by U.S. persons. Specialists received feedback and directions to improve the quality of their posts. Defendants and their co-conspirators issued or received guidance on: ratios of text, graphics, and Video to use in posts; the number of accounts to operate; and the role of each account (for example, differentiating a main account from which to post information and auxiliary accounts to promote a main account through links and reposts).

    Use of U.S. Computer Infrastructure

    39. To hide their Russian identities and ORGANIZATION affiliation, Defendants and their co- conspirators—particularly POLOZOV and the ORGANIZATION’s IT department—purchased space on computer servers located inside the United States in order to set up Virtual private networks (“VPNs”). Defendants and their co-conspirators connected from Russia to the U.S.- based infrastructure by way of these VPNs and conducted activity inside the United States— including accessing online social media accounts, opening new accounts, and communicating with real U.S. persons—while masking the Russian origin and control of the activity.

    40. Defendants and their co-conspirators also registered and controlled hundreds of web-based email accounts hosted by U.S. email providers under false names so as to appear to be U.S. persons and groups. From these accounts, Defendants and their co-conspirators registered or linked to online social media accounts in order to monitor them; posed as U.S. persons when requesting assistance from real U. S. persons; contacted media outlets in order to promote activities inside the United States; and conducted other operations, such as those set forth below.

    Use of Stolen U.S. Identities

    41. In or around 2016, Defendants and their co-conspirators also used, possessed, and transferred, without lawful authority, the social security numbers and dates of birth of real U.S. persons without those persons’ knowledge or consent. Using these means of identification, Defendants and their co-conspirators opened accounts at PayPal, a digital payment service provider; created false means of identification, including fake driver’s licenses; and posted on ORGANIZATION—controlled social media accounts using the identities of these U.S. Victims. Defendants and their co-conspirators also obtained, and attempted to obtain, false identification documents to use as proof of identity in connection with maintaining accounts and purchasing advertisements on social media sites.

    Actions Targeting the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election

    42. By approximately May 2014, Defendants and their co-conspirators discussed efforts to interfere in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Defendants and their co-conspirators began to monitor U.S. social media accounts and other sources of information about the 2016 U.S. presidential election.

    43. By 2016, Defendants and their co-conspirators used their fictitious online personas to interfere with the 2016 U.S. presidential election. They engaged in operations primarily intended to communicate derogatory information about Hillary Clinton, to denigrate other candidates such as Ted Cruz and Marco Rubio, and to support Bernie Sanders and then-candidate Donald Trump.

    a. On or about February 10, 2016, Defendants and their co-conspirators internally circulated an outline of themes for future content to be posted to ORGANIZATION—controlled social media accounts. Specialists were instructed to post content that focused on “politics in the USA” and to “use any opportunity to criticize Hillary and the rest (except Sanders and Trump—we support them)”

    b. On or about September 14, 2016, in an internal review of an ORGANIZATION- created and controlled Facebook group called “Secured Borders,” the account specialist was criticized for having a “low number of posts dedicated to criticizing Hillary Clinton” and was told “it is imperative to intensify criticizing Hillary Clinton” in future posts.

    44. Certain ORGANIZATION—produced materials about the 2016 U.S. presidential election used election—related hashtags, including: “#Trump2016,” “#Trurinrain,” “#MAGA,” “#IWontProtectHillary,” and “#Hillary4Prison.” Defendants and their co-conspirators also established additional online social media accounts dedicated to the 2016 U.S. presidential election, including the Twitter account “March for Trump” and Facebook accounts “Clinton FRAUDation” and “Trumpsters United.”

    45. Defendants and their co-conspirators also used false U.S. personas to communicate with unwitting members, volunteers, and supporters of the Trump Campaign involved in local community outreach, as well as grassroots groups that supported then-candidate Trump. These individuals and entities at times distributed the ORGANIZATION’s materials through their own accounts Via retweets, reposts, and similar means. Defendants and their co-conspirators then monitored the propagation of content through such participants.

    46. In or around the latter half of 2016, Defendants and their co-conspirators, through their ORGANIZATION—controlled personas, began to encourage U.S. minority groups not to vote in the 2016 U.S. presidential election or to vote for a third-party U.S. presidential candidate.

    a. On or about October 16, 2016, Defendants and their co-conspirators used the ORGANIZATION—controlled Instagram account “Woke Blacks” to post the following message: “[A] particular hype and hatred for Trump is misleading the people and forcing Blacks to vote Killary. We cannot resort to the lesser of two devils. Then we’d surely be better off without voting AT ALL.”

    On or about November 3, 2016, Defendants and their co-conspirators purchased an advertisement to promote a post on the ORGANIZATION—controlled Instagram account “Blacktivist” that read in part: “Choose peace and vote for Jill Stein. Trust me, it’s not a wasted vote.”

    By in or around early November 2016, Defendants and their co-conspirators used the ORGANIZATION—controlled “United Muslims of America” social media accounts to post anti-vote messages such as: “American Muslims [are] boycotting elections today, most of the American Muslim voters refuse to vote for Hillary Clinton because she wants to continue the war on Muslims in the middle east and voted yes for invading Iraq.”

    47. Starting in or around the summer of 2016, Defendants and their co-conspirators also began to promote allegations of voter fraud by the Democratic Party through their fictitious U. S. personas and groups on social media. Defendants and their co-conspirators purchased advertisements on Facebook to further promote the allegations.

    a. On or about August 4, 20 16, Defendants and their co-conspirators began purchasing advertisements that promoted a post on the ORGANIZATION—controlled Facebook account “Stop AI.” The post alleged that “Hillary Clinton has already committed voter fraud during the Democrat Iowa Caucus.”

    b. On or about August 11, 2016, Defendants and their co-conspirators posted that allegations of voter fraud were being investigated in North Carolina on the ORGANIZATION—controlled Twitter account @TEN_GOP.

    c. On or about November 2, 2016, Defendants and their co-conspirators used the same account to post allegations of “#VoterFraud by counting tens of thousands of ineligible mail in Hillary votes being reported in Broward County, Florida.”

    Political Advertisements

    48. From at least April 2016 through November 2016, Defendants and their co-conspirators, while concealing their Russian identities and ORGANIZATION affiliation through false personas, began to produce, purchase, and post advertisements on U.S. social media and other online sites expressly advocating for the election of then-candidate Trump or expressly opposing Clinton. Defendants and their co-conspirators did not report their expenditures to the Federal Election Commission, or register as foreign agents with the U.S. Department of Justice.

    49. To pay for the political advertisements, Defendants and their co-conspirators established various Russian bank accounts and credit cards, often registered in the names of fictitious U.S. personas created and used by the ORGANIZATION on social media. Defendants and their co- conspirators also paid for other political advertisements using PayPal accounts.

    50. The political advertisements included the following:

    Approximate DateExcerpt of Advertisement
    April 6, 2016"You know, a great number of black people support us saying that #HilaryClintonIsNotMyPresident"
    April 7, 2016"I say no to Hillary Clinton/ I say no to manipulation"
    April 19, 2016"JOIN our #HillaryClintonForPrison2016"
    May 10, 2016"Donald wants to defeat terrorism ... Hillary wants to sponsor it"
    May 19, 2016"Vote Republican, vote Trump, and support the Second Amendment!"
    May 24, 2016"Hillary Clinton Doesn't Deserve the Black Vote"
    June 7, 2016"Trump is our only hope for a better future!"
    June 30, 2016"#NeverHillary #HillaryForPrison #Hillary4Prison #HillaryForPrison2016 #Tmmp2016 #Trump #Trump4President"
    July 20, 2016"Ohio Wants Hillary 4 Prison"
    August 4, 2016"Hillary Clinton has already committed voter fraud during the Democrat Iowa Caucus."
    August 10, 2016"We cannot trust Hillary to take care of our veterans!"
    October 14, 2016"Among all the candidates Donald Trump is the one and only who can defend the police from terrorists."
    October 19, 2016"Hillary is a Satan, and her crimes and lies had proved just how evil she is."
    Staging U.S. Political Rallies in the United States

    51. Starting in approximately June 2016, Defendants and their co-conspirators organized and coordinated political rallies in the United States. To conceal the fact that they were based in Russia, Defendants and their co-conspirators promoted these rallies while pretending to be U.S. grassroots activists who were located in the United States but unable to meet or participate in person.

    Defendants and their co-conspirators did not register as foreign agents with the U.S. Department of Justice.

    52. In order to build attendance for the rallies, Defendants and their co-conspirators promoted the events through public posts on their false U.S. persona social media accounts. In addition, Defendants and their co-conspirators contacted administrators of large social media groups focused on U.S. politics and requested that they advertise the rallies.

    53. In or around late June 2016, Defendants and their co-conspirators used the Facebook group “United Muslims of America” to promote a rally called “Support Hillary. Save American Muslims” held on July 9, 2016 in the District of Columbia. Defendants and their co-conspirators recruited a real U. S. person to hold a sign depicting Clinton and a quote attributed to her stating “I think Sharia Law will be a powerful new direction of freedom.” Within three weeks, on or about July 26, 2016, Defendants and their co-conspirators posted on the same Facebook page that Muslim voters were “between Hillary Clinton and a hard place.”

    54. In or around June and July 2016, Defendants and their co-conspirators used the Facebook group “Being Patriotic,” the Twitter account @March_for_Trump, and other ORGANIZATION accounts to organize two political rallies in New York. The first rally was called “March for Trump” and held on June 25, 2016. The second rally was called “Down with Hillary” and held on July 23,2016.

    a. In or around June through July 2016, Defendants and their co-conspirators purchased advertisements on Facebook to promote the “March for Trump” and “Down with Hillary” rallies.

    b. Defendants and their co-conspirators used false U.S. personas to send individualized messages to real U.S. persons to request that they participate in and help organize the rally. To assist their efforts, Defendants and their co-conspirators, through false U.S. personas, offered money to certain U.S. persons to cover rally expenses.

    c. On or about June 5, 2016, Defendants and their co-conspirators, while posing as a U.S. grassroots activist, used the account @March_for_Trump to contact a volunteer for the Trump Campaign in New York. The volunteer agreed to provide signs for the “March for Trump” rally.

    55. In or around late July 2016, Defendants and their co-conspirators used the Facebook group “Being Patriotic,” the Twitter account @March_for_Trump, and other false U.S. personas to organize a series of coordinated rallies in Florida. The rallies were collectively referred to as “Florida Goes Trump” and held on August 20, 2016.

    a. In or around August 2016, Defendants and their co-conspirators used false U.S. personas to communicate with Trump Campaign staff involved in local community outreach about the “Florida Goes Trump” rallies.

    b. Defendants and their co-conspirators purchased advertisements on Facebook and Instagram to promote the “Florida Goes Trump” rallies.

    c. Defendants and their co-conspirators also used false U.S. personas to contact multiple grassroots groups supporting then-candidate Trump in an unofficial capacity. Many of these groups agreed to participate in the “Florida Goes Trump” rallies and serve as local coordinators.

    d. Defendants and their co-conspirators also used false U.S. personas to ask real U.S. persons to participate in the “Florida Goes Trump” rallies. Defendants and their co-conspirators asked certain of these individuals to perform tasks at the rallies.

    For example, Defendants and their co-conspirators asked one U.S. person to build a cage on a flatbed truck and another U.S. person to wear a costume portraying Clinton in a prison uniform. Defendants and their co-conspirators paid these individuals to complete the requests.

    56. After the rallies in Florida, Defendants and their co-conspirators used false U.S. personas to organize and coordinate U. S. political rallies supporting then-candidate Trump in New York and Pennsylvania. Defendants and their co-conspirators used the same techniques to build and promote these rallies as they had in Florida, including: buying Facebook advertisements; paying U.S. persons to participate in, or perform certain tasks at, the rallies; and communicating with real U.S. persons and grassroots organizations supporting then-candidate Trump.

    57. After the election of Donald Trump in or around November 2016, Defendants and their co- conspirators used false U.S. personas to organize and coordinate U. S. political rallies in support of then president-elect Trump, while simultaneously using other false U.S. personas to organize and coordinate U.S. political rallies protesting the results of the 2016 U.S. presidential election. For example, in or around November 2016, Defendants and their co-conspirators organized a rally in New York through one ORGANIZATION-controlled group designed to “show your support for President-Elect Donald Trump” held on or about November 12, 2016. At the same time, Defendants and their co-conspirators, through another ORGANIZATION-controlled group, organized a rally in New York called “Trump is NOT my President” held on or about November 12, 2016. Similarly, Defendants and their co-conspirators organized a rally entitled “Charlotte Against Trump” in Charlotte, North Carolina, held on or about November 19, 2016.

    Destruction of Evidence

    58. In order to avoid detection and impede investigation by U.S. authorities of Defendants’ operations, Defendants and their co-conspirators deleted and destroyed data, including emails, social media accounts, and other evidence of their activities.

    a. Beginning in or around June 2014, and continuing into June 2015, public reporting began to identify operations conducted by the ORGANIZATION in the United States. In response, Defendants and their co-conspirators deleted email accounts used to conduct their operations.

    Beginning in or around September 2017, U.S. social media companies, starting with Facebook, publicly reported that they had identified Russian expenditures on their platforms to fund political and social advertisements. Facebook’s initial disclosure of the Russian purchases occurred on or about September 6, 2017, and included a statement that Facebook had “shared [its] findings with US authorities investigating these issues.”

    Media reporting on or about the same day as Facebook’s disclosure referred to Facebook working with investigators for the Special Counsel’s Office of the U.S. Department of Justice, which had been charged with investigating the Russian government’s efforts to interfere in the 2016 presidential election.

    Defendants and their co-conspirators thereafter destroyed evidence for the purpose of impeding the investigation. On or about September 13, 2017, KAVERZINA wrote in an email to a family member: “We had a slight crisis here at work: the FBI busted our activity (not a joke). So, I got preoccupied with covering tracks together with the colleagues.” KAVERZINA further wrote, “I created all these pictures and posts, and the Americans believed that it was written by their people.”

    Overt Acts

    59. In furtherance of the Conspiracy and to effect its illegal object, Defendants and their co- conspirators committed the following overt acts in connection with the staging of U.S. political rallies, as well as those as set forth in paragraphs 1 through 7, 9 through 27, and 29 through 58, which are re-alleged and incorporated by reference as though fully set forth herein.

    60. On or about June 1, 2016, Defendants and their co-conspirators created and purchased Facebook advertisements for their “March for Trump” rally.

    61. On or about June 4, 2016, Defendants and their co-conspirators used allforusa@yahoo.com, the email address of a false U.S. persona, to send out press releases for the “March for Trump” rally to New York media outlets.

    62. On or about June 23, 2016, Defendants and their co-conspirators used the Facebook account registered under a false U.S. persona “Matt Skiber” to contact a real U.S. person to serve as a recruiter for the “March for Trump” rally, offering to “give you money to print posters and get a megaphone.”

    63. On or about June 24, 2016, Defendants and their co-conspirators purchased advertisements on Facebook to promote the “Support Hillary. Save American Muslims” rally.

    64. On or about July 5, 2016, Defendants and their co-conspirators ordered posters for the “Support Hillary. Save American Muslims” rally, including the poster with the quote attributed to Clinton that read “I think Sharia Law will be a powerful new direction of freedom.” 65. On or about July 8, 2016, Defendants and their co-conspirators communicated with a real U.S. person about the posters they had ordered for the “Support Hillary. Save American Muslims” rally.

    66. On or about July 12, 2016, Defendants and their co-conspirators created and purchased Facebook advertisements for the “Down With Hillary” rally in New York.

    67. On or about July 23, 2016, Defendants and their co-conspirators used the email address of a false U.S. persona, joshn1ilton024@grnail.com, to send out press releases to over thirty media outlets promoting the “Down With Hillary” rally at Trump Tower in New York City.

    68. On or about July 28, 2016, Defendants and their co-conspirators posted a series of tweets through the false U.S. persona account @March_for_Trump stating that “[w]e’re currently planning a series of rallies across the state of Florida” and seeking volunteers to assist.

    69. On or about August 2, 2016, Defendants and their co-conspirators used the false U.S. persona “Matt Skiber” Facebook account to send a private message to a real Facebook account, “Florida for Trump,” set up to assist then-candidate Trump in the state of Florida. In the first message, Defendants and their co-conspirators wrote:

    Hi there! I’m a member of Being Patriotic online community. Listen, we’ve got an idea. Florida is still a purple state and we need to paint it red. If we lose Florida, we lose America. We can’t let it happen, right? What about organizing a YUGE pro-Trump flash mob in every Florida town? We are currently reaching out to local activists and we ’ve got the folks who are okay to be in charge of organizing their events almost everywhere in FL. However, we still need your support. What do you think about that? Are you in?

    70. On or about August 2, 2016, and August 3, 2016, Defendants and their co-conspirators, through the use of a stolen identity of a real U.S. person, T.W., sent emails to certain grassroots groups located in Florida that stated in part:

    My name is [T.W.] and I represent a conservative patriot community named as “Being Patriotic.” . . . So we’re gonna organize a flash mob across Florida to support Mr. Trump. We clearly understand that the elections winner will be predestined by purple states. And we must win Florida. . . . We got a lot of volunteers in ~25 locations and it’s just the beginning. We’re currently choosing venues for each location and recruiting more activists. This is why we ask you to spread this info and participate in the flash mob.

    71. On or about August 4, 2016, Defendants and their co-conspirators created and purchased Facebook advertisements for the “Florida Goes Trump” rally. The advertisements reached over 59,000 Facebook users in Florida, and over 8,300 Facebook users responded to the advertisements by clicking on it, which routed users to the ORGANIZATION’s “Being Patriotic” page.

    72. Beginning on or about August 5, 2016, Defendants and their co-conspirators used the false U.S. persona @March_for_Trump Twitter account to recruit and later pay a real U.S. person to wear a costume portraying Clinton in a prison uniform at a rally in West Palm Beach.

    73. Beginning on or about August 11, 2016, Defendants and their co-conspirators used the false U.S. persona “Matt Skiber” Facebook account to recruit a real U.S. person to acquire signs and a costume depicting Clinton in a prison uniform.

    74. On or about August 15, 2016, Defendants and their co-conspirators received an email at one of their false U.S. persona accounts from a real U.S. person, a Florida-based political activist identified as the “Chair for the Trump Campaign” in a particular Florida county. The activist identified two additional sites in Florida for possible rallies. Defendants and their co-conspirators subsequently used their false U.S. persona accounts to communicate with the activist about logistics and an additional rally in Florida.

    75. On or about August 16, 2016, Defendants and their co-conspirators used a false U.S. persona Instagram account connected to the ORGANIZATION-created group “Tea Party News” to purchase advertisements for the “Florida Goes Trump” rally.

    76. On or about August 18, 2016, the real “Florida for Trump” Facebook account responded to the false U.S. persona “Matt Skiber” account with instructions to contact a member of the Trump Campaign (“Campaign Official 1”) involved in the campaign’s Florida operations and provided Campaign Official 1’s email address at the campaign domain donaldtrump.com. On approximately the same day, Defendants and their co-conspirators used the email address of a false U.S. persona, joshn1ilton024@gmail.com, to send an email to Campaign Official 1 at that donaldtrump.com email account, which read in part:

    Hello [Campaign Official 1], [w]e are organizing a state-wide event in Florida on August, 20 to support Mr. Trump. Let us introduce ourselves first. “Being Patriotic” is a grassroots conservative online movement trying to unite people offline. . . . [W]e gained a huge lot of followers and decided to somehow help Mr. Trump get elected. You know, simple yelling on the Internet is not enough. There should be real action. We organized rallies in New York before. Now we’re focusing on purple states such as Florida.

    The email also identified thirteen “confirmed locations” in Florida for the rallies and requested the campaign provide “assistance in each location.”

    77. On or about August 18, 2016, Defendants and their co-conspirators sent money via interstate wire to another real U.S. person recruited by the ORGANIZATION, using one of their false U.S. personas, to build a cage large enough to hold an actress depicting Clinton in a prison uniform

    78. On or about August 19, 2016, a supporter of the Trump Campaign sent a message to the ORGANIZATION-controlled “March for Trump” Twitter account about a member of the Trump Campaign (“Campaign Official 2”) who was involved in the campaign’s Florida operations and provided Campaign Official 2’s email address at the domain donaldtrump.com. On or about the same day, Defendants and their co-conspirators used the false U.S. persona joshn1ilton024@grnail.com account to send an email to Campaign Official 2 at that donaldtrump.com email account.

    79. On or about August 19, 2016, the real “Florida for Trump” Facebook account sent another message to the false U.S. persona “Matt Skiber” account to contact a member of the Trump Campaign (“Campaign Official 3”) involved in the campaign’s Florida operations. On or about August 20, 2016, Defendants and their co-conspirators used the “Matt Skiber” Facebook account to contact Campaign Official 3.

    80. On or about August 19, 2016, Defendants and their co-conspirators used the false U.S. persona “Matt Skiber” account to write to the real U.S. person affiliated with a Texas-based grassroots organization who previously had advised the false persona to focus on “purple states like Colorado, Virginia & Florida.” Defendants and their co-conspirators told that U.S. person, “We were thinking about your recommendation to focus on purple states and this is what we’re organizing in FL.” Defendants and their co-conspirators then sent a link to the Facebook event page for the Florida rallies and asked that person to send the information to Tea Party members in Florida. The real U.S. person stated that he/she would share among his/her own social media contacts, who would pass on the information.

    81. On or about August 24, 2016, Defendants and their co-conspirators updated an internal ORGANIZATION list of over 100 real U.S. persons contacted through ORGANIZATION- controlled false U.S. persona accounts and tracked to monitor recruitment efforts and requests. The list included contact information for the U.S. persons, a summary of their political Views, and activities they had been asked to perform by Defendants and their co-conspirators.

    82. On or about August 31, 2016, Defendants and their co-conspirators, using a U.S. persona, spoke by telephone with a real U.S. person affiliated with a grassroots group in Florida. That individual requested assistance in organizing a rally in Miami, Florida. On or about September 9, 2016, Defendants and their co-conspirators sent the group an interstate wire to pay for materials needed for the Florida rally on or about September 11, 2016.

    83. On or about August 31, 2016, Defendants and their co-conspirators created and purchased Facebook advertisements for a rally they organized and scheduled in New York for September 11, 2016.

    84. On or about September 9, 2016, Defendants and their co-conspirators, through a false U. S. persona, contacted the real U.S. person who had impersonated Clinton at the West Palm Beach rally. Defendants and their co-conspirators sent that U.S. person money Via interstate wire as an inducement to travel from Florida to New York and to dress in costume at another rally they organized.

    85. On or about September 22, 2016, Defendants and their co-conspirators created and purchased Facebook advertisements for a series of rallies they organized in Pennsylvania called “Miners for Trump” and scheduled for October 2, 2016.

    All in Violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 371.

    COUNT TWO
    (Conspiracy to Commit Wire Fraud and Bank Fraud)

    86. Paragraphs 1 through 7, 9 through 27, and 29 through 85 of this Indictment are re-alleged and incorporated by reference as if fully set forth herein.

    87. From in or around 2016 through present, in the District of Columbia and elsewhere, Defendants INTERNET RESEARCH AGENCY LLC, DZHEYKHUN NASIMI OGLY ASLANOV, and GLEB IGOREVICH VASILCHENKO, together with others known and unknown to the Grand Jury, knowingly and intentionally conspired to commit certain offenses against the United States, to wit:

    a. to knowingly, having devised and intending to devise a scheme and artifice to defraud, and to obtain money and property by means of false and fraudulent pretenses, representations, and promises, transmit and cause to be transmitted, by means of wire communications in interstate and foreign commerce, writings, signs, signals, pictures, and sounds, for the purposes of executing such scheme and artifice, in Violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1343; and b. to knowingly execute and attempt to execute a scheme and artifice to defraud a federally insured financial institution, and to obtain monies, funds, credits, assets, securities and other property from said financial institution by means of false and fraudulent pretenses, representations, and promises, all in Violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1344.

    88. The conspiracy had as its object the opening of accounts under false names at U. S. financial institutions and a digital payments company in order to receive and send money into and out of the United States to support the ORGANIZATION’s operations in the United States and for self- enrichment.

    Manner and Means of the Conspiracy

    89. Beginning in at least 2016, Defendants and their co-conspirators used, without lawful authority, the social security numbers, home addresses, and birth dates of real U.S. persons without their knowledge or consent. Using these means of stolen identification, Defendants and their co- conspirators opened accounts at a federally insured U.S. financial institution (“Bank 1”), including the following accounts:

    Approximate DateAccount NameMeans of Indentification
    June 16, 2016T.B.Social Security Number
    Date of Birth
    July 21, 2016A.R.Social Security Number
    Date of Birth
    July 27, 2016T.C.Social Security Number
    Date of Birth
    August 2, 2016T.W.Social Security Number
    Date of Birth

    90. Defendants and their co-conspirators also used, without lawful authority, the social security numbers, home addresses, and birth dates of real U.S. persons to open accounts at PayPal, a digital payments company, including the following accounts:

    Approximate DateAccount NameMeans of Indentification
    June 16, 2016T.B.Social Security Number
    Date of Birth
    July 21, 2016A.R.Social Security Number
    Date of Birth
    August 2, 2016T.W.Social Security Number
    Date of Birth
    November 11, 2016J.W.Home Address
    January 18, 2017V.S.Social Security Number

    Defendants and their co-conspirators also established other accounts at PayPal in the names of false and fictitious U.S. personas. Some personas used to register PayPal accounts were the same as the false U.S. personas used in connection with the ORGANIZATION’s social media accounts.

    91. Defendants and their co-conspirators purchased credit card and bank account numbers from online sellers for the unlawful purpose of evading security measures at PayPal, which used account numbers to verify a user’s identity. Many of the bank account numbers purchased by Defendants and their co-conspirators were created using the stolen identities of real U.S. persons. After purchasing the accounts, Defendants and their co-conspirators submitted these bank account numbers to PayPal.

    92. On or about the dates identified below, Defendants and their co-conspirators obtained and used the following fraudulent bank account numbers for the purpose of evading PayPal’s security measures:

    Approximate DateCard/Bank Account NumberFinancial InstitutionEmail Used to Acquire Account Number
    June 13, 2016XXXXXXXXX8902Bank 2wemakeweather@gmail.com
    June 16, 2016XXXXXX8731Bank 1allforusa@yahoo.com
    July 21, 2016XXXXXX2215Bank 3antwan_8 @yahoo.com
    August 2, 2016XXXXXX5707Bank 1xtimwaltersx@gmail.com
    October 18, 2016XXXXXXXXX5792Bank 4urntedvetsofarnerica@gmail.com
    October 18, 2016XXXXXXXXX4743Bank 4patriototus@gmail.com
    November 11, 2016XXXXXXXXX2427Bank 4beautifullelly@gmail.com
    November 11, 2016XXXXXXXXX7587Bank 5staceyredneck@gmail.com
    November 11, 2016XXXXXXXX7590Bank 5ihatecrime1@gmail.com
    November 11, 2016XXXXXXXX1780Bank 6staceyredneck@gmail.com
    November 11, 2016XXXXXXXX1762Bank 6ihatecrime1@gmail.com
    December 13, 2016XXXXXXXX6168Bank 6thetaylorbrooks@aol.com
    March 30, 2017XXXXXXXXX6316Bank 3wokeaztec@outlook.com
    March 30, 2017XXXXXX9512Bank 3wokeaztec@outlook.com

    93. Additionally, and in order to maintain their accounts at PayPal and elsewhere, including online cryptocurrency exchanges, Defendants and their co-conspirators purchased and obtained false identification documents, including fake U.S. driver’s licenses. Some false identification documents obtained by Defendants and their co-conspirators used the stolen identities of real U. S. persons, including U.S. persons T.W. and J.W.

    94. After opening the accounts at Bank 1 and PayPal, Defendants and their co-conspirators used them to receive and send money for a variety of purposes, including to pay for certain ORGANIZATION expenses. Some PayPal accounts were used to purchase advertisements on Facebook promoting ORGANIZATION-controlled social media accounts. The accounts were also used to pay other ORGANIZATION-related expenses such as buttons, flags, and banners for rallies.

    95. Defendants and their co-conspirators also used the accounts to receive money from real U.S. persons in exchange for posting promotions and advertisements on the ORGANIZATION- controlled social media pages. Defendants and their co-conspirators typically charged certain U.S. merchants and U.S. social media sites between 25 and 50 U.S. dollars per post for promotional content on their popular false U.S. persona accounts, including Being Patriotic, Defend the 2nd, and BlacktiVist.

    All in Violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1349.

    COUNTS THREE THROUGH EIGHT
    (Aggravated Identity Theft)

    96. Paragraphs 1 through 7, 9 through 27, and 29 through 85, and 89 through 95 of this Indictment are re-alleged and incorporated by reference as if fully set forth herein.

    97. On or about the dates specified below, in the District of Columbia and elsewhere, Defendants INTERNET RESEARCH AGENCY LLC, DZHEYKHUN NASIMI OGLY ASLANOV, GLEB IGOREVICH VASILCHENKO, IRINA VIKTOROVNA KAVERZINA, and VLADIMIR VENKOV did knowingly transfer, possess, and use, without lawful authority, a means of identification of another person during and in relation to a felony Violation enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(c), to wit, wire fraud and bank fraud, knowing that the means of identification belonged to another real person:

    Approximate DateAccount NameMeans of Indentification
    June 16, 2016T.B.Social Security Number
    Date of Birth
    July 21, 2016A.R.Social Security Number
    Date of Birth
    August 2, 2016T.W.Social Security Number
    Date of Birth
    November 11, 2016J.W.Home Address
    January 18, 2017V.S.Social Security Number
    May 19, 2017J.W.Home Address
    Date of Birth

    All in Violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1028A(a)(1) and 2. FORFEITURE ALLEGATION

    98. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2, notice is hereby given to Defendants that the United States will seek forfeiture as part of any sentence in accordance with Title 18, United States Code, Sections 981(a)(1)(C) and 982(a)(2), and Title 28, United States Code, Section 2461(c), in the event of Defendants’ convictions under Count Two of this Indictment Upon conviction of the offense charged in Count Two, Defendants INTERNET RESEARCH AGENCY LLC, DZHEYKHUN NASIlVII OGLY ASLANOV, and GLEB IGOREVICH VASILCHENKO shall forfeit to the United States any property, real or personal, which constitutes or is derived from proceeds traceable to the offense of conviction. Upon conviction of the offenses charged in Counts Three through Eight, Defendants INTERNET RESEARCH AGENCY LLC, DZHEYKHUN NASIMI OGLY ASLANOV, GLEB IGOREVICH VASILCHENKO, IRINA VIKTOROVNA KAVERZINA, and VLADIMIR VENKOV shall forfeit to the United States any property, real or personal, which constitutes or is derived from proceeds traceable to the offense(s) of conviction. Notice is further given that, upon conviction, the United States intends to seek a judgment against each Defendant for a sum of money representing the property described in this paragraph, as applicable to each Defendant (to be offset by the forfeiture of any specific property).

    Substitute Assets

    99. If any of the property described above as being subject to forfeiture, as a result of any act or omission of any defendant --

    a. cannot be located upon the exercise of due diligence;

    b. has been transferred or sold to, or deposited with, a third party;

    c. has been placed beyond the jurisdiction of the court;

    d. has been substantially diminished in value; or

    e. has been commingled with other property that cannot be subdivided without difficulty;

    it is the intent of the United States of America, pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 982(b) and Title 28, United States Code, Section 2461(c), incorporating Title 21, United States Code, Section 853, to seek forfeiture of any other property of said Defendant.

    (18 U.S.C. §§ 981(a)(1)(C) and 982; 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c))

    Robert S. Mueller, III,
    Special Counsel
    U.S. Department of Justice

    U.S. v. Richard Pinedo

    Criminal information in the case against Richard Pinedo

    The Special Counsel informs the Court:

    (Identity Fraud)

    From approximately 2014 through November 2017, defendant RICHARD PINEDO did knowingly transfer, possess, and use, in and affecting interstate and foreign commerce, and without lawful authority, means of identification of other persons with the intent to commit, and to aid or abet, and in connection with, unlawful activity that constitutes a violation of Federal law, to wit, wire fraud, in Violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1343. As a result of the offense, PINEDO obtained $1,000 01 more during a one-year period.

    (Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1028(a)(7), (b)(1)(D) & (c)(3)(A).)
    ROBERT S. MUELLER, III
    Special Counsel

    By:
    Jeannie S. Rhee
    L. Rush Atkinson
    Ryan K. Dickey
    The Special Counsel’s Office

    Richard Pinedo Plea Agreement

    Dear Counsel:

    This letter sets forth the full and complete plea offer to your client, Richard Pinedo (hereinafter referred to as “your client” or “defendant”), from the Special Counsel’s Office (hereinafter also referred to as “the Government” or “this Office”). If your client accepts the terms and conditions of this offer, please have your client execute this document in the space provided below. Upon receipt of the executed document, this letter will become the Plea Agreement (hereinafter referred to as “this Agreement”). The terms of the offer are as follows:

    1. Changes and Statutory Penalties

    Your client agrees to plead guilty to the attached Criminal Information, charging your client with identity fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1028(a)(7), (b)(1)(D) & (c)(3)(A).

    Your client understands that a violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1028(a)(7) & (b)(1)(D) carries a maximum sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment; a fine of $250,000, pursuant to 18 U.S.Cr §3571(b)(3); a term of supervised release of not more than 3 years, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b)(2); and an obligation to pay any applicable interest or penalties on fines and restitution not timely made.

    In addition, your client agrees to pay a special assessment of $1 00 per felony conviction to the Clerk of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Your client also understands that, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3572 and § SE12 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, Guidelines Manual (2016) (hereinafter “Sentencing Guidelines,” “Guidelines,” or “U.S.S.G.”), the Court may also impose a fine that is sufficient to pay the federal government the costs of any imprisonment, term of supervised release, and period of probation.

    2. Factual Stipulations

    Your client agrees that the attached “Statement of the Offense” fairly and accurately describes your client’s actions and involvement in the offense to which your client is pleading guilty. Please have your client sign and return the Statement of the Offense as a written proffer of evidence, along with this Agreement.

    3. Additional Charges

    In consideration of your client’s guilty plea to the above offense, your client will not be firmer prosecuted criminally by this Office for the conduct set forth in the attached Statement of the Offense.

    4. Sentencing Guidelines Analysis

    Your client understands that the sentence in this case will be determined by the Court, pursuant to the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), including a consideration of the applicable guidelines and policies set forth in the Sentencing Guidelines. Pursuant to Federal Rub of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(B), and to assist the Court in determining the appropriate sentence, the parties agree to the following:

    A. Estimated Offense Level Under the Guidelines

    The parties agree that the following Sentencing Guidelines sections apply:

    U.S.S.G. §2B1.1(a)(2)Base Offense Level:6
    U.S.S.G. §2B1.1(b)(1)(D)Gain between $40,000 & $60,000+6
    U.S.S.G. §2B1.1(b)(10)Offense Outside the United States:+ 2 (min. level 12)
    U.S.S.G. §2B1.1(a)(11)Identity Theft Enhancement:+ 2 (min. level 12)
    Total (minimum level)16
    B. Acceptance of Responsibility

    The Government agrees flat 3 2-1eve1 reduction will be appropriate, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, provided that your client clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility, to the satisfaction of the Government, through your client’s allocution, adherence to every provision of this Agreement, and conduct between entry of the plea and imposition of sentence. Furthermore, assuming your client has accepted responsibility as deserted it the previous sentence, the Government agrees that an additional l-level reduction will be appropriate, pursuant to U.S.S.G § 3E1.1(b), because your client has assisted authorities by providing timely notice of your client’s intention to enter a plea of guilty, thereby permitting the Government to avoid preparing for trial and permitting the Court to allocate its resources efficiently.

    Nothing in this Agreement limits the right of the Government to seek denial of the adjustment for acceptance of responsibility, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, and/or imposition of an adjustment for obstruction of justice, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, regardless of any agreement set forth above, should your client move to withdraw your client’s guilty plea after it's entered, or should it be determined by the Government that your client has either (a) engaged in conduct, unknown to the Government at the time of the signing of the Agreement, that constitutes obstruction of justice, or (b) engaged in additional criminal conduct after signing this Agreement.

    In accordance with the above, the applicable Guidelines Offense Level will be at least 13.

    C. Estimated Criminal History Category

    Based upon the information now available to this Office, your client has no criminal convictions.

    Accordingly, your client is estimated to have zero criminal history points and your client’s Criminal History Category is estimated to be 1. Your client acknowledges that if additional convictions are discovered during the pre-sentence investigation by the United States Probation Office, your client’s criminal history points may increase.

    D. Estimated Applicable Guidelines Range

    Based upon the agreed total offense level and the estimated criminal history category set forth above, your client’s estimated Sentencing Guidelines range is twelve months to eighteen months’ imprisonment (the “Estimated Guidelines Range”). In addition, the parties agree that, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2, should the Court impose a fine, at Guidelines level 13, the estimated applicable fine range is $5,500 to $55,000. Your client reserves the right to ask the Court not to impose any applicable fine.

    The parties agree that, solely for the purposes of calculating the applicable range under the Sentencing Guidelines, neither a downward nor upward departure fi’om the Estimated Guidelines Range set forth above is warranted, subject to the paragraphs regarding cooperation below. Accordingly, neither party will seek any departure 0r adjustment to the Estimated Guidelines Range, nor will either party suggest that the Court consider such a departure or adjustment, except as provided in the preceding sentence. Moreover, your client understands and acknowledges that the Estimated Guidelines Range agreed to by the parties is not binding on the Probation Office or the Court. Should the Court determine that a different guidelines range is applicable, your client will not be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea on that basis, and the Government and your client will still be bound by this Agreement.

    Your client understands and acknowledges that the terms of this section apply only to conduct that occurred before the execution of this Agreement. Should your client commit any conduct after the execution of this Agreement that would form the basis for an increase in your client’s base offense level or justify an upward departure (examples of which include, but are not limited to, obstruction of justice, failure to appear for a court proceeding, criminal conduct while pending sentencing, and false statements to law enforcement agents, the probation officer, or the Court), the Government is free under this Agreement to seek an increase in the base offense level based on that post—agreement conduct.

    5. Agreement as to Sentencing Allocution

    Based upon the information known to the Government at the time of the signing of this Agreement, the parties further agree that a sentence within the Estimated Guidelines Range would constitute a reasonable sentence in light of all of the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), should such a sentence be subject to appellate review notwithstanding the appeal waiver provided below.

    6. Reservation of Allocution

    The Government and your client reserve the right to describe fully, both orally and in writing, to the sentencing judge, the nature and seriousness of your client’s misconduct, including any misconduct not described in the charges to which your client is pleading guilty.

    The parties also reserve the right to inform the presentence report writer and the Court of any relevant facts, to dispute any factual inaccuracies in the presentence report, and to contest any matters not provided for in this Agreement. In the event that the Court considers any Sentencing Guidelines adjustments, departures, or calculations different from any agreements contained in this Agreement, or contemplates a sentence outside the Guidelines range based upon the general sentencing factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the parties reserve the right to answer any related inquiries from the Court. In addition, if in this Agreement the parties have agreed to recommend or refrain from recommending to the Court a particular resolution of any sentencing issue, the parties reserve the right to full allocution in any post-sentence litigation. The parties retain the hill right of allocution in connection with any post—sentence motion which may be filed in this matter and/or any proceeding(s) before the Bureau of Prisons. In addition, your client acknowledges that the Government is not obligated and currently does not intend to file any post—sentence downward departure motion in this case pursuant to Rule 35(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.

    7. Court Not Bound by this Agreement or the Sentencing Guidelines

    Your client understands that the sentence in this case will be imposed in accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), upon consideration of the Sentencing Guidelines. Your client further understands that the sentence to be imposed is a matter solely within the discretion of the Court. Your client acknowledges that the Court is not obligated to follow any recommendation of the Government at the time of sentencing or to grant a downward departure based on your client’s substantial assistance to the Government, even if the Government files a motion pursuant to Section 5K1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines. Your client understands that neither the Government’s recommendation nor the Sentencing Guidelines are binding on the Court.

    Your client acknowledges that your client’s entry of a guilty plea to the charged offense authorizes the Court to impose any sentence, up to and including the statutory maximum sentence, which may be greater than the applicable Guidelines range. The Government cannot, and does not, make any promise or representation as to what sentence your client will receive. Moreover, it is understood that your client will have no right to withdraw your client’s plea of guilty should the Court impose a sentence that is outside the Guidelines range or if the Court does not follow the Government’s sentencing recommendation. The Government and your client will be bound by this Agreement, regardless of the sentence imposed by the Court. Any effort by your client to withdraw the guilty plea because of the length of the sentence shall constitute a breach of this Agreement.

    8. Cooperation

    Your client agrees to cooperate with this Office on the following terms and conditions:

    (a) Your client shall cooperate fully, truthfully, completely, and forthrightly with this Office and other Federal, state, and local law enforcement authorities identified by this Office in any and all matters as to which this Office deems the cooperation relevant. Your client acknowledges that your client’s cooperation may include, but will not necessarily be limited to: answering questions; providing sworn written statements; taking government-administered polygraph examination(s); and participating in covert law enforcement activities. Any refusal by your client to cooperate fully, truthfully, completely, and forthrightly as directed by this Office and other Federal, state, and local law enforcement authorities identified by this Office in any and all matters in which this Office deems your client’s assistance relevant will constitute a breach of this Agreement by your client, and will relieve this Office of its obligations under this Agreement, including, but not limited to, its obligation to inform this Court of any assistance your client has provided. Your client agrees, however, that such breach by your client will not constitute a basis for withdrawal of your client’s plea of guilty or otherwise relieve your client of your client’s obligations under this Agreement.

    (b) Your client shall promptly turn over to this Office, or other law enforcement authorities, or direct such law enforcement authorities to, any and all evidence of crimes about which your client is aware; all contraband and proceeds of such crimes; and all assets traceable to the proceeds of such crimes. Your client agrees to the forfeiture of all assets which are proceeds of crimes or traceable to such proceeds of crimes.

    (c) Your client shall submit a full and complete accounting of all your client’s financial assets, whether such assets are in your client’s name or in the name of a third party.

    (d) Your client acknowledges and understands that, during the course of the cooperation outlined in this Agreement, your client will be interviewed by law enforcement agents and/or Government attorneys. Your client waives any right to have counsel present during these interviews and agrees to meet with law enforcement agents and Government attorneys outside of the presence of counsel. If, at some future point, you or your client desire to have counsel present during interviews by law enforcement agents and/or Government attorneys, and you communicate this decision in writing to this Office, this Office will honor this request, and this change will have no effect on any other terms and conditions of this Agreement.

    (e) Your client shall testify fully, completely and truthfully before any and all Grand Juries in the District of Columbia and elsewhere, and at any and all trials of cases or other court proceedings in the District of Columbia and elsewhere, at which your client’s testimony may be deemed relevant by the Government.

    (f) Your client understands and acknowledges that nothing in this Agreement allows your client to commit any criminal Violation of local, state or federal law during the period of your client’s cooperation with law enforcement authorities or at any time prior to the sentencing in this case. The commission of a criminal offense during the period of your client’s cooperation or at any time prior to sentencing will constitute a breach of this Agreement and will relieve the Government of all of its obligations under this Agreement, including, but not limited to, its obligation to inform this Court of any assistance your client has provided. However, your client acknowledges and agrees that such a breach of this Agreement will not entitle your client to withdraw your client’s plea of guilty or relieve your client of the obligations under this Agreement.

    (g) Your client agrees that the sentencing in this case may be delayed until your client’s efforts to cooperate have been completed, as determined by the Government, so that the Court will have the benefit of all relevant information before a sentence is imposed.

    9. Waivers

    A. Venue

    Your client waives any challenge to and consents to venue in the District of Columbia.

    B. Statute of Limitations

    Your client agrees that, should the conviction following your client’s plea of guilty pursuant to this Agreement be vacated for any reason, any prosecution, based on the conduct set forth in the attached Statement of the Offense, that is not time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations on the date of the signing of this Agreement (including any counts that the Government has agreed not to prosecute or to dismiss at sentencing pursuant to this Agreement) may be commenced or reinstated against your client, notwithstanding the expiration of the statute of limitations between the signing of this Agreement and the commencement or reinstatement of such prosecution. It is the intent of this Agreement to waive all defenses based on the statute of limitations with respect to any prosecution of conduct set forth in the attached Statement of the Offense that is not time-barred on the date that this Agreement is signed.

    C. Trial Rights

    Your client understands that by pleading guilty in this case your client agrees to waive certain rights afforded by the Constitution of the United States and/or by statute or rule. Your client agrees to forgo the right to any further discovery or disclosures of information not already provided at the time of the entry of your client’s guilty plea. Your client also agrees to waive, among other rights, the right to be indicted by a Grand Jury, the right to plead not guilty, and the right to a jury trial. If there were a jury trial, your client would have the right to be represented by counsel, to confront and cross-examine witnesses against your client, to challenge the admissibility of evidence offered against your client, to compel witnesses to appear for the purpose of testifying and presenting other evidence on your client’s behalf; and to choose whether to testify. If there were a jury trial and your client chose not to testify at that trial, your client would have the right to have the jury instructed that your client’s failure to testify could not be held against your client. Your client would further have the right to have the jury instructed that your client is presumed innocent until proven guilty, and that the burden would be on the United States to prove your client’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. If your client were found guilty after a trial, your client would have the right to appeal your client’s conviction. Your client understands that the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States protects your client from the use of compelled self—incriminating statements in a criminal prosecution. By entering a plea of guilty, your client knowingly and voluntarily waives or gives up your client’s right against compelled self- incrimination.

    Your client acknowledges discussing with you Rule 11(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and Rule 4100f the Federal Rules of Evidence, which ordinarily limit the admissibility of statements made by a defendant in the course of plea discussions or plea proceedings if a guilty plea is later withdrawn. Your client knowingly and voluntarily waives the rights that arise under these rules in the event your client withdraws your client’s guilty plea or withdraws from this Agreement after signing it.

    Your client also agrees to waive all constitutional and statutory rights to a speedy sentence and agrees that the plea of guilty pursuant to this Agreement will be entered at a time decided upon by the parties with the concurrence of the Court. Your client understands that the date for sentencing will be set by the Court.

    D. Appeal Rights

    Your client understands that federal law, specifically 18 U.S.C. §3742, affords defendants the right to appeal their sentences in certain circumstances. Your client agrees to waive the right to appeal the sentence in this case, including but not limited to any term of imprisonment, fine, forfeiture, award of restitution, term or condition of supervised release, authority of the Court to set conditions of release, and the manner in which the sentence was determined, except to the extent the Court sentences your client above the statutory maximum or guidelines range determined by the Court or your client claims that your client received ineffective assistance of counsel, in which case your client would have the right to appeal the illegal sentence or above- guidelines sentence or raise on appeal a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, but not to raise on appeal other issues regarding the sentencing. In agreeing to this waiver, your client is aware that your client’s sentence has yet to be determined by the Court. Realizing the uncertainty in estimating what sentence the Court ultimately will impose, your client knowingly and willingly waives your client’s right to appeal the sentence, to the extent noted above, in exchange for the concessions made by the Government in this Agreement

    E. Collateral Attack

    Your client also waives any right to challenge the conviction entered or sentence imposed under this Agreement or otherwise attempt to modify or change the sentence or the manner in which it was determined in any collateral attack, including, but not limited to, a motion brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 or Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), except to the extent such a motion '5 based on newly discovered evidence or on a claim that your client received ineffective assistance of counsel Your client reserves the right to file a motion brought under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), but agrees to waive the right to appeal the denial of such a motion.

    F. Privacy Act and FOIA Rights

    Your client also agrees to waive all rights, whether asserted directly or by a representative, to request or receive from any department or agency of the United States any records pertaining to the investigation or prosecution of this case, including and without limitation any records that may be sought under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552, or the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, for the duration of the Special Counsel’s investigation

    10. Restitution

    Your client understands that the Court has an obligation to determine whether, and in what amount, mandatory restitution applies in this case under 18U.S.C. §3663A. The Government and your client agree that mandatory restitution does not apply in this case.

    11. Breach of Agreement

    Your client understands and agrees that, if after entering this Agreement, your client tails specifically to perform or to fulfill completely each and every one of your client’s obligations under this Agreement, or engages in any criminal activity prior to sentencing, your client will have breached this Agreement. In the event of such a breach: (a) the Government will be free from its obligations under this Agreement; (b) your client will not have the right to withdraw the guilty plea; (c) your client will be fully subject to criminal prosecution for any other crimes, including perjury and obstruction of justice; and (d) the Government Will be free to use against your client, directly and indirectly, in any criminal or civil proceeding, all statements made by your client and any of the information or materials provided by your client, including such statements, information, and materials provided pursuant to this Agreement or during the course of any debriefings conducted in anticipation of; or after entry of; this Agreement, whether or not the debriefings were previously characterized as “off-the-record” debriefings, and including your client’s statements made during proceedings before the Court pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.

    Your client understands and agrees that the Government shall be required to prove a breach of this Agreement only by a preponderance of the evidence, except where such breach 'r; based on a violation of federal, state, or local criminal law, which the Government need prove only by probable cause in order to establish a breach of this Agreement.

    Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to permit your client to commit perjury, to make false statements or declarations, to obstruct justice, or to protect your client rom prosecution for any crimes not included within this Agreement or committed by your client alter the execution of this Agreement. Your client understands and agrees that the Government reserves the right to prosecute your client for any such offenses. Your client further understands that any perjury, false statements or declarations, or obstruction of justice relating to your client’s obligations under this Agreement shall constitute a breach of this Agreement In the event of such a breach, your client will not be allowed to withdraw your client’s guilty plea.

    12. Government’s Obligations

    The Government will bring to the Court’s attention at the time of sentencing the nature and extent of your client’s cooperation or lack of cooperation. The Government will evaluate the fill] nature and extent of your client’s cooperation to determine whether your client has provided substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense. If the Government determines that your client has provided such substantial assistance, this Office shall file a departure motion pursuant to Section 5K1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines, which would afford your client an opportunity to persuade the Court that your client should be sentenced to a lesser period of incarceration and/or fine than indicated by the Sentencing Guidelines. The determination of whether your client has provided substantial assistance warranting the filing of a motion pursuant to Section 5K1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines is within the sole discretion of the Government and is not reviewable by the Court. In the event your client should tail to perform specifically and fulfill completely each and every one of your client’s obligations under this Agreement, the Government will be flee from its obligations under this Agreement, and W111 have no obligation to present your client’s case to the Departure Guideline Committee or file a departure motion pursuant to Section 5K1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines.

    13. Complete Agreement

    No agreements, promises, understandings, or representations have been made by the parties or their counsel other than those contained in writing herein, nor Will any such agreements, promises, understandings, or representations be made unless committed to writing and signed by your client, defense counsel, and the Special Counsel’s Office.

    Your client further understands that this Agreement is binding only upon the Special Counsel’s Office. This Agreement does not bind any other United States Attorney’s Office, nor does it bind any other state, local, or federal prosecutor. It also does not bar or compromise any civil, tax, or administrative claim pending or that may be made against your client.

    If the foregoing terms and conditions are satisfactory, your client may so indicate by signing this Agreement and the Statement of the Offense, and returning both to me no later than February 7, 2018.

    Sincerely yours,

    ROBERT S. MUELLER, III
    Special Counsel

    By:
    Jeannie S. Rhee
    Senior Assistant Special Counsel
    L. Rush Atkinson
    Ryan K. Dickey
    Assistant Special Counsels
    The Special Counsel’s Office

    DEFENDANT’S ACCEPTANCE

    I have read every page of this Agreement and have discussed it with my attorney, Jeremy Ian Lessem. I fully understand this Agreement and agree to it without reservation. I do this voluntarily and of my own free will, intending to be legally bound. No threats have been made to me nor am I under the influence of anything that could impede my ability to understand this Agreement fully. I am pleading guilty because I am in fact guilty of the offense identified in this Agreement.

    I reaffirm that absolutely no promises, agreements, understandings, or conditions have been made or entered into in connection with my decision to plead guilty except those set forth in the Agreement. I am satisfied with the legal serviced provided by my attorneys in connection with this Agreement and matters related to it.

    Richard Pinedo
    Defendant
    02/02/18

    ATTORNEY'S ACKNOWLEDGMENT

    I have read every page of this Agreement, reviewed this Agreement with my client, Richard Pinedo, and fully discussed the provisions of this Agreement with my client. These pages accurately and completely set forth the entire Agreement. I concur in my client's desire to plead guilty as set forth in this Agreement.

    Jeremy Ian Lessem
    Attorney for Defendant
    2/2/18

    Statement of Offense in the case against Richard Pinedo

    STATEMENT OF THE OFFENSE

    Pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, the United States of America and the defendant, RICHARD PINEDO, stipulate and agree that the following facts are true and accurate. These facts do not constitute all of the facts known to the parties concerning the charged offense; they are being submitted to demonstrate that sufficient facts exist that the defendant committed the offense to which he is pleading guilty.

    1. From approximately 2014 through December 2017, the defendant, RICHARD PINEDO, operated an online service called “Auction Essistance.” Through Auction Essistance, Pinedo offered a variety of services designed to circumvent the security features of large online digital payment companies, including a large digital payments company hereinafter referred to as Company 1.

    2. PINEDO sold bank account numbers through interstate and foreign commerce, specifically over the internet. PINEDO obtained bank account numbers either by registering accounts in his own name or by purchasing accounts in the names of other people through the internet. Many of the bank accounts purchased by PINEDO over the internet were created using stolen identities of U.S. persons. Although PTNEDO was not directly involved in the registration of these accounts using stolen identities, he willfully and intentionally avoided learning about the use of stolen identities.

    3. Company 1 required users to submit bank account numbers as a means of verifying a user’s identity. To circumvent this requirement, certain users (hereinafter “Users”) registered for Company 1’s online services with bank account numbers in the names of other people. PINEDO sold Users bank account numbers over the internet to aid and abet, and in connection with, this scheme to defraud Company 1 by means of internet communications in interstate and foreign commerce.

    4. After acquiring bank account numbers from PINEDO, Users linked the bank account numbers to their accounts with Company 1 as if they were the real owners of the bank accounts. Company I sought to verify the bank account numbers by making de minimus trial deposits into the accounts and asking Users to identity the amount of these trial deposits. PINEDO told Users the amounts of those trial deposits, thereby further aiding the Users in their scheme to circumvent verification processes by Company 1.

    5. PINEDO frequently purchased bank account numbers from an individual he knew to be outside the United States. Similarly, based on IP addresses and other information, PINEDO knew that many of the persons to whom he sold bank account numbers were outside the United States.

    6. In total, PFNEDO knowingly transferred, possessed, and used, without lawful authority, hundreds of bank account numbers to aid and abet, and in connection with, the use of the wires in interstate and foreign commerce to defeat security measures employed by Company 1. PINEDO personally collected tens of thousands of dollars, and more than $1,000 during a one— year period, through the sale of these bank account numbers.

    DEFENDANT’S ACCEPTANCE

    The preceding statement is a summary, made for the purpose of providing the Court with a factual basis for my guilty plea to the charges against me. It does not include all of the facts known to me regarding this offense. I make this statement knowingly and voluntarily and because I am, in fact, guilty of the crime charged. No threats have been made to me nor am I under the influence of anything that could impede my ability to understand this Statement of the Offense fully.

    I have read every word of this Statement of the Offense, or have had it read to me. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, after consulting with my attorneys, I agree and stipulate to this Statement of the Offense, and declare under penalty of perjury that it is true and correct.

    Richard Pinedo
    Defendant
    02/02/18

    ATTORNEYS' ACKNOWLEDGMENT

    I have read this Statement of Offense, and have reviewed it with my client fully. I concur in my client's desire to adopt and stipulate to this Statement of Offense as true and accurate.

    Jeremy Ian Lessem
    Attorney for Defendant
    02/02/18
    ROBERT S. MUELLER, III
    Special Counsel

    By
    Jeannie S. Rhee
    Senior Assistant Special Counsel
    L. Rush Atkinson
    Ryan K. Dickey
    Assistant Special Counsels
    The Special Counsel’s Office

    U.S. v. Michael Flynn

    Criminal information in the case against Michael Flynn

    INFORMATION

    The Special Counsel informs the Court:

    Count One

    (False Statements)

    On or about January 24, 2017, defendant MICHAEL T. FLYNN did willfully and knowingly make materially false, fictitious, and fraudulent statements and representations in a matter Within the jurisdiction of the executive branch of the Government of the United States, to wit, the defendant falsely stated and represented to agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, in Washington, D.C., that:

    (i) On or about December 29, 2016, FLYNN did not ask the Government of Russia’s Ambassador to the United States (“Russian Ambassador”) to refrain from escalating the situation in response to sanctions that the United States had imposed against Russia that same day; and FLYNN did not recall the Russian Ambassador subsequently telling him that Russia had chosen to moderate its response to those ' sanctions as a result of his request; and

    (ii) On or about December 22, 2016, FLYNN did not ask the Russian Ambassador to delay the vote on or defeat a pending United Nations Security Council resolution; and that the Russian Ambassador subsequently never described to _FLYNN Russia’s response to his request.

    (Title 18, United States Code, Section 1001(a)(2))
    ROBERT S. MUELLER, III
    Special Counsel

    By:
    Brandon L. Van Grack
    Zainab N. Ahmad
    Senior Assistant Special Coufisels
    The Special Counsel’s Office

    Michael Flynn Plea Agreement

    Dear Counsel:

    This letter sets forth the full and complete plea offer to your client, Lieutenant General Michael T. Flynn (Ret.) (hereinafter referred to as “your client” or “defendant”), from the Special Counsel’s Office (hereinafter also referred to as “the Government” or “this Office”). If your client accepts the terms and conditions of this offer, please have your client execute this document in the space provided below. Upon receipt of the executed document, this letter will become the Plea Agreement (hereinafter referred to as “this Agreement”). The terms of the offer are as follows:

    1. Charges and Statutogy Penalties

    Your client agrees to plead guilty to the Criminal Information, a copy of which is attached, charging your client with making false statements to the Federal Bureau of Investigation in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001.

    Your client understands that a violation of 18 U.S.C. § l001 carries a maximum sentence of 5 years’ imprisonment; a fine of $250,000, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3571(b)(3); a term of supervised release of not more than 3 years, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b)(2); and an obligation to pay any applicable interest or penalties on fines and restitution not timely made.

    In addition, your client agrees to pay a special assessment of $100 per felony conviction to the Clerk of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Your client also understands that, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3572 and § 5E1.2 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, Guidelines Manual (2016) (hereinafter “Sentencing Guidelines,” “Guidelines,” or “U.S.S.G.”), the Court may also impose a fine that is sufficient to pay the federal government the costs of any imprisonment, term of supervised release, and period of probation.

    2. F actual Stipulations

    Your client agrees that the attached “Statement of the Offense” fairly and accurately describes your client’s actions and involvement in the offense to which your client is pleading guilty. Please have your client sign and return the Statement of the Offense as a written proffer of evidence, along with this Agreement.

    3. Additional Charges

    In consideration of your client’s guilty plea to the above offense, your client will not be further prosecuted criminally by this Office for the conduct set forth in the attached Statement of the Offense.

    4. Sentencing Guidelines Analysis

    Your client understands that the sentence in this case will be determined by the Court, pursuant to the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(3), including a consideration of the applicable guidelines and policies set forth in the Sentencing Guidelines. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(l )(B), and to assist the Court in determining the appropriate sentence, the parties agree to the following:

    A. Estimated Offense Level Under the Guidelines

    The parties agree that the following Sentencing Guidelines sections apply:

    U.S.S.G. §2B1.1(a)(2)Base Offense Level: 6 Total: 6
    B. Acceptance of Responsibility

    The Government agrees that a 2-level reduction will be appropriate, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3131.1, provided that your client clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility, to the satisfaction of the Government, through your client’s allocution, adherence to every provision of this Agreement, and conduct between entry of the plea and imposition of sentence.

    Nothing in this Agreement limits the right of the Govemment to seek denial of the adjustment for acceptance of responsibility, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.l, and/or imposition of an adjustment for obstruction of justice, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.l , regardless of any agreement set forth above, should your client move to withdraw your client’s guilty plea after it is entered, or should it be determined by the Government that your client has either (a) engaged in conduct, unknown to the Government at the time of the signing of this Agreement, that constitutes obstruction of justice, or (b) engaged in additional criminal conduct after signing this Agreement.

    In accordance with the above, the applicable Guidelines Offense Level will be at least 4.

    C. Estimated Criminal History Category

    Based upon the infonnation now available to this Office, your client has no criminal convictions.

    Accordingly, your client is estimated to have zero criminal history points and your client’s Criminal History Category is estimated to be 1. Your client acknowledges that if additional convictions are discovered during the pre-sentence investigation by the United States Probation Office, your client’s criminal history points may increase.

    D. Estimated Applicable Guidelines Range

    Based upon the agreed total offense level and the estimated criminal history category set forth above, your client’s estimated Sentencing Guidelines range is zero months to six months’ imprisonment (the “Estimated Guidelines Range”). In addition, the parties agree that, pursuant to UlS.S.G. § 5E1.2, should the Court impose a fine, at Guidelines leve14, the estimated applicable fine range is $500 to $9,500. Your client reserves the right to ask the Court not to impose any applicable fine.

    The parties agree that, solely for the purposes of calculating the applicable range under the Sentencing Guidelines, neither a downward nor upward departure from the Estimated Guidelines Range set forth above is warranted, subject to the paragraphs regarding cooperation below. Accordingly, neither party will seek any departure or adjustment to the Estimated Guidelines Range, nor will either party suggest that the Court consider such a departure or adj ustment, except as provided in the preceding sentence. Moreover, your client understands and acknowledges that the Estimated Guidelines Range agreed to by the parties is not binding on the Probation Office or the Court. Should the Court determine that a different guidelines range is applicable, your client will not be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea on that basis, and the Government and your client will still be bound by this Agreement.

    Your client understands and acknowledges that the terms of this section apply only to conduct that occurred before the execution of this Agreement. Should your client commit any conduct after the execution of this Agreement that would form the basis for an increase in your client’s base offense level orjustify an upward departure (examples of which include, but are not limited to, obstruction of justice, failure to appear for a court proceeding, criminal conduct while pending sentencing, and false statements to law enforcement agents, the probation officer, or the Court), the Government is free under this Agreement to seek an increase in the base offense level based on that post-agreement conduct.

    5. Agreement as to Sentencing Allocution

    Based upon the information known to the Government at the time of the signing of this Agreement, the parties further agree that a sentence within the Estimated Guidelines Range would constitute a reasonable sentence in light of all of the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), should such a sentence be subject to appellate review notwithstanding the appeal waiver provided below.

    6. Reservation of Allocution

    The Government and your client reserve the right to describe fully, both orally and in writing, to the sentencing judge, the nature and seriousness of your client’s misconduct, including any misconduct not described in the charges to which your client is pleading guilty.

    The parties also reserve the right to inform the presentenee report writer and the Court of any relevant facts, to dispute any factual inaccuracies in the presentence report, and to contest any matters not provided for in this Agreement. In the event that the Court considers any Sentencing Guidelines adjustments, departures, or calculations different from any agreements contained in this Agreement, or contemplates a sentence outside the Guidelines range based up0n the general sentencing factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the parties reserve the right to answer any related inquiries from the Court. In addition, if in this Agreement the parties have agreed to recommend or refrain from recommending to the Court a particular resolution of any sentencing issue, the parties reserve the right to full allocution in any post-sentence litigation. The parties retain the full right of allocution in connection with any post-sentence motion which may be filed in this matter and/or any proceeding(s) before the Bureau of Prisons. In addition, your client acknowledges that the Government is not obligated and currently does not intend to file any post—sentence downward departure motion in this case pursuant to Rule 35(1)) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.

    7. Court Not Bound by this Agreement or the Sentencing Guidelines

    Your client understands that the sentence in this case will be imposed in accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), upon consideration of the Sentencing Guidelines. Your client further understands that the sentence to be imposed is a matter solely within the discretion of the Court. Your client acknowledges that the Court is not obligated to follow any recommendation of the Government at the time of sentencing or to grant a downward departure based on your client’s substantial assistance to the Government, even if the Government files a motion pursuant to Section 5K1.l of the Sentencing Guidelines. Your client understands that neither the Govemment’s recommendation nor the Sentencing Guidelines are binding on the Court.

    Your client acknowledges that your client’s entry of a guilty plea to the charged offense authorizes the Court to impose any sentence, up to and including the statutory maximum sentence, which may be greater than the applicable Guidelines range. The Government cannot, and does not, make any promise or representation as to what sentence your client will receive. Moreover, it is understood that your client will have no right to withdraw your client’s plea of guilty should the Court impose a sentence that is outside the Guidelines range or if the Court does not follow the Government’s sentencing recommendation. The Government and your client will be bound by this Agreement, regardless of the sentence imposed by the Court. Any effort by your client to withdraw the guilty plea because of the length of the sentence shall constitute a breach of this Agreement.

    8. Cooneration

    Your client agrees to cooperate with this Office on the following terms and conditions:

    (a) Your client shall cooperate fully, truthfully, completely, and forthrightly with this Office and other Federal, state, and local law enforcement authorities identified by this Office in any and all matters as to which this Office deems the cooperation relevant. Your client acknowledges that your client’s cooperation may include, but will not necessarily be limited to: answering questions; providing sworn written statements; taking government-administered polygraph examination(s); and participating in covert law enforcement activities. Any refusal by your client to cooperate fully, truthfully, completely, and forthrightly as directed by this Office and other F ederal, state, and local law enforcement authorities identified by this Office in any and all matters in which this Office deems your client’s assistance relevant will constitute a breach of this Agreement by your client, and will relieve this Office of its obligations under this Agreement, including, but not limited to, its obligation to inform this Court of any assistance your client has provided. Your client agrees, however, that such breach by your client will not constitute a basis for withdrawal of your client’s plea of guilty or otherwise relieve your client of your client’s obligations under this Agreement.

    (b) Your client shall promptly turn over to this Office, or other law enforcement authorities, or direct such law enforcement authorities to, any and all evidence of crimes about which your client is aware; all contraband and proceeds of such crimes; and all assets traceable to the proceeds of such crimes. Your client agrees to the forfeiture of all assets which are proceeds of crimes or traceable to such proceeds of crimes.

    (c) Your client shall submit a full and complete accounting of all your client’s financial assets, whether such assets are in your client’s name or in the name of a third party.

    (d) Your client acknowledges and understands that, during the course of the cooperation outlined in this Agreement, your client will be interviewed by law enforcement agents and/or Government attorneys. Your client waives any right to have counsel present during these interviews and agrees to meet with law enforcement agents and Government attorneys outside of the presence of counsel. If, at some future point, you or your client desire to have counsel present during interviews by law enforcement agents and/or Government attorneys, and you communicate this decision in writing to this Office, this Office will honor this request, and this change will have no effect on any other terms and conditions of this Agreement.

    (e) Your client shall testify fully, completely and truthfully before any and all Grand Juries in the District of Columbia and elsewhere, and at any and all trials of cases or other court proceedings in the District of Columbia and elsewhere, at which your client’s testimony may be deemed relevant by the Government.

    (f) Your client understands and acknowledges that nothing in this A greement allows your client to commit any criminal violation of local, state or federal law during the period of your client’s cooperation with law enforcement authorities or at any time prior to the sentencing in this case. The commission of a criminal offense during the period of your client’s cooperation or at any time prior to sentencing will constitute a breach of this Agreement and will relieve the Government of all of its obligations under this Agreement, including, but not limited to, its obligation to inform this Court of any assistance your client has provided. However, your client _#‘aeknowledgesandagreesthafsoeirabreaehofthis Agreementwrttnorenhfleyourehent—te—R withdraw your client’ 8 plea of guilty or relieve your client of the obligations under this Agreement.

    (g) Your client agrees that the sentencing in this case may be delayed until your client’s efforts to cooperate have been completed, as determined by the Government, so that the Court will have the benefit of all relevant information before a sentence is imposed.

    9. Waivers

    A. Venue

    Your client waives any challenge to venue in the District of Columbia.

    B. Statute of Limitations

    Your client agrees that, should the conviction following your client’s plea of guilty pursuant to this Agreement be vacated for any reason, any prosecution, based on the conduct set forth in the attached Statement of the Offense, that is not time-barrecl by the applicable statute of limitations on the date of the signing of this Agreement (including any counts that the Government has agreed not to prosecute or to dismiss at sentencing pursuant to this Agreement) may be commenced or reinstated against your client, notwithstanding the expiration of the statute of limitations between the signing of this Agreement and the commencement or reinstatement of such prosecution. It is the intent of this Agreement to waive all defenses based on the statute of limitations with respect to any prosecution of conduct set forth in the attached Statement of the Offense that is not time-barred 0n the date that this Agreement is signed.

    C. Trial Rights

    Your client understands that by pleading guilty in this case your client agrees to waive certain rights afforded by the Constitution of the United States and/or by statute or rule. Your client agrees to forgo the right to any further discovery or disclosures of information not already provided at the time of the entry of your client’s guilty plea. Your client also agrees to waive, among other rights, the right to be indicted by a Grand Jury, the right to plead not guilty, and the right to a jury trial. If there were a jury trial, your client would have the right to be represented by counsel, to confront and crossexamine witnesses against your client, to challenge the admissibility of evidence offered against your client, to compel witnesses to appear for the purpose of testifying and presenting other evidence on your client’s behalf, and to choose whether to testify. If there were ajury trial and your client chose not to testify at that trial, your client would have the right to have the jury instructed that your client’s failure to testify could not be held against your client. Your client would further have the right to have thejury instructed that your client is presumed innocent until proven guilty, and that the burden would be on the United States to prove your client’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. If your client were found guilty after a trial, your client would have the right to appeal your client’s conviction. Your client understands that the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States protects your client from the use of compelled self—incriminating statements in a criminal prosecution. By entering a plea of guilty, your client knowingly and voluntarily waives or gives up your client’s right against compelled self-incrimination.

    Your client acknowledges discussing with you Rule 11(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and Rule 410 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which ordinarily limit the admissibility of statements made by a defendant in the course of plea discussions or plea proceedings if a guilty plea is later withdrawn. Your client knowingly and voluntarily waives the rights that arise under these rules in the event your client withdraws your client’s guilty plea or withdraws from this Agreement after signing it.

    Your client also agrees to waive all constitutional and statutory rights to a speedy sentence and agrees that the plea of guilty pursuant to this Agreement will be entered at a time decided upon by the parties with the concurrence of the Court. Your client understands that the date for sentencing will be set by the Court.

    D. Appeal Rights

    Your client understands that federal law, specifically 18 U.S.C. § 3742, affords defendants the right to appeal their sentences in certain circumstances. Your client agrees to waive the right to appeal the sentence in this case, including but not limited to any term of imprisonment, fine, forfeiture, award of restitution, term or condition of supervised release, authority of the Court to set conditions of release, and the manner in which the sentence was determined, except to the extent the Court sentences your client above the statutory maximum or guidelines range determined by the Court or your client claims that your client received ineffective assistance of counsel, in which case your client would have the right to appeal the illegal sentence or above-guidelines sentence or raise on appeal a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, but not to raise on appeal other issues regarding the sentencing. In agreeing to this waiver, your client is aware that your client’s sentence has yet to be determined by the Court. Realizing the uncertainty in estimating what sentence the Court ultimately will impose, your client knowingly and willingly waives your client’s right to appeal the sentence, to the extent noted above, in exchange for the concessions made by the Government in this Agreement.

    E. Collateral Attack

    Your client also waives any right to challenge the conviction entered or sentence imposed under this Agreement or otherwise attempt to modify or change the sentence or the manner in which it was determined in any collateral attack, including, but not limited to, a motion brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 or Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), except to the extent such a motion is based on newly discovered evidence or on a claim that your client received ineffective assistance of counsel. Your client reserves the right to file a motion brought under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), but agrees to waive the right to appeal the denial of such a motion.

    F. Privacy Act and FOIA Rights

    Your client also agrees to waive all rights, whether asserted directly or by a representative, to request or receive from any department or agency of the United States any records pertaining to the investigation or prosecution of this case, including and without limitation any records that may be sought under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552, or the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 55221, for the duration of the Special Counsel’s investigation.

    10. Restitution

    Your client understands that the Court has an obligation to determine whether, and in what amount, mandatory restitution applies in this case under 18 U.S.C. {5 3663A. The Government and your client agree that mandatory restitution does not apply in this case.

    11. Breach of Agreement

    Your client understands and agrees that, if after entering this Agreement, your client fails specifically to perform or to fulfill completely each and every one of your client’s obligations under this Agreement, or engages in any criminal activity prior to sentencing, your client will have breached this Agreement. In the event of such a breach: (a) the Government will be free from its obligations under this Agreement; (b) your client will not have the right to withdraw the guilty plea; (c) your client will be fully subject to criminal prosecution for any other crimes, including perjury and obstruction ofjustice; and (d) the Government will be free to use against your client, directly and indirectly, in any criminal or civil proceeding, all statements made by your client and any of the information or materials provided by your client, including such statements, information, and materials provided pursuant to this Agreement or during the course of any debriefings conducted in anticipation of, or after entry of, this Agreement, whether or not the debriefings were previously characterized as “off-the-record” debriefings, and including your client’s statements made during proceedings before the Court pursuant to Rule 11 of the F ederal Rules of Criminal Procedure.

    Your client understands and agrees that the Government shall be required to prove a breach of this Agreement only by a preponderance of the evidence, except where such breach is based on a violation of federal, state, or local criminal law, which the Government need prove only by probable cause in order to establish a breach of this Agreement.

    Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to permit your client to commit perjury, to make false statements or declarations, to obstruct justice, or to protect your client from prosecution for any crimes not included within this Agreement or committed by your client after the execution of this Agreement. Your client understands and agrees that the Government reserves the right to prosecute your client for any such offenses. Your client further understands that any perjury, false statements or declarations, or obstruction ofjustice relating to your client’s obligations under this Agreement shall constitute a breach of this Agreement. In the event of such a breach, your client will not be allowed to withdraw your client’s guilty plea.

    12. Government’s Obligations

    The Government will bring to the Court’s attention at the time of sentencing the nature and extent of your client’s cooperation or lack of cooperation. The Government will evaluate the full nature and extent of your client’s cooperation to determine whether your client has provided substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense. If the Government determines that your client has provided such substantial assistance, this Office shall file a departure motion pursuant to Section 5Kl.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines, which would afford your client an opportunity to persuade the Court that your client should be sentenced to a lesser period of incarceration and/or fine than indicated by the Sentencing Guidelines. The determination of whether your client has provided substantial assistance warranting the filing of a motion pursuant to Section 5K1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines is within the sole discretion of the Government and is not reviewable by the Court. In the event your client should fail to perform specifically and fulfill completely each and every one of your client’s obligations under this Agreement, the Government will be free from its obligations under this Agreement, and will have no obligation to present your client’s case to the Departure Guideline Committee or file a departure motion pursuant to Section SK] .1 of the Sentencing Guidelines.

    13. Complete Agreement

    No agreements, promises, understandings, or representations have been made by the parties or their counsel other than those contained in writing herein, nor will any such agreements, promises, understandings, or representations be made unless committed to writing and signed by your client, defense counsel, and the Special Counsel’s Office.

    Your client further understands that this Agreement is binding only upon the Special Counsel’s Office. This Agreement does not bind any other United States Attorney’s Office, nor does it bind any other state, local, or federal prosecutor. It also does not bar or compromise any civil, tax, or administrative claim pending or that may be made against your client.

    If the foregoing terms and conditions are satisfactory, your client may so indicate by signing this Agreement and the Statement of the Offense, and returning both to me no later than November 30, 2017.

    Sincerely yours,

    ROBERT S. MUELLER, III
    Special Counsel

    By:
    Bratidon L. Van Grablt
    Zainab N. Ahmad
    Senior Assistant Special Counsels
    The Special Counsel’s Office

    DEFENDANT’S ACCEPTANCE

    I have read every page of this Agreement and have discussed it with my attorneys, Robert K. Kelner and Stephen P. Anthony. I fully understand this Agreement and agree to it without reservation. I do this voluntarily and of my own free will, intending to be legally bound. No threats have been made to me nor am I under the influence of anything that could impede my ability to understand this Agreement fully. I am pleading guilty because I am in fact guilty of the offense identified in this Agreement.

    I reaffirm that absolutely no promises, agreements, understandings, or conditions have been made or entered into in connection with my decision to plead guilty except those set forth in this Agreement. I am satisfied with the legal services provided by my attorneys in connection with this Agreement and matters related to it.

    Lieutenant l Michael T. Flynn (Ret.)
    Defendant
    Date: 11/30/17

    ATTORNEY'S ACKNOWLEDGMENT

    I have read every page of this Agreement, reviewed this Agreement with my client, Lieutenant General Michael T. Flynn (Ret.), and fully discussed the provisions of this Agreement with my client. These pages accurately and completely set forth the entire Agreement. I concur in my client’s desire to plead guilty as set forth in this Agreement.

    Robert K. Kelner
    Attorney for Defendant
    Stephen P. Anthony
    Attorney for Defendant
    Date: 11/30/17

    Statement of Offense against Michael Flynn

    Pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure I l, the United States of America and the defendant, MICHAEL T. FLYNN, stipulate and agree that the following facts are true and accurate. These facts do not constitute all of the facts known to the parties concerning the charged offense; they are being submitted to demonstrate that sufficient facts exist that the defendant committed the offense to which he is pleading guilty.

    1. The defendant, MICHAEL T. FLYNN, who served as a surrogate and national security advisor for the presidential campaign of Donald J. Trump (“Campaign”), as a senior member of President—Elect Trump’s Transition Team (“Presidential Transition Team”), and as the National Security Advisor to President Trump, made materially false statements and omissions during an interview with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) on January 24, 2017, in Washington, DC. At the time of the interview, the FBI had an open investigation into the Government of Russia’s (“Russia") efforts to interfere in the 2016 presidential election, including the nature of any links between individuals associated with the Campaign and Russia, and whether there was any coordination between the Campaign and Russia’s efforts.

    2. FLYNN’s false statements and omissions impeded and otherwise had a material impact on the FBI’s ongoing investigation into the existence of any links or coordination between individuals associated with the Campaign and Russia’s efforts to interfere with the 2016 presidential election.

    False Statements Regarding FLYNN’S Request to the Russian Ambassador that Russia Refrain from Escalating the Situation in Response to US. Sanctions against Russia

    3. On or about January 24, 2017, FLYNN agreed to be interviewed by agents from the FBI (“January 24 voluntary interview”). During the interview, FLYNN falsely stated that he did not ask Russia’s Ambassador to the United States (“Russian Ambassador”) to refrain from escalating the situation in response to sanctions that the United States had imposed against Russia. FLYNN also falsely stated that he did not remember a follow—up conversation in which the Russian Ambassador stated that Russia had chosen to moderate its response to those sanctions as a result of FLYNN’s request. In truth and in fact, however, FLYNN then and there knew that the following had occurred:

    a. On or about December 28, 2016, then-President Barack Obama signed Executive Order 13757, which was to take effect the following day. The executive order announced sanctions against Russia in response to that government’s actions intended to interfere with the 2016 presidential election (“U.S. Sanctions”).

    b. On or about December 28, 2016, the Russian Ambassador contacted FLYNN.

    c. On or about December 29, 2016, FLYNN called a senior official of the Presidential Transition Team (“PTT officia1”), who was with other senior members of the Presidential Transition Team at the Mar-a-Lago resort in Palm Beach, Florida, to discuss what, if anything, to communicate to the Russian Ambassador about the US. Sanctions. On that call, FLYNN and the PTT official discussed the US. Sanctions, including the potential impact of those sanctions on the incoming administration’s foreign policy goals. The PTT official and FLYNN also discussed that the members of the Presidential Transition Team at Mar-a-Lago did not want Russia to escalate the situation.

    d. Immediately after his phone call with the PTI‘ official, FLYNN called the Russian Ambassador and requested that Russia not escalate the situation and only respond to the US. Sanctions in a reciprocal manner.

    e. Shortly after his phone call with the Russian Ambassador, F LYNN spoke with the PTT official to report on the substance of his call with the Russian Ambassador, including their discussion of the US. Sanctions.

    f. On or about December 30, 2016, Russian President Vladimir Putin released a statement indicating that Russia would not take retaliatory measures in response to the US. Sanctions at that time.

    g. On or about December 31, 2016, the Russian Ambassador called FLYNN and informed him that Russia had chosen not to retaliate in response to FLYNN’s request.

    h. After his phone call with the Russian Ambassador, FLYNN spoke with senior members of the Presidential Transition Team about FLYNN’s conversations with the Russian Ambassador regarding the US. Sanctions and Russia’s decision not to escalate the situation.

    False Statements Regarding FLYNN’s Request that Foreign Officials Vote Against or Delay a United Nations Security Council Resolution

    4. During the January 24 voluntary interview, FLYNN made additional false statements about calls he made to Russia and several other countries regarding a resolution submitted by Egypt to the United Nations Security Council on December 21, 2016. Specifically FLYNN falsely stated that he only asked the countries’ positions on the vote, and that he did not request that any of the countries take any particular action on the resolution. FLYNN also falsely stated that the Russian Ambassador never described to him Russia’s response to FLYNN’s request regarding the resolution. In truth and in fact, however, FLYNN then and there knew that the following had occurred:

    a. On or about December 21, 2016, Egypt submitted a resolution to the United Nations Security Council on the issue of Israeli settlements (“resolution”). The United Nations Security Council was scheduled to vote on the resolution the following day.

    b. On or about December 22, 2016, a very senior member of the Presidential Transition Team directed FLYNN to contact officials from foreign governments, including Russia, to learn where each government stood on the resolution and to influence these governments to delay the vote or defeat the resolution.

    c. On or about December 22, 2016, FLYNN contacted the Russian Ambassador about the pending vote. FLYNN informed the Russian Ambassador about the incoming administration’s opposition to the resolution, and requested that Russia vote against or delay the resolution.

    d. On or about December 23, 2016, FLYNN again spoke with the Russian Ambassador, who informed FLYNN that if it came to a vote Russia would not vote against the resolution.

    Other False Statements Regarding FLYNN'S' Contacts with Foreign Governments

    5. On March 7, 2017, FLYNN filed multiple documents with the Department of Justice pursuant to the Foreign Agents Registration Act (“PARA”) pertaining to a project performed by him and his company, the Flynn Intel Group, Inc. (“FIG” , for the principal benefit of the Republic of Turkey (“Turkey project ”). In the FARA filings, FLYNN made materially false statements and omissions, including by falsely stating that (a) FIG did not know whether or the extent to which the Republic of Turkey was involved in the Turkey project, (b) the Turkey project was focused on improving US. business organizations’ confidence regarding doing business in Turkey, and (c) an op-ed by FLYNN published in The Hill on November 8, 2016, was written at his own initiative; and by omitting that officials from the Republic of Turkey provided supervision and direction over the Turkey project.

    ROBERT S. MUELLER, III
    Special Counsel

    By:
    Brandon L. Van Grack
    Zainab N. Ahmad
    Senior Assistant Special Counsels
    The Special Counsel’s Office

    DEFENDANT’S ACCEPTANCE

    The preceding statement is a summary, made for the purpose of providing the Court with a factual basis for my guilty plea to the charge against me. It does not include all of the facts known to me regarding this offense. I make this statement knowingly and voluntarily and because I am, in fact, guilty of the crime charged. No threats have been made to me nor am I under the influence of anything that could impede my ability to understand this Statement of the Offense fully.

    I have read every word of this Statement of the Offense, or have had it read to me. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, after consulting with my attorneys, I agree and stipulate to this Statement of the Offense, and declare under penalty of perjury that it is true and correct.

    Michael T. Flynn
    Defendant

    11/30/17

    ATTORNEYS’ ACKNOWLEDGMENT

    I have read this Statement of the Offense, and have reviewed it with my client fully. I concur in my client’s desire to adopt and stipulate to this Statement of the Offense as true and accurate.

    Robert K. Kelner
    Attorney for Defendant

    Stephen P. Anthony
    Attorney for Defendant

    11/30/17

    U.S. v. George Papadopoulos

    Criminal information in the case against George Papadopoulos

    The Special Counsel informs the Court:

    COUNT ONE
    (False Statements)

    On or about the 27th day of January, 2017, defendant GEORGE PAPADOPOULOS did willfully and knowingly make a materially false, fictitious, and fraudulent statement and representation in a matter within the jurisdiction of the executive branch of the Government of the United States, to wit, defendant PAPADOPOULOS lied to special agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, concerning a federal investigation based out of the District of Columbia, about the timing, extent, and nature of his relationships and interactions with certain foreign nationals whom he understood to have close connections with senior Russian government officials.

    (Title 18, United States Code, Section 1001(a)(2).)

    ROBERT S. MUELLER, III
    Special Counsel

    By:
    Jeannie S. Rhee
    Andrew D. Goldstein
    Aaron SJ. Zelinsky
    The Special Counsel's Office

    George Papadopoulos Plea Agreement

    October 5, 2017 FILED
    Clerk. U.S. District and Bankruptcy Courts

    Thomas M. Breen, Esq.
    Robert W. Stanley, Esq.
    Breen & Pugh
    Monadnock Building
    53 West Jackson Boulevard Suite 1215
    Chicago, Illinois 60604

    Re: United States v. George Papadopoulos
    Criminal Case No. 17 Cr. 182 (RDM) SEALED

    Dear Mr. Breen:

    This letter sets forth the full and complete plea offer to your client, George Papadopoulos (hereinafter referred to as “your client” or “defendant”), from the Special Counsel's Office (hereinafter also referred to as “the Government” or “this Office”). This plea offer expires on October 5, 2017 at 2:00 pm. If your client accepts the terms and conditions of this offer, please have your client execute this document in the space provided below. Upon receipt of the executed document, this letter will become the Plea Agreement (hereinafter referred to as “this Agreement”). The terms of the offer are as follows:

    1. Charges and Statutory Penalties

    Your client agrees to plead guilty to the Criminal Information, a copy of which is attached, charging your client with making false statements to the Federal Bureau of Investigation in violation of18 U.S.C. § 1001.

    Your client understands that a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 100] carries a maximum sentence of 5 years’ imprisonment; a fine of $250,000, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 357l(b)(3); a term of supervised release of not more than 3 years, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b)(2); and an obligation to pay any applicable interest or penalties on fines and restitution not timely made.

    In addition, your client agrees to pay a special assessment of $100 per felony conviction to the Clerk of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Your client also understands that, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3572 and § SE] .2 of the United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual (2016) (hereinafter “Sentencing Guidelines,” “Guidelines,” or “U.S.S.G.”), the Court may also impose a fine that is sufficient to pay the federal government the costs of any imprisonment, term of supervised release, and period of probation.

    2. Factual Stipulations

    Your client agrees that the attached “Statement of the Offense” fairly and accurately describes your client’s actions and involvement in the offense to which your client is pleading guilty. Please have your client sign and return the Statement of the Offense as a written proffer of evidence, along with this Agreement.

    3. Additional Charges

    In consideration of your client’s guilty plea to the above offense, your client will not be further prosecuted criminally by this Office for the conduct set forth in the attached Statement of the Offense.

    4. Sentencing Guidelines Analysis

    Your client understands that the sentence in this case will be determined by the Court, pursuant to the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(3), including a consideration of the applicable guidelines and policies set forth in the Sentencing Guidelines. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(l)(B), and to assist the Court in determining the appropriate sentence, the parties agree to the following:

    A. Estimated Offense Level Under the Guidelines

    The parties agree that the following Sentencing Guidelines sections apply:

    U.S.S.G. §281.1(a)(2)Base Offense Level: 6
    Total: 6
    B. Acceptance of Responsibility

    The Government agrees that a 2-level reduction will be appropriate, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, provided that your client clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility, to the satisfaction of the Government, through your client’s allocution, adherence to every provision of this Agreement, and conduct between entry of the plea and imposition of sentence.

    Nothing in this Agreement limits the right of the Government to seek denial of the adjustment for acceptance of responsibility, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3131.1, and/or imposition of an adjustment for obstruction of justice, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3C 1 .1, regardless of any agreement set forth above, should your client move to withdraw your client’s guilty plea after it is entered, or should it be determined by the Government that your client has either (a) engaged in conduct, unknown to the Government at the time of the signing of this Agreement, that constitutes obstruction of justice, or (b) engaged in additional criminal conduct after signing this Agreement.

    In accordance with the above, the applicable Guidelines Offense Level will be at least 4.

    C. Estimated Criminal History Category

    Based upon the information now available to this Office, your client has no criminal convictions.

    Accordingly, your client is estimated to have zero criminal history points and your client’s Criminal History Category is estimated to be 1. Your client acknowledges that if additional convictions are discovered during the pre-sentence investigation by the United States Probation Office, your client’s criminal history points may increase.

    D. Estimated Applicable Guidelines Range

    Based upon the agreed total offense level and the estimated criminal history category set forth above, your client’s estimated Sentencing Guidelines range is zero months to six months’ imprisonment (the “Estimated Guidelines Range”). In addition, the parties agree that, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2, should the Court impose a fine, at Guidelines level 4, the estimated applicable fine range is $500 to $9,500. Your client reserves the right to ask the Court not to impose any applicable fine.

    The parties agree that, solely for the purposes of calculating the applicable range under the Sentencing Guidelines, neither a downward nor upward departure from the Estimated Guidelines Range set forth above is warranted. Accordingly, neither party will seek any departure or adjustment to the Estimated Guidelines Range, nor will either party suggest that the Court consider such a departure or adjustment, except as provided above, Moreover, your client understands and acknowledges that the Estimated Guidelines Range agreed to by the parties is not binding on the Probation Office or the Court Should the Court determine that a different guidelines range is applicable, your client will not be permitted to withdraw your client’s guilty plea on that basis, and the Government and your client will still be bound by this Agreement.

    Your client understands and acknowledges that the terms of this section apply only to conduct that occurred before the execution of this Agreement. Should your client commit any conduct after the execution of this Agreement that would form the basis for an increase in your client’s base offense level or justify an upward departure (examples of which include, but are not limited to, obstruction of justice, failure to appear for a court proceeding, criminal conduct while pending sentencing, and false statements to law enforcement agents, the probation officer, or the Court), the Government is free under this Agreement to seek an increase in the base offense level based on that post-agreement conduct.

    5. Agreement as to Sentencing Allocation

    The parties further agree that a sentence within the Estimated Guidelines Range would constitute a reasonable sentence in light of all of the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), should such a sentence be subject to appellate review notwithstanding the appeal waiver provided below. Nevertheless, your client reserves the right to seek a sentence below the Estimated Guidelines Range based upon factors to be considered in imposing a sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and the Government reserves the right to seek a sentence above the Estimated Guidelines Range based on § 3553(a) factors.

    6. Reservation of Allocation

    The Government and your client reserve the right to describe fully, both orally and in writing, to the sentencing judge, the nature and seriousness of your client’s misconduct, including any misconduct not described in the charges to which your client is pleading guilty.

    The Government agrees to bring to the Court’s attention at sentencing the defendant's efforts to cooperate with the Government, on the condition that your client continues to respond and provide information regarding any and all matters as to which the Government deems relevant. Your client also agrees that the sentencing in this case may be delayed until your client’s efforts to cooperate have been completed, as determined by the Government, so that the Court will have the benefit of all relevant information before a sentence is imposed.

    The parties also reserve the right to inform the presentence report writer and the Court of any relevant facts, to dispute any factual inaccuracies in the presentence report, and to contest any matters not provided for in this Agreement. In the event that the Court considers any Sentencing Guidelines adjustments, departures, or calculations different from any agreements contained in this Agreement, or contemplates a sentence outside the Guidelines range based upon the general sentencing factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the parties reserve the right to answer any related inquiries from the Court. In addition, if in this Agreement the parties have agreed to recommend or refrain from recommending to the Court a particular resolution of any sentencing issue, the parties reserve the right to full allocution in any post—sentence litigation. The parties retain the full right of allocution in connection with any post-sentence motion which may be filed in this matter and/or any proceeding(s) before the Bureau of Prisons. In addition, your client acknowledges that the Government is not obligated and does not intend to file any post-sentence downward departure motion in this case pursuant to Rule 35(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.

    7. Court Not Bound by this Agreement or the Sentencing Guidelines

    Your client understands that the sentence in this case will be imposed in accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), upon consideration of the Sentencing Guidelines. Your client further understands that the sentence to be imposed is a matter solely within the discretion of the Court. Your client acknowledges that the Court is not obligated to follow any recommendation of the Government at the time of sentencing. Your client understands that neither the Government’s recommendation nor the Sentencing Guidelines are binding on the Court.

    Your client acknowledges that your client’s entry of a guilty plea to the charged offense authorizes the Court to impose any sentence, up to and including the statutory maximum sentence, which may be greater than the applicable Guidelines range. The Government cannot, and does not, make any promise or representation as to what sentence your client will receive. Moreover, it is understood that your client will have no right to withdraw your client’s plea of guilty should the Court impose a sentence that is outside the Guidelines range or if the Court does not follow the Government’s sentencing recommendation. The Government and your client will be bound by this Agreement, regardless of the sentence imposed by the Court. Arty effort by your client to withdraw the guilty plea because of the length of the sentence shall constitute a breach of this Agreement.

    8. Conditions of Release

    Your client acknowledges that, although the Government will not seek a change in your client’s release conditions pending sentencing, the final decision regarding your client’s bond status or detention will be made by the Court at the time of your client’s plea of guilty. The Government may move to change your client‘s conditions of release, including requesting that your client be detained pending sentencing, if your client engages in further criminal conduct prior to sentencing or if the Government obtains information that it did not possess at the time of your client’s plea of guilty and that is relevant to whether your client is likely to flee or pose a danger to any person or the community. Your client also agrees that any violation of your client’s release conditions or any misconduct by your client may result in the Government filing an ex parte motion with the Court requesting that a bench warrant be issued for your client’s arrest and that your client be detained without bond while pending sentencing in your client’s case.

    9. Waivers

    A. Venue

    Your client waives any challenge to venue in the District of Columbia.

    B. Statute of Limitations

    Your client agrees that, should the conviction following your client‘s plea of guilty pursuant to this Agreement be vacated for any reason, any prosecution, based on the conduct set forth in the attached Statement of the Offense, that is not time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations on the date of the signing of this Agreement (including any counts that the Government has agreed not to prosecute or to dismiss at sentencing pursuant to this Agreement) may be commenced or reinstated against your client, notwithstanding the expiration of the statute of limitations between the signing of this Agreement and the commencement or reinstatement of such prosecution. It is the intent of this Agreement to waive all defenses based on the statute of limitations with respect to any prosecution of conduct set forth in the attached Statement of the Offense that is not time-barred on the date that this Agreement is signed.

    C. Trial Rights

    Your client understands that by pleading guilty in this case your client agrees to waive certain rights afforded by the Constitution of the United States and/or by statute or rule. Your client agrees to forego the right to any further discovery or disclosures of information not already provided at the time of the entry of your client’s guilty plea. Your client also agrees to waive, among other rights, the right to be indicted by a Grand Jury, the right to plead not guilty, and the right to a jury trial. If there were a jury trial, your client would have the right to be represented by counsel, to confront and cross—examine witnesses against your client, to challenge the admissibility of evidence offered against your client, to compel witnesses to appear for the purpose of testifying and presenting other evidence on your client’s behalf, and to choose whether to testify. If there were a jury trial and your client chose not to testify at that trial, your client would have the right to have the jury instructed that your client’s failure to testify could not be held against your client. Your client would further have the right to have the jury instructed that your client is presumed innocent until proven guilty, and that the burden would be on the United States to prove your client’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. If your client were found guilty after a trial, your client would have the right to appeal your client’s conviction. Your client understands that the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States protects your client from the use of self-incriminating statements in a criminal prosecution. By entering a plea of guilty, your client knowingly and voluntarily waives or gives up your client’s right against self—incrimination.

    Your client acknowledges discussing with you Rule 11(f) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and Rule 410 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which ordinarily limit the admissibility of statements made by a defendant in the course of plea discussions or plea proceedings if a guilty plea is later withdrawn. Your client knowing and voluntarily waives the rights that arise under these rules in the event your client withdraws your client’s guilty plea or withdraws from this Agreement after signing it.

    Your client also agrees to waive all constitutional and statutory rights to a speedy sentence and agrees that the plea of guilty pursuant to this Agreement will be entered at a time decided upon by the parties with the concurrence of the Court. Your client understands that the date for sentencing will be set by the Court.

    D. Appeal Rights

    Your client understands that federal law, specifically 18 U.S.C. § 3742, affords defendants the right to appeal their sentences in certain circumstances. Your client agrees to waive the right to appeal the sentence in this case, including but not limited to any term of imprisonment, fine, forfeiture, award of restitution, term or condition of supervised release, authority of the Court to set conditions of release, and the manner in which the sentence was determined, except to the extent the Court sentences your client above the statutory maximum or guidelines range determined by the Court or your client claims that your client received ineffective assistance of counsel, in which case your client would have the right to appeal the illegal sentence or above-guidelines sentence or raise on appeal a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, but not to raise on appeal other issues regarding the sentencing. In agreeing to this waiver, your client is aware that your client's sentence has yet to be determined by the Court. Realizing the uncertainty in estimating what sentence the Court ultimately will impose, your client knowingly and willingly waives your client’s right to appeal the sentence, to the extent noted above, in exchange for the concessions made by the Government in this Agreement.

    E. Collateral Attack

    Your client also waives any right to challenge the conviction entered or sentence imposed under this Agreement or otherwise attempt to modify or change the sentence or the manner in which it was determined in any collateral attack, including, but not limited to, a motion brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 or Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), except to the extent such a motion is based on newly discovered evidence or on a claim that your client received ineffective assistance of counsel. Your client reserves the right to file a motion brought under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), but agrees to waive the right to appeal the denial of such a motion.

    F. Privacy Act and FOIA Rights

    Your client also agrees to waive all rights, whether asserted directly or by a representative, to request or receive from any department or agency of the United States any records pertaining to the investigation or prosecution of this case, including and without limitation any records that may be sought under the Freedom of Information Act. 5 U.S.C. § 552, or the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552, for the duration of the Special Council’s Investigation.

    11. Restitution

    Your client understands that the Court has an obligation to determine whether, and in what amount, mandatory restitution applies in this case under 18 U.S.C. § 3663A. The Government and your client agree that mandatory restitution does not apply in this case.

    12. Breach of Agreement

    Your client understands and agrees that, if after entering this Agreement, your client fails specifically to perform or to fulfill completely each and every one of your client’s obligations under this Agreement, or engages in any criminal activity prior to sentencing, your client will have breached this Agreement. In the event of such a breach: (a) the Government will be free from its obligations under this Agreement; (b) your client will not have the right to withdraw the guilty plea; (0) your client will be fully subject to criminal prosecution for any other crimes, including perjury and obstruction of justice; and (d) the Government will be free to use against your client, directly and indirectly, in any criminal or civil proceeding, all statements made by your client and any of the information or materials provided by your client, including such statements, information and materials provided pursuant to this Agreement or during the course of any debriefings conducted in anticipation of, or after entry of, this Agreement, whether or not the debriefings were previously characterized as “off—the—record” debriefings, and including your client’s statements made during proceedings before the Court pursuant to Rule 1 l of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.

    Your client understands and agrees that the Government shall be required to prove a breach of this Agreement only by a preponderance of the evidence, except where such breach is based on a violation of federal, state, or local criminal law, which the Government need prove only by probable cause in order to establish a breach of this Agreement.

    Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to permit your client to commit perjury, to make false statements or declarations, to obstruct justice, or to protect your client from prosecution for any crimes not included within this Agreement or committed by your client after the execution of this Agreement. Your client understands and agrees that the Government reserves the right to prosecute your client for any such offenses. Your client further understands that any perjury, false statements or declarations, or obstruction of justice relating to your client’s obligations under this Agreement shall constitute a breach of this Agreement. In the event of such a breach, your client will not be allowed to withdraw your client’s guilty plea.

    13. Complete Agreement

    No agreements, promises, understandings, or representations have been made by the patties or their counsel other than those contained in writing herein, nor will any such agreements, promises, understandings, or representations be made unless committed to writing and signed by your client, defense counsel, and the Special Counsel’s Office.

    Your client further understands that this Agreement is binding only upon the Special Counsel’s Office. This Agreement does not bind any other United States Attorney's Office, nor does it bind any other state, local, or federal prosecutor. It also does not bar or compromise any civil, tax, or administrative claim pending or that may be made against your client.

    If the foregoing terms and conditions are satisfactory, your client may so indicate by signing this Agreement and the Statement of the Offense, and returning both to me no later than October 5,2017 at 2:00 pm.

    Sincerely yours,

    Robert S. Mueller, III
    Special Counsel

    By:
    Jeanie S, Rhee
    Andrew D. Goldstein
    Aaron SJ. Zelinsky
    The Special Counsel’s Office

    DEFENDANT’S ACCEPTANCE

    I have read every page of this Agreement and have discussed it with my attorneys, Thomas M. Breen and Robert W. Stanley. I fully understand this Agreement and agree to it without reservation. I do this voluntarily and of my own free will, intending to be legally bound. No threats have been made to me nor am I under the influence of anything that could impede my ability to understand this Agreement fully. I am pleading guilty because I am in fact guilty of the offense identified in this Agreement.

    I reaffirm that absolutely no promises, agreements, understandings, or conditions have been made or entered into in connection with my decision to plead guilty except those set forth in this Agreement. I am satisfied with the legal services provided by my attorney in connection with this Agreement and matters related to it.

    George Papadopoulos
    Defendant
    10/5/18

    ATTORNEY’S ACKNOWLEDGMENT

    I have read every page of this Agreement, reviewed this Agreement with my client, George Papadopoulos, and fully discussed the provisions of this Agreement with my client. These pages accurately and completely set forth the entire Agreement. I concur in my client’s desire to plead guilty as set forth in this Agreement.

    Thomas M. Breen
    Robert W. Stanley
    Attorneys for Defendant
    10/5/17

    Statement of the Offense against George Papadopolulos

    Pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, the United States of America and the defendant, GEORGE PAPADOPOULOS, stipulate and agree that the following facts are true and accurate. These facts do not constitute all ofthe facts known to the parties concerning the charged offense; they are being submitted to demonstrate that sufficient facts exist that the defendant committed the offense to which he is pleading guilty.

    Overview

    1. The defendant, GEORGE PAPADOPOULOS, who served as a foreign policy advisor for the presidential campaign of Donald J. Trump (the "Campaign"), made material false statements and material omissions during an interview with the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI'.) that took place on January 27, 2017. At the time ofthe interview, the FBI had an open investigation into the Russian government's efforts to interfere in the 2016 presidential election, including the nature of any links between individuals associated with the Campaign and the Russian government, and whether there was any coordination between the Campaign and Russia's efforts. The FBI opened and coordinated the investigation in Washington, D.C.

    2. Defendant PAPADOPOULOS made the following material false statements and material omissions to the FBI:

    a. Defendant PAPADOPOULOS claimed that his interactions with an overseas professor, who defendant PAPADOPOULOS understood to have substantial connections to Russian government officials, occurred before defendant PAPADOPOULOS became a foreign policy adviser to the Campaign. Defendant PAPADOPOULOS acknowledged that the professor had told him about the Russians possessing "dirt" on then-candidate Hillary Clinton in the form of"thousands of emails," but stated multiple times that he learned that information prior to joining the Campaign. In truth and in fact, however, defendant PAPADOPOULOS learned he would be an advisor to the Campaign in early March, and met the professor on or about March 14, 2016; the professor only took interest in defendant PAPADOPOULOS because of his status with the Campaign; and the professor told defendant PAPADOPOULOS about the "thousands of emails" on or about April 26, 2016, when defendant PAPADOPOULOS had been a foreign policy adviser to the Campaign for over a month.

    b. Defendant PAPADOPOULOS further told the investigating agents that the professor was "a nothing" and "just a guy talk[ing] up connections or something." In truth and in fact, however, defendant PAPADOPOULOS understood that the professor had substantial connections to Russian government officials (and had met with some ofthose officials in Moscow immediately prior to telling defendant PAPADOPOULOS about the "thousands of emails") and, over a period of months, defendant PAPADOPOULOS repeatedly sought to use the professor's Russian connections in an effort to arrange a meeting between the Campaign and Russian government officials.

    c. Defendant PAPADOPOULOS claimed he met a certain female Russian national before he joined the Campaign and that their communications consisted of emails such as, '"Hi , how are you?"' In truth and in fact, however, defendant PAPADOPOULOS met the female Russian national on or about March 24, 2016, after he had become an adviser to the Campaign; he believed that she had connections to Russian government officials; and he sought to use her Russian connections over a period ofmonths in an effort to arrange a meeting between the Campaign and Russian government officials.

    3. Through his false statements and omissions, defendant PAPADOPOULOS impeded the FBI 's ongoing investigation into the existence of any links or coordination between individuals associated with the Campaign and the Russian government' s efforts to interfere with the 2016 presidential election.

    II. Timeline of Selected Events

    PAPADOPOULOS's Role on the Campaign

    4. In early March 2016, defendant PAPADOPOULOS learned he would be a foreign policy advisor for the Campaign. Defendant PAPADOPOULOS was living in London, England, at the time. Based on a conversation that took place on or about March 6, 2016, with a supervisory campaign official (the "Campaign Supervisor"), defendant PAPADOPOULOS understood that a principal foreign policy focus of the Campaign was an improved U.S. relationship with Russia.

    PAPADOPOULOS's Introduction to the Professor and the Female Russian National

    5. On or about March 14, 2016, while traveling in Italy, defendant PAPADOPOULOS met an individual who was a professor based in London (the "Professor"). Initially, the Professor seemed uninterested in defendant PAPADOPOULOS. However, after defendant PAPADOPOULOS infonned the Professor about his joining the Campaign, the Professor appeared to take great interest in defendant PAPADOPOULOS. Defendant PAPADOPOULOS was interested in the Professor because, among other reasons, the Professor claimed to have substantial connections with Russian government officials, which defendant PAPADOPOULOS thought could increase his importance as a policy advisor to the Campaign.

    6. On or about March 21, 2016, the Campaign told The Washington Post that defendant PAPADOPOULOS was one of five named foreign policy advisors for the Campaign.

    7. On or about March 24, 2016, defendant PAPADOPOULOS met with the Professor in London. The Professor brought with him a female Russian national (the "Female Russian National"), introduced to defendant PAPADOPOULOS as a relative of Russian President Vladimir Putin with connections to senior Russian government officials. PAPADOPOULOS Pursues His Contacts with the Professor and the Female Russian National

    8. Following his March 24, 2016 meeting with the Professor and the Female Russian National, defendant PAPADOPOULOS emailed the Campaign Supervisor and several members of the Campaign's foreign policy team and stated that he had just met with his "good friend" the Professor, who had introduced him to the Female Russian National (described by defendant PAPADOPOULOS in the email as "Putin's niece") and the Russian Ambassador in London.[1] Defendant PAPADOPOULOS stated that the topic oftheir discussion was "to arrange a meeting between us and the Russian leadership to discuss U.S.-Russia ties under President Trump." The Campaign Supervisor responded that he would "work it through the campaign," but that no commitments should be made at that point. The Campaign Supervisor added: "Great work."

    9. On or about March 31, 2016, defendant PAPADOPOULOS attended a "national security meeting" in Washington, D.C., with then-candidate Trump and other foreign policy advisors for the Campaign. When defendant PAPADOPOULOS introduced himself to the group, he stated, in sum and substance, that he had connections that could help arrange a meeting between then-candidate Trump and President Putin.

    10. After his trip to Washington, D.C., defendant PAPADOPOULOS worked with the Professor and the Female Russian National to arrange a meeting between the Campaign and the Russian government, and took steps to advise the Campaign of his progress.

    a. In early April 2016, defendant PAPADOPOULOS sent multiple emails to other members ofthe Campaign's foreign policy team regarding his contacts with "the Russians" and his "outreach to Russia."

    b. On or about April 10, 2016, defendant PAPADOPOULOS emailed the Female Russian National, who responded the next day, on or about April 11, 2016, that she "would be very pleased to support your initiatives between our two countries." Defendant PAPADOPOULOS then asked the Female Russian National, in an email cc'ing the Professor, about setting up "a potential foreign policy trip to Russia."

    c. The Professor responded to defendant PAPADOPOULOS's email later that day, on or about April 11 , 2016: "This is already been agreed. I am flying to Moscow on the 18th for a Valdai meeting, plus other meetings at the Duma." The Duma is a Russian government legislative assembly.

    d. The Female Russian National responded: " I have already alerted my personal links to our conversation and your request. ... As mentioned we are all very excited by the possibility of a good relationship with Mr. Trump. The Russian Federation would love to welcome him once his candidature would be officially announced."

    The Professor Introduces PAPADOPOULOS to a Russian National Connected to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

    11. On or about Apri I 18, 2016, the Professor introduced defendant PAPADOPOULOS over email to an individual in Moscow (the " Russian MFA Connection") who told defendant PAPADOPOULOS he had connections to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs ("MFA"). The MFA is the executive entity in Russia responsible for Russian foreign relations. Over the next several weeks, defendant PAPADOPOULOS and the Russian MFA Connection had multiple conversations over Skype and email about setting "the groundwork" for a "potential" meeting between the Campaign and Russian government officials.

    12. On or about April 22, 2016, the Russian MF A Connection sent defendant PAPADOPOULOS an email thanking him "for an extensive talk" and proposing "to meet in London or in Moscow." Defendant PAPADOPOULOS replied by suggesting that "we set one up here in London with the Ambassador as well to discuss a process moving forward."

    13. On or about April 25, 2016, defendant PAPADOPOULOS emailed a senior policy advisor for the Campaign (the "Senior Policy Advisor"): "The Russian government has an open invitation by Putin for Mr. Trump to meet him when he is ready []. The advantage of being in London is that these governments tend to speak a bit more openly in 'neutral' cities." PAPADOPOULOS Learns that the Russians Have "Dirt " on Clinton

    14. On or about April 26, 2016, defendant PAPADOPOULOS met the Professor for breakfast at a London hotel. During this meeting, the Professor told defendant PAPADOPOULOS that he had just returned from a trip to Moscow where he had met with highlevel Russian government officials. The Professor told defendant PAPADOPOULOS that on that trip he (the Professor) learned that the Russians had obtained "dirt" on then-candidate Clinton. The Professor told defendant PAPADOPOULOS, as defendant PAPADOPOULOS later described to the FBI, that "They [the Russians] have dirt on her"; "the Russians had emails of Clinton"; "they have thousands of emails."

    15. Following that conversation, defendant PAPADOPOULOS continued to correspond with Campaign officials, and continued to communicate with the Professor and the Russian MFA Connection, in an effort to arrange a meeting between the Campaign and the Russian government.

    a. For example, the day after his meeting at the hotel with the Professor, on or about April 27, 2016, defendant PAPADOPOULOS emailed the Senior Policy Advisor: "Have some interesting messages coming in from Moscow about a trip when the time is right."

    b. Also on or about April 27, 2016, defendant PAPADOPOULOS emailed a high-ranking official of the Campaign (the "High-Ranking Campaign Official") "to discuss Russia's interest in hosting Mr. Trump. Have been receiving a lot of calls over the last month about Putin wanting to host him and the team when the time is right."

    c. On or about April 30, 2016, defendant PAPADOPOULOS thanked the Professor for his "critical help" in arranging a meeting between the Campaign and the Russian government, and remarked: " It's history making if it happens." PAPADOPOULOS Shares Information.from the Russian MFA Connection

    16. On or about May 4, 2016, the Russian MFA Connection sent an email (the "May 4 MF A Email") to defendant PAPADOPOULOS and the Professor that stated: " I have just talked to my colleagues from the MFA. The[y] are open for cooperation. One ofthe options is to make a meeting for you at the North America Desk, if you are in Moscow." Defendant PAPADOPOULOS responded that he was "[g]lad the MF A is interested." Defendant PAPADOPOULOS forwarded the May 4 MFA Email to the High-Ranking Campaign Official, adding: "What do you think? Is this something we want to move forward with?" The next day, on or about May 5, 2016, defendant PAPADOPOULOS had a phone call with the Campaign Supervisor, and then forwarded the May 4 MF A Email to him, adding to the top ofthe email: "Russia updates."

    17. On or about May 13, 2016, the Professor emailed defendant PAPADOPOULOS with "an update" of what they had discussed in their "recent conversations," including: "We will continue to liaise through you with the Russian counterparts in terms of what is needed for a high level meeting of Mr. Trump with the Russian Federation."

    18. The next day, on or about May 14, 2016, defendant PAPADOPOULOS emailed the High-Ranking Campaign Official and stated that the "Russian government[] ha[s] also relayed to me that they are interested in hosting Mr. Trump."

    19. On or about May 21, 2016, defendant PAPADOPOULOS emailed another highranking Campaign official, with the subject line "Request from Russia to meet Mr. Trump." The email included the May 4 MFA Email and added: "Russia has been eager to meet Mr. Trump for quite sometime and have been reaching out to me to discuss."[2]

    20. On or about June 1, 2016, defendant PAPADOPOULOS emailed the High-Ranking Campaign Official and asked about Russia. The High-Ranking Campaign Official referred him to the Campaign Supervisor because "[h]e is running point." Defendant PAPADOPOULOS then emailed the Campaign Supervisor, with the subject line "Re: Messages from Russia": "I have the Russian MF A asking me if Mr. Trump is interested in visiting Russia at some point. Wanted to pass this info along to you for you to decide what's best to do with it and what message I should send (or to ignore)."

    21. From mid-June through mid-August 2016, PAPADOPOULOS pursued an "off the record" meeting between one or more Carnpaign representatives and "members of president putin's office and the mfa."

    a. For example, on or about June 19, 2016, after several email and Skype exchanges with the Russian MFA Connection, defendant PAPADOPOULOS emailed the High-Ranking Campaign Official, with the subject line "New message from Russia": "The Russian ministry of foreign affairs messaged and said that if Mr. Trump is unable to make it to Russia, if a campaign rep (me or someone else) can make it for meetings? I am willing to make the trip off the record if it's in the interest ofMr. Trump and the campaign to meet specific people."

    b. After several weeks of further communications regarding a potential "off the record" meeting with Russian officials, on or about August 15, 2016, the Campaign Supervisor told defendant PAPADOPOULOS that "I would encourage you" and another foreign policy advisor to the Campaign to "make the trip[], if it is feasible."

    c. The trip proposed by defendant PAPADOPOULOS did not take place.

    III. The Defendant's False Statements to the FBI

    22. On or about January 27, 2017, defendant PAPADOPOULOS agreed to be interviewed by agents from the FBI.

    23. The agents informed defendant PAPADOPOULOS that the FBI was investigating interference by the Russian government in the 2016 presidential election and whether any individuals related to the Campaign were involved. The agents further informed defendant PAPADOPOULOS that he needed to be truthful and warned that he could get " in trouble" if he lied. The agents also advised him that lying to them "is a federal offense." They confirmed that the interview was "completely voluntary."

    24. During the course of the interview, defendant PAPADOPOULOS made numerous false statements and omitted material facts regarding the conduct and communications described above, and, in particular, lied about the extent, timing, and nature of his communications with the Professor, the Female Russian National, and the Russian MF A Connection.

    False Statement: PAPADOPOULOS Met the Professor and Learned About Russian "Dirt " Before He Joined Lhe Campaign

    25. During his interview with the FBI, defendant PAPADOPOULOS acknowledged that he met the Professor and that the Professor told him the Russians had "dirt" on thencandidate Clinton in the form of "thousands of emails," but defendant PAP ADO POULOS stated multiple times that those communications occurred prior to when he joined the Campaign. Defendant PAPADOPOULOS told the FBI: "This isn't like he [the Professor]'s messaging me while I'm in April with Trump"; " I wasn't even on the Trump team, that wasn't even on the radar"; " I wasn't even on Trump's orbit[] at this time"; and "This was a year ago, this was before I even got with Trump." He also said it was a "very strange coincidence'' to be told of the "dirt" before he started working for the Campaign.

    26. In truth and in fact, however, and as set forth above, defendant PAPADOPOULOS met the Professor for the first time on or about March 14, 2016, after defendant PAPADOPOULOS had already learned he would be a foreign policy advisor for the Campaign; the Professor showed interest in defendant PAPADOPOULOS only after learning of his role on the Campaign; and the Professor told defendant PAPADOPOULOS about the Russians possessing "dirt" on then-candidate Clinton in late April 2016, more than a month after defendant PAPADOPOULOS had joined the Campaign.

    False Statement: PAPADOPOULOS's Contacts with the Professor Were Inconsequential

    27. During his interview with the FBI, defendant PAPADOPOULOS also made false statements in an effort to minimize the extent and importance of his communications with the Professor. For example, defendant PAPADOPOULOS stated that "[the Professor]'s a nothing," that he thought the Professor was "just a guy talk[ing] up connections or something," and that he believed the Professor was "BS'ing to be completely honest with you."

    28. In truth and in fact, however, defendant PAPADOPOULOS understood the Professor to have substantial connections to high-level Russian government officials and that the Professor spoke with some ofthose officials in Moscow before telling defendant PAPADOPOULOS about the "dirt." Defendant PAPADOPOULOS also engaged in extensive communications over a period of months with the Professor regarding foreign policy issues for the Campaign, including efforts to arrange a "history making" meeting between the Campaign and Russian government officials.

    29. In addition, defendant PAPADOPOULOS failed to inform investigators that the Professor had introduced him to the Russian MF A Connection, despite being asked if he had met with Russian nationals or "[a]nyone with a Russian accent" during the Campaign. Indeed, while defendant PAPADOPOULOS told the FBI that he was involved in meetings and did " shuttle diplomacy" with officials from several other countries during the Campaign, he omitted the entire course ofconduct with the Professor and the Russian MF A Connection regarding his efforts to establish meetings between the Campaign and Russian government officials.

    False Statement: PAPADOPOULOS Met the Female Russian National Before He Joined the Campaign, and His Contacts with Her Were Inconsequential

    30. During his interview with the FBI, defendant PAPADOPOULOS also falsely claimed that he met the Female Russian National before he joined the Campaign, and falsely told the FBI that he had "no" relationship at a ll with the Female Russian National. He stated that the extent of their communications was her sending emails- "Just, 'Hi, how are you?'" "That's it."

    31. In truth and in fact, however, defendant ]:>APADOPOULOS met the Female Russian National on or about March 24, 2016, after he had joined the Campaign; he believed that the Female Russian National had connections to high-level Russian government officials and could help him arrange a potential foreign policy trip to Russia; and during the Campaign he emailed and spoke over Skype on numerous occasions with the Female Russian National about the potential foreign policy trip to Russia.

    IV. Events Following PAPADOPOULOS's January 27, 2017 Interview with the FBI

    32. The FBI interviewed defendant PAPADOPOULOS again on February 16, 2017. His counsel was present for the interview. During the interview, defendant PAPADOPOULOS reiterated his purported willingness to cooperate with the FBl's investigation.

    33. The next day, on or about February 17, 2017, defendant PAPADOPOULOS deactivated his Facebook account, which he had maintained since approximately August 2005 and which contained information about communications he had with the Professor and the Russian MFA Connection. Shortly after he deactivated his account, PAPADOPOULOS created a new Facebook account that did not contain the communications with the Professor and the Russian MFA Connection.

    34. On or about February 23, 20 17, defendant PAPADOPOULOS ceased using his cell phone number and began using a new number.

    35. On July 27, 2017, defendant PAPADOPOULOS was arrested upon his arrival at Dulles International Airport. Following his arrest, defendant PAPADOPOULOS met with the Government on numerous occasions to provide information and answer questions.

    [1] Defendant PAPADOPOULOS later learned that the Female Russian National was not in fact a relative of President Putin. In addition, while defendant PAPADOPOULOS expected that the Professor and the Female Russian National would introduce him to the Russian Ambassador in London, they never did.

    [2] The government notes that the official forwarded defendant PAPADOPOULOS's email to another Campaign official (without including defendant PAPADOPOULOS) and stated: "Let[']s discuss. We need someone to communicate that OT is not doing these trips. It should be someone low level in the campaign so as not to send any signal."

    ROBERT S. MUELLER, III
    Special Counsel

    By:
    Jeannie S. Rhee
    Andrew D. Goldstein
    Aaron S.J. Zelinsky
    The Special Counsel's Office

    DEFENDANT'S ACCEPTANCE

    The preceding statement is a summary, made for the purpose of providing the Court with a factual basis for my guilty plea to the charge against me. It does not include all ofthe facts known to me regarding this offense. I make this statement knowingly and voluntarily and because I am, in fact, guilty ofthe crime charged. No threats have been made to me nor am I under the influence of anything that could impede my ability to understand this Statement ofthe Offense fully.

    I have read every word ofthis Statement of the Offense, or have had it read to me. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 , after consulting with my attorney, I agree and stipulate to this Statement ofthe Offense, and declare under penalty of perjury that it is true and correct.

    George Papadopoulos
    Defendant

    10/5/17

    ATTORNEY'S ACKNOWLEDGMENT

    I have read this Statement ofthe Offense, and have reviewed it with my client fully. I concur in my client's desire to adopt and stipulate to this Statement of the Offense as true and accurate.

    Thomas M. Breen
    Robert W. Stanley
    Attorneys for Defendant
    10/5/17